Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

by Clay Blair

  THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE

  Owing to the lack of success and to the heavy air patrols in the Gibraltar-Morocco area, U-boat Control concluded it might achieve better results against Middle Atlantic convoys by attacking them as they sailed out of New York. Accordingly, a task force of six Type IXs was assigned to this operation, including the former Tümmler boat U-106, commanded by Hermann Rasch, who was to first refuel near Madeira from the tanker U-461.

  One of these boats did not get far: the IXC U-508, commanded by Georg Staats. Five days out from France, on February 26, a B-24 of British Squadron 224, piloted by Peter J. Cundy, caught Staats on the surface and bombed the boat, causing heavy damage. Unable to dive, Staats went west at high speed, to get beyond range of Coastal Command aircraft on Biscay patrols. In response to his calls for help, U-boat Control ordered two boats to assist: the IXC U-172, commanded by Ritterkreuz holder Carl Emmermann, outbound to join the New York task force, and the Type VII U-590, commanded by Heinrich Müller-Edzards, outbound to the North Atlantic run with a doctor on board, t

  Emmermann reached the U-508 first and stood by for several days, providing assistance until Müller-Edzards arrived in U-590 with the doctor. Forced to abort, Staats gave Emmermann and Müller-Edzards most of his fuel, then limped back across the Bay of Biscay to France. As a result of the battle damage, the U-508 was out of action for nearly three months. Emmermann in U-172 proceeded toward New York, pausing to sink two lone freighters in the Middle Atlantic for an aggregate of 11,000 tons.

  Another boat assigned to the New York task force was the famous U-130, with a new skipper, Siegfried Keller, age twenty-five, former watch officer on Bleichrodt’s U-109. On his fifth day out from France, March 4, the Luftwaffe reported a convoy en route from Gibraltar to the British Isles. Keller found it the next day and with skill and aplomb, he mounted a lone attack on the convoy, XK 2, firing four bow torpedoes. Remarkably, this single salvo sank four British freighters for 16,400 tons. After he reported that a second attack had been thwarted by escorts, U-boat Control ordered him to break off and to resume his course to join the New York task force.

  Increased to seven boats, the New York task force continued westward across the Middle Atlantic. Several days later, B-dienst provided precise information on a big Africa-bound Torch convoy, United States-Gibraltar Slow 6 (UGS 6), which had departed New York on March 4. Originally it had been composed of forty-five heavily laden ships, but an accident had reduced it to forty-three. A Norwegian freighter sailing alone had blundered into the convoy in darkness and collided with a freighter. The Norwegian had gone down; her disabled victim had been forced to fall out of the convoy. Another merchantman had also fallen out to stand by the damaged ship.

  Like all the American convoys sailing between the United States and Africa and vice versa, UGS 6 was very heavily guarded. Commanded by Charles Wellborn, Jr. (who later rose to vice admiral), the escort consisted of seven modern (1935-1942) fleet destroyers, one of which was fresh from workup. All were equipped with the latest centimetric-wavelength radar. None had Huff Duff, but the improved Allied shore-based Huff Duff network in the Atlantic Ocean area provided the Allies with fairly fast and precise information on the locations of the U-boats that were transmitting radio traffic.

  Upon receiving the B-dienst report, U-boat Control directed the New York task force, five boats of which were organized into group Unverzaget (Intrepid) to alter course and intercept UGS 6. The eager new skipper Siegfried Keller in U-130— still flush from his four sinkings from convoy XK 2—found UGS 6 on the evening of March 12. Per doctrine, U-boat Control ordered Keller to shadow and not to attack until other boats had established contact. Shore-based Huff Duff stations alerted Wellborn to the presence of U-130 and the probability that she would draw in other U-boats.

  At about that same time, the skipper of the second newest of the destroyers, Charles L. Melson (later, a four-star admiral and in 1958-1960, superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy) in Champlin, got a radar contact at two miles. Ringing up flank speed, Melson ran down the bearing and opened fire with his 5” guns in the forward turret at a range of one mile. Too late, Keller in U-130 dived, catching two close depth charges before he could get deep. Temporarily detached from the convoy, Melson in Champlin hunted the U-boat for four hours, carrying out four separate, well-executed depth-charge attacks. Nothing further was ever heard from U-130*

  Forced by another destroyer to drop back, Ritterkreuz holder Carl Emmermann in U-172, who had already sunk two loners, found a straggler fifty miles astern of the formation, the 5,600-ton American freighter Keystone. Emmermann easily sank this sitting duck with torpedoes, then put on speed to haul ahead of the convoy to gain a better shooting position. Meanwhile, five other Type IXs reported contact with the convoy: Ritterkreuz holder Hermann Rasch in U-106; Kurt Sturm, who had replaced the injured Neubert as skipper of the U-167; Rolf Rüggeberg in U-513 (delayed again by engine problems); Ritterkreuz holder Werner Henke in U-515 (who was bound for Freetown and had earlier sunk a lone 8,300-ton British freighter); and Walter von Steinaecker in U-524. Aggressive escorts, sweeping ahead and astern and on the flanks of the convoy as far out as ten miles, “damaged” Henke’s U-515, he reported, but he was not a skipper easily cowed.

