CHAPTER 10
Why the Greeks Used Ambush
NEITHER THE GREEKS NOR anyone else set up an ambush because of anything genetic, as a cultural imperative or from a lack of morality. Ambush is a tactical choice; it is a method used for its military practicality. It is appropriate only in certain times and places. It cannot be used ubiquitously, or done by every type of soldier. Army or navy units set up ambushes for the following reasons.
As a Force Multiplier When One Is Outnumbered
An ambush is used when advanced intelligence is needed to attack a powerful, more formidable enemy. An ambush takes advantage of them before they can arrange themselves in their customary battle formations. Ambush can also be used when one’s forces are less heavily armed than the opponents, i.e. skirmishers attacking heavily-armed hoplites.1
When It Is the Only Mode of Attack Available
Ambush is not the choice of a power that can put a large force on a battlefield with heavy armour and shock force. Ambush is the choice of a group that must work with smaller forces, and lightly-armed troops.2 For example, ambush and guerrilla warfare are the classic choices for a people occupied by an imperial power and whose native armies have been disbanded. Since they have been disallowed weapons or a formal military, they are forced to become guerrilla fighters. Indeed, under those very conditions it is the optimum choice if one is fighting with lightly armed forces not trained in the tactics of set-piece battles. Light infantry can destroy the enemy on his own ground, make the best of initiative, stealth, surprise, infiltration, ambush and night operations.3 The ultimate insult comes when the occupying power uses the pejorative terms ‘assassin’ and ‘terrorist’ against those people they have disarmed and forced into this mode of fighting in the first place. To their own people these combatants are, of course, called freedom fighters.
To Establish the Element of Surprise
Ambush is used against armies on the march, temporarily halted or otherwise out of formation. One achieves surprise by striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses his command and control structure, reduces his effectiveness and induces psychological shock in soldiers and leaders.4 This shock enables attackers to succeed with fewer forces than they might otherwise have required. If surprise and shock are achieved, a unit can attack an enemy two or three times its size. If surprise is lost, if the enemy is well protected, or if it has other advantages the attacker will need at least three times as many troops as the enemy they are attacking.5
When the Terrain Dictates It
If one is fighting on rocky, mountainous, forested or broken terrain, ambush is more practical than a set-piece battle. Weather conditions can also play a role in the choice of ambush spots. Terrain is the ally of light infantrymen; they do not avoid difficult or close terrain – they seek it out. Mountains, ravines, forests, jungles, stream beds or even folds in the ground may be used to hide friendly forces until they close with the enemy.6 Greece has more of this sort of terrain than large, empty plains. The helplessness of Greek heavy infantry when attacked by light-armed troops on broken ground has often been remarked upon.7
When the Opportunity Presents Itself
Sometimes there is a need for immediate action. If one receives information that the enemy is approaching, one may have to attack before being caught oneself. Ambushing can keep the enemy from knowing or countering your own movements and tactical operations. Speed and surprise give more security to your own unit.8 Night, rain, snow, smoke, dust and fog all help to mask attacking forces.
An Ambush Can Be Used As a Diversion
Evidently, even the threat of an ambush could be a deception. In Polyaenus a deserter is sent to tell Nicias that, if the Athenians try to escape at night, they will be ambushed by the Syracusans.9 They stay put rather than attack, and this gives the Syracusans time to take the river crossings and bridges in advance and then attack the next day and slaughter the Athenians.
