We have already mentioned the escape at sea that occurred in the winter of 415/14. As the Syracusans approached Catana by land, the Athenians sailed off to Syracuse at night and put in unobserved at a place called Leon, which is six or seven stadia distant from Epipolae, disembarking the landing force there and anchoring their ships at Thapsus. They disembarked at daybreak at a point opposite the Olympeium, where they occupied a camping place. The Syracusan horsemen rode back from Catana to Syracuse to alert the infantry and help defend the city 39 (see map 7).
At Plemmyrium in 413, we have an example of both the army and navy being moved into position at night. Gylippus, the Spartan general, was fighting against the Athenians, and the naval battle was begun before dawn. When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out his whole land force under cover of night, intending to make an assault by land upon the forts of Plemmyrium (see map 7). At the same time, on a pre-arranged signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes would sail to the attack from the Great Harbour, and another forty-five would sail round from the lesser harbour, where their shipyard was. They would all join together with those inside the harbour and simultaneously attack Plemmyrium. The Athenians would find themselves under attack from both directions, and would be thrown into confusion. The Athenians hastily manned sixty ships to oppose them; twenty-five engaged with the thirty-five Syracusan ships that were in the Great Harbour, and with the other twenty-five went to meet the squadron that was sailing round from the shipyard. And so they all engaged at once in battle in front of the mouth of the Great Harbour, and for a long time held out against one another, one side wishing to force the entrance, the other trying to prevent this.40 In the meantime, while the Athenians were down at the sea attending to the naval battle, Gylippus and his force made a sudden attack on the forts in the early morning. Once he had captured the biggest fort, the men in the other two smaller ones escaped to a merchant ship and to various small craft and those forts were captured too.41
Weather had a tremendous effect on what could be achieved at sea. The Peloponnesians attacked the Athenians on a sail from Cos to Syme in 412/11 (see map 8), the winter of the twentieth year of the war. There was great confusion because of the darkness, rain and fog.42 From Cos, arriving by night in Cnidus, Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, was urged by the Cnidians not to disembark his sailors, but to sail immediately against twenty Athenian vessels out patrolling. These Athenian ships, along with Charminus, one of the commanders at Samos, were on the watch for the very twenty-seven ships from the Peloponnesus which Astyochus was himself sailing to join.43 Astyochus, therefore, sailed directly to Syme before his arrival was reported on the chance that he might catch the Peloponnesian ships somewhere on the high seas. But rain and the foggy state of the weather caused his ships to lose their way in the darkness and become disoriented. At daybreak, when his fleet was still scattered, his left wing became visible to the Athenians while the rest of the ships were still wandering round the island. Charminus and the Athenians hastily put to sea against them with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the ships from Caunus they were watching for. Falling upon them at once, they sank three and damaged others and had the advantage in the action until, to their surprise, the main body of the fleet suddenly came into sight and they found themselves surrounded on all sides. Thereupon they took to flight, and after losing six ships the rest escaped to the island of Teutlussa and thence to Halicarnassus.44
Sailing before dawn and hugging the coast was a trick used many times over to escape detection. Night was the perfect time to make an escape, although, in some cases, not all the fleet got away safely. Thucydides tells of a night escape by sea from the Chersonese at Sestos in 41145 (see map 4). The Athenians were at Sestos with eighteen ships, when they learned of the approach of the Spartan fleet. Their signallers alerted them and they observed the sudden blaze of numerous fires on the hostile shore, and so realised that the Peloponnesians were entering the straits. That same night, making what speed they could and hugging shore of the Chersonese, they sailed towards Elaeus, wishing to get by the enemy’s ships and out into open water. They eluded the sixteen ships at Abydos (although they had been warned by their friends to be on the alert to prevent their sailing out). They sighted the fleet of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. Not all ships had time to get away. The greater number escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four of those in the rear were overtaken off Elaeus (see map 9). One of these was stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its crew. Two others were captured without their crews and the fourth was abandoned on the shore of Imbros and burned by the enemy46 (see map 9).
