Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps

by Yitzhak Arad

  The arrival of the prisoners of war, a cohesive group with battle experience and bearing the glory of the Soviet army, raised the morale of the Sobibor prisoners. Lieutenant Pechersky drew the attention of the other prisoners by his behavior and courage in an event that occurred on September 26. Pechersky wrote about it:

  An ordinary day. . . . About twenty-five men received twenty-five lashes for various infractions. I was almost one of them. This is how it happened: forty of our men were busy chopping wood. Hungry, emaciated, exhausted, they raised the heavy axes with great effort and dropped them on the chunky stumps. Frenzel [Pechersky called him “Franz” by mistake] kept hurrying them on: “Schnell, schnell. “ Quietly he walked over to one of the Dutch Jews. . . . Frenz [el] let him have one with his whip. . . . Frenz[el] noticed that I had stopped chopping. He called out to me: “Komm.” He pushed aside the Dutch Jew and said to me in broken Russian: “Russian soldier, you don’t like the way I punish this fool? I give you exactly five minutes to split this stump. If you make it, you get a pack of cigarettes. If you miss by as much as one second, you get twenty-five lashes. . . .” Frenz[el] gave the command: “Begin.” . . . With all my strength and with genuine hatred, I hit it time and again until I smashed it into pieces. . . . Frenz [el] handed me a pack of cigarettes. “Four and a half minutes,” I heard him say. . . . But I literally could not take the gift from the scoundrel’s hand. “Thanks, I don’t smoke,” I said and resumed working. Frenz [el] went away quietly and returned in about twenty minutes holding half a roll and a slice of margarine in his hand. . . . “Russian soldier, take it,” he said. . . . “Thank you, the rations we are getting satisfy me fully.” Naturally, the German could not let the irony of my reply pass unnoticed. . . . I saw Frenz[el] clench the whip in his hand, but he restrained himself, turned abruptly and left the yard.1

  Pechersky’s proud, bold behavior was something unusual in the camp. The story spread quickly among the prisoners, and Pechersky became the object of considerable admiration. His fellow war prisoners accepted him as their natural leader because of his officer’s rank and his personal qualities and behavior. There was a second officer, a major in the signal corp, among the prisoners of war in Sobibor who arrived from Minsk, but although his rank was higher than Pechersky’s, he was always depressed and it was clear that he was not the man to take initiative and assume leadership. The more active prisoners of war expected Pechersky to outline an escape after they learned what Sobibor was and the fate that awaited them there.

  On September 27, four days after their arrival in Sobibor, Pechersky was approached by two of his friends while a large group, part of them war prisoners, were working on construction in Camp IV. At that time a transport with Jews arrived, and the screams of the women and children on their way to the gas chambers reached them. Pechersky wrote:

  Shlomo Leitman and Boris Tsibulsky came up to me. Both were shaken and pale. Tsibulsky said: “Sasha, we must run from here. It is about 200 meters to the wood. The Germans are now occupied. We can waylay the guards at the fence with our axes.” I replied: “We, perhaps, may succeed in running away, but what will happen to the others? They will all be finished at once. If the plan is to run away, then we must all run together. . . . “You are right,” Tsibulsky said, “but we must not delay too long. Winter is approaching. Footsteps leave marks in the snow. Generally it is more difficult to remain in the woods in wintertime.”2

  Two days later, on September 29, while eighty prisoners were working in Camp IV, Pechersky was again approached by some prisoners of war who urged him to join them in an immediate escape. “There are only five guards now,” they said to him. “We will waylay them and make for the woods.” Pechersky convinced them that a thoroughly unprepared escape had no chance to succeed. The few of them would be unable to kill all the guards, and there would still remain the problem of crossing the minefield and eluding the ensuing German pursuit in the daytime. In addition, all the other prisoners who were working with them would certainly be shot. Pechersky made them understand that more preparations were needed for a successful escape. His words had the desired effect.3

