by Yitzhak Arad
The Underground activity did not pass unnoticed by two of the capos in the camp, Czepik and Pozyczka. Indeed, it was very hard in such a small camp, where the life of the prisoners was limited to a few workshops and living barracks, to conceal any unusual talks and movements. The intimate talks between Pechersky, Leitman, and Feldhendler in the women’s barrack, as well as the tunnel digging, had drawn their attention. In the first days of October, Czepik, who was the capo in charge of the putzers, approached Moniek, the putzer foreman and a member of the Underground Committee. Czepik told Moniek that he knew some clandestine activity was going on and that he would like to participate and help in the escape from the camp. Moniek denied any knowledge of such activity or preparations for an escape. On October 7, Feldhendler told Pechersky and Leitman about Czepik’s request and Moniek’s opinion that it would be worthwhile to include the capos in the escape plot. The decision was to postpone the resolution about including the capos in the activity of the Underground.16
On October 10, Pechersky and Leitman were invited to the smithy to listen to a record player that had been brought by the Ukrainian guards for repair. Someone had found several Soviet records among the belongings left by the victims in Camp II and brought them along. Capo Pozyczka was there also, listening to the records and taking part in the conversation. Later, some of the prisoners, including Pozyczka and Pechersky, went over to the locksmith’s shop, which was in a nearby room. There, Pozyczka found an opportunity to speak to Pechersky and asked him to include him and Czepik in the escape plan. In his opinion, the third capo, Schmidt, could not be trusted. Pozyczka said to Pechersky:
You need not tell me anything. I know all. . . . You yourself are not talking about it to anybody but that little one Shlomo I believe his name is, that clever fellow, does all the talking for you. You are sleeping next to one another and you have the opportunity to talk things over. I know but I’m not informing on you and I don’t intend to. . . . I propose that you make me a partner in the undertaking. Together we’ll carry it through much easier and more efficiently. We, the capos, have the possibility, during worktime, to move about freely through all the camps except Camp III. We can talk with whomever we have to without arousing suspicion. Just think how useful we could be to you. You may ask why do I propose this to you? Very simple. Because I don’t believe the Germans. Frenzel makes all kinds of rosy promises to us. We have privileges, but when the time comes to liquidate the camp, we’ll find ourselves standing next to you. They’ll kill us too. That is clear.17
Pechersky did not give Pozyczka a definite answer. He neither confirmed nor denied the existence of an Underground group and the preparations for an escape. He faced a dilemma. He understood the advantages of having the capos with them and the important help they could extend in the preparation and implementation of the escape. On the other hand, to put their trust in the capos, to believe in their honesty, to be dependent on their loyalty, was not an easy decision. He decided to discuss the whole matter with the other members of the Underground Committee.18
Time was running out. Winter was approaching, and in November there could be snow. The trails left in the snow would make a successful escape almost impossible. The time for action was limited to the end of October, no more than two weeks away. It was also becoming more and more difficult to preserve the secrecy of the existence of an Underground organization and the preparations for a mass escape from the prisoners in the camp. The talk with Pozyczka convinced Pechersky that their clandestine activity was known among the prisoners. This created a very dangerous situation, because in some way their activity and preparations could reach the camp authorities. There was no time to postpone the action; decisions had to be taken promptly.
39
The Plan for the Uprising in Sobibor
On the morning of October 11, when the prisoners were already at their workplaces, horrible screams and rifle shootings came from the direction of Camp II. A new transport of victims had arrived and was taken to Camp III. The people of this transport resisted. Some who were already undressed realized what was going on and started to run to the barbed wire; they were shot down by the guards. It took some hours of turmoil in the camp until this transport was liquidated.
October 12 was also an unforgettable day for the prisoners. In the morning a group of SS men led by Frenzel entered the living barracks. At that time, eighteen camp inmates, who had been sick for several days, were lying on the bunks inside. Frenzel ordered the sick to rise at once and march to Camp III. One of the sick was a young man from Holland who could hardly stand on his feet. His wife, who was in the women’s barrack, found out where her husband was being taken. She threw herself at the Germans, screaming, “Murderers! I know where you are taking my husband. Take me with him. I will not, you hear, I will not live without him. Murderers! Scum!” She took her husband’s arm, supporting him, and marched off with the others to her death.1
Pechersky and his fellow prisoners from Minsk were not used to such tragic events, and they were shocked at the liquidation of the transport and at the way prisoners like themselves, with whom they worked and slept side by side, were taken to the gas chambers. They faced the fact that they, too, could at any moment be taken to their death. They became eager to act.
Another important factor influenced the decision for not delaying the uprising. The Underground leadership learned that Reichleitner, the camp commander, Wagner, the sergeant-major of the camp, and Gomerski, one of the cruellest in Sobibor, as well as some other SS men had left the camp for vacations in Germany. This considerably weakened the German staff in the camp; especially important was the absence of Wagner, who was very shrewd and suspicious, and was the man who kept the strictest supervision over the prisoners. It followed that the uprising and escape would have to be carried out before these key persons returned.2
The Underground Committee held meetings on the evenings of October 11 and 12, at which time the plan for the uprising was presented by Pechersky and discussed in detail. These meetings were held in the carpentry, and some members of the Underground were posted in the yard and at the gate of Camp I to warn if Germans or Ukrainians were approaching. In that event the Underground Committee would have time to scatter.
