by Clay Blair
In running up his big score, Henke mounted one of the most remarkable convoy attacks of the war. En route from Takoradi, Ghana, to Freetown, Sierra Leone, the convoy (TS 37) consisted of fourteen freighters weakly guarded by four escorts, one corvette and three ASW trawlers. After fending off a Catalina with a single 20mm flak gun, Henke found the convoy on the moonless night of April 30, ninety miles south of Freetown. Attacking from dead astern, Henke aimed a salvo of six electrics with new Pi2 magnetic pistols at six different ships. He claimed all six torpedoes hit, but in actuality, the two stern shots missed. In a second attack toward dawn on May 1, Henke fired three more electrics with Pi2 magnetic pistols at three different ships. These all hit as well, Henke reported. This time he was right.
His claim was nine ships sunk from the convoy for 62,000 tons, but the confirmed number was seven ships sunk for 43,300 tons. Adding another 4,500-ton ship to his bag in the following week earned Henke Oak Leaves for his Ritterkreuz from Hitler.* Inbound, he refueled from a XIV U-tanker, and returned to France on June 24, completing an arduous but highly productive patrol of 124 days.
Two boats were lost while homebound from these extended Freetown patrols. On June 2, Jürgen Nissen in the IXB U-105, passing close to Dakar, was caught and sunk by an aircraft of Free French Squadron 141. There were no survivors. Severely damaged by aircraft off Freetown, Siegfried Kietz in the IXC U-126 was detected by a plane, bombed, and sunk in the Bay of Biscay on the night of July 2-3. The plane was a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 172, piloted by the Rhodesian Alex Coumbis, who had earlier sunk U-566. There were no survivors of this boat either.
Young Johann Mohr in the IXB U-124, who wore Oak Leaves on his Ritterkreuz, sailed from France to the Gibraltar-Morocco area on March 27. On the seventh night out, April 2, while west of Cape Finisterre, Mohr encountered a big convoy, Outbound South 45, en route from the British Isles to Sierra Leone. Per doctrine, Mohr reported the convoy and shadowed to bring up other boats. Since there were no other boats in the immediate vicinity, U-boat Control authorized Mohr to attack, but only once and not to shadow because of the heavy Allied air patrols from Gibraltar and Morocco, which extended far to the west of Portugal. Taking advantage of the darkness, Mohr attacked on the surface and sank two British freighters for an aggregate 9,500 tons.
Immediately after these sinkings, one of the escorts, the sloop Black Swan, commanded by Rodney Thomson, got U-124 on her centimetric-wavelength radar. Thomson ran down the bearing with both twin 4” forward turrets primed. At a range of not more than one hundred feet—too close to depress the turret guns—a lookout saw U-124’s conning tower go under. Passing over the swirl, Thomson fired a salvo of shallow-set depth charges by eye. He then directed another escort, the corvette Stonecrop, commanded by Patrick Smythe, to fall out and hunt down the U-boat. Smythe got U-124 on sonar and dropped a depth-charge salvo, but lost contact in the noise of the explosions. Nothing further was ever heard from U-124. The Admiralty credited Black Swan and Stonecrop with the kill, a loss keenly felt by Dönitz and others in the U-boat arm.†
As a result of the small returns, the high risks, and of the “shortage of U-boats” for convoy battles on the North Atlantic run (as U-boat Control put it), on April 6, Dönitz ordered that all Type IXs, theretofore regarded as less suitable for warfare against heavily escorted convoys in rough waters, were to reinforce the U-boats operating on the North Atlantic run. The U-boat patrols to the Gibraltar-Azores area, which had produced so few sinkings at such great risk and cost, were again to be temporarily suspended.
FUTILE U-BOAT OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
East of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean U-boat force, commanded by Leo Kreisch, focused almost all of its available strength on Torch shipping in the area between Oran and Tripoli. Counting the losses and new arrivals in the last quarter of 1942, on January 1, 1943, Kreisch had a net strength of twenty-three boats,* of which several were undergoing battle-damage repairs. In place of the two boats that had aborted attempts to transit the Strait of Gibraltar in December, Berlin sent one more boat in January 1943. She was the U-224, commanded by Hans-Karl Kosbadt, who got into the Mediterranean on January 12, temporarily increasing the force to twenty-four boats.
U-boat patrols in the Mediterranean in 1943 were more hazardous than ever. As the Allies closed the vise on the Axis armies in Tunisia, they established a line of airfields along the north coast of Africa, reaching from Oran to Alexandria. Some of these airfields were used by ASW aircraft to protect the convoys sailing in those waters. Other ASW aircraft, based on the island of Malta, provided additional convoy support. These newly arrived aircraft and the growing numbers of surface-ship convoy escorts and a few newly established destroyer hunter-killer groups based in North African seaports became so formidable that U-boat attacks failed time and time again, and more often than ever, drew devastating reprisals.