  There were other plans of escape by war prisoners. On October 9, Grisha, a prisoner of war who had received twenty-five lashes for chopping wood in a sitting position, decided to escape the same night with some other prisoners of war. Pechersky was informed by his fellow prisoner Shubayev about Grisha’s intentions. He warned Grisha not to go through with his plan, because it would spoil the mass escape that was to be carried out soon. However, Pechersky did not succeed in persuading Grisha to give up his plan. Therefore, Pechersky posted some members of his group on alert close to the fence near the latrine where Grisha’s group planned to cross, and forcibly prevented Grisha’s escape. This indeed foiled the escape.4

  Pechersky’s closest friends in the camp were Shlomo Leitman, Boris Tsibulsky, and Alexander Shubayev from Baku (nicknamed Kalimali). With them he discussed the different options and ways for organizing the escape. Pechersky’s personality and prominent position among the prisoners of war drew the attention of Feldhendler, who still sought an organizer and leader for a mass escape. Feldhendler knew about the talks of escape among the prisoners of war and that Pechersky was involved in these plans. On September 28, at lunchtime, Feldhendler approached Shlomo Leitman and asked him to bring his friend Pechersky to the women’s barrack for a talk in the evening. The women’s barrack served as a place for social meetings, but Leitman understood that this invitation was not just for a social talk. Pechersky and Leitman came as requested, but Feldhendler was not yet there. The women surrounded the Soviet officer and asked many questions about the war, about partisans, and about the Soviet army. Pechersky spoke in Russian, and Leitman translated his answers. One of the women asked why the partisans did not attack and liberate the prisoners in Sobibor. Pechersky replied that the “partisans have their tasks, and no one can do our work for us.” During the talk, capo Pozyczka appeared in the barrack and listened to Pechersky’s answers. Feldhendler did not arrive that evening. Pozyczka’s attendance prevented him from having an intimate talk with Pechersky, and he preferred not to be seen discussing anything with the Soviet officer.5

  The meeting between Feldhendler and Pechersky took place the next day, on September 29, in the evening. Feldhendler told Pechersky about the Underground group that existed in the camp, and proposed that he, Pechersky, take command and organize a mass escape. As Pechersky did not know Feldhendler too well, he was prudent in his answers. He neither rejected nor agreed to the proposal, but he did leave the door open for further talks. Pechersky, who in his records mistakenly called Leon Feldhendler “Baruch,” wrote about this meeting:

  In the evening I met with Baruch [Leon]. He began by saying that what I had said in the women’s barracks the other night—no one can do our work for us—had made a deep impression on the women and that they understood the meaning of those words. But that nearby there had been standing a tall, skinny man, one eye always slightly closed, perhaps I had noticed him. “He is the capo Pozyczka, a vile creature. One has to be on guard against him.”

  “I have no reason to be on guard,” I said, “because I do not intend to do anything other than what I am told.”

  “I understand, you have to answer me that way,” Baruch [Leon] said. “We must, nevertheless, have a talk. . . . I understand you are up to something, but did you stop to consider what might happen to all of us if you should escape? The Germans cannot afford to have the secret of this extermination camp broadcast. As soon as one demonstrates that escape is possible, they will liquidate all of us at once. That is clear.”

  “Tell me,” I asked, “have you been in this camp long?”

  “Close to a year.”

  “So you, too, believe the Germans will not kill you. And I believe it as much as you do. What makes you think I am planning to escape?”

  “Don’t run off,” Baruch [Leon] held my arm. “Wait a minute. You wonder why we haven’t escaped till now.
So I’ll tell you. We had thought about it more than once, but we didn’t know how. You are a Soviet man, a military man. Take over. Tell us what to do and we’ll do it. I can understand your misgivings. We hardly know each other. But be that as it may, we must talk it over. In the name of a group I come to tell you: we trust you. Act.”

  I looked at him as he stood before me. He was not a tall man, but compact, with a clever, open face. I liked him.

  “Anyway,” I said, “thank you for warning me against Pozyczka. You are long in this camp. Would you perhaps know how the field behind the fence is mined? How thick and in what order?”