Ambush is Used to Capture Intelligence Assets
This is one of the most common tactics used by the Greeks overseas. In Xenophon, Anabasis we see natives captured so they might be used as guides.10
As Part of a Deception Plan
Ambushes can be used actively to mislead the enemy, to make them think you are after something you are not, to make them think your army is somewhere it is not or to find out what their intelligence resources are.11
Ambush to Demoralise the Enemy
Large numbers of casualties can demoralise the enemy.12
Because Your Intelligence Assets Are Better Than the Enemy’s
If you can anticipate enemy locations and movements, you can use that intelligence to neutralise them.13
Greeks Using Ambushes
Not only did the Greeks use ambush for the above reasons, commanders such as Demosthenes or Iphicrates became famous for it.14 Right from the beginning of their written literature, the Greeks ambushed their enemies. In Xenophon’s Hellenica we see the stages of planning: selection of the right place; concealment; delay till the right moment; surprise and panic of the victims; and hand-to-hand combat clearly laid out.15
There is nothing cowardly about ambushing. Indeed, ambush is one of the deadliest forms of fighting. Tactically, it is a very murderous form of battle that exploits surprise to its maximum.16 Modern field manuals define area ambushes as operations used to ‘interdict enemy movements and inflict maximum casualties on enemy forces [italics mine]’.17 It is not the polar opposite of killing in battle, it is killing in battle, but on a smaller scale. Mardonius says the Greeks preferred battle where they face their enemy at arm’s reach to kill and be killed, and this is what ambush is – hand-to-hand combat, close up and deadly. Tyrtaeus states: ‘No man ever proves himself a good man in war unless he endures to face the blood and slaughter.’18 Well, ambush is blood and slaughter. Ambush by small forces can rack up the carnage quite quickly. There are passages in Greek literature that condescend to light-armed troops such as bowmen, slingers and other troops who hurl weapons from a distance, but ambushers are not in this category. They fight close up and dirty – face to face. Thanks to John Keegan, there has been much interest in recent years in the ‘what it was like for them?’ approach to ancient military operations. We should be asking: ‘What was it like for an ancient soldier to spring an ambush on the enemy?’ It is easy to dismiss ambushers as cowards, but quite something else to examine the physical aspects of wielding an ancient weapon, waiting for the enemy to approach and then killing them at close range. The psychological question of who was equipped for such duty and what place this activity had in Greek warfare is a valid one.
In many of the examples we have seen, ambushes caused carnage.19 Casualties were very high and often the attacked force was wiped out. Indeed, casualties increase in direct proportion to the amount of time the soldiers are exposed to enemy attack. The most effective way to suppress the enemy is to kill him. This is done with violent, close-combat action once a unit has closed with the enemy.20 The area in which the enemy finds himself is not called a ‘kill zone’ for nothing. The high casualty rate is stressed even in the ancient sources. Thucydides talks about the dawn operation of Demosthenes using the Messenians against the Ambraciots.21 He comments about how many of them were killed on the spot. Those who escaped the first onslaught fled into neighbouring ravines where ambushes had been sent up and the Ambraciot troops were slaughtered. In many of the passages below we encounter the verb diaphtheiro which means to destroy utterly.22
In Herodotus, the Persians are attacked during a night march and cut to pieces.23 In Thucydides, an attack by the Amphilochians by the Ambraciots produced a ‘slaughter’.24 Also in Thucydides, the Sicels ambush a force that is off-guard, and destroy 800 of the enemy; only one Corinthian envoy escaped and led the remaining 1,500 to Syracuse.25 In Polyaenus, all the Corinthians who are ambushed are killed.26 In Polybius, the mercenaries of Pellene ambush the Achaeans an
d cut them to pieces.27 In Xenophon’s Hellenica, Iphicrates sets an ambush in the territory of Phlius that killed so many of them that the city, while previously anti-Spartan, called backs its pro-Spartan exiles and put the city and the citadel in the hands of the Spartans to guard.28 Also in Hellenica, Anaxibius and 200 of his Spartans were killed in a mountain pass in Abydos.29
