Lieutenant General Ryabyshev was forced to plan his attack based on fragmented information. Headquarters of the South-Western Front did not pass down any usable information about the enemy. No liaison officer from the air force fighter division showed up, and there was no telephone or radio contact with it, either.
Even though the received information did not create a clear picture about the enemy, it still allowed us to more or less get our bearings and begin preparing for combat. Working on the plan for the upcoming battle, I took into consideration that the enemy is not occupying fortified defensive positions and decided to suddenly attack the forward Hitlerite units at dawn of June 26th and, continuing with the offensive, by the end of the day reach the line of Volkovye-Berestechko-Mikolayev. Each division commander received a concrete and clear mission. The corps was deployed in one echelon; the 34th Tank Division was to advance on the right, with the mission of breaching the enemy position in the sector of Sytno-Sytenka River. The 12th Tank Division, advancing in the center, was to breach the enemy in the sector from Sytenka River to Leshnyuv. On the left, acting in concert with the 212th Motorized [Rifle] Division and securing corps’ left flank, the 7th Motorized [Rifle] Division will begin its advance.22
XV MECHANIZED CORPS, MAJ. GEN. I. I. KARPEZO COMMANDING
The XV Mechanized Corps spent most of June 25 engaged in heavily see-saw fighting and was unable to prepare for the next day’s offensive. The 10th Tank Division under Maj. Gen. S. Y. Ogurtzov experienced particularly heavy fighting.
Around 1600 hours, Major Govor, chief of staff of the 20th Tank Regiment, led a task force of fifteen tanks in a local counterattack. They ran straight into strong German antitank defenses and were brutalized, losing eleven out of fifteen tanks, including four new T-34s and seven light BT-7 machines. Personnel losses in this task force were heavy, with Major Govor himself missing and presumed dead.
The Germans continued pressing 10th Tank Division, slowly flowing around its flanks. In order to improve its position, 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment counterattacked, supported by several tanks from 20th Tank Regiment and two batteries from 10th Howitzer Regiment. The attack was bloodily repulsed, resulting in one rifle battalion being completely gutted.
While 10th Tank Division was spilling its lifeblood, its sister 37th Tank Division was slowly moving towards Radekhov. They were advancing practically blind, being unaware of locations of the main German positions near Radekhov. Karpezo ordered its commander, Colonel Anikushkin, to locate the enemy and find fords on the Radostavka River.23 By the end of the day, its two tank regiments were in position.
The 212th Motorized Rifle Division fought several small clashes with the German reconnaissance elements moving south from Leshnov.
SITUATION AT THE END OF JUNE 25
The suddenness of the German attack and their rapid advance, coupled with heavy Soviet losses, produced many cases of breakdown in morale among the Soviet troops. While on the move to their new command post during the night of June 25–26, the command group of the Fifth Army witnessed a disorderly retreat of units from 135th Rifle and 19th Tank Divisions from XXII Mechanized Corps and 460th Artillery Regiment of XXVII Rifle Corps.24 Only personal involvement by Potapov and other officers from the army headquarters halted the flight of men and vehicles and prevented the spread of panic, which was beginning to also affect the 131st Motorized Division of the IX Mechanized Corps.
The Military Council of the Fifth Army immediately took quick and severe measures to reestablish discipline and combat-effectiveness of the affected units. All the roads to the rear were blocked and actively patrolled to prevent desertion. A collection point was set up in the woods north of Tsuman in order to process individuals and small groups which were found wandering around in the rear of the army. After two or three days of reorganization and mental and moral fortification, they were sent back to their units.
