by Yitzhak Arad
However, these diggings and searches endangered the German intent to erase the traces of their crimes and hide the very fact of the existence of a death camp in Belzec. Germans and Ukrainians from Sobibor and Treblinka were sent back to Belzec to prevent further diggings and to restore the “peaceful-looking” character of the place. To prevent future searches and digging, Operation Reinhard authorities decided to keep a permanent guard on the spot. A farm was built for a Ukrainian guard who would live there with his family. This precautionary measure was later adopted also in Treblinka and Sobibor. Globocnik wrote about this to Himmler: “For reasons of surveillance, in each camp a small farm was created which is occupied by a guard. An income must regularly be paid to him so that he can maintain the small farm.”4
A group of twelve Ukrainians under the command of Unterscharführer Karl Schiffer came from Treblinka to build the farmhouse. Another group arrived from Sobibor to carry out afforestation work there. Scharführer Heinrich Unverhau testified about this group:
A few weeks before the uprising in Sobibor, I and three other SS men and a larger group of Ukrainian auxiliaries were again ordered to go to Belzec. We were doing afforestation work there. . . . We had to prevent the Poles from turning the whole area upside down in their searches for gold.5
The afforestation work was completed at the end of October 1943, before the winter set in and the last SS men and Ukrainians had left the place. A former Ukrainian guard from Belzec settled there with his family, and the Belzec death camp had turned into an “ordinary” farm.
The next camp to be liquidated was Treblinka. The last transports to this camp, before its closing, came from the Bialystok ghetto, where over 25,000 Jews had lived until the second half of August 1943. All these Jews, according to the deportation plan, had to be sent to Treblinka in five train transports.6 The transports, which included seventy-six freight cars, arrived in Treblinka on August 18 and 19. The other three transports passed through Treblinka, but continued on. One went to Majdanek; one to Auschwitz; and one with children to Theresienstadt.
The two transports from Bialystok were the last to arrive and be murdered in Treblinka. At that time the camp had already ceased to be fully operational. Part of it had been destroyed during the uprising a few weeks earlier, and only a few Jewish prisoners were still there to carry out the work connected with the extermination process. Therefore, the annihilation of the transports from Bialystok took more time than before the uprising. Only ten freight cars loaded with Jews could enter the camp simultaneously, as opposed to twenty previously. These difficulties were why the other transports from Bialystok, except for the one with the children, were sent to Majdanek and Auschwitz.7
The deportation and liquidation of the Jews from Bialystok was the last large-scale killing operation in which Globocnik and the Operation Reinhard staff were involved. Upon accomplishing this mission and in recognition of his work, Globocnik was promoted and appointed by Himmler as the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Trieste area in northeast Italy. Another reason for Globocnik’s transfer to Italy was his strained relationship with Governor-General Hans Frank.8 Moreover, the Germans were urgently needed at that time for reinforcements in Italy. This was after the downfall of Mussolini and the landing of the Allied forces in southern Italy and was a period of increased partisan activity in northern Italy.
Globocnik left Lublin in September 1943 and took with him to Italy a group of SS men and Ukrainians who had been under his command in Operation Reinhard, including Wirth, Stangl, and Reichleitner. Gottlieb Hering, the commander of Belzec and later Poniatowa, joined them in Italy after Operation Erntefest.
For Stangl, the appointment to Italy was a pleasant surprise. Since the uprising of August 2 in Treblinka, he had been worried about being charged with responsibility for what had happened there. Stangl testified to his feelings after the uprising:
They left me stewing for three weeks before Globocnik sent for me. It was my most difficult time. I was sure I would get all the blame. But as soon as I entered the office, Globocnik said: “You are transferred immediately to Trieste for antipartisan combat.” I thought my bones would melt. I had been so sure they were going to say I had done something wrong, and now, on the contrary, I had what I always wanted. I was going to get out. And to Trieste, too, near home. I went back to Treblinka, but I only stayed three or four days, just enough to organize a transport. . .9
Kurt Franz, Stangl’s deputy, was appointed commander of Treblinka. He was responsible for dismantling the camp, destroying the gas chambers, and erasing all signs of the extermination camp. Franz had at his disposal some SS men and a group of Ukrainian guards. The physical work was carried out by about 100 Jewish prisoners who remained there after the uprising. The work was accomplished during September/October 1943. A few days after the uprising in Sobibor, on October 20, thirty to fifty Jewish prisoners from Treblinka were sent to Sobibor to carry out the dismantling work there.10
In Treblinka about thirty Jewish prisoners remained, among them two women, to finish the work there. They were kept during the night in two closed freight cars on the railway spur. On November 17, the last transport, carrying equipment from the camp, departed. At the end of November, Kurt Franz received an order to demolish whatever yet remained in Treblinka and to take his men to Sobibor. Before Franz and his men left, the last Jewish prisoners were shot. Franz was in charge of the execution. The Jews were taken in groups of five and shot by three SS men. Before being shot, each group was forced to cremate the corpses of the five who had been shot before them; the last group was burned by the Ukrainians.11 These thirty Jews were the last victims of Treblinka.