Of course, there is no guarantee of success with an ambush and the tables can be turned. Polyaenus relates how, when Iphicrates was attacking Sicyon, an ambush was set for him.30 He admits he made a mistake not by reconnoitring the area. Yet he recovered, attacked the ambushers and killed them all. In Thucydides, Aristius killed a large number of Sermylians by ambush near their own city.31 In Xenophon, Hellenica, Chabrias landed in Aegina, set up an ambush in a hollow and quickly killed 150 Aeginetans and 200 resident aliens.32 In Polyaenus, Arxilaidas the Laconian is shown attacking ambushers and ‘out-generalling’ them because of his advance intelligence and preparations.33
Aeneas Tacticus proves that some people never learn the lesson.34 The Triballi laid waste to the country of the Abderites and set ambushes.35 The Abderites resented being tricked and victimised, so they made a hasty attack with great eagerness, and the Triballi drew them into another ambush. The rest of the people in the city, not hearing of what had happened (bad intelligence gathering), rushed out to the rescue of their comrades and fell into a third ambush. It is said that more men perished in a shorter time than had ever been the case, at least from a single city of similar size. In Polyaenus, Cassander ambushed the Epidamnians and killed no fewer than 2,000 men outside the city and then got into the city gates to do more damage.36 Polybius has Lycus kill 200, capture 800 and a large amount of war booty from the Eleans.37 By ambushing some and putting others to flight, one causes panic in those watching the action.38
Light-armed troops are best suited to springing an ambush, but hoplites were used also. In Thucydides, Demosthenes sets up an ambush with 200 Messenians hoplites;39 Xenophon’s Hellenica has the Spartans using younger hoplites,40 and in Anabasis he has his rearguard ambush natives who are following him.41 Xenophon’s Hellenica also mentions Chabrias using peltasts.42 Polybius describes an ambush where Lycus overruns the countryside with light-armed infantry, but puts his heavily-armed troops in ambush then springs it on the Eleans.43
Ambushers need not even be soldiers, although soldiers are obviously the preferred choice. Civilians, even women, as we have seen, could set up an ambush. Polyaenus tells of Philip accepting the surrender of the Pharcedonians in Thessaly and as his troops entered the town people threw stones and javelins down upon him from the roofs.44 Also in Polyaenus, Onomarchus lures Macedonians into the hollow of a crescent-shaped mountain and crushes their phalanx with rocks.45 Native tribesmen can set an ambush as well as the Greeks.46
In short, ambushes are lethal and quick. As soon as the enemy is hit, the ambushers only have a few seconds to kill the enemy before he recovers from his initial shock and fights back or leaves the area. Such forces must pre-plan their escape to be sure they are not ambushed by reinforcements. When authors talk about the ‘madness that is close combat’ the only difference between a hoplite battle and an ambush is scale.47 The famous military strategist Ardant du Picq writes: ‘A man surprised needs an instant to collect his thoughts and defend himself, during this instant, he is killed if he does not run away.’48
The Skills
Staging an ambush is not something easy to accomplish. It is best done with soldiers who are trained by their leaders in the skills needed for such operations. Troops must be trained to be highly responsive and flexible. They must be able to close with the enemy and kill him. Light infantrymen can be used to destroy the enemy on his own ground, make the best of initiative, stealth and surprise, infiltration, ambush and night operations.49 Iphicrates trained his light-armed troops by staging fake ambushes, fake assaults, fake panics and fake desertions so his men would be ready if the real thing happened.50 Light infantrymen are not tacticians. They cannot respond mechanically to a set of conditions on a battlefield with a pre-determined action like a phalanx. Whoever leads the ambush must know how to use initiative, understand intent, take independent action, analyse the field of operations, collect intelligence and make rapid decisions. Initiative means bold action and often involves risks. Initiative by a tactical leader may be independent of what higher commanders want done to the enemy.51 The men such leaders work with are soldiers trained to fend for themselves through hardship and risk in hostile, uncompromising terrain. Such operations build a greater degree of teamwork and skill than other types of infantry formations as a result of the stress put on adaptability, close-combat skills and independent action.