  As it turned out, the camp inmates had dug the holes [for the mines] and Baruch [Leon] was able to supply some valuable information about the mine fields. We arranged that future contact between us would be made through Shlomo [Leitman].

  After that I went to see the women.6

  Although Pechersky did not mention any contacts or developments between him and Feldhendler for about nine days, between September 29 and October 7—he did write about a close friendship that developed between him and Luka, an eighteen-year-old girl from Holland, with whom he used to sit for hours in the evenings in the women’s barrack—the contacts between Pechersky and Feldhendler did continue during this entire period. The liaison man was Shlomo Leitman, who enjoyed the confidence of both men. It was with his help that Pechersky dropped his suspicions and began trusting Feldhendler and his group. As a result of these contacts and talks, a united leadership of the Underground in Sobibor, called the “Underground Committee” came into being. Pechersky was the leader, and Feldhendler was his deputy. The other members were Yanek the carpenter, Josef the tailor, Jakub the shoemaker—all of them heads of their respective shops—and Moniek, who headed the youngsters, the putzers. The prisoners of war were represented by Tsibulsky, Shubayev, and Leitman.7

  Cooperation between and unification of these two groups were very important and decisive for the Underground in Sobibor. Feldhendler’s group contributed its experience in the camp and familiarity with its conditions, and Pechersky’s people had the military know-how, fighting experience, and leadership. Each side contributed what the other side lacked and needed. The evening visits in the women’s barrack, where Pechersky used to meet Luka and where social meetings of men and women were common, served also for meetings of members of the Underground Committee. One of the prisoners of war testified about these meetings of Pechersky, Feldhendler, and the Underground Committee and the security measures taken to conceal them. Semion Rosenfeld relates:

  In the evenings Pechersky’s group used to meet in the women’s barrack. I, Sasha Kuptshin, and three others were appointed as a “security team” to safeguard these meetings. During the time that the consulations were going on, we organized games, dancing, and group singing to draw the attention of the other prisoners to our activity. Simultaneously we were on guard. If somebody suspicious approached the barrack, we warned the Underground Committee. The women in the barrack did not suspect that in this barrack their fate and freedom was decided.8

  From the talks with Feldhendler, and from his own observations, Pechersky learned about everything he needed for planning a mass escape. He gathered information about the camp and its occupants, about the security arrangements, the fences, and the minefields, and about the routine of life in the camp. He also learned about the successes and failures of past escape attempts from the camp and about the recently discovered tunnel in Camp III.

  The first result of this research was Pechersky’s plan to dig a tunnel for a mass escape from the camp. According to another source, the idea for the tunnel was Leitman’s and he came up with it when Feldhendler told him and Pechersky about the tunnel in Camp III.9

  The digging had to be conducted by Boris Tsibulsky, who was by profession a miner from Donbas. The tunnel had to start at the carpentry, which was the closest barrack to the fences where prisoners were working, and it had to run beneath the fences and minefields. The tunnel had to originate at the stove in the carpentry and exit behind the minefield, a distance of about 35 meters. According to the plan, its height and width would have to be 75 × 75 centimeters and it would need to be 80 centimeters beneath the earth’s surface, so that it would not touch the mine holes. It could not go any deeper, because there was a danger that it might strike water. About 20 cubic meters of soil had to be shoveled out. Part of the dug-out earth had to be hidden beneath the floor of the shop and, in the course of the work, some other places for the surplus earth had to be prepared somewhere along the wooden walls of the barrack. The plan called for the digging to be done during the night and to last from twelve to fifteen days.10

  The digging of the tunnel started at the beginning of October. The main work was done at night, but some work was done also during daytime. A digging shift included four people: while two were digging, the other two disposed of the earth and rested. They remained in the carpentry during the entire night. About fifteen prisoners, some of them Polish Jews, knew of and were involved in the digging work. The digging progressed smoothly for a few days, but on October 8 and 9, heavy rains fell on the camp and water penetrated the tunnel and flooded it completely. When Tsibulsky entered the tunnel on the night of October 9, he found it utterly wrecked. The tunnel escape plan had to be abandoned. An alternative plan for escape had to be found.11