  Sensing an opportunity for a big kill that would help the Axis forces in Tunisia, U-boat Control organized a second group, Wohlgemut (Optimistic), to backstop group Unverzaget. On the charts in Berlin the two groups were neatly organized into five and six boats, respectively, but by sunset on March 14, the boats were all mixed up. Attempting to attack in the dark, they were repeatedly detected and driven off by the destroyers. The Ritterkreuz holder Helmut Witte in U-159 and Walter von Steinaecker in U-524 managed to haul ahead for submerged attacks; however, both attacks were thwarted when the convoy suddenly zigged away. Shooting with small hope of success, von Steinaecker hit and sank the 8,100-ton French freighter Wyoming. While the newest of the destroyers, Hobby, drove off the U-boats, skipper Melson in Champlin rescued Wyoming’s entire crew of 127 men.

  To increase the possibilities of a decisive success versus UGS 6, on March 16 U-boat Control ordered those boats of the distant group Tümmler that had sufficient fuel to join the chase. This raised the number of U-boats assigned to the operation to seventeen, less the lost U-130. That same day Emmermann in U-172 and von Steinaecker in U-524, using Metox to help elude those escorts with meter-wavelength radar, gained positions to attack submerged. Von Steinaecker clearly missed and made no claims. Emmermann fired six torpedoes (four bow, two stern) and claimed two freighters for 18,000 tons sunk and two others for 12,000 tons probably sunk. In reality, Emmermann hit only one vessel, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Benjamin Harrison, which was abandoned and sunk by one of the destroyers.

  By noon on March 17, the convoy had reached a position about seven hundred miles west of the Strait of Gibraltar. Later that day several flights of Sunderlands and Catalinas from Gibraltar and Morocco met the convoy and drove the U-boats under. Nonetheless, after dark Kurt Sturm in the IXC U-167 and the Ritterkreuz holder Günther Krech in the VII U-558 attacked. Sturm claimed he sank the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Molly Pitcher, but he only damaged her. Klaus Bargsten in U-521 came up and put the abandoned hulk under with a finishing shot. Krech reported possible hits, but they could not be confirmed. In view of the saturation air coverage and the exhaustion of the U-boat crews, U-boat Control canceled further operations versus UGS 6 in the early hours of March 19.

  Proudly stressing its assistance to Axis forces in Tunisia, U-boat Control informed the OKM that the German submariners had sunk eight ships for 56,565 tons and hit or damaged five other ships from UGS 6. The confirmed ships sunk were less than half the claim: four for 28,000 tons. No other ships were damaged. The other thirty-nine ships of the convoy—and all seven American destroyers— reached African ports without further incident.

  Eight of the boats involved in the battle with UGS 6 immediately set course for France. They
were joined by the IXB U-109, commanded by a new skipper, her former first watch officer, Hans Joachim Schramm, age twenty-six, who had only just arrived in the area but was forced by a mechanical failure to abort. He gave his spare fuel to the homebound boats U-43, U-202, and U-558. The Ritterkreuz holder Hermann Rasch in U-106, who had sunk no ships on this patrol, gave all of his spare fuel to Helmut Witte in U-159 and Werner Henke in U-515. When U-106 reached France, Rasch left the boat and went to other duty. U-boat Control directed three of the homebound boats (U-103, U-504, U-521) to intercept a Gibraltar-bound convoy, but none could find it. After reaching France, Klaus Bargsten in the IXC U-521, who had conducted a relentlessly aggressive patrol and boldly attacked three separate convoys, was awarded a Ritterkreuz* These departures left eight IXs in the Gibraltar-Morocco area, including the newly arrived IXB U-105, commanded by Jürgen Nissen.