The troops developed in the fourth century needed a more prolonged and thorough training than the Greek states in the fifth century. The exception was Sparta. The Spartans had to be almost a professional army, and there had to be at least a cadre of professional officers to train them. Without a standing army of full-time soldiers, strong positions could not be permanently garrisoned.52 An officer class, corresponding to our commissioned and non-commissioned officers, was a thing no Greek state (except Sparta in its own way) wanted or thought of.53 The hoplite system had been a democratic one. Every man supplied his own armour and weapons. It was not like a modern army where the government owns the tanks, the jeeps, the guns, the bullets. A citizen contributed to the needs of the state when called upon.54 Institutionalised naval warfare or the permanent garrisoning of passes and frontiers would have been beyond the economic capacity of most early Greek states. It was something more suitable for Hellenistic kings.
The weapons of ambush were the sword, the spear, the knife and the garrotte, or even bare hands if necessary. Each soldier had to be an aggressive and skilled fighter in hand-to-hand combat. Training in skills such as navigation, camouflage, foraging, tracking and stalking, and using weather and terrain as an ally were all useful.55 Such soldiers operated under dangerous and stressful conditions. They had to carry only the equipment and supplies needed for the mission to assure mobility, but also enough to be able to defend themselves. They had to maintain operational security to keep the enemy from finding out their location. Surprise is achieved by operations that make good use of speed of action and secrecy.56 Reconnaissance is a constant process. Physical security keeps the unit from being surprised itself. This includes rear and flank observation during the offence and defence, the use of covered and concealed routes during movement, and making sure that silence is maintained. Good discipline is a must. Just springing the ambush is not enough. As soon as the enemy is hit, he reacts. Ambush members have one or two seconds to kill the enemy in the kill zone before he recovers from the initial shock and either attacks you or leaves the area.57 There must be a withdrawal route secured if one is operating in enemy territory; the unit withdraws from the area as soon as it can. One must be alert for other forces in the vicinity and cover any tracks out of the ambush area to keep from being followed.
Nature of the Ground Chosen for the Ambush
The most common types of ambush among the Greeks were: those made along the line of march; and those made by an attacking force decoying the defenders of a walled city from the safety of their position. There are fifteen examples of ambush along the line of march or sail.58 There are seventeen examples of ambush of defenders of city by besieger.59 Pritchett finds five examples of ambush of a force assaulting a city,60 three of ambushes during battle,61 three examples of ambush by marauders from land,62 and four of ambush by marauders at sea.63 There are also numerous cavalry ambushes.64 In addition to the Greek authors, the Roman military writer Frontinus has a section On Ambushes (De insidiis) that lists fifty-seven examples, of which six are Greek.65
The frequency of ambushes in siege warfare is illustrated by the attention that Aeneas Tacticus devotes to the subject in his highly regarded treatise on military science. In his work there are numerous occurrences of the words enedra (seven) and enedreo
(seven), as well as one of enedreutikos.66 The references occur in sections that recommend measures to be taken in regulating forays outside the city walls (fifteen to sixteen) and the secret sallies by night (twenty-three). Bands within a besieged city were to be organised to avoid enemy ambushes,67 when the former sallied forth to prevent devastation to their fields. Special measures were also to be taken when the defenders set ambushes outside the city walls at night to prevent revolutionary factions from seizing the city from within.68 All these measures are concerned with defence against aggression.
Ambushes became so much a part of warfare by the time of Polybius that he goes into great detail about the ground best suited for ambushes. He feels that flat and treeless plains are better than woods. The ambushers could hide in any watercourse with a slight bank that had reeds or bracken. Thorny plants could be made use of to conceal not only infantry but even the dismounted horsemen at times. This allowed the attackers a good view of the surrounding area, while they remained concealed themselves.
Cavalry Scouts
As ambushes become more frequent and dangerous, so the Greeks realised the importance of cavalry scouts to prevent against them.69 The use of advance mounted guards minimised the ambush of large armies on the march, and a number of passages testify to the use of cavalry scouts to prevent ambush. The earliest examples are the skiritai used by the Spartans.70
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