by Mark Stille
The Japanese plan counted on gaining surprise. If Mikawa’s force was detected early, it could be attacked by American aircraft from the three carriers operating south of Guadalcanal or, even if his force was not attacked by air, it faced a superior Allied surface force once it reached Guadalcanal. The impending disaster for the Allies was directly linked to their inability to provide warning of Mikawa’s approach. There were certainly many opportunities to ensure that the Allied ships were ready and waiting for Mikawa off Guadalcanal. The Japanese force was spotted south of the St George Channel by submarine S-38 about 2000hrs on August 7. The next morning, at 1026hrs, a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hudson aircraft spotted Mikawa east of Bougainville. The RAAF crew reported the Japanese force as “three cruisers, three destroyers, two seaplane tenders or gunboats” on a southeasterly course at 15 knots. A second Hudson spotted Mikawa again at 1101hrs and gave a report that included two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one unknown ship.
The Allied naval force operating off Guadalcanal was under the overall command of Rear Admiral Richmond Turner. Turner appointed British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley as his deputy. Turner had good reason to believe that his ships off Guadalcanal would receive adequate warning of a Japanese counterattack. In addition to American and Australian aircraft flying from New Guinea covering the waters south and east of Rabaul, American PBY flying boats and B-17s flew search patterns covering the entire Solomons and the waters to the north of the Solomons against any movement down from the Japanese central Pacific base at Truk. Even after S-38’s report of a Japanese force moving south at high speed on August 7, Turner expected that if the Japanese continued south they would be detected by air searches. However, the hastily created American search plan contained several holes, which were exacerbated by problems with weather. The sectors most likely to contact the Japanese were missed owing to weather conditions, and a request for an afternoon search in the most dangerous area was ignored. Mikawa timed his approach carefully in order not to enter the danger area for detection until the late afternoon, well after the morning flights had reached the farthest limits of their patterns. The fact that the searches in the sector most likely to contain the Japanese had not been conducted only reached Turner at 2333hrs on August 8.
On August 8, the Japanese dispatched G4M bombers with torpedoes to attack invasion shipping off Guadalcanal. This view shows the aircraft approaching their targets at low level. The attack was repelled with heavy losses. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-17066)
As flagship of 8th Fleet, heavy cruiser Chokai saw continual action during the campaign. This is Chokai at Truk in November 1942 with either superbattleship Yamato or Musashi in the background. Chokai was present at Savo Island, and returned to the waters off Guadalcanal to bombard Henderson Field on October 14. She later provided cover for another cruiser force, which bombarded the airfield on November 14; after the bombardment, Chokai was lightly damaged by aircraft from Enterprise. (Yamato Museum, 070300)
The two Hudsons which contacted the Japanese force during the morning were under orders to maintain contact until another aircraft arrived on station. Neither did so. On top of that, their ship identification skills were very poor. The worst part was that the contact reports did not reach Turner until well after the fact; 1900hrs for the first contact and 2130hrs for the second.
Given the lack of contact data after 1101hrs and the misidentification of a Japanese force, which included two seaplane tenders that posed no threat to his beachhead, Turner did nothing to raise the alert status of his ships off Guadalcanal. While his deduction that the Japanese force was intent on setting up a seaplane base on Santa Isabel Island northwest of Guadalcanal was reasonable, given the information at hand, he was guilty of attempting to discern Japanese intentions, while not taking into account their capabilities and preparing for the most dangerous course of action that they might take. His failure to alert his command to the possibility of a Japanese night attack would have tragic consequences.
