by Mark Stille
Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo was a 1910 graduate of Eta Jima. He spent his entire career in surface ships until being promoted to flag in November 1939. When the war began, he was commander of Sentai 6, a division of the four oldest heavy cruisers in the IJN in September 1941. During the battle of Coral Sea, he commanded the Main Body and lost light carrier Shoho to air attack. He was present at Savo Island where his well-drilled cruisers provided the backbone of the victorious Japanese force. On October 12, he led the Japanese force at the battle of Cape Esperance. His total disregard for even the possibility of an American attempt to challenge him in a night battle led to his force being surprised and defeated. He was killed on his flagship by American shellfire.
One of the most prominent Japanese naval figures of the Guadalcanal campaign was Rear Admiral Tanaka Razio. He graduated from Eta Jima in 1913. His career included tours on destroyers, battleships and even as a commander of a submarine squadron. He began the war as commanding officer of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. This unit saw action during the invasion of the Dutch East Indies and the battle of Midway. Tanaka saw action in every major engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign and his name has been linked with the destroyer reinforcement and resupply runs to the island known to the Americans as the “Tokyo Express.” He commanded the Japanese force at the last naval battle of the campaign, the battle of Tassafaronga. This was the single greatest Japanese destroyer victory of the war. Later, on December 12, he was wounded when his flagship was sunk on a resupply run. Following this, he was removed from command. Ironically, his skills seemed to have been appreciated more by the US Navy than the IJN, where his pessimistic comments regarding the course of the campaign resulted in his loss of command. He was later promoted to vice admiral, but never given an important command.
Rear Admiral Tanaka was a veteran of many actions off Guadalcanal, including his signal victory in the battle of Tassafaronga in November. This performance gained him the respect of his American counterparts, but he was criticized by some Japanese figures for not providing leadership and leaving the conduct of the battle to his subordinates. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 63429)
Vice Admiral Abe Hiroaki was a 1911 graduate of Eta Jima and spent his career almost entirely in surface units. He achieved flag rank in 1938, and began the war as commander of Sentai 8 (a squadron of Japan’s latest heavy cruisers) which were assigned to screen the IJN’s main carrier force. Abe fought with the carriers at Midway, during which he assumed temporary command of the battle after the commander of the carrier fleet was forced to depart his flagship. He held important commands during the Guadalcanal campaign, including the Vanguard Force at both the battle of Eastern Solomons in August and again at Santa Cruz in October. Abe was promoted to vice admiral on November 1, 1942, and placed in charge of the Henderson Field bombardment force for the major Japanese November offensive. At the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, he was surprised by the Americans. He not only failed to perform his mission, but also lost the first Japanese battleship of the war. As a consequence, he was forced to resign from the IJN in disgrace. On November 14, he was relieved of command and forced to face a Board of Inquiry over the loss of his flagship, the battleship Hiei. He was reassigned to the Naval General Staff in December and retired on March 20, 1943.
US COMMANDERS
The father of the Guadalcanal campaign and the primary figure behind all US naval strategy during World War II was Admiral Ernest J. King. After duty on surface ships and submarines, he transferred to naval aviation in 1926. He earned his wings in 1927, and commanded the carrier Lexington in 1930. In 1933, he was promoted to flag and assigned to the Bureau of Aeronautics. In 1938, he was promoted to vice admiral and took command of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers. In 1939, his career was all but over when instead of being selected for Chief of Naval Operations, he was posted to the General Board. However, as war approached, his undeniable toughness and leadership skills brought him out of irrelevance in January 1941 when he was appointed as the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. After Pearl Harbor, King was named the Commander-in-Chief US Fleet and in March he was also appointed as Chief of Naval Operations, giving him authority over all American naval strategy and operations.
Admiral Chester Nimitz (left) and Admiral Ernest King on June 30,1942, as Nimitz received the Distinguished Service Medal for his leadership during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. Nimitz played a supporting role during the Guadalcanal campaign. King was the originator of the entire concept of an early counteroffensive to roll back Japanese gains in the South Pacific. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 58409)
He did not hesitate to use this authority and constantly worked to expand the US Navy’s freedom of action in the Pacific, which under the “Germany First” strategy, was defined as a secondary theater. The Guadalcanal campaign was entirely of King’s making. This was a bold, if risky operation which caught the Japanese entirely by surprise. The knowledge that Guadalcanal resulted in an important American victory makes it easy to forget how large a risk King was running when he launched his offensive. Up until the naval battles of mid-November, there was the real possibility of an American defeat. Not only would this have had serious implications for the course of the war, but for King personally.
