Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  Per plan, Merten and Emmermann closed Table Bay on the night of October 5, traveling on the surface to avoid undisclosed defensive mines. To minimize loss of life should U-172 hit a mine, Emmermann ordered as many crew as possible topside in life jackets. What the two skippers found was deeply disappointing. The Table Bay anchorage was “empty,” Emmermann reported. Not only that, Merten elaborated, but the anchorage was bathed by a “searchlight barrage” and land-based radar, which made it impossible for the boats to attack on the surface. Under these circumstances he doubted that the surprise attack would work.

  Both skippers requested release from the plan and freedom of action. In reply, Dönitz asked the two skippers to try again, in case the “empty” anchorage was a fluke of shipping schedules. If on the second try they found the anchorage still empty, then they would be released from the plan and have freedom of action from midnight, October 8.

  Claiming later that he received a garbled version of those orders, Emmermann wrote that he proceeded on the basis that he had freedom of action from 4 A.M., October 7, onward. Hence, he jumped the gun by nineteen hours and sank the outbound 6,200-ton American freighter Chickasaw City with two torpedoes. Three hours later he sank an inbound freighter, the 4,700-ton Firethorn with two torpedoes. Perhaps with crossed fingers or tongue in cheek, Dönitz later reprimanded Emmermann for this premature attack: “The fact that the captain struck prematurely could easily have wrecked the whole operation and for Command reasons it must be condemned.”

  The other four boats waited impatiently for the midnight deadline. Helmut Witte in U-159 also jumped the gun, by five minutes, to sink the 5,800-ton British freighter Boringia with a single torpedo. Neither she nor the two ships sunk prematurely by Emmermann in U-172 got off distress signals. Thus when H-hour arrived at midnight, October 8, Cape Town was lit up “as in peace time” and still unaware that a U-boat attack was in progress.

  The U-boats continued the attack into the early hours of October 8. Emmermann sank his third ship, the 3,800-ton Greek Pantelis with a single torpedo. Close by, Merten in U-68 sank two ships in quick succession, expending seven torpedoes: the 3,600-ton Greek Koumoundouros and the 8,600-ton Dutch Gaasterkerk. Both of these vessels had time to get off distress signals, alerting Cape Town, but authorities there still had no idea the U-boats had sunk six ships.

  At first light on October 8, Cape Town deployed its weak ASW forces. The British destroyers Active, Arrow, and Foxhound, the Australian destroyer Nizam, and the British corvette Rockrose sailed out to do battle, but spent most of the day rescuing survivors of the six ships. Every available military aircraft, including those of a basic training school, took to the air to assist in the rescues.

  The U-boats sank one more ship during that day. Witte found the 7,600-ton British freighter Clan Mactavish imprudently stopped dead in the water, picking up survivors of the Boringia, which he had sunk earlier. Witte put the Clan Mactavish under with two torpedoes. Aircraft on ASW patrols guided another freighter, Matheran, to the scene, and she rescued the crews of both ships.

  After dark that day, Ernst Sobe in the U-cruiser U-179, which was close by U-68 and U-172, torpedoed the 6,600-ton British freighter City of Athens. Still later that evening, the British destroyer Active reached the site and rescued ninety-nine persons. While she was doing so, her radar operator reported a contact at 2,500 yards. This was Sobe in U-179, who had loitered at the scene apparently in hopes of sinking another freighter on a rescue mission. When Active’s sonar operator also reported a contact, her skipper, M. W. Tomkinson, rang up full speed and ran down the bearing.

  Soon Active’s lookouts discerned a “large” U-boat on the surface, which appeared to be stopped. Closing to eight hundred yards, Tomkinson turned on his searchlight and opened fire with his main battery. It is likely that U-179’s lookouts had seen Active before she opened fire and that Sobe had dived immediately. However, his big, clumsy, slow-diving U-cruiser was no match for a radar-equipped fleet destroyer. As the seas closed over U-179’s conning tower, Active raced over her swirl at twenty-five knots and fired “by eye” ten depth charges set for fifty to one hundred feet. These blew U-179 back to the surface, Tomkinson logged. She hung momentarily, then plunged under, never to be seen again, an expensive loss in weaponry and manpower for the Germans.*

  Close by, Merten in U-68 and Emmermann in U-172 heard Active’s attack on U-179. Emmermann logged that he picked up the sinking noises of U-179 “quite clearly.” At about this same time, the corvette Rockrose detected and doggedly chased Emmermann, dropping twelve depth charges, which Emmermann described as “too close for comfort.” The explosions slightly damaged one bow torpedo tube but were otherwise “ineffective,” Emmermann continued.