SAVO ISLAND ORDER OF BATTLE
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
8th Fleet Striking Force Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi
Flagship Heavy cruiser Chokai
Sentai 6 Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo
Heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, Furutaka
Sentai 18
Light cruisers Tenryu, Yubari
Destroyer Yunagi
UNITED STATES NAVY
Task Force 62 Rear Admiral Richmond K.Turner
Southern Group Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, RN
Heavy cruisers Australia (RAN), Canberra (RAN), Chicago
Destroyers Bagley, Patterson
Northern Group Captain Frederick Riefkohl
Heavy cruisers Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes
Destroyers Helm, Wilson
Eastern Group Rear Admiral Norman Scott
Light cruisers San Juan, Hobart (RAN)
Destroyers Monssen, Buchanan
Picket Ships
Destroyers Blue, Ralph Talbot
The total Allied force of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eight destroyers possessed the means to deal with Mikawa’s smaller force. However, the deployment of the Allied force was too dispersed and therefore subject to defeat in detail. The two destroyers on picket duty north and south of Savo Island were both equipped with radar, but since they could be apart by as much as 20 miles at certain times, there remained a huge gap for the Japanese to enter Iron Bottom Sound undetected. In addition, the picket destroyers were not deployed far enough ahead of the cruiser groups to give adequate warning. On top of this, on the night of the August 8, Crutchley took Australia out of position for a conference with Turner. He left the captain of Chicago in charge of the Southern Group. When the conference was over, he did not return to the Southern Group, but neglected to tell the commanders of the other groups any of this.
Savo Island: phase one
Mikawa’s luck held as he approached Savo Island. At 2312hrs, he launched four floatplanes to provide information about the Allied deployment and to provide target illumination at the appropriate time. Even the presence of these aircraft above the Allied ships, which were correctly identified as cruiser floatplanes, failed to alert the Allied commanders. At 2400hrs, Mikawa brought his ships to battle stations and increased speed to 26 knots. The first Allied ship encountered was the picket destroyer Blue steaming southwest of Savo Island. Lookouts on the lead Japanese ship, Chokai, spotted the American ship at over five miles at 0050hrs. Not for the first time Japanese optics would prove superior to American electronics. Mikawa deftly slowed his speed to reduce his wake and Blue steamed away to the south.
Chokai’s lookouts remained vigilant when at 0134hrs they spotted destroyer Jarvis to port as she exited the area after having been damaged by the earlier air attacks. Just two minutes later, the same lookouts spotted three “cruisers” at over six miles. These were the unsuspecting ships of the Southern Group. The battle opened at 0138hrs with Chokai firing four torpedoes at Canberra; all missed. Chokai opened fire on Canberra at 0143hrs. Within minutes, Furutaka, Aoba and Kako joined in; by this time the Southern Group was illuminated by flares dropped by Japanese floatplanes.
Heavy cruiser Kako under way in 1940. After an outstanding performance at the battle of Savo Island, Kako was sunk the day after the battle by a submarine, with the loss of 43 men. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 73014)
Destroyer Patterson in May 1942 at Pearl Harbor. Patterson was a 1,500-ton Bagley-class destroyer and was present at Savo Island where she was one of the few American ships to put in a creditable performance. After attempting to warn the rest of the American task force, she fought a gun duel with Tenryu and Yunagi. During this engagement, Patterson took a Japanese shell, which knocked out her two aft guns and killed ten men. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-64754)
Canberra was smothered by as many as 24 hits in the first few minutes of the battle. Her captain was mortally wounded, power was quickly lo
st, and a hit below the waterline created a severe starboard list. Fortunately for the Allies, all of the 11 torpedoes fired at the Australian cruiser missed. The other heavy cruiser in the Southern Group, Chicago, mounted an ineffectual response. Her crew was unable to grasp that Canberra’s sudden maneuvering meant she was already under attack. At 0147hrs, a torpedo from Kako hit the cruiser on her starboard bow. A second torpedo hit the cruiser aft in the machinery spaces, but did not explode. Chicago was unable to find any targets for her main battery, but did engage Tenryu with her 5in. guns, probably scoring a hit which caused severe personnel casualties. Chicago continued to steam to the west and soon exited the engagement. Inexplicably, her captain sent no report of this action. He also neglected to give orders to his two destroyers. Patterson engaged at least three Japanese cruisers with gunfire, but was damaged by gunfire in return and was ordered to break off the engagement at 0210hrs. Of all the Allied ships present, destroyer Patterson was the most alert and best fought. Destroyer Bagley launched an ineffectual torpedo attack and then moved off to the west. In only seven minutes, Mikawa’s cruisers had neutralized the Southern Group. None of the ships of the Southern Group bothered to report any of this.