In addition to administrative measures, the Military Council of the army, starting on 26th of June and later, issued a series of directives and orders dealing with steps to be taken to increase discipline and morale of the troops. These directives pointed out that the communists and Comsomol members do not take the leading roles in fighting, do not oppose the panic mongers, and often desert themselves. The directives immediately demanded to turn over the deserters, cowards, and panic-mongers to the military tribunals. Communists and Comsomol members were to take a leading role in the struggle and lead by example; there was to be only one slogan for a communist: death or victory. The party bureaus which could not prevent the unauthorized withdrawals were to be disbanded, and the communists who could not reestablish order in their units were to be held accountable.25
At the same time, all technical personnel of the whole Volyn region civilian communication apparatus were mobilized. This allowed military communications units to be filled up with highly qualified personnel and equipment. A liaison section headed by Major Shestakov was created at the Fifth Army headquarters. Each division and corps of the Fifth Army was required to send two liaison officers with their own transportation to be part of this section. These liaison officers were to constantly be on the move between the army headquarters and their units in order to provide up-to-date information, not more than two hours old. This was a valuable additional source of communication besides radio and telephone.26
Despite taking Lutsk, German command did not actively exploit a continual offensive on this direction. Both panzer divisions of German III Corps received orders in the evening of 25th to shift south. The 14th Panzer Division was to advance on Rovno via Ostrozhets (ten miles southeast of Lutsk), the 13th Panzer Division, via Plosk village, further south. This in effect moved them away from the strategic highway going through Vladimir-Volynskiy to Rovno and then to Zhitomir and Kiev. The stubborn resistance of Soviet forces, especially strong antitank defenses posed by Moskalenko’s 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, forced the Germans to move away from this major road artery and probe forward along secondary roads.27
The time lost by the VIII Mechanized Corps was wisely used by Germans, allowing them to pull up at least four infantry divisions on the key Dubno axis. Especially bitter was the fact that the XV Mechanized Corps in the morning of June 25 was moving through the area which it occupied on the 23rd. Unbeknown to Soviet command, on June 26 they would be facing not the porous defenses of panzer divisions, but solid antitank barriers put up by the German infantry divisions. Still, the Soviet counterattack came sooner than expected. Command of Army Group South expected a major Soviet offensive on June 28. Instead, it came on June 26.
The 16th Panzer Division, moving up in the wake of 11th, crossed the border on June 24 near Krystonopol. It had to fight several skirmishes with still-resisting bunkers on the Molotov Line. According to the history of this division, the “border defenses were fiercely defended.”28
CHAPTER 10
Battle for Dubno, June 26–27
JUNE 26, 1941
AFTER MEETING SPIRITED SOVIET RESISTANCE in the Lutsk area and not being able to develop an attack along the highway onto Rovno, command of the German III Mechanized Corps shifted its 13th Panzer Division south on June 26. Following in the wake of the 11th Panzer Division, the 13th crossed the Ikva River over a bridge near Mlynov and followed the 11th Panzer towards Ostrog. Behind the two panzer divisions came 111th and 299th Infantry Divisions hurrying along on foot into the gap breached by the hard-charging 11th Panzer division. Behind and to the south came the 75th Infantry and 16th Panzer Divisions, anchoring the tenuous supply and communications line of the “Ghost Division” to Berestechko.
Driving determinedly forward, the 11th Panzer Division was not aware of the danger gathering on both of its flanks. Even after suffering severe casualties in fighting up to this point and terrible attrition of combat vehicle due to noncombat losses, the four Soviet mechanized corps moving up to cut off the spearhead of German armored thrust were still very formidable. The clash of armor was promising to be a loud one.
; After Lutsk finally fell in the evening of June 25, Germans continued pressing their attack along the highway to Rovno. The 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, the motorcycle regiment of the XXII Mechanized Corps, and the 131st Motorized Division were barely defending a wide front from Rozhysche to Ostrozhets, ten miles southeast of Lutsk.
XIX Mechanized Corps, Major General Feklenko Commanding
The northern Soviet pincer aimed at Dubno from north and northeast was composed of IX and XIX Mechanized Corps. However, being only vaguely aware of each other’s whereabouts, the two corps commanders were not able to meet and work out a coordinated attack plan.