The first subject discussed at the meeting on October 11 was the request of the two capos, Pozyczka and Czepik, to join the Underground. In Pechersky’s plan for the uprising and escape, the two capos would play an important role. They would place members of the Underground in the stores and workshops where the killing of the SS men had to be carried out. They also would be indispensable in organizing all the prisoners of the camp for the escape. Of particular importance was Pozyczka, because he could move freely through the whole camp, while Czepik was limited mainly to Camp I. After a short discussion, it was agreed to accept them into the Underground, and Pozyczka was called to join the meeting. When Pozyczka walked into the carpentry workshop, Pechersky told him: “Pozyczka, we have decided to invite you to this consultation. I think you understand what kind of responsibility you are assuming by coming here. If we fail, you will be one of the first to be executed.” Pozyczka replied that he understood and that they should not worry about him.3
After Pozyczka joined them, Pechersky presented his plan. The first stage of the action would be the liquidation of the SS men. They had to be eliminated one by one, without the slightest sound and within no more than one hour. Less time was impossible, but it could take no longer. If one of the SS men became aware that another SS man was missing, he might sound the alarm. The task of killing the SS men would be assigned to people selected mainly from among the prisoners of war, those who were known for their courage and resolution, who had battle experience and who would be firm and unwavering at the decisive moment. One moment of vacillation, one failure, could spoil the whole action. It would be the duty of Pozyczka to transfer some prisoners of war to Camp II, where none of them were working, to kill the SS men there.4
The details of the uprising and esc
ape were discussed also on the following evening, October 12, at a meeting attended by all the members of the Underground Committee, and by Capo Pozyczka. This meeting was held a few hours after the eighteen sick prisoners were taken to the gas chambers, and this selection overshadowed the deliberations.
A detailed plan for the uprising was discussed at this meeting. It was decided where the battle teams would be stationed; an exact timetable was fixed for the uprising; and members of the Underground Committee received their assignments. The time of the action was influenced by two factors, similar to those in Treblinka. First, it had to be carried out during working hours, when the SS men who had to be liquidated were still dispersed in the different areas of the camp and the prisoners were working in their vicinity. Second, it had to be close to nightfall, so the escape of the prisoners and the ensuing pursuit by German forces would be in the darkness.
The plan of escape was based on the assumption that the Ukrainians, except for those ten or so on guard duty, had no ammunition for their rifles. According to this plan, the prisoners would escape through the main gate, where it was known that there were no mines, but this would mean they would pass right by the Ukrainians’ barracks. It would therefore be disastrous for the whole plan if the Ukrainians in the barracks had ammunition and dozens of them, in addition to those who were on guard duty, could open fire on the prisoners. Pechersky decided to check this personally. He asked Pozyczka to send him to the Ukrainians’ barracks for some repairs. Next day a request came to Yanek, the head of the carpentry shop, to send somebody to repair the doors in these barracks. Yanek, a member of the Underground Committee, sent Pechersky to carry out the work. The barrack was empty when Pechersky came in, and he was able to check some closets where rifles were kept. There was no trace of ammunition in the barracks. Pechersky returned to the camp carpentry satisfied with the results of his search.5
The quiet liquidation of the SS men had to be carried out in the workshops of Camp I and in the warehouses of Camp II. Pechersky was in charge of the operation in Camp I. Feldhendler had to command the killing of the SS men who were in Camp II at that time and to cut the phone line that connected the administration building in the forester’s house to Wlodawa and Lublin. The cutting of the phone line had to prevent a call for help from these places and postpone the pursuit. For these actions, Feldhendler would have under his command a group of Polish Jews and some prisoners of war.
The plan did not take into consideration the prisoners in Camp III. There were still Jewish prisoners there to clean the gas chambers and cremate the corpses from the transports that continued to arrive from time to time. The last of these had been the transport of October 11. The number of Jews in Camp III was unknown: it may have been several dozen or as many as 150. The prisoners in Camp III were totally unaware of the preparations for the uprising in the other parts of the camp and did not participate in them.
The detailed plan that was crystallized during the consultations held on the evenings of October 11 and 12 was divided into two main stages:
• Stage A: The quiet liquidation of the leading SS staff: 15:30–16:30 hours.
• Stage B: The escape from the camp: 16:30–17:30 hours.
In Stage A the leading SS men would be asked, for various reasons, to come to the workshops in Camp I or to the warehouses in Camp II. They would be asked to these places by the heads of the workshops or warehouses, for clothing or shoe measurements, for inspecting some work in the carpentry workshop, or for similar excuses. In each of these places, a battle team of two or three Underground members, armed with knives and axes, would be hiding; they were to kill the SS men. Six battle teams were assigned to carry out this action.6 It was to take place inside the barracks, in absolute silence, so that the Ukrainian guards on the towers or in other places would neither see nor hear what was going on.
