by Clay Blair
A Loss boat and a Pfeil boat made contact with the convoy in clearing weather the next day, September 24. The Loss boat was the veteran U-432, commanded by the Ritterkreuz holder Heinz-Otto Schultze. The Pfeil boat was the new U-258, commanded by Wilhelm von Mässenhausen, age twenty-seven. Schultze sank a 5,900-ton American freighter. Mässenhausen fired a full bow salvo at overlapping ships and claimed damage to two freighters, but the hits could not be confirmed.
On the next day, Coastal Command aircraft gave Slow Convoy 100 saturation coverage, which drove the U-boats under and held others at bay. Upon learning of this, Dönitz canceled a plan to resume operations, blaming the storm, poor radio reception, and aggressive escorts for the failure of the joint Loss-Pfeil attack. The confirmed losses in Slow Convoy 100: five ships for 26,300 tons. Three of the five were sunk by one of the twenty-one U-boats assigned to the battle, Brandi in U-617.
Caught up in the same hurricane, the British 20th Support Group was unable to carry out its hunter-killer mission. After the weather cleared, the group remained briefly in support of Convoy 100 and Slow Convoy 102 (the first of this type to sail from New York), but for naught since the U-boats did not find and attack that convoy. In early October the hunter-killer group returned to the British Isles to prepare for Torch missions. Although it had not made contact with the enemy, the group gained valuable operating experience, which was passed on for the benefit of hunter-killer groups to be formed in the future.
Farther to the west, meanwhile, the seven remaining boats of group Vorwärts refueled from Wolf Stiebler’s tanker, U-461, on September 20 and established a patrol line to intercept an eastbound convoy predicted by B-dienst. After the storm had swept through, one of these boats, the new U-380, commanded by Josef Röther (who had sunk a lone 3,000-ton Norwegian freighter from Outbound North 129 but lost that convoy in foul weather), found what he reported to be an eastbound convoy of big “troop transports.” Owing to the “great value” of these supposed troopships, all remaining boats of groups Pfeil, Vorwärts, and the boats of a newly formed group, Blitz, were ordered to converge on Röther’s convoy.
Röther had found not a convoy of big “troop transports,” but rather a formation of moderate-size vessels similar in silhouette to big two-funnel ocean liners. In actuality, they were American Great Lakes steamers sold to the British en route from the St. Lawrence River to England in a special fast convoy, River to Britain, or RB 1. A dozen or more U-boats responded to Röther’s contact, all hungrily seeking a formation of ocean liners of 15,000 to 20,000 tons filled with troops.
Ten U-boats were in contact with convoy RB 1 by September 23. Two boats, Hellriegel’s U-96 and Röther’s U-380, incurred diesel-engine failures that spoiled any chance of hauling ahead for an attack. Six other boats attempted to shoot, but only two managed to do so: Karl Hause, age twenty-six, in the new U-211 and the Ritterkreuz holder Ernst Mengersen in U-607. Neither skipper claimed a hit. Mengersen reported that while maneuvering for a submerged daylight attack, he was rammed by a destroyer but sustained only slight damage. By happenstance, Hause in U-211 encountered the 11,200-ton American tanker Esso Williamsburg, which was sailing alone, and sank her.
A dozen boats held contact with the RB convoy. On September 25 and 26 half of them attacked. Karl-Otto Schultz in the new VIID (minelayer) U-216 claimed sinking a 19,000-ton liner. His victim was later identified as the 5,000-ton laker Boston. Hellriegel in U-96 claimed that his torpedoes “exploded” a 17,700-ton liner. His victim was later identified as the 5,000-ton laker New York. Kurt Makowski, age twenty-seven, in the new U-618, claimed sinking a 11,660-ton vessel, which proved to be the 1,500-ton laker Yorktown. Heinz Walkerling in U-91 claimed a hit on a steamer, but it could not be confirmed. Kurt Sturm, age thirty-six, in the new U-410 reported four misses. Georg Wallas, age thirty-seven, in the new U-356 reported three misses. Otto von Bülow in U-404 reported that his attack failed. A half dozen boats lying in wait ahead of the convoy in daylight were outfoxed when the convoy suddenly zigged away.
Von Bülow in U-404 hung on tenaciously. The next day he regained contact and attacked, firing three torpedoes at a destroyer, the old 1,100-ton British Veteran. Two torpedoes hit Veteran; the third hit a freighter. The destroyer blew apart and sank with heavy loss of life. The hit on the freighter could not be confirmed.*
Shortly afterward von Bülow returned to France. He claimed sinking three freighters and a tanker for 23,000 tons, the destroyer Veteran, and probable hits on two other freighters during this patrol. Postwar records confirmed the sinking of Veteran but not the other ships, plus hits on two tankers in ballast for 16,700 tons. Counting past claims and overclaims, von Bülow was awarded a Ritterkreuz.† He was the only skipper in the North Atlantic to win that high decoration in the fall of 1942.