Major General Feklenko had very meager resources to contribute to the offensive, the actual strength of his XIX Mechanized Corps under his direct command being closer to a division size. On paper, the combat-arms portion of XIX Mechanized Corps amounted to five tank, four motorized rifle, four artillery, and one motorcycle regiment. In reality, none of its motorized rifle formations were fully present for action on June 26. Roughly two battalions of infantrymen from the 213th Motorized Rifle Division were loaded up into the few available trucks and brought along with the tank formations. The rest of division trudged forward on foot and were approximately seventy kilometers east of Rovno in the morning of June 26. The bulk of artillery regiments moved with them as well, brought forward mainly by slow tractors and horse teams. Armored vehicles belonging to the 132nd Tank Regiment of the 213th Motorized Rifle Division were split between the two tank divisions.
As mentioned previously, the two tank regiments in each tank division lost so many combat vehicles during the approach phase that they had to be combined into a provisional regiment. Also, advance elements of the 19th Mechanized had been in contact with the enemy since the night of June 24, further adding to the loss of tanks and armored cars. Thus the actual combat strength of the XIX Mechanized Corps which took part in the fighting on June 26 were two tank regiments and an equivalent of a weak rifle regiment, basically an understrength division.
The morning of June 26 found the 40th Tank Division roughly twelve miles northwest of Rovno in the area of Klevan. Its sister division, the 43rd Tank, was near Goscha, ten miles east of Rovno. During the previous night, the motorized rifle regiment of the 43rd Tank Division made contact with a rifle regiment from 228th Rifle Division belonging to the XXXVI Rifle Corps and deployed in the immediate vicinity northeast of Dubno. These two weak regiments formed the advanced Soviet positions.
The 40th Tank Division was to attack Mlynov, capture it, and continue southwest. The 43rd Tank Division was assigned to take Dubno and, after taking it, continue southwest as well, parallel to the 40th Tank.
The attack was supposed to begin at 0900 hours, but not all the units were ready and the start was postponed to 1100 hours and then again to 1400 hours. The Germans did not oblige by waiting for the Soviets and attacked first and steadily pushed the advance elements of the 43rd Tank and 228th Rifle Divisions away from Dubno.
As the main bodies of the 40th and 43rd Tank Divisions advanced, they became intermixed with the units of the 228th Rifle Division. The 40th Tank advanced around and through the right flank of the 228th, and the 43rd Tank took up similar positions on 228th’s left.
Opposing the 19th Mechanized Corps on the north side of Dubno were elements of German 11th and 13th Panzer and 111th and 299th Infantry Divisions.
All the available tanks in the 43rd Tank Division were merged into its 86th Tank Regiment. In the morning of June 26 this unit numbered two KV-1 tanks, two T-34s, and seventy-five T-26s. While the Soviet and German numbers were roughly equivalent in this sector, the Germans had distinct advantage of heavy artillery assigned to the 11th Panzer Division from corps assets.
Attacking into the face of heavy artillery and dug-in infantry, commander of the 43rd Tank Division, Colonel I. G. Tsibin, placed his four KV-1 and T-34 tanks in the first echelon, acting as mobile armored screen for his light-skinned T-26s. The see-saw battle lasted all day, with both sides constantly conducting small-unit attacks and counter-attacks. Slowly gaining ground, the 43rd Tank Division reached the Ikva River on the eastern outskirts of Dubno. However, the price it paid was high: Colonel Tsibin’s division lost both of its KV-1 tanks and fifteen T-26 tanks, an irretrievable loss of over 22 percent of armored vehicles.
By late afternoon, the Soviet attacks started petering out. German 13th Panzer Division broke through the defensive positions of the 228th Rifle Division and began flanking the 40th Tank Division around the left. The 11th Panzer Division went around the left flank of the 43rd Tank Division south of Dubno, and one of its combat groups raced towards Ostrog and Zdolbunov. A breach began developing between the two tank divisions of the XIX Mechanized Corps.
Fearing his corps being fragmented and surrounded, Major General Feklenko ordered his units to disengage and pull back. The majority of the 228th Rifle Division accompanied Feklenko’s corps in retreat.
Ostrog: Task Force Lukin vs. 11th Panzer Division
The German breakthrough to Ostrog was not foreseen by the Soviet command, and this town was lightly held by a small garrison unit, incapable of offering any resistance to the Germans. The way to Shepetovka, an important railroad junction, looked open. Gustav Schrodek, describing the actions of 15th Panzer Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division, writes:
The regiment’s advance resumes already at 0200 hours, and by 0630 hours Mlodowa is taken after a tough fight against enemy infantry and artillery.1 However, this was achieved at a loss of three of our own panzers.
