I've argued that, on theism, all actual horrible events/actions are, to be more precise, morally best, or at least among the morally best live options in our actual world. I've argued that this undermines our ability to make moral decisions. You've disagreed and again mentioned your theistic explanations of morality from earlier.
Randal: Okay, but morally best is not the same thing as among the morally best live options. My primary issue is with the former description rather than the latter one.
Justin: The problem is that it's not at all obvious how you think this solves anything.
I imagine you use background information regarding likely causes and outcomes of events when making moral choices, to best inform your efforts toward what you see as your obligations.
Now, if you know that murders actually occur with a high frequency, then you have an overwhelming amount of background information that says that, very frequently in the actual world, murders are among the best moral options for God to achieve her ends.
Randal: No, Justin, my moral judgment that murder is wrong is not based primarily on background information regarding the likely causes and outcomes of murder. Rather, as I pointed out in our discussion of moral perception, it's rooted in an immediate perceptual grasp of the wrongness of the action, a grasp that can subsequently be strengthened by discursive reasoning. And that intuition or immediate perception provides the basis for our grasp of moral value and obligation.
And God allows murders because God has morally sufficient reasons to do so. That doesn't change my moral obligation to prevent murder where possible. Think again of John Rabe, called to protect the innocent in Nanjing.
Justin: Okay, but our intuitions are often shaped by past moral experiences. These are experiences in our background information. My only point is that you might not understand what God's exact reasons are for these tragedies but your background information tells you that very, very often they do, in fact, exist if theism is true. To the theist who rationally incorporates this rich amount of background information into their decision-making, it will not be at all obvious to them whether or not to intervene if given the opportunity to stop a murder.
Randal: Once again for good measure: our moral duty is to prevent evil while knowing that God has a morally sufficient reason to allow the evil we fail to prevent.
And as for the problem of evil you've presented, the question is whether the person open to the arguments I've presented for theism should think you've provided a good reason to think God doesn't exist.
Justin: I disagree. I began this chapter by promising to offer evidence which favors atheism over theism. Now, everybody has different starting points, and of course they may have other arguments to consider (like your pro-theism arguments), and perhaps they'll end their investigation on the theistic side of the fence with you.
Randal: Sounds good to me. The grass is definitely greener over here.
Justin: I'm sure you think that. My only point is that that's a separate question from whether the information I'm offering up in this chapter counts as evidence favoring atheism over theism.
Randal: My point here is that your argument is of negligible impact for a person who is already a theist, since they readily assimilate the evils of the world into their overarching providential framework.
Justin: But, Randal, this is trivial if their ad hoc assimilation strategies are poor or inductively confused. After all, I've never claimed that all theists should find these arguments compelling.
Moreover, I could make the same trivial point against all the arguments you've presented in this book. I'm not interested in winning converts per se. I'm interested in what hypothesis the evidence favors.
Randal: Hold up there, kemosabe; I'm not talking about people who exhibit “ad hoc assimilation strategies.” One of my primary concerns with this attempt to appeal to evil as evidence against God involves the issue of cognitive limitations. In my view, you are simply not in a position to opine on the kinds of reasons God could have to allow the evils that do occur. To object to God's existence based on the very limited experience we have of the world is equivalent to rejecting the novel of a Nobel Prize–winning author after reading the first page. Like the reader of that book, your selection sample is too limited. You're simply not in a position to draw an informed judgment.
Justin: There needs to be a careful distinction drawn out here. You claim that, because of the limited experience and knowledge of humans compared to God, we cannot rationally say that it is unlikely that God has some justifying reason for arranging things in such a way as the argument highlights. Now, if that was the argument, I'd probably agree with you.
Randal: Awesome.
Justin: It's not.
Randal: Aww, nuts.
Justin: It is essential, I think, to understand that this argument is comparative and centers around the explanatory merits of two distinct metaphysical theses. If, according to atheism in conjunction with blind, Darwinian evolution, the relevant observations to which I've drawn attention are likely, then this view has a certain degree of explanatory power. If, on theism, our knowledge in relation to God's has us skeptical of our ability to put any likelihood estimations on theism's ability to yield the relevant data, then theism scores poorly (relative to atheism) with respect to explaining the relevant data. At the very least then, the observational data regarding pain and suffering favors atheism.
Randal: Well, I've argued that Darwinian evolution doesn't favor atheism, since there are many theoretical possibilities to account for the origin of species on an atheistic view. So I don't think atheism has any advantage here.
Justin: You're certainly welcome to argue that.
Randal: And for that I am thankful!
Justin: But it's important to note that your conclusion that Darwinian evolution doesn't favor atheism does not logically follow from merely pointing out other theoretical possibilities on atheism. Besides, that was only the first half of the argument.