Fourth Century
Ambushes continued at sea well into the fourth century. One event concerned Conon, the Athenian admiral famous for his overwhelming victory over the Spartan fleet off Cnidus (the southwestern extremity of modern Turkey) in 394 and his restoration the following year of the long walls and fortifications of Athens’ port, Piraeus. Conon and Arcsilaidas got their men to remain fighting by convincing them there was an enemy ambush. He writes:
When the allies were deserting him, Conon sent a deserter to inform the enemy that they were about to run away and from where and when. The enemy set an ambush and waited. Conon then announced to the allies that it was safer to retreat because he had learned about the ambush. The retreating men, perceiving the ambush in advance, turned around and remained until they had fought the war through to a victory for him.47
In 387, Antalcidas in Abydos set up an ambush based on the tightest possible secrecy. His scouts had signalled to him that eight triremes were approaching. He embarked sailors on twelve of his fastest ships and gave orders that if anyone was lacking men he should fill up his crew from the ships left behind and lay in wait with the utmost possible concealment. Then, as the enemy was sailing past him, he pursued. When they saw him coming, the enemy fled. Antalcidas succeeded in overtaking the slowest of the Athenian ships with his fastest. By giving orders to the leaders of his own fleet not to attack the hindmost ships, he continued the pursuit of those who were ahead. And when he had captured them, those who were behind, upon seeing that the leaders of their fleet were being taken, out of discouragement were themselves taken even by the slower ships of Antalcidas, and the result was that all the ships were captured.48
Xenophon reports a night operation at Cape Zoster in 388. At Aegina, the Spartan ships under Gorgopas followed an Athenian flotilla at night as it returned to port and attacked the ships successfully as they landed near Cape Zoster in Attica. Eunomus waited for nightfall then hoisted his sail and with his ship led the way carrying a light, as was customary so that the rest of his ships, which were following, would not wander off-course. At that moment, Gorgopas immediately embarked his men and followed Eunomus, watching the light but keeping a bit behind so that Eunomus’ men would not see or notice them – his boatswains kept time by clicking stones together instead of using their voices, and the men made a slicing motion with their oars.49
For those who argue that the Greeks do not fight at night, there is the continuation of this story on Cape Zoster. When Eunomus’ ships approached the shore around Zoster in Attica, Gorgopas, by means of a trumpet, gave the command to attack. Now the men on some of Eunomus’ ships were just disembarking, other ships were still coming to anchor, while yet other ships were making their way to shore. A sea battle by moonlight took place in which Gorgopas captured four ships that he put in tow and carried off with him to Aegina. The rest of the Athenian ships escaped.50
Some events combine a sea landing with a land ambush. Polyaenus tells of an event from 388, when Chabrias was sailing against an enemy city, and he landed the peltasts at night. At dawn he sailed towards the harbour that was farther from the city. The men from the city ran out to prevent the men from the ships disembarking. The peltasts from the ambush, appearing behind them, killed some, captured others alive, boarded the ships and put out to sea.51
Night assaults from sea continued in the fourth cent
ury. Another story about Chabrias from 388 sees him setting out on a voyage to Cyprus to aid Evagoras. He took 800 peltasts and ten triremes, to which he added more ships and a body of hoplites obtained from Athens. He and his peltasts landed at night on Aegina to set up an ambush in a hollow place a short distance beyond the Temple of Heracles. At daybreak, at the agreed signal, the Athenian hoplites came under the command of Demaenetus and ascended to a point about sixteen stadia beyond the Heracleium, where the so-called Tripyrgia is, an unknown location. When Gorgopas’ vanguard passed the ambush spot, Chabrias and his peltasts rose up immediately and threw their javelins and stones at the enemy. The Athenian hoplites who had disembarked from the ships also advanced upon them. The enemy soldiers in the van, inasmuch as they were not a compact mass, were quickly killed. Gorgopas and the Spartans were among the dead. When they fell, the other troops took flight.52 Chabrias’ peltasts were particularly useful in the pursuit. There were 150 Aeginetans killed and 200 foreigners, i.e. resident aliens in Aegina.
A similar tactic of unknown date, but attributed by Polyaenus to Diognetus, had this Athenian trying to capture a certain city. He landed soldiers secretly at night, placed them in an ambush and at daybreak sailed in openly. The men from the city ran to their ships, and the men in ambush rushed to the city and captured it easily. After sailing in and anchoring, Diognetus disembarked the men from the ships and conquered those who had come out to defend their city.53
Polyaenus lists a number of strategies used by Diotimus, the fourth-century Athenian admiral.54 In one adventure he has ten ships, which he disguises as five by pulling in the oars on one side, yoking them together, and only raising five sails. The Lacedaemonians were lured into an attack because of the small number of Athenian ships. Due to the Athenians’ expertise, they sank six of the Laconian ships and captured the other four with their men. Such deception was considered both clever and fair, at least by the time Polyaenus was writing.55
In another adventure, Diotimus sailed at night into the enemy’s territory. He landed many men from each ship and hid them in an ambush. At daybreak he held the ships at anchor near the men in ambush, and after ordering the men on deck to prepare to fight and the rowers to take up the Thalamians, Zeugite and Thranite oars, in turns, he tried to bring some of the ships to land.56 The enemy ran up and tried to prevent the landing. But when he raised the pre-arranged signal, the men in ambush appeared, killed many of the enemy and routed the rest. Diotimus landed safely.57
Another ambush involving a combined, land and sea operation is related by Frontinus, Polyaenus and Diodorus. They tell the story of Alcibiades sailing in 409 to Byzantium in preparation for a siege of the city. Since Byzantium was a large city with many defenders, taking it would require having allies on the inside. The Athenian generals created the impression that they were going to raise the siege by sailing off in the afternoon with all their ships and withdrew their land army some distance. But they returned in the middle of the night and drew near to the city. They dispatched triremes with orders to drag off the Byzantine boats. They also raised a clamour to make it sound as if their entire force was there. They hid their land army near the walls and waited for the signal from their agents inside the city. The Byzantines in the city, unaware of the ambush, rushed out to help save their ships. The betrayers in the city raised the signal from the wall and admitted Alcibiades’ troops by means of ladders in complete safety. In this way he took the city.58