  While that was going on, Merten sank two ships. The first was the fully loaded, 8,200-ton American tanker Swiftsure. One torpedo turned her into an inferno, sending “pitch dark clouds of smoke … hundreds of meters skyward.” Even so, she did not sink immediately and the British tried to tow her into port, but in vain. The second ship was the 5,300-ton British freighter Sarthe, which Merten put under with two torpedoes.

  Merten’s massacre continued past midnight into the wee hours of October 9, when he attacked two more ships: the 5,000-ton American freighter Examelia, sunk with one torpedo, and the 5,400-ton freighter Belgian Fighter, sunk with two torpedoes. In the second attack, Merten lost control of U-68 in a routine dive and plunged at a terrifying angle to 656 feet before his emergency measures restored control. This near-fatal accident dampened somewhat the celebrations over the boat’s remarkable successes at the Cape: six confirmed ships for 36,000 tons sunk within twenty-four hours, bringing his total for this patrol to eight ships for 48,200 tons.

  That afternoon, October 9, in that same area, Helmut Witte in U-159 sank yet another ship with a single torpedo. She was the 6,600-ton American freighter Coloradan. That victory brought the sinkings off the Cape by Merten, Emmermann, Witte, and Sobe in about forty-eight hours to eleven vessels for 77,300 tons, far exceeding U-boat successes off the American coast over a comparable time period. Berlin propagandists praised the skippers for this extraordinary achievement in such far distant waters, releasing their combined score as a conservative twelve ships sunk for 74,000 tons.

  By the next day, October 10, the Cape Town authorities had diverted or frozen most shipping in South African waters, but the Germans scored two more impressive victories. Operating that morning near the Cape in foul, rainy weather and heavy seas, Emmermann in U-172 spotted the 23,456-ton liner Orcades, sailing alone to the British Isles with 1,300 Allied troops and Axis POWs. After a brief chase, Emmermann hit her with three bow torpedoes. The crew abandoned ship, but with the help of fifty-two volunteers who reboarded, the captain attempted to limp into Table Bay. Emmermann chased, reloaded his bow tubes, and put Orcades under with three more hits from close range. That same morning the southbound U-cruiser U-178, commanded by Hans Ibbeken, sank another crowded homebound British liner, the 20,119-ton Duchess of Atholl, sailing alone a little north of Ascension Island. Fortunately for the Allies, the loss of life in the sinking of these two troopships was light: forty on Orcades.*

  The fifteenth—and last—ship to fall victim to the Eisbär boats and the U-cruiser U-l 79 off Cape Town was the 7,200-ton British freighter Empire Nomad. Helmut Witte in U-159 sank her with four torpedoes. When added to the victories achieved on his outstanding first patrol to the Caribbean, Witte’s sinkings off Cape Town qualified him for a Ritterkreuz.† One day after the award of his Ritterkreuz by radio, on October 23, Witte requested a rendezvous with Ibbeken’s oncoming U-cruiser, U-178, to transfer a sick crewman to the latter, which had a doctor on board.

  Believing the South African traffic had been diverted far to the south of the Cape, one by one the Eisbär boats proceeded to that area. This took them to the notorious “Roaring Forties” (i.e., 40 degrees south latitude) where for over a week they were slammed around by hurricane-force storms and mountainous seas. Nonethel
ess, Witte sank with five torpedoes two British freighters on October 29 in. those inhospitable waters: the 5,000-ton Ross and the 7,300-ton Laplace.

  Fritz Poske in U-504 got off to a wobbly start at the Cape, but his luck began to change when he reached the Roaring Forties. There, on October 17, he sank the 6,000-ton British freighter Empire Chaucer. Since he had freedom of action, he elected to go north to Durban on the southeast coast of Africa, where, as he knew, the U-cruisers were headed. En route, he attacked two ships off East London on October 23 and 26. His torpedoes sank the 5,700-ton British freighter City of Johannesburg and broke in half the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Anne Hutchinson. Her stern eventually sank, but a minesweeper and a tugboat towed the bow into Port Elizabeth, a complete loss.