Dönitz was convinced that this attack on RB 1 was successful: three big “ocean liners” for about 50,000 tons and Veteran sunk. When aircraft from Iceland appeared at the site, he wrongly assumed that they must be assisting in the rescue of the hundreds of soldiers embarked in the liners and canceled further operations. The OKM diarist—and Berlin radio—gloated that the loss of the “three big ocean liners” was “a severe blow to the enemy.” In reality, the U-boats had sunk three ancient lakers and Veteran, comprising 12,600 tons in all.
A boat of group Pfeil, the U-617, commanded by Albrecht Brandi, came upon another convoy in foul weather on September 26. It was Outbound North 131, escorted by Canadian Escort Group C-3, the destroyers Saguenay and Skeena and five corvettes. Brandi’s contact report drew in seventeen other boats of groups Vörwarts and Blitz, which hurriedly reorganized into a single new group, Tiger.
While the boats gathered, Brandi was authorized to shoot. He claimed that three torpedoes sank two freighters and damaged another, but none of these sinkings or hits have been confirmed in postwar records. One of the radar-equipped escorts drove Brandi off and prevented a second attack. Thereafter another massive storm swept the area, fouling the operations of group Tiger. The old hand Werner Schulte in U-582 sank a 3,000-ton Norwegian freighter that strayed from this convoy. Kurt Makowski in the new U-619 found and sank another, a 7,200-ton American freighter. Georg Wallas in U-356 hit and stopped yet another straggler from the convoy, but he missed and the ship steamed off into foul weather and escaped. Another boat of this group, U-595, commanded by Jürgen Quaet-Faslem, was disabled by a fire in a battery cable and forced to abort to France. Due to the storm, operations versus Outbound North 131 were canceled.
Altogether, the Allies sailed nineteen convoys across the North Atlantic run east or west in September, comprised of about 580 merchant ships.* The great congregation of U-boats mounted decisive attacks on only three convoys in the month of September: the eastbound Slow Convoy 100 and RB 1, and the westbound Outbound North 127. From these convoys, the boats sank nineteen merchant ships (3 percent) and two destroyers (the Canadian Ottawa and the British Veteran) for about 89,000 tons. Nine of the merchant ships sunk (1.5 percent) were eastbound to the British Isles.
German casualties in the North Atlantic in the month of September were not light. Five new boats were lost: the IX U-165, and the VIIs U-253, U-261, U-705, and U-756. Four VIIs aborted with battle damage: U-218, U-440, U-595, and U-659. In addition, one of the two highest scorers, the aging U-96 (four ships for 16,000 tons), had to go into yard overhaul.
HEAVY U-BOAT LOSSES
By October 1942, the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and Acquitania were operating fulltime on the North Atlantic run transporting American personnel to the British Isles. Sailing with as many as fifteen thousand troops, these fast liner troopships were escorted away from the American coast by American destroyers, then zigzagging at high speed, crossed the Atlantic unescorted. Upon nearing the British Isles, an escort of British warships met the liners and shepherded them through North Channel to the Firth of Clyde.
On the night of October 1, the Queen Mary, captained by C. G. Illingworth, with about fifteen thousand American troops em
barked, picked up her British escort about sixty miles northwest of Bloody Foreland. The warships included the light antiaircraft cruiser Curaçao, commanded by John Boutwood. As it happened, that night the new Type VII U-407, commanded by twenty-five-year-old Ernst-Ulrich Brüller, which had sailed to the North Atlantic from Kiel on August 15 and was inbound to Brest, came upon the 81,235-ton Queen Mary, with a fair chance to shoot.
Apparently, lookouts or the radar watch on Curaçao or Queen Mary saw U-407 and gave the alarm. Turning to run down U-407’s bearing, Curaçao crossed into the zigzagging path of Queen Mary. The sharp bow of the big liner struck Curaçao amidships at about twenty-six knots and cut her clean in half. The two sections of Curaçao drifted apart and sank within five minutes. Captain Illingworth could not risk the Queen Mary to rescue Curaçao’s survivors, and 338 men perished. Brüller deserved credit for indirectly causing the loss of Curaçao, but the British kept the mishap secret until after the war.