Admiral Chester Nimitz (pictured in 1942) though commander of the Pacific Fleet, did not exert direct control of the Guadalcanal campaign. He was responsible for keeping the battle resourced and he played a key role by relieving his South Pacific commander during a key stage of the battle. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-466244)
The commander of the US Pacific Fleet after the attack on Pearl Harbor was Admiral Chester Nimitz. His early career was spent mainly in submarines, but later he served on cruisers and battleships. Nimitz was recognized as a capable administrator with the ability to pick good leaders and then give them the authority to accomplish their mission. Early in the war, Nimitz displayed his strategic insight and aggressiveness at Coral Sea and Midway. On April 3, Nimitz was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas in addition to his duties as Commander of the Pacific Fleet. This made him responsible for the execution of King’s ambitious offensive plans in the South Pacific. However, it is important to note that Nimitz played no role in originating the plan for offensive operations in the South Pacific, and he did not direct operations there since this was the responsibility of the Commander, South Pacific Area. Nimitz played little direct role in battle, other than to ensure a constant flow of reinforcements for the campaign. His most important contribution to the effort was the timely relief of Ghormley in October.
Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley assumed the post as Commander, South Pacific Area on June 19. He held this position up until October 18, so he was in overall command during only two of the five major naval surface battles of the campaign. Ghormley has been described as possessing intelligence and a gift for diplomacy, but his direction of the campaign was weak and indecisive. For example, he gave the Japanese undisputed nighttime use of the waters around Guadalcanal from early August until mid-October. Ghormley was a controversial figure and it is easy to blame him for the precarious American position on Guadalcanal. Ghormley had to contend with many severe challenges – a barely workable command structure, limited resources, and, most of all, a tenuous logistical situation. Nevertheless, it is clear that his lack of command experience fed a lack of decisiveness that brought the campaign to the brink of disaster. His continued concern for the protection of his rear areas at the expense of reinforcing Guadalcanal demonstrated he did not fully understand his mission. His saving grace was that the Japanese leadership was even more indecisive.
Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, photographed in 1942. His direction of the Guadalcanal campaign lacked direction and energy and he was replaced in mid-October. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-12864-A)
Vice Admiral William F. Halsey relieved Ghormley as Commander, South Pacific Area on October 18, 1942. Halsey began his career primarily in dest
royers but in 1934 switched to naval aviation. In June 1940 he was promoted to vice admiral and was the senior ranking carrier commander in the Pacific Fleet. In several early-war carrier raids, he showed his aggressive style, though he missed Coral Sea and Midway. When Nimitz was looking for a leader to breathe energy into the flagging Guadalcanal campaign, the natural choice was Halsey. The selection was inspired and Halsey provided an immediate boost to American morale at a critical juncture in the campaign. He made a promise to support the Marines ashore with everything he had. This resulted in the battle of Santa Cruz in late October when he risked his last two carriers beyond the effective range of land-based air cover. In November, with the campaign in the balance, he did not hesitate to commit his last surface units to protect the airfield. Guadalcanal was Halsey’s finest hour. Later in the war, his penchant for sloppy staff work and taking risks would be displayed again.
The commander of the Amphibious Force South Pacific was Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. He was a 1908 graduate of the Naval Academy and spent his early career on destroyers and battleships. Subsequently, he trained as an aviator and remained in various aviation billets until 1935. Following a tour at the Naval War College, he commanded the heavy cruiser Astoria from 1938–40. From 1940–42, he served as Director of the War Plans Division and also as assistant chief of staff to King from 1941–42. King made him Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific in time to conduct his offensive in the Solomons. In this capacity, Turner was responsible for the tactical conduct of operations around Guadalcanal, with the exception of the carrier task forces. His misreading of Japanese intentions in the days after the initial landing led directly to the disaster at Savo Island. After Savo, he became a stalwart, making up for Ghormley’s lack of aggression. Savo Island aside, Turner proved an aggressive and capable commander and became the premier practitioner of amphibious warfare in the Pacific.