Polyaenus mentions an ambush by one Archebius of Heraclea. When the enemy was constantly harassing the coast, Archebius dragged up fishing boats, made them difficult to move by tying ropes through the keel, and hid in ambush with some others. A trumpeter was up in a tree as a lookout (skopos). The lookout saw the enemy had anchored in one warship while two thirty-oared vessels disembarked. Some were looting while others tried to free the fishing boats from the ropes. It was then he blew his trumpet. Archebius, rousing his troops from ambush, fell upon the enemy and brought their thirty-oared vessels and the warships into the city’s harbour.59
In a case involving not regular warfare but renegade mercenaries, we see how the element of surprise was used. In 413, the Athenians sent back a contingent of Thracian mercenaries so they would not have to pay them. Diitrephes the Athenian was appointed to command them on their return journey. They were to sail through the Euripus doing whatever damage they could to the enemy along the coast. Then they landed at Tanagra and did some looting. In the evening, he then sailed across the Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea, landed in Boeotia and led them against Mycalessus (see map 11). Diitrephes spent the night unobserved near the Temple of Hermes, which was two miles (three kilometres) from the town. At daybreak they assaulted the city and captured it because the population was off-guard and not expecting that anyone would march so far inland from the sea and attack them [italics, mine]. They sacked the houses and temples, butchered the inhabitants including women and children. Thucydides, once again, calls this aprosdokeitos – unexpected or unlooked for.60
Aeneas Tacticus warns against the use of diversionary tactics by invaders.61 In the case of the betrayal of Byzantium, the Athenians used a seaborne raid, land troops and a diversion to gain entry to the city. After feigning a withdrawal from the area, they dispatched triremes for a night raid on the port. Meanwhile, the land army was brought up close to the walls. The raiders in the port made a great deal of noise and, consequently, the Peloponnesians and Byzantines rushed off to the scene of the disturbance. The fifth columnists them admitted Alcibiades and his troops.62
Land and Sea Operations
The Greeks considered it wholly acceptable to catch an enemy at a disadvantage in a sea battle. A common ploy was to attack when the enemy’s crews had scattered for their midday meal.63 The disastrous defeat at Syracuse happened in part because the Syracusans had established a market so close to their ships that their rowers could shop, eat and be prepared to fight again long before the Athenian crews were ready.64 The disastrous defeat at Aegospotami happened because of a surprise attack that was made when the bulk of the crews were several miles away at market.65
What all these examples show is that the element of surprise was as important in naval operations as it was in land battles. The distinction between the two is artificial because the Greeks co-ordinated their land and sea attacks. In fact, as the Peloponnesian war progressed, there were fewer and fewer men who fought only at sea or only on land. Instead, there were men who were sometimes soldiers and sometimes sailors.66 We often see Greeks carrying out night marches to meet a fleet arriving in port, or a night landing of the fleet disembarking hoplites for a land attack.
Outright deceptions also occurred, including several instances of disguised identity. Crews were put onboard captured ships, which then sailed towards or past the enemy, sometimes towing their own ships as if they had been captured. Decoys were used to create diversions.67 The Greeks found nothing unusual in these operations. Nor do we see any moralising about such methods – quite the opposite. They are collected in handbooks by Greek writers and attributed to clever commanders. Individual leaders seem to have been free to choose the tactics they felt were appropriate and the only judgement made was whether the operation succeeded. If navies awaited the enemy in plain sight, it was not because they felt obliged to engage the enemy in plain sight but because they believed the place and time offered them the best chance of victory.68
CHAPTER 8
The Age of Light-Armed
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ENDED in 404 and closed out the fifth century with a surprise attack. Lysander, the Spartan, tricked the Athenians at Aegospotami, by attacking their vessels at a regular hour and then calling off his fleet. Once this had become an established procedure, the Athenians dropped their guard after the Spartans dispersed. Then, when most of the Athenians had scattered according to their usual pattern, he returned, attacked and slew the rest, and captured all their vessels.1 The fourth century was thus ushered in with the defeat of the Athenian Empire
and a Spartan hegemony that took its place and lasted until the Battle of Leuctra in 371. Sparta found itself engulfed in the so-called Corinthian war from 395 until 387 against a coalition of four allied states: Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos, which were initially backed by Persia. Then the Boeotian or Theban war broke out in 378 as the result of a revolt in Thebes against Sparta; the war would last six years.
There was obviously no shortage of warfare in the fourth century, and all sides continued to fight with hoplites, but the conditions of military life were slowly changing. Gone was the era of short military campaigns that took place only during the summer after the harvest. Cities were now attacked by night, fighting took place year-round, and atrocities were committed against civilians.2 The prolongation of campaigns and a change in tactics set the stage for the professionalisation of Greek armies. Whereas hoplite warfare had not necessarily called for very elaborate training, the use of missiles and the tactics of staging ambushes required training at a higher technical level. When light-armed troops were utilised everything depended upon movement. Rapid changes of position, sudden strikes, speedy retreats and ambushes were all operations that needed to be carefully prepared with accurate intelligence. Because such operations had to be well directed and executed with speed and determination, it could mean training one’s own troops or hiring well-trained mercenaries.3
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