In compliance with Hitler’s orders, six Type VIIs of the Atlantic force were directed to penetrate the Strait of Gibraltar during the period of the October new moon and permanently join the Mediterranean U-boat force, commanded by Leo Karl Kreisch. For administrative purposes, Dönitz organized the boats into group Tümmler After passing through the strait, they were to patrol the western Mediterranean before proceeding to bases at La Spezia, Pola, or Salamis.
Group Tümmler sailed from French bases from October 1 to October 4. En route, two boats reported “radio failures” and did not attempt the strait: Dietrich Lohmann in U-89 and Rudolf Franzius in U-438. Both skippers subsequently repaired their radios and joined groups operating on the North Atlantic run. Four boats successfully penetrated the strait on the nights of October 10 and 11: Kurt Diggins in U-458, Gerd Kelbling in U-593, Herbert-Viktor Schütze in U-605, and Gotz Baur in U-660. Schütze in U-605 reported that upon entering the Mediterranean, a British submarine shot at him but missed. The addition of these four boats increased the German U-boat force in the Mediterranean to nineteen.
The “loss” of these four boats from the Atlantic force to the Mediterranean was partially offset by the return of two boats that had been loaned recently to the Norway/Arctic commands to attack PQ/QP convoys and repel possible invaders of Norway. These were the U-606, with a third skipper in as many months, Hans Döhler, age twenty-four, and the U-436, commanded by Günther Seibicke. Both boats proceeded directly from Norway to groups operating on the North Atlantic run.
A boat of group Luchs, the new U-610, commanded by Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen, age twenty-six, found an eastbound convoy on October 2. This was the fast Halifax 209, protected by British Escort Group B-4. Acting on U-610’s signals, other boats of group Luchs converged, but the weather again turned foul and a solar storm drastically impeded radio transmissions. Nonetheless, a dozen boats got close to the Allied ships and a few were able to shoot. Odo Loewe, from the wrecked U-256, substituting in U-254 for the regular captain, Hans Gilardone, who was ill, reported that he sank the burned-out hulk of the 11,700-ton abandoned American tanker Robert H. Colley, but no other boats had any success.
One reason, U-boat skippers reported, was that “seaplanes” were swarming over Halifax 209, preventing attacks. These were probably Catalinas based in Iceland, working at extreme range. The air escorts sank two U-boats with the loss of all hands: Werner Schulte in 17-582 and Kurt Makowski in the new U-619* A Catalina of U.S. Navy Squadron VP 73 sank U-582.† A Hudson of British Squadron 269, piloted by J. Markham, sank U-619. Another British aircraft depth-charged Heinz Rahe in the new U-257 so badly that he was forced to abort to France, where battle-damage repairs required weeks.
In the days following, Dönitz jockeyed groups Leopard, Wotan, and Panter to intercept westbound convoys, based on a good flow of information from B-dienst. Several boats made contact with one or more of these convoys, but owing to heavy storms, poor communications, misidentifications, erroneous position reports, and other factors, the outcome was less than satisfactory.
A new boat of group Leopard, U-620, commanded by Heinz Stein, age twenty-nine, reported a westbound convoy in very rough seas on October 12. This was Outbound North (Slow) 136, which had come apart in the storm. In response to Stein’s signals, the new U-382, commanded by Herbert Juli, age twenty-six, and the U-597, commanded by Eberhard Bopst, came up and made contact with scattered sections of the convoy, which was escorted by British group B-3. Juli in U-382 fired a salvo of three torpedoes at a “flush-deck destroyer.” He claimed she sank, but no hits on a destroyer could be confirmed. Bopst in U-597 fired four torpedoes at a 7,000-ton freighter and claimed hits, but these were never confirmed either.
Four different U-boats each picked off a straggling freighter of Outbound North (Slow) 136: Ralph Kapitzky in the new U-615 got a 4,200-ton Panamanian and captured the captain and chief engineer; Horst Schünemann, age twenty-eight, in the new U-621 got a 6,100-ton Britisher; Horst Kessler in the U-704, making his second patrol, got a 4,200-ton Britisher; and Alexander Zitzewitz, age twenty-six, in the new U-706, also got a 4,200-ton Britisher.
The convoy escorts and long-range Coastal Command aircraft from Iceland counterattacked the boats of group Leopard. Coastal Command aircraft continued to have successes:
• At about noon on October 12, a B-24, piloted by the commander of British Squadron 120, Terence M. Bulloch, spotted Bopst in U-597 on the surface. In a straight-in, diving attack, Bulloch dropped six shallow-set depth charges on U-597 in a close pattern. Bulloch reported that the U-boat literally blew up, hurling a “large oval chunk” of steel skyward that almost hit his rear gun turret. There were no German survivors.