By 1400 hours the regiment was in a renewed fight with enemy tanks which advanced from northeast—and were stopped again. Part of the regiment, Battle Group Angern, advanced there and in the afternoon already stand five kilometers west of Mizoch, approximately 20 kilometers northwest from Ostrog.2
And here the German intelligence failure came into play. Unbeknown to the Germans, the Soviet Sixteenth Army, one of the two armies forming the second strategic echelon, was located near the town of Berdichev. At the start of the war, the Sixteenth Army was just finishing up its move from Siberia. On June 26th, the Sixteenth Army and its sister Nineteenth Army, also newly arrived in Ukraine, received orders to move by train north to Byelorussia to shore up the crumbling Western Front there.
Since the morning of June 26, the units of the Sixteenth Army under Lt. Gen. M. F. Lukin were moving towards their railhead at Shepetovka. Finding out about the German breakthrough at Ostrog and realizing the severity of the situation, Lieutenant General Lukin, on his own initiative, diverted the 109th Motorized Rifle Division of his V Mechanized Corps from the embarkation and personally led it towards Ostrog.
Its 173rd Reconnaissance Battalion arrived in Ostrog just before the Germans. It did not have time to dig in before the German 61st Motorcycle Battalion from the 11th Panzer Division slammed into them. After a sharp fight, the German motorcycle troopers pushed their Soviet counterparts to the northeast of the town, where the Red Army men were able to dig in, partially surrounded.
However, the fighting that raged on the flanks of the 11th Panzer Division created many anxious moments for its men:
Employment of our own Air Force eliminates the activity of the Russian aircraft, which is generally pleasantly noted. Considering the situation which was becoming ever more unclear, it was welcomed to be able to completely turn one’s attention on the battlefield alone. The Russians tried to break through everywhere and thereby temporarily created quite critical situations. For a short time the Russians succeeded in closing the route of advance towards Ostrog with a flank attack. . . . By the evening of 26th, however, the situation was again quite secure.”3
During the night of June 26–27, all the forces that Lieutenant General Lukin could divert from Shepetovka gathered just east of Ostrog. Organized into Task Force Lukin, they were the 109th Motorized Rifle Division composed of 173rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 381st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the 602nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 404th Artille
ry Regiment, plus several small garrison and rear echelon detachments. The rest of Lukin’s army already departed or were in the process of leaving for the Western Front.4
IX Mechanized Corps, Major General K. K. Rokossovskiy Commanding
Realizing that his orders to attack on the 26th would be virtually suicidal, Major General Rokossovskiy was not eager to throw his weak corps into the meat grinder. His motorized rifle division, the 131st, was fighting detached east of Lutsk. The majority of artillery belonging to his 9th Mechanized Corps had not arrived yet, and only his two tank divisions were available for the attack. However, though never blessed with an abundance of tanks, the march towards the sound of the gun further depleted the numbers available to him.
The IX Mechanized Corps started the war with right around three hundred tanks, not a single one of them being new T-34s or KV-1s. In fact, roughly 20 percent of tanks in Rokossovskiy’s formation were armed only with machine guns. Approximately a third of his tank strength was contained in the 131st Motorized Rifle Division, which was being steadily ground down east of Lutsk. With large numbers of breakdowns during the march, Rokossovskiy had only small numbers of light T-26s, BT-5s, and BT-7s with which to attack. His 20th Tank Division, numbering around thirty tanks, was basically a reinforced rifle regiment. The 35th Tank Division, with slightly over one hundred tanks, would have to bear the brunt of the offensive.
Even on the day of the offensive, Rokossovskiy did not have contact with neighboring corps, nor coordination from above: “Nobody was tasked with coordinating actions of the three corps. They were committed into combat piecemeal and directly from the march, without any consideration given to condition of the forces which already fought with strong enemy for two days, and without taking into consideration their distance from the area of expected contact with the enemy.”5
The Bloody Triangle Page 22