  Pechersky was aware of the difficulties of the tunnel escape plan even before its failure. He did not foresee the flooding, but he was worried about other drawbacks. On October 7, two days before the tunnel plan had to be abandoned, he said to Feldhendler and Leitman:

  What are the drawbacks of this plan? I am afraid that from eleven at night till dawn will not be sufficient time for 600 people to crawl, one behind the other, a distance of 35 meters. Because it is not a matter of just these 35 meters. It is important to get as far beyond them as possible, unnoticed. We must also bear in mind that in the course of the hours it will take to cover this distance, fights may flare up. Everyone will want to be the first in line.12

  So even as the digging was going on, another plan was taking shape in Pechersky’s mind. The main idea of this plan was to eliminate the SS men in the camp by force and then to carry out the escape. For this purpose, he asked Feldhendler to prepare in the workshops about seventy sharp knives to be distributed to the Underground members in time for action. “In case the plan fails,” Pechersky said to Feldhendler, “we should at least have some weapons in our hands.” Pechersky also asked Feldhendler to find a way for him and Leitman to be transferred from their work in Camp IV, which was in the remote part of Sobibor, to work in the carpentry workshop, which was in Camp I. From this working place, which was located in the center of the camp, it would be easier for them to control the preparations and to command the operation when it began. The next day, October 8, Yanek, the head of the carpentry and an Underground member, requested three more workers from the SS man in charge. He received permission, and during the morning roll call he took out three prisoners, including Pechersky and Leitman.13

  October 9 was Yom Kippur. The prisoners were permitted to gather for Kol Nidrei prayers in one of the barracks. This prayer gathering was used by members of the Underground Committee to discuss further plans. It was already clear that the tunnel escape plan had failed. What remained was the plan for escape by using force and arms. All efforts had to be directed to preparing an Underground cadre divided into combat groups, to arm them with knives, axes, and shovels, and to be ready for the uprising. This was the outcome of the Yom Kippur talks.14

  The uprising plan had to take many details into consideration. Pechersky, in his talks with Feldhendler, had gathered information and studied the routine of the German staff in the camp—where they were during the day, in which places they were working, when they came for inspections, whether they could be summoned for some reason to the workshops. He learned when the SS men were going on vacation to Germany, for before they left they used to come to the workshops of the ta
ilors, shoemakers and goldsmiths, or to the stores, to ask the Jewish prisoners to prepare clothing and other presents to take to their families. He also learned a very important fact: only the Ukrainians who were on guard duty received ammunition for their weapons, and this only in small numbers—in some cases no more than five bullets. All the others carried no ammunition in their rifles.15 The reason for this procedure was that a short time before, some Ukrainians had escaped from the camp to join the partisans and had taken their arms with them. Rifles with no bullets made it more difficult for the Ukrainians to escape and fight their way to the partisans.

  From the information Pechersky collected and during the night talks with Leitman in the barrack, as they lay side by side on the wooden bunks, the general plan of the uprising started to take shape. The main idea was to kill the SS men within a short time while they were dispersed in different work sites or when they would be summoned to the workshops under different pretexts. The next stage would be the organized escape from the camp.

  There were still many unsolved problems. One was how to place prisoners of war, who had to be the backbone of combat groups, in the different workshops and stores where the SS men had to be liquidated. Another problem was how to organize the 600 prisoners who knew nothing about the uprising for a mass escape after the SS men would be eliminated. All this had to be carried out in a very short time and unnoticed by the Ukrainians on the watchtowers. The whole problem of the Ukrainian guards and their reaction after they discovered what was going on had to be considered. As Pechersky began working on the details of the plan, an unforseen development, connected with some of the capos, opened new possibilities for Pechersky and his friends.