Savo Island: phase two
The Northern Group, under the command of the skipper of cruiser Vincennes, remained oblivious to the presence of Mikawa’s force. During the engagement with the Southern Group, the Japanese force had split into two separate columns. To the east was Chokai, leading Aoba, Kako, and Kinugasa; the western column included Yubari, leading Tenryu and Furutaka. The only Japanese destroyer, Yunagi, was busily engaged in a sporadic gunnery duel with Jarvis south of Savo Island.
Previously, Chokai’s superb lookouts had spotted at 0138hrs one of the cruisers of the Northern Group, Vincennes, at the astounding range of nine miles. Per his battle plan, Mikawa headed north to attack the second group of enemy ships. Using the same tactic that crippled the Southern Group, the Japanese cruisers first attacked with torpedoes and then closed for a gun attack. At 0148hrs, Chokai launched four torpedoes at Vincennes from six miles. Once again, the American ships were surprised. At 0150hrs, all three cruisers of the Northern Group were illuminated by powerful Japanese searchlights. With this illumination, the Japanese cruisers quickly found their targets. Chokai illuminated Astoria at 7,700 yards; Aoba found Quincy at 9,200 yards and Kako spotlighted Vincennes at 10,500 yards. The American ships were caught with their main guns trained fore and aft and the Japanese could see personnel running on their decks.
Light cruiser Yubari was commissioned in 1923 and carried a fairly heavy armament of six 5.5in. guns and four torpedo tubes on a small displacement of 2,890 tons. Despite her age, she played an important part of the Japanese victory at Savo Island. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-9957)
The skill and training of the Japanese cruiser gun crews was once again thoroughly displayed. Aoba and Kako scored hits on their third salvo and Chokai scored on her fifth. Heavy cruiser Quincy was quickly crippled, but the American ship went down fighting. Aoba’s early salvoes caused fires fed by Quincy’s floatplanes and also hit the ship’s bridge. Soon, Aoba, Furutaka and Tenryu were pouring fire into Quincy. She managed to get off three salvoes against the Japanese before being forced out of action. Aoba and Tenryu added to the carnage with a total of three torpedo hits. These, combined with 54 shell hits of various sizes, were enough to ensure Quincy’s destruction, with the loss of 370 of her crew. The cruiser was the first ship to sink during the battle, at 0238hrs, becoming the first ship of many to litter Iron Bottom Sound. In return, Quincy inflicted the only significant damage of the battle on the Japanese when she placed two 8in. rounds in the chartroom of Chokai’s bridge, barely missing Mikawa and his staff. Thirty-six men were killed or wounded.
Heavy cruiser Quincy during the battle of Savo Island being illuminated by Japanese cruiser searchlights. Quincy was overwhelmed by accurate Japanese gunfire and then finished off by torpedoes. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 50346)
Heavy cruiser Quincy pictured on August 3,1942 at New Caledonia before departing for the invasion of Guadalcanal. The cruiser was sunk days later by Japanese shells and torpedoes. Losses were very heavy, with 389 men killed and 147 wounded. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-K-563)
Under fire from Kako, Vincennes quickly found a target for her 8in. guns and scored a hit on their second salvo, which damaged Kinugasa. Kako quickly began to score hits amidships which created a fire, again fed by the American cruiser’s floatplanes. As Vincennes’s captain attempted radically to maneuver, one torpedo from Chokai hit at about 0155hrs. Another torpedo, this one from Yubari, hit at 0203hrs. Chokai continued to pummel the crippled cruiser and as many as 74 shells struck the vessel. The ship was abandoned at 0230hrs and she later sank at 0258hrs. A total of 332 crewmen were killed.