On the grounds of the former camp there were still sections of barbed wire, some pits, heaps of sand, and all kinds of articles—traces of the terrible tragedy that had occurred there. An agricultural farm was built on the site, and the bricks from the gas chambers were used for the farmhouse. A Ukrainian by the name of Strebel who had been a guard in Treblinka brought his family and began farming the area. The deserted fields of Treblinka were plowed, lupin was sown, and pine woods were planted.12
The last camp to be demolished and closed was Sobibor. After all the prisoners who had not escaped were shot there the day after the uprising, the Jews who were brought to Sobibor from Treblinka carried out the dismantling work. They also loaded the ammunition from Camp IV onto trains.13 As in Belzec and Treblinka, all the buildings in Sobibor were destroyed and a farm was built. Late in November, upon completing this work, all the remaining Jewish prisoners were murdered. They were taken to Camp III, forced to lie down side by side on the grills where the victims were cremated, and shot. The execution was carried out by Oberscharführer Wagner and the Ukrainian Zugwachmänner Alex Kaiser and Bodessa. The place was guarded by some other SS men and Ukrainians. The last SS men and Ukrainians left the camp in December 1943.14
Treblinka today, as a national memorial.
Sobibor today. The national memorial. The extermination area, where the bodies were cremated.
While Operation Reinhard was in its closing phase and the death camps in various stages of liquidation, Globocnik was replaced as SS and Police Leader of the Lublin district by SS Gruppenführer Jacob Sporrenberg at the end of August/beginning of September 1943. However, the labor camps and the industrial enterprises of the SS in the Lublin district remained Globocnik’s responsibility until October 22, 1943. Globocnik was then relieved of responsibility for the labor camps in the old airport of Lublin, in Trawniki, in Poniatowa, and from his post as director of the Eastern Industries.15 All these camps were put under the command of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, headed by SS Obergruppenführer Oswald Pohl. But even then Globocnik was not officially exempted from his responsibility over all the assets, including valuables and money, taken from the victims of Operation Reinhard, valued at hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks. On September 22, 1943, Himmler had already sent Globocnik a letter with a request to submit to him by December 31,
1943, a summary report concerning all the assets and economic achievements of Operation Reinhard. Globocnik wrote to Himmler from Trieste on November 3, 1943. The letter read:
I concluded Operation Reinhard, which I directed in the General Government, on October 19,1943, and have dissolved all the camps. I take the liberty of submitting the attached portfolio to you, Reichsführer, as my final statement. I have in the meantime handed over the labor camps to SS Obergruppenführer Pohl. . . .
During a visit, you, Reichsführer, held out to me the prospect that a few Iron Crosses might be awarded for the special performance of this difficult task after the work had been concluded. . . . I beg to point out that such an award to the forces of the local SS and Police Leader was authorized for the work in Warsaw, which formed only a comparatively small part of the total work. . . .16
On November 30, 1943, Himmler replied to Globocnik:
Dear Globocnik,
I confirm receipt of your letter dated November 4, 1943, and your notification regarding the termination of Operation Reinhard. Also I thank you for the portfolio you sent me. I express to you my thanks and my acknowledgement for the great and unique services which you performed for the entire German people by carrying out Operation Reinhard.
Heil Hitler!
Sincerely yours,
H. H. [Himmler]17
In his letter Himmler did not refer to Globocnik’s request that the Iron Cross be awarded to leading figures of Operation Reinhard. His thanks and acknowledgment were to suffice.
Globocnik submitted to Himmler a further report about the economic and administrative developments of Operation Reinhard on January 5, 1944. The report included a detailed appendix about the assets delivered from Operation Reinhard—Reichsmarks, foreign currency, precious metals, other valuables, and textiles. Globocnik knew that some circles in SS headquarters, mainly those in the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, blamed him for not properly handling the economic matters of Operation Reinhard, and even accused him of corruption. In his report he wrote: “ . . . a certain odium still rests upon me to the effect that in all economic matters I did not maintain the necessary order. In this respect I must advance indisputable proof that this is not so.”
Globocnik asked Himmler to confirm that the delivery of the assets was in proper order and that he was no longer responsible for any economic aspects of Operation Reinhard. A copy of this report was sent by Globocnik to Obergruppenführer Pohl. Globocnik was also worried about other problems concerning his participation in Operation Reinhard. He wrote in his report: “There is one additional factor to be added to the total accounting of [Operation] Reinhard, which is, that the documents dealing with it must be destroyed as soon as possible, after all the other basic works concerning this matter have already been destroyed.”18
In January 1944, the question of hiding his crimes began to bother Globocnik, whereas a year and a half earlier, in August 1942, when asked by visiting SS officers whether it would not be better, for reasons of secrecy, to cremate rather than to bury the corpses of the victims of Operation Reinhard, Globocnik had answered, “We ought, on the contrary, to bury bronze tablets stating that it was we who had the courage to carry out this gigantic task.”