  Remaining about 250 miles east of the coastline to minimize attacks from ASW aircraft, Poske beat the U-cruisers into Durban waters. On October 31 he sank two British freighters: the 7,000-ton Empire Guidon and the 5,100-ton Reynolds. With only two torpedoes remaining, he about-faced and headed home. While rounding the Cape on November 3, he expended his last torpedoes to sink the 5,200-ton Brazilian freighter Porto Alegre. These successes raised Poske’s bag in eighteen days to the level of Merten in U-68: six ships sunk for 36,000 tons. When these sinkings were added to his claims on two prior patrols, Poske qualified for and received a Ritterkreuz* by radio on November 6.

  The four Eisbär boats departed the Cape Town area in high spirits. Merten and Poske went directly up the center of the Atlantic to France. Witte and Emmermann went to a rendezvous with the tanker U-461 and the torpedo-supply boat U-D3.

  Homebound in the middle of the South Atlantic on November 6. Merten found and sank the 8,000-ton British freighter City of Cairo, which carried 125 passengers, including women and children. This sinking raised his score for the patrol to nine ships for 56,200 tons and qualified him for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz, which came from Hitler via radio.† Upon reaching France, both Merten and Poske left their boats and did not return to combat. Merten was assigned to command the 24th Flotilla in the Training Command.

  Witte in U-159 and Emmermann in (7-772, who had become arch rivals in the tonnage competition, proceeded northwestward to the U-tanker rendezvous, raking likely Allied shipping routes between Cape Town and Trinidad. On the way Witte found and sank two lone American ships. The first was the 5,500-ton La Salle, loaded with ammo. The torpedo exploded her cargo with an awesome blast that was heard three hundred miles away at Cape Town and that “atomized” the ship and rained debris on U-159, slightly injuring Witte and three crewmen. The second was the posh but aged (1887) six-masted, 2,300-ton sailing vessel Star of Scotland (ex-Kenilworth), which was en route to Brazil with a load of guns. Witte stripped her of food, cigarettes, and other useful commodities, then sank her by gun. Cutting across the South Atlantic into Brazilian waters, Emmermann sank four freighters, the British Aldington Court, Llandilo, and Benlomond,* of 4,900, 5,000, and 6,600 tons, respectively, and the 5,400-ton American Alaskan. These sinkings raised Emmermann’s bag to eight ships for 60,000 tons and qualified him for a Ritterkreuz.†

  As related earlier, Witte and Emmermann rendezvoused with the tanker U-461 and the torpedo-supply boat U-D3 and eight other U-boats on December 9. In addition to fuel, Witte took on eight air torpedoes and joined six other Type IXs for a concerted attack on Allied shipping in Brazilian waters. In a period of three days, from December 13 to 16, he sank three freighters for 18,600 tons, two British and— awkwardly—one neutral 5,000-ton Argentine, the Star of Suez. These sinkings raised Witte’s score for this patrol to an impressive eleven ships for 63,700 tons.

  Homebound with but two torpedoes on December 11, Emmermann in U-172 found a Cape Town to Trinidad convoy at a grid position exactly predicted by B-dienst. Emmermann attacked, firing one torpedo at each of two ships. He claimed both torpedoes hit and that, based on the noise he heard, both ships probably sank. He was credited with one sinking for about 8,000 tons, raising his bag to nine ships for 68,000 tons, thereby besting his rival, Helmut Witte in U-159, but the last sinking could not be confirmed in postwar records and Witte came out the winner after all.

  The attack by group Eisbär on South Africa was one of the most successful U-boat operations of the war. The four Type IXs sank twenty-three ships for 155,335 tons off Cape Town and Durban. In addition, three of the four sank eleven ships for 60,829 tons en route to and from the Cape, raising the number of sinkings to thirty-four ships for 216,164 tons. This was an average of 8.5 ships for 54,041 tons per boat per patrol,‡ a substantially greater return than the best month in the U-boat attack on the United States.

  The other three IXD2 U-cruisers arrived off the Cape in late October. Cagni tarried in the Gulf of Guinea, where she sank a ship on November 3, and came later. The U-cruisers confronted intensified ASW measures, but these did not significantly impede the Germans.

  Leading the pack, Hans Ibbeken in U-178, who had sunk the 20,119-ton troopship Duchess of Atholl en route, skirted the Cape and went north to Durban. In his first two days in those waters, he vainly chased a tanker, missed a freighter with two torpedoes, and narrowly escaped an aircraft attack. However, on November 1, he attacked “a big passenger ship,” which he identified “quite definitely” as the 18,700-ton Laurentic, a “nice present after so long a time.” His first two torpedoes missed. The next two hit and sank what proved to be a troopship half the size of Laurentic, the British Mendoza, 8,200 tons. About 150 of the four hundred persons on board were killed or never found.*

  Earlier in the war, Ibbeken recalled, Dönitz had promised that he would be the first German U-boat skipper to circumnavigate the island of Madagascar. He did so, sinking two freighters along the way: the 2,600-ton Norwegian Hai King and the 5,200-ton British Trekieve. Bedeviled by engine trouble, the voyage around Madagascar itself was unproductive.