  Upon conclusion of Gondola (the Biscay air offensive, from February 6 to 15), the two American B-24 squadrons (numbers 1 and 2) left St. Eval and proceeded, as originally planned, to Port Lyautey, Morocco. The combined outfit, ultimately known as the 480th Group, had flown 218 hunter-killer missions in the Bay of Biscay, comprising nearly two thousand hours flying time. Of the original nineteen aircraft that had finally reached St. Eval, five had been lost on operations: one shot down by a German JU-88, two failed to return for undetermined reasons, and two crashed. Sixty-five airmen had perished. The group’s planes had carried out eight separate attacks on U-boats and had been credited with severe damage to the VII U-211 and one kill, U-519—but, as related, that kill was subsequently withdrawn.

  The 480th Group, commanded by Jack Roberts, began operations from Port Lyautey on March 19 with about one thousand personnel and sixteen aircraft, eight shy of authorized strength. In accordance with the latest agreement between the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, the group was controlled by the commander of the Navy’s newly established Moroccan Sea Frontier, who also commanded Fleet Air Wing (Fairwing) 15, consisting of two squadrons of Catalinas, VP 73 and VP 92. The B-24s were to fly “defensive” missions in support of Torch convoys, rather than the preferred “offensive” hunter-killer missions.

  Pilot William L. Sanford of Squadron 2, flying the B-24 “Tidewater Tillie” (mistakenly credited with sinking U-519 earlier), made a low-level attack on a fully surfaced U-boat northwest of the Canary Islands on March 22. This was the IXC U-524, commanded by Walter von Steinaecker, en route to a new patrol area. Sanford’s crew dropped four 650-pound Mark XXXVII depth charges in a tight straddle. These big missiles destroyed U-524. The airmen saw “nine” German survivors “on a raft,” but they, as well as the rest of the Germans on U-524, perished.

  Having shelved the idea of a New York task force, U-boat Control repositioned the seven remaining boats in a large reconnaissance arc running from west to southeast of the Canary Islands in hopes of snagging another UGS convoy. The reconnaissance arc proved to be futile; no boat intercepted a UGS convoy.

  Acting on B-dienst information, U-boat Control shifted all the boats in the arc, plus, temporarily, the Freetown-bound U-123, commanded by Horst von Schroeter, to the narrow waters between the Canaries and the African coast. Designated group Seeräuber (Pirate), these eight boats found the convoy on March 28. It was RS 3, southbound from Rabat to Sierra Leone, supported by land-based air patrols. As a result of the close protection provided by the aircraft, only three of the nine boats were able to mount successful attacks.

  • Ritterkreuz holder Helmut Witte in U-159 sank a 5,500-ton British freighter.

  • Kurt Sturm in U-167 sank a 4,600-ton British freighter.

  • Ritterkreuz holder Carl Emmermann in U-172 sank a 5,300-ton British freighter, raising his total for this patrol to an impressive five confirmed ships sunk for about 29,000 tons.

  Allied aircraft damaged three U-boats in this brief battle, all commanded by Ritterkreuz holders: Günther Müller-Stöckheim in U-67, Witte in U-159, and Emmermann in U-172. Hit hard by aerial depth charges, the U-67 plunged to 750 feet before the crew could regain control. Upon surfacing later, it was discovered that the six topside torpedo canisters and great chunks of the superstructure had been ripped away. In a similar near-disaster, Witte in U-159 plunged to 689‡feet before regaining control. Emmermann in U-172 stood by U-67 until it was reckoned that the latter could make it back to France. Before leaving the area, U-67 gave spare fuel to Henke in U-515, who proceeded south to Dakar in place of Witte’s badly damaged U-159, which went to a “quiet” area in the Azores.

  By then, the U.S. Navy’s Fairwing 15 at Craw Field, Port Lyautey, Morocco, had become a formidable and busy force: twenty-four Catalinas of Squadrons VP 73 and 92, and twenty-four B-24s of the Army Air Forces ASW Squadrons 1 and 2. On April 7, a B-24 of Squadron 1, piloted by Walter E. Thorne, got a radar contact on Emmermann’s surfaced U-172 thirty miles away. Thorne attacked but, to his surprise, Emmermann remained on the surface, zigzagging and shooting back with his rapid-fire 37mm cannon and other antiaircraft weaponry. When Thorne called for assistance, another B-24 of Squadron 1, piloted by H. C. Easterling, responded. Low on fuel, both aircraft finally ran in and dropped a total of twelve depth charges, but none fell close enough to harm U-172.*

  Two boats, Kurt Sturm in U-167 and Rolf Rüggeberg in U-513, remained in the narrow waters between the Canaries and the mainland. On April 5, two Hudsons of British Squadron 233, piloted by Donald D. Lipman and William E. Willets, hit U-167 and so badly damaged the boat that Sturm was forced to run in close to Grand Canary Island and scuttle in seventy-two feet of water,† About fifty men of U-167 got ashore. After extensive diplomatic negotiations with Spanish authorities in the Canary Islands and Madrid, the crew was released for repatriation.