• Another (unidentified) aircraft caught and depth-charged Herbert Juli in U-382, disabling three of his four bow torpedo tubes. Upon reporting this damage, Juli was ordered to leave the combat zone and to find and provide escort for the inbound blockade-runner Tannenfels. When he finally reached France at the end of October, the boat went into repair for over three months.
Surface escorts of convoy Outbound North (Slow) 136 pounced on Heinz Stein in U-620 and Klaus Rudloff in U-609. They depth-charged Stein for six hours, but he survived to fight on. Battle damage forced Rudloff in U-609, who had only just arrived from France, to abort.
On that same day, October 12, the new U-258 of group Wotan, commanded by Wilhelm von Mässenhausen, found an anticipated eastbound convoy. This was Slow Convoy 104, composed of forty-eight ships, which had sailed from New York on October 3. It was protected by British Escort Group B-6, the battle-wise British destroyers Fame and Viscount and four corvettes manned by Norwegian crews. The British destroyers were equipped with Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar; at least two ships had Huff Duff.
Von Mässenhausen shadowed Slow Convoy 104 and brought up group Wotan. Next to arrive were the new U-221 and U-356, commanded by Hans Trojer and Georg Wallas, respectively. The destroyers and corvettes drove von Mässenhausen and Wallas off, but Trojer in U-221 found an opening and shot a full salvo of five torpedoes. He claimed sinking four freighters for 20,000 tons and leaving another in flames, but only three sinkings for 11,354 tons could be confirmed in this first attack.
Five Wotan boats got into position to launch a second attack on Slow Convoy 104 on October 14. Leading the pack was Trojer in U-221, who claimed sinking four more ships for 27,547 tons, including the British whale factory ship Southern Empress. Only two of these sinkings were confirmed, a 5,900-ton American freighter and the 12,398-ton Southern Empress* The Ritterkreuz holder Ernst Mengersen in U-607 hit and sank a 4,800-ton Greek freighter, but an escort counterattacked him, causing so much damage that he was forced to abort to France. Erich von Lilienfeldt, age twenty-six, in the new U-661, sank a 3,700-ton Greek freighter. Yet another new skipper, Kurt Baberg, age twenty-five, in U-618, claimed two sinkings for 11,000 tons plus damage to a third ship, but only one sinking, a 5,800-ton British freighter, could be confirmed. Finally, another new skipper, Kurt Sturm in U-410, claimed to have sun
k a 3,000-ton freighter that had been damaged by another boat.
In retaliation, each of the two British destroyers of the escort sank a Type VIIC U-boat.
• Viscount, commanded by John Waterman, got a radar contact at six thousand yards on the new U-661 in the early hours of October 15. Waterman immediately rang up twenty-six knots and set a course to ram. He missed on the first try, but, as he put it, “for reasons which will never be discovered,” the U-boat turned and cut right across Viscount’s bow. This time the destroyer hit U-661 a hard blow abaft the conning tower and rode up on her superstructure. When the two ships disengaged, Waterman wrote, the U-boat had “a broken back” and “Viscount opened fire and obtained numerous hits with the close-range weapons.” Fourteen minutes after the original contact, Waterman dropped a “heavy charge” on U-661. Destroyed by these depth charges, the boat upended and sank stern first with no survivors. Heavily damaged by the collision, Viscount reduced speed to seven knots and eased inside the convoy formation.
• In the afternoon of the next day, October 16, the destroyer Fame, commanded by R. Heathcote, which was sweeping ahead of the convoy, got a firm sonar contact at two thousand yards. This was the new boat U-353, commanded by twenty-six-year-old Wolfgang Römer, twenty-five days out from Kiel. Römer was hovering at sixty-five feet—not deep enough to pass under the convoy and too deep to use his periscope. Before he could collect his wits and evade, Fame was on top of U-353, throwing off ten depth charges set for fifty to 140 feet. These explosions wrecked U-353. Römer ordered her to the surface to scuttle.
As Fame was coming about for a Hedgehog attack, U-353 suddenly popped up. When Römer and his crew rushed topside, Heathcote and his men opened fire with every weapon that would bear and rang up eighteen knots to ram. Fame hit U-353 a glancing blow and scraped down her starboard side, tearing a “long rent” in her own plating. When U-353 drew astern, Fame plastered her with five more depth charges set for fifty feet. Meanwhile, the entire convoy overtook the combatants and every ship in it that could bring a weapon to bear opened fire on the U-boat.