Admiral William Halsey (right) with Nimitz on a repair ship at Espiritu Santo on January 20, 1943. Halsey took over control of the campaign before the Japanese offensive in October, defeating that operation and the final Japanese onslaught in November. His total commitment to supporting the Marines on the island was a key to victory. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-34822)
Rear Admiral Norman Scott was the first US Navy officer to beat the Japanese in a major surface battle during the Pacific War. Graduating from the Naval Academy in 1911, he was the Executive Officer aboard a destroyer that was sunk by German submarine attack in December 1917 and was commended for his performance. Following promotion to captain, he was commanding officer of heavy cruiser Pensacola until shortly after Pearl Harbor. Captain Scott was assigned to the staff of Admiral King during the first months of 1942. After promotion to rear admiral in May, he was granted his wish of being posted to a combat command in the Pacific. Scott commanded a surface task group for the first three months of the Guadalcanal campaign, but missed the action at the battles of Savo Island and Eastern Solomons. On the night of October 11–12, Scott got his chance to engage the Japanese. The result was the first Japanese defeat in a night action. Scott’s performance at the battle of Cape Esperance was far from perfect, but he had demonstrated that the IJN could be beaten, even at night. His victory was made possible by taking the Japanese by surprise and the implementation of a clear battle plan. In November, command of the American surface task group operating off Guadalcanal was given to Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan. Undoubtedly, Scott would have been the better choice with his six months’ sea experience and his victory at Cape Esperance behind him, but he was 15 days junior to Callaghan on the seniority list. As deputy commander to Callaghan during the night action known as the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 13, Scott was killed when his flagship was struck by gunfire. For his actions in the October and November battles, Scott was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Rear Admiral Richmond Turner on the bridge of attack transport McCawley during the initial phases of the Guadalcanal campaign. With him is the commander of the 1st Marine Division, Major General Vandegrift. These two men formed a capable team, which was instrumental in forging victory. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-CF-112-4-63)
Rear Admiral Daniel Judson Callaghan was a 1911 graduate of the Naval Academy. He spent most of his early career on battleship duty. In 1936, he was assigned as executive officer of heavy cruiser Portland and then was assigned to the staff of the Pacific Fleet’s cruiser force. Following this, he was the Naval Aide to President Roosevelt from 1938–41. In May 1941, he assumed command of heavy cruiser San Francisco. In June 1942, Callaghan was assigned as chief of staff to Ghormley. When Halsey took over from Ghormley he brought in his own chief of staff which left Callaghan without a job. Turner decided to use him to command his surface support group, and he relieved Scott when the two forces joined up off of Guadalcanal in November. Callaghan was in command at the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and ordered to stop a battleship bombardment of the airfield. Callaghan seemed under no illusion about the fate of his command against a Japanese force with two battleships, but he bravely led his force directly at the oncoming Japanese. However, his bungled handling of the battle undoubtedly increased its cost to the Americans. Callaghan was killed in this action.
Norman Scott, shown here as a captain, was the first American admiral to defeat the Japanese in a night battle. Following his victory at Cape Esperance, he was killed in the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-20823)
Rear Admiral Willis Augustus Lee played a critical role in the campaign when he was entrusted by Halsey with the only two operational modern battleships in the Pacific during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Lee was a 1908 graduate of the Naval Academy and spent World War I on destroyers. After commanding several destroyers, he moved to cruisers, commanding light cruiser Concord, and then held various staff positions, including assistant chief of staff to King. He assumed command of Battleship Division 6 in August 1942, which would eventually lead him to his fateful spot on the bridge of battleship Washington in Iron Bottom Sound on the night of November 14–15. He was known as a gunnery expert and was among the first to embrace the use of radar fully. His performance at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal has been acknowledged as superb. It must be also acknowledged that his victory owed a great deal to good luck as well, as none of the many Japanese torpedoes fired at his two battleships hit its target. Lee himself made no bones about his victory being due to the possession of radar, and not to any American edge in skill or training. He went on after Guadalcanal to command fast battleships throughout the war until being assigned in 1945 to investigate methods to combat the kamikaze threat. He died before the end of the war.
Daniel Callaghan pictured as a captain at Ghormley’s headquarters in 1942. As a rear admiral, he led the American surface force at the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal where his lack of control over the battle led to a close-range slugfest with heavy American losses. He did succeed in thwarting the planned Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-11671)
Rear Admiral Carleton Herbert Wright was a 1912 graduate of the Naval Academy. Following a varied career that focused on mine warfare, he commanded the heavy cruiser Augusta in 1941 and then served as commander of cruiser task forces in the Pacific Fleet from July to November 1942. His first independent command was Task Force 67 at the battle of Tassafaronga in which his cruiser force was sharply defeated by a smaller Japanese destroyer force. Wright took full responsibility for the disaster, as it was his indecision which, more than any other factor, led to defeat. Remarkably, after his humiliation at Tassafaronga, Wright returned to command a cruiser division in the Aleutians and Gilberts campaigns. More amazing was his award of the Navy Cross (the second-highest Navy award for valor) after the battle.
Rear Admiral Willis Lee pictured on board his flagship Washington. His adept handling of Washington during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal gained victory
for the Americans. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 48283)
Carleton Wright, pictured on the left when he was captain of heavy cruiser Augusta in September 1941, accompanying Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on an inspection of his ship. Wright’s background in cruisers did nothing to help him in November 1942 when his task force was decimated by Japanese torpedoes. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 50323)
OPPOSING FLEETS
For decades before the opening of the Pacific war, both navies had planned, equipped and trained for a massive fleet engagement somewhere in the Central Pacific, in which battleships would take center stage. Within this construct, firmly shared by both sides, other fleet elements including aircraft carriers, cruiser and destroyer forces, and submarines were expected to play important roles, but the big guns aboard the battleships were seen as the final arbiters.