  The second and third IXD2 U-cruisers reached the Cape Town area nearly simultaneously. Ritterkreuz holder Robert Gysae in U-177 was first to find a target. On November 2, he chased and fired four torpedoes at the 4,500-ton Greek freighter Aegeus, which had a load of ammo. Two torpedoes missed but two hit, and the ship literally disappeared in an immense explosion that showered debris on U-177, injuring a lookout. The next day, Ritterkreuz holder Wolfgang Lüth in U-181 found and attacked the 8,200-ton American Ore carrier East Indian. As with Gysae, two torpedoes missed but two hit and the ship went down. Thirty-four of her fifty-man crew were never found.

  The two boats hunted off the Cape for about ten days. Gysae attacked only one other ship, the 2,600-ton British tanker Cerion, sailing in ballast. In a frustrating daylong chase, he shot five torpedoes at her, all of which missed. He then surfaced to sink the ship with his deck gun, but Cerion shot back and finally Gysae was forced to let her go. Lüth in U-181 sank three more freighters (two American, one Norwegian) for 14,000 tons, enough, Dönitz ruled, to qualify him for Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. The award came in a personal message from Hitler on November 13.†

  Gysae and Lüth cruised north toward Durban, where Ibbeken in U-178 concluded his disappointing journey around Madagascar. In the period from November 13 to 15, Ibbeken attacked two British freighters off Durban: the 3,800-ton Louise Moller and the 6,300-ton Adviser. He sank the former, but the latter was salvaged and towed into Durban. In reaction, ASW aircraft twice attacked U-178, driving Ibbeken down and thwarting an attack on another ship. “Three aerial bombs,” Ibbeken logged, “very close [but] no damage.” Still bedeviled by engine and other mechanical troubles, Ibbeken hauled well offshore to make extended repairs, then headed for home. While rounding the Cape, he missed one ship but sank another, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Jeremiah Wadsworth, raising his confirmed sinkings to six ships for 47,000 tons. Upon arrival in France on January 9, completing a voyage of 124 days, Ibbeken left U-178 for other duty.

  On the day Ibbeken departed the Durban area, November 15, the British destroyer Inconstant, responding to alarms from ASW aircraft, caught Lüth in U-181.
Lüth dived deep (573 feet) to evade, but the skipper of Inconstant, W. S. Clouston, mounted a dogged nine-hour chase, dropping thirty depth charges. Late in the afternoon, two corvettes, Jasmine and Nigella, arrived to relieve Inconstant. Jasmine got a sonar contact and dropped five more depth charges but she lost U-181 in the noise and, finally, Lüth escaped in darkness and repaired the considerable damage. It was a close call. Had the two corvettes pursued U-181 as persistently as had Inconstant and had aircraft assisted them the following day, they might well have forced U-181 to the surface for a kill.

  After completing repairs, Lüth cruised north about 250 miles to the magnificent neutral port of Lourenço Marques, situated on Delagoa Bay, Portuguese East Africa. Patrolling near this port over the next two weeks, from November 19 to December 2, Lüth sank by gun and torpedo eight ships for 23,800 tons, four principally by deck gun, expending his entire stock of 355 rounds of 4.1” ammo. A recent biographer of Lüth* characterized the prodigal expenditure of shells as “callous,” “malicious,” and “unprofessional,” in that the gunfire killed many seamen needlessly and that Lüth recklessly exposed U-181 in these attacks.

  Saving two torpedoes for self-defense, Lüth returned to France on January 18, completing a voyage of 129 days in which he traveled 21,369 miles without refueling. His confirmed bag for this patrol was twelve ships for 58,381 tons. This was twice the number of ships that were sunk by Ibbeken in U-178, but 5,350 fewer tons than were sunk by Witte in U-159 and 1,700 fewer tons than were sunk by Merten in U-68 and Emmermann in U-172. Thus a big, expensive U-cruiser in the hands of a veteran skipper wearing Oak Leaves did not sink significantly more tonnage in the same area than any one of the three Type IXCs.