Randal: So here's the big question: should we expect this kind of world if theism is true? While I concede that a superficial reflection might say no, I think a deeper reflection will say yes. Time and again we find the truth in the wisdom that high reward only comes with high investment. God could have set us in a cosmic nursery where the biggest suffering is a stubbed toe. Or he could have hooked us all up to pleasure machines, the ultimate matrix.
Justin: To be honest, pleasure machines sound pretty sexy.
Randal: Hmm, sorry to disappoint you. But life is about far more than pleasure. It's about becoming people of virtue, good people.
And from that perspective, it isn't nearly as surprising that God put us in a world of undeniably great suffering, since this is also a world tuned for soul-making. On the other side of that dark night of the soul there is also inestimable reward in the attainment of courage, selflessness, compassion, and love. Those are the goods that God brings about through this veil of tears. And I'm content to defer to divine wisdom that those great goods give redemptive meaning to the suffering of the world.
INTO THE ICY DEPTHS OF GOD'S HIDDEN REASONS
Justin: At least with regard to the two main arguments I've presented in this chapter, evolution and the relationship between biological goals and pain, it isn't at all obvious that soul-making has anything substantive to add to theism's ability to explain any of it.
But now to a disturbing trend I've noticed repeatedly throughout this entire exchange, which was most clearly on display in your most recent comments. On the one hand, you boldly claim that we finite humans are “simply not in a position to opine on the kinds of reasons God could have to allow the evils that do occur.”
Randal: That's right.
Justin: And yet, now you're doing just that by claiming that the goodness of soul-making is, in fact, one of the reasons that God allows evil to occur. What gives, Randal?
Randal: What gives? What gives? I'll tell you what gives!
In the passage you just quoted, I
was not intending to claim that we can't have any knowledge about the reasons God might have to allow evil to occur. Indeed, it is part and parcel of the Christian tradition to claim we do have at least some knowledge in this area. See, for example, biblical passages such as Romans 5:3–5 and James 1:2–4. Rather, my intent was to claim that we don't have a comprehensive grasp of all the kinds of reasons God would have. In other words, the soul-making justifications cited in the two biblical passages I just referenced are the tip of what could be a very large iceberg.
Justin: Okay, I see.
However, there remains a problem with this response. If we have no idea whether or not the moral reasons represented in the “tip” of the proverbial iceberg are even roughly representative of the iceberg as a whole (and if we have no idea how big the known tip is compared to the unknown bulk of the berg), then we are in no position to make judgments regarding the likelihood of there being contra-soul-making concerns in the unknown bulk of the iceberg that cancel out the soul-making concerns you've brought up as represented in the “known” tip of the iceberg.
How's that for a run-on sentence?
Randal: Pretty impressive, actually!
Justin: When mystery is theism's greatest resource, explanations are its biggest weakness.
Randal: Oh wow, nice line. Seriously man, you could market that on merchandise at secular humanist conventions!
However, I must say there is some irony in all this. While you don't have much sympathy with the soul-making reasons God might have for allowing evil, you are quick to speculate on the possibility of additional so-called contra-soul-making concerns. What reason do you have to think that the perfect God would include these contra-soul-making reasons (whatever those may be) in his big iceberg of reasons for allowing evil?
Justin: The iceberg analogy is being used to illustrate the difference between the total moral reasons God, if she were to exist, would have available to her compared to the total number of moral reasons we, with our limited intellect, can plausibly see.
For all we know, the unseen bulk of the berg of reasons could be much larger than the portion we know of and might contain a myriad of reasons completely inconceivable to us. If God exists and what you say about our ignorance compared to God is true, then at the end of the day, we're simply not in a position to place any expectations on God's actions.
Randal: Um, I disagree. But go on.
Justin: But, Randal, for any reason on which you speculate in order to excuse God's poor fit with some horror in the world, there is always the fact that, for all we know, this reason is massively outweighed by unknown reasons (unknown to us but known to God) hiding below the surface that point in the exact opposite direction. Appealing to unknowns helps nobody because they cancel each other out.
The lesson here I think is that, once we say that we're not in a position to make judgment calls about the kinds of things God is likely to permit to occur on account of all the unknowns, we also rob ourselves of being in a position to make informed judgments that our favorite theodicy is not also outweighed by other reasons within that unknown-to-us section of God's epistemic iceberg.
Nevertheless, if we're comparing two hypotheses as to their ability to explain some set of data, a mystery-heavy hypothesis will perform poorly relative to most of its possible rivals. Compared to the ever-deepening mystery that is the theistic hypothesis, the indifference of atheism has a relatively easy time explaining the issues discussed in this chapter.4
Randal: For starters, I never endorsed your claim that “we're not in a position to make judgment calls about the kinds of things God is likely to permit….” Quite the opposite, in fact. As I've pointed out, we have access to many of God's reasons, just not all of them. Moreover, since God is maximally good, we have excellent grounds to believe that whatever reasons he has for allowing evil are consistent with the desire that the maximum number of his creatures possible achieves a state of shalom (that is, wellness or flourishing).