In the summer of 1942, Globocnik was still confident of Nazi Germany’s ultimate victory and the annihilation of the Jewish people, and his part was to be a “glorious chapter” in the history of the Third Reich. But at the beginning of 1944, things seemed much gloomier. The German army was retreating on all fronts, and defeat was looming. The “gigantic task” Globocnik spoke of in August 1942—and, above all, his personal involvement in it—had to be hidden, erased from history. All the documents had to be destroyed, even those that did not relate directly to the murder of people but to money, textiles, and gold. Globocnik did not hesitate to mention this to Himmler in his last report on Operation Reinhard. And why should he? They had been partners in the “gigantic task” that had become the most gigantic crime of history.
Operation Reinhard was terminated.
Epilogue
The largest single massacre action of the Holocaust, Operation Reinhard, which lasted twenty-one months, from March 1942 to November 1943, was carried out by, and accomplished according to the plans of, the Nazi extermination machine. It was an integral and substantial part of the overall plan for the “Final Solution of the Jewish problem.”
The commanders of Operation Reinhard, Globocnik, Wirth, and the SS men subordinate to them, succeeded in creating an efficient yet simple system of mass extermination by using relatively scanty resources. In each of the death camps—in Belzec, in Sobibor, and in Treblinka—a limited number of 20 to 35 Germans were stationed for purposes of command and supervision, and about 90 to 130 Ukrainians were responsible for guard duties. All the physical work in the extermination process was imposed on 700 to 1,000 Jewish prisoners who were kept in each camp.
The layout and structure of the camps were adapted to serve the extermination system and procedure. They were relatively small and compact, which enabled permanent and strict control over the entire area and all activities in the camp. The material used to build the camps—lumber and bricks—and the means used for the extermination—a simple motor vehicle and ordinary petrol—were readily available in the immediate vicinity. Local workers and Jewish prisoners built the camps. All these elements made the entire operation independent of outside and distant factors. Anything needed for the smooth running of the extermination action could be procured in the surrounding areas within a short time. The killing system, as developed by Wirth, enabled the murder of tens of thousands of Jews every day in the three death camps under his jurisdiction.
The German authorities succeeded in keeping the erection of the camps and the activities there secret from the overwhelming majority of the victims throughout Operation Reinhard. Even when rumors or some information about Belzec and Treblinka, and, to a much lesser extent, about Sobibor, reached the Jews still left in the ghettos of the General Government, the people were reluctant to believe them. It was much easier to accept the Nazi ruse that the deportees were destined for labor camps somewhere “in the East” where manpower was needed for wartime economic enterprises than to believe that innocent people were being sent to gas chambers. But even those who took the rumors about gas chambers and mass extermination seriously had no means of rescue for themselves and their families.
In the face of the hostility of substantial segments of the population and the indifference or neutrality of the majority of the local people, the chance to find refuge from deportation was practically nil. The Germans further influenced the non-Jewish population by using embedded anti-Semitic feelings, bribery, and threats to encourage the capture and surrender of Jews in hiding or those who were attempting to escape. The Germans were the beneficiaries of the “non-interventionist” attitude of the local people, which kept them neutral and silent while their Jewish neighbors were dispatched to their death. This attitude, even if it was often motivated simply by fear of reprisals in case of extending help to Jews, contributed to the success of the Nazi extermination machine.
The Jewish people, in order to survive, were in need of active help from the local people in providing hiding places, food, and Aryan documents. This was forthcoming neither from the local Polish population nor from the Polish Underground. There were only a few exceptions to this general pattern of noninvolvement. The attitude of the majority of the Ukrainian population, which lived in the areas east of the camps, was even more hostile.
The Jews in the ghettos and in the camps were aware of the attitude of the local population and the slim chances of finding refuge among them. This, and the uncertainty of the destination and fate of the deportations, discouraged many from even considering escape. Nevertheless, many did try to escape during the deportations and from the trains. Very few survived.
The ruse continued even after the Jews arrived in the camps. Almost all of the victims went to the gas chambers believi
ng that these were indeed baths. Secrecy, deception, and disguise on the one hand, and little chance for rescue or for hiding among the local population on the other hand, enabled the Nazis to keep their extermination machine running smoothly.
But those Jews who were selected for work in the camps and who were aware of what was going on there did not give up. Prisoners in Sobibor and Treblinka succeeded, despite the strict control and surveillance under which they were kept, in carrying out individual escapes and in staging an uprising accompanied by a mass escape. The uprisings ensured the survival of hundreds of prisoners and revealed the secrets of the death camps to the world. These survivors were the main witnesses at the Sobibor and Treblinka trials in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as at other trials. The perpetrators did not succeed in their attempts to bury and burn the truth of the camps together with the victims.
While Nazi Germany succeeded in keeping the aim of the deportations and the existence of the death camps secret from their victims, they did not succeed in preventing the truth about Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka from reaching the governments in London and Washington. In the initial stages of Operation Reinhard, information was transferred by the Polish Underground to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London and through their channels to the governments of Great Britain and the United States. As time passed, and especially toward the end of 1942, more and more detailed and accurate information reached the free world. It can be assumed that such information also reached the government of the Soviet Union.
No action followed this information. No steps were taken to warn the victims, to call on the local population and Underground to help the victims, to bomb the railways, or even the camps, to disturb the smooth implementation of the deportations and extermination. The Jewish people were left to their fate.