Astoria’s reaction to the sudden Japanese onslaught reflected the general confusion throughout the Northern Group. The ship’s gunnery officer quickly ordered his 8in. guns to engage the enemy after his ship came under fire from Chokai, but the ship’s skipper ordered his ship to cease fire after arriving on the bridge thinking that he was being fired upon by friendly ships. Chokai’s accurate fire knocked out two of Astoria’s three 8in. turrets, but Astoria was able to fire 53 8in. rounds before all her guns were knocked out. Gunfire from Aoba, Kinugasa and Kako finished off Astoria with between 34 and 63 hits. She sank with 216 of her crew.
The last action of the night occurred as the Japanese force was withdrawing to the north of Savo Island. At 0216hrs, Tenryu and Furutaka engaged destroyer Ralph Talbot, still on patrol north of Savo Island. In the first exchange, the Japanese scored only a single hit. Minutes later, Yubari illuminated the destroyer and quickly scored five hits. Ralph Talbot was saved by a rain squall as the Japanese force continued its sweep to the northwest.
Heavy cruiser Astoria pictured on August 6 as it approaches Guadalcanal. Within days, the cruiser was shattered by Japanese cruiser gunfire and sunk. Losses included 235 men killed and 190 wounded out of a crew of some 800. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-13477)
The Japanese retirement was the most controversial aspect of the battle. Having shattered Turner’s covering force, Mikawa had the opportunity to turn a tactical victory into a strategic one. Little stood between him and the American transports. Off Tulagi were five transports screened by two destroyers and three destroyer transports, and off Guadalcanal were another 13 transports, escorted by another three destroyers and five old destroyer minesweepers. At 0216hrs, Mikawa analyzed the situation with his staff. As already mentioned, the Japanese force had split into two groups with destroyer Yunagi operating separately. The Japanese reckoned that it would take two hours to reassemble their force and reverse course to the east to attack the transports. This left only an hour of night and ensured that the force would be vulnerable to air attack when morning came. If Mikawa continued to track to the northwest, the Japanese would find themselves some 120 miles from Iron Bottom Sound and thus had a good chance of avoiding air attack from the carriers Mikawa assessed were rushing into position to deliver a morning attack. On the positive side for Mikawa, the engagement with the Allied cruiser forces still left the Japanese with around 60 percent of their gun ammunition and 50 percent of their torpedoes. After briefly considering his options, Mikawa decided at 0220hrs to break off the action and return to Rabaul.
Mikawa did not know it at the time, but he had just squandered the IJN’s best chance of delivering a knockout blow to the first American offensive in the Pacific. It is hard to imagine the Americans holding on to their lodgment following the destruction of their transport fleet and the supplies still on board. The destruction of the American transports would have been worth the sacrifice of Mikawa’s entire force.
Savo Island: the aftermath
Though Mikawa’s victorious battle was an incomplete triumph, Savo Island was still the worst US Navy defeat ever suffered at sea. When the Canberra sank at 0800hrs
after being scuttled by American destroyers, this brought Allied losses to four heavy cruisers sunk and a fifth damaged. Two destroyers were also damaged. Personnel losses were very heavy, with 1,077 sailors killed and 709 wounded.
Australian heavy cruiser Canberra the morning after the battle of Savo Island. The ship is listing to starboard and will soon sink. Alongside are American destroyers Blue and Patterson to remove the ship’s survivors. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-13488)
Japanese losses were minor. Chokai suffered three hits that killed 34 and wounded 48. Aoba took topside damage but suffered no personnel casualties. Kinugasa had one killed and one wounded from two hits. The single 5in. hit on Tenryu killed 23 and wounded 21. The most severe loss was suffered after the battle on August 10 when American submarine S-44 sank Kako on her way to Kavieng. The lack of a proper destroyer screen cost Mikawa in this instance. When Kako sank, 71 crewmen were killed and 15 wounded.
The battle of Savo Island confirmed several key facts. The IJN proved itself the master of night combat and established dominance in the waters around Guadalcanal at night. Japanese nightfighting doctrine proved itself under actual combat conditions and featured the use of superior night optics, the superb Type 93 torpedo and reliance on quick and accurate gunnery. Despite the fame of the Type 93 torpedo (and not all ships at Savo Island carried this weapon), it is important to note that Japanese gunfire was the primary agent of destruction at Savo Island.