To drive the point home I'm going to return to something you said earlier in this chapter, during our exchange on evolution. To recap, I raised the prospect that evolution could be overturned by a new scientific theory in the future. And you replied like this: “But Randal, this is the case with all evidential arguments on all sides of any debate that appeal to the current state of acquired knowledge.”
I didn't think that response worked in that context, and I explained why. But I do think it works here. The fact is that there is no reason at all to believe God is motivated by what you call contra-soul-making concerns, and so we can safely set that skeptical scenario aside.
Problem solved.
Justin: Eh, not so fast.
You've argued that, if God exists, we have access to some of her reasons. But, more importantly, you've also compared God's knowledge (and our access to it) to an iceberg. We can see the portion above water, but not the rest. In fact, we have no idea how big the submerged portion is so we also have no idea if the part we see is even roughly representative of the iceberg as a whole. For all we know, it could be massive down there.
Randal: No doubt.
Justin: So, with God's moral reasons, we see some of them, yes. But we don't know if the reasons we do see are even roughly representative of the total reasons that exist (only God knows them all).
The entire point of bringing this up is so that you can argue that we are not in a position to make likelihood inferences about the total moral reasons for which God might act from the moral reasons we can see. That is, unless we have good reason to think the moral reasons we see are representative of the whole of moral reasons available to God.
What follows then is that we are not in a position to say that there probably do not exist any contra-soul-making moral reasons. This is because we shouldn't expect to know about or “see” them even if they did exist. But if that is true, then we are also in no position to say that the posited soul-making reason you've given isn't cancelled out by these other possibly existing contra-soul-making moral reasons.
So, we're left yet again with theism being explanatorily blind when it comes to the facts about suffering (pain, evolution, etc.) that we observe in the world.
Randal: Explanatorily blind? I can see you're not pulling your punches here. Fair enough. If you want to play rough, we can both finish this book with some bumps and bruises!
So here's the essence of your proposed skeptical concern: while the theist purports to know some reasons why God allows evil, we can't claim to know that these reasons are, as you say, “roughly representative of the total reasons” that God has to allow evil. And for all we know, some of the as-yet-unknown reasons lodged deep in the icy, dark depths of that divine iceberg could be soul-destroying for finite creatures.
Justin: Well, right, so, just as nearly every action we can take has reasons in support of it and reasons against it, God might have reasons we know about that motivate his actions that are soul-making and others that we are ignorant of that are soul-destroying and that motivate God to avoid certain actions.
The crux of the issue is that, given that we have no reason to think that the moral reasons we know of are representative of the whole of moral reasons, we are in no position to say one doesn't cancel out the other. If we're to endorse this skeptical attitude about moral reasons to avoid key inferences in arguments from evil, then it needs to be consistent and recognize that all we are doing is punting to mystery. On the other hand, atheism renders the facts about suffering identified in this chapter a matter of common course.
Randal: Sorry Justin, but it seems to me that you're the one punting to mystery here. What you neglect to observe is that whatever additional reasons God may have must be consistent with the reasons already revealed. The theist believes God is maximally good and wise and that God always acts in a way consistent with the end of eventually achieving the maximum shalom or wellness for his creatures. This means that whatever other reasons for allowing evil may be hidden in the dark depths, they must
be in accord with God's unwavering desire for his creatures to flourish. And with that fact the skeptical worries you've raised melt like, well, an iceberg in the tropics.
Justin: I agree fully with that. I'm not suggesting the possibility that God has soul-destroying behavior that she engages in. I'm suggesting just the opposite. Just like with human decision makers, there are going to be reasons for or against God doing any particular action. For all we know, from God's perspective, the soul-making reasons that we mere humans know of may be cancelled out by soul-destroying reasons of which we are ignorant and of which God knows all too well. If the view about our ignorance compared to God's is correct, none of us are in a position to say this is unlikely.
Randal: There you go punting to mystery again with your “for all we know” speculations. So if we're going to play that game, then here's another one: for all we know, we're brains in vats being fed a matrix of manufactured experience of an external world that doesn't really exist. After all, if we were brains in vats we wouldn't be able to tell that we are. So perhaps you want to worry about that too?
Justin: Remember, you're the one (not me) who seems willing to appeal to this “for all we know” skepticism of God's potentially hidden reasons. You've done this in an attempt to avoid the thrust of my arguments throughout this entire conversation. I've argued that you've failed to consider consistently the implications on your end.
You'll no doubt disagree. But I think we may have hit the last dead-end in our conversation.
Randal: You're right, I disagree. The fact is that you're the one who needs to come to terms with the fact that your ad hoc atheistic parries are futile when contrasted with my intellectually superior theistic swordplay. Ahem, and now as I have your back against the wall once again, alas we find the chapter coming to a close!
Justin: Here I was thinking the Monty Python ending would never come!
Randal: Indeed! But you fought bravely Black Knight, even if I've left you hopping on one leg!
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