The Underground members in Camp II would be reinforced by a battle team of prisoners of war whom Capo Pozyczka would transfer from Camp I at 15:30 hours. They would be received there by Feldhendler, who was working in Camp II. The liquidation of the SS men in Camp II was to begin at 15:30. At 16:00, the phone line, which was the only means of communication from the camp to the outside world—there was no wireless equipment in the camp—was to be cut. The electric lines had to be cut later in order not to raise unnecessary suspicion at this early stage of action. The trucks had to be sabotaged by the prisoners working in the garage. The Underground members had to prevent, even by force, any prisoners who had witnessed the killings in the workshops and stores from leaving the barracks in case they might panic and reveal what was going on and thereby jeopardize the entire action. The liquidation of the SS men in Camp I had to begin at 16:00, after or close to completing the elimination of the SS men in Camp II.
An Underground member, Shlomo (Stanislaw) Szmajzner, a Polish Jew who was in those days in charge of repairing the stoves in the Ukrainian barracks, undertook to smuggle out some rifles from there and bring them to Camp I at the start of the action. According to the plan, the firearms that would be at the disposal of the Underground at the end of Stage A would include a dozen revolvers taken from the killed SS men and some rifles that Szmajzner was supposed to seize. Some youngsters and women who worked in the SS barracks were to smuggle out any ammunition that they might find there. For crossing the fences between the sections within the camp and the outside fences, wire cutters also had to be prepared in the workshops. The main goal of Stage A was to quietly eliminate most of the SS men in the camp, among them all the key personnel, so that no authority would remain capable of organizing the Ukrainians for suppression of the uprising and for immediate pursuit.
During Stage B all 600 prisoners in the camp had to be assembled and, in an organized way, leave the camp through the main gate, the only exit from the camp without mines. The idea behind this plan was that after Stage A was quietly accomplished, the Ukrainians at the guard positions would still be unaware of what was going on. Then, by sticking to camp routine, the prisoners would be called to the daily evening roll call by Capos Pozyczka and Czepik. In the autumn, when night fell early, the evening roll call was around five o’clock. At the roll call, those prisoners who were still unaware of what was happening would be informed about the action. They would be warned not to panic and told that, since there was no possible penance after the SS men had already been killed, the only chance of survival was to proceed with the plan. Then the entire prisoner body in the roll call, lined up four abreast, headed by the prisoners of war, armed with pistols taken from the SS men and led by Pozyczka, would march to the camp gate—just like the Waldkommando used to go to work in the woods. Until the march toward the gate, nothing of the daily routine would have been altered. The assumption was that without the key SS personnel in the camp, it would take some time for the Ukrainian guards or some of the surviving Germans to grasp that something unusual was happening. With some luck, the prisoners might march right out the gate—at least be close to it—before their ruse was discovered.
While marching toward the camp exit, some of the Underground members would try to penetrate the arms store of the SS, which was close to the gate—but only after the main body of prisoners would be near the gate, or even outside it. It was assumed that at this stage the guards would certainly catch on to what was happening and open fire. But, being close to the gate and armed with the weapons, the prisoners would continue the breakthrough from the camp by force and fighting.
The plan did not detail what the prisoners would do after they left the camp. Once outside the camp, everyone was on his own. They would try to escape to the woods and later attempt to find the partisans or some other shelter.
During the discussion about the uprising plan held by the Underground Committee at the meeting in the carpentry workshop on the evening of October 11, Pechersky was asked by Yanek what would happen if the Germans were to cut off the gate and the approach to it with machine-gun fire. This might even happen before they had a chance to get enou
gh weapons to arm themselves. Pechersky replied:
It’s quite possible that the guards will become aware of this before the anticipated time, cut off our path to the gate and open fire on us from the two machine guns they have there. In that case, if we have succeeded in arming ourselves, we’ll engage them in battle. But just in case this doesn’t come off, we must be ready with an alternate plan.
Not far from the carpentry workshop, very close to the wire fence, stands the officers’ house. We must assume that even if the strip of field nearby is mined, it is mined with signal mines which are not dangerous. Right there, behind the officers’ house, the wire fence must be hacked through. Those in the front lines will hurl stones as they advance. Where the stones fall, the mines will explode. Thus the way will be at least partially cleared of mines.
This is the plan. Shlomo [Leitman] and I have thought it through more than once. We see no other alternatives. Now let each of you consider carefully whether you’ll be able to carry through the task assigned to you. Tomorrow evening we will meet again. And remember, comrades, not a word to anyone. Neither to wife, brother, nor friend may you utter a single word of what was decided here.7
The possibility that gunfire might be opened on the prisoners while they were still in Camp I at the roll call was taken into account and the carpenters prepared planks and a ladder to be used to cross the water ditch west of Camp I in front of the fences and to climb over the fences. The planks and ladder were hidden in the weeds behind the carpentry workshop.8
At the meeting held on October 11, the date for the uprising was fixed for October 13, and this was confirmed at the meeting on October 12. The secret of the uprising was known to the members of the Underground Committee and to some prisoners of war who had to take part in eliminating the SS men, a total of about thirty to forty members of the Underground. The details were known only to the Underground Committee. The axes and knives were distributed at the last moment to those assigned for action.9