  Carrying out the first step of a complicated and oft-delayed plan, on the night of April 13-14 the crew embarked at Las Palmas on a tugboat, which ferried the Germans out to a rendezvous with Hans-Martin Scheibe in the VII U-455, who, as related, had laid a minefield off Fedala. Scheibe took the U-167 crew on board, then later met Ritterkreuz holder Helmut Witte in the damaged U-159 and Friedrich-Wilhelm Wissmann in U-518, returning from Brazil. Witte, Wissmann, who refueled from the newly arrived XB minelayer U-117, and Scheibe divided the fifty U-167 survivors among their three boats and returned to France. Upon reaching Germany, Sturm and some of the U-167 crew were assigned to commission a new Type IX.

  Other boats in the Middle Atlantic also began the return voyage to France. On the way, Rolf Rüggeberg in U-513, who had sunk no ships, was diverted to help escort the inbound blockade-runner Irene (ex-Silvaplana), as was Müller-Stöckheim in U-67, until Control learned that U-67 was severely damaged. Two IXCs outbound from France, U-174 and U-176, were also to meet Irene to give her instructions for crossing the Bay of Biscay. None of the boats homebound from the south was able to find Irene.

  Approaching Lorient on April 14, Rüggeberg in U-513 met the German escorts and also the new IXC40 U-526, commanded by Hans Möglich, age twenty-seven, inbound from her maiden patrol from Germany. As the senior skipper, Rüggeberg was entitled to follow immediately behind the minesweeper escort into Lorient, but heedless of protocol, Möglich pushed ahead of Rüggeberg. One mile from home, the minesweeper peeled off and Möglich maneuvered toward the dock, where the commander of Combat Flotilla 10, Günter Kuhnke, together with an honor guard, a band, and other greeters, waited.

  Suddenly there was chaos. U-526 hit a newly planted British mine and blew sky-high. Forty-two of her men were killed, including Möglich; twelve men, including nine injured, were saved. The two halves of U-526 were salvaged for their engines and other valuables. Spared by a breach of protocol, Rüggeberg and the crew of U-513 moored safely amid the frantic rescue operations. Having made two and a half unsuccessful patrols, Rüggeberg left U-513 to command Combat Flotilla 13 in Norway.

  Owing to strong Allied surface and air escorts and to information from naval Enigma decrypts, which enabled many convoys to evade U-boat reconnaissance lines, the U-boat patrols to
the Gibraltar-Azores area in the first quarter of 1943 were extremely hazardous and not very productive. Including ten attack boats that sailed to or were diverted to that area in December* and thirty-six more in January, February, and March, the forty-six patrols resulted in the sinking of forty ships for 252,000 tons, an average of less than one ship sunk per boat per patrol. Twenty of the forty-six attack boats (47 percent) sank no ships. Nine boats (six IXs, three VIIs) were lost. Most of the crew of the U-167, scuttled in the Canaries, was saved, but there were no survivors from the approximately four hundred men on the other eight boats. Seven other boats incurred battle damage that forced them to abort.

  In all, these boats were able to mount really meaningful attacks on only six of the scores of Torch convoys which plied that area from January through April 1943.*

  In March, when ten big eastbound and westbound UG and GU convoys passed through, the U-boats had managed to sink ships from only one, UGS 6. Although the Admiralty was rattled, there was never the slightest possibility that U-boats might sever the Middle Atlantic All-American UG-GU, OT-TO, and CU-UC convoy routes.

  Three boats that engaged in these futile attacks and had ample fuel stocks continued southward for prolonged patrols off Freetown and the Gulf of Guinea, replacing Heinrich Bruns in the IXC U-175, who had sunk merely one ship and had endured a punishing depth-charge attack. The replacements were Jürgen Nissen in the IXB U-105, Horst von Schroeter in the IXB U-123, and Ritterkreuz holder Werner Henke in the IXC U-515. They were joined by the newly sailed IXC U-126, commanded by a new skipper, Siegfried Kietz, age twenty-six. Nissen and Kietz each sank one ship and Kietz damaged the American tanker Standella, previously hit by a U-boat in the Caribbean. Von Schroeter in U-123 sank five ships for 24,900 tons, including the 680-ton British submarine P-615.† Counting the 8,300-ton British freighter he sank en route to join the canceled New York task force and another of 2,400 tons while southbound off Dakar, Werner Henke in U-515 turned in the best patrol of 1943: ten confirmed ships sunk for 58,456 tons.