The OKM issued new submarine-torpedo policies that applied to the Mediterranean U-boats. Owing to the phosphorescence in the Mediterranean waters, the looping air torpedo (G7a, FAT),† which could only be used at night, was to be withdrawn because its highly visible bubble track gave away the position of the U-boat. The plan was that by April 1943, a new looping electric torpedo (G7e, FAT), which left no bubble wake (day or night), was to be issued to U-boats in the Mediterranean and the Arctic and by June to U-boats in the Atlantic force. The FAT production goals called for one hundred of each type per month, but owing to unforeseen “assembly difficulties, considerable delays were encountered. When sufficient electric FATs became available, the Mediterranean boats were to load four of these forward and two aft, as well as six T-3 (Falke) “homing torpedoes” forward.
Owing to the extremely hazardous nature of U-boat operations in the Mediterranean, force commander Leo Kreisch was less demanding of proof of successes and more generous with awards to skippers. A notable case was that of Albrecht Brandi in U-617, one of the boats that had arrived in November 1942 in reaction to Torch.
On his first Mediterranean patrol in November, Brandi claimed that he sank a 5,500-ton freighter and damaged another of the same tonnage and also that he hit and damaged three important warships: a 33,950-ton battleship, a 6,496-ton light cruiser, and a 1,500-ton destroyer. None of these claims has been officially verified.
On his second patrol, Brandi claimed that he sank eight ships for 25,600 tons (including a fleet destroyer) and damaged two freighters for 14,000 tons. Three of the sinkings for 6,996 tons were confirmed: a 4,324-ton Greek freighter, the British ocean tug St Issey, and a 1,862-ton Norwegian freighter. The hits for damage have not been officially verified. On January 21, Brandi was awarded a Ritterkreuz.*
On his third patrol, Brandi claimed he sank three ships for 12,450 tons, including a 5,450-ton light cruiser All three sinkings were confirmed, but the tonnage was almost halved (to 7,264), including the 2,650-ton British minelayer/cruiser Welshman and two medium Norwegian freighters, for an aggregate 4,614 tons.
On his fourth patrol in April, Brandi claimed that he sank an 8,000-ton “Uganda-class” cruiser and damaged two destroyers, and a 23,500-ton “Orcades-class” ocean liner, serving as a troopship. None of these claims has been officially verified. On April 11, Brandi was awarded Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz†
Apart from Brandi in U-617, three veteran Mediterranean U-boats sank three oceangoing vessels for 13,600 tons during January 1943. These included the 545-ton British ASW trawler Jura, by Waldemar Mehl in U-371, who also damaged the 7,200-ton British freighter Ville de Strasbourg; the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Arthur Middleton, by Horst Deckert in U-73; and the 5,859-ton Belgian freighter Jean Jadot, by Egon-Reiner von Schlippenbach in U-453. In addition, the veteran U-431, commanded by a new skipper, Dietrich Schöneboom, age twenty-five, sank four sailing ships for an aggregate 265 tons. The most significant Axis sinking of that month was achieved by Vittorio Patrelli-Camgagnano in Platino, who got the British corvette Samphire,
In the month of Februa
ry, three Mediterranean U-boats sank four oceangoing ships for 16,211 tons. Otto Hartmann in U-77 got two big British freighters for an aggregate 13,742 tons. Waldemar Mehl in U-371 got a 2,100-ton British freighter and also damaged an American Liberty ship. Gunter Jahn in U-596 got a 380-ton British LCI. Wilhelm Franken in the veteran U-565 shared credit with the Luftwaffe for destroying the 7,200-tom American Liberty ship Nathanael Greene and damaged the 10,400-ton British tanker Seminole. In addition, the famous U-81, commanded by a new skipper, Johann-Otto Krieg, age twenty-three, sank three sailing vessels for an aggregate 352 tons. The Italian Pasquale Beltrami, commanding Acciaio, sank the 409-ton British ASW trawler Tervani.
The Mediterranean U-boat force reached its high-water mark in the month of March 1943. Six skippers sank nine oceangoing vessels. Günter Jahn in U-596 was the highest tonnage scorer with the 9,600-ton Norwegian tanker Hallanger and the 7,100-ton British freighter Fort à la Corhe, plus damage to two other big British ships, Fort Norman and Empire Standard, for an aggregate 14,180 tons. Subsequently Jahn was awarded a Ritterkreuz and promoted to command the (Mediterranean) 29th Flotilla.* Second best in tonnage was Gerd Kelbling in U-593, who got three British freighters for 9,723 tons. Otto Hartmann in U-77 got the 5,222-ton British freighter Hadleigh and damaged another of similar size. Josef Röther in U-380 (who had earlier sunk the Dutch troopship Nieuw Zeeland) got the 7,200-ton British Liberty ship Ocean Seaman. Dietrich Schöneboom in U-431 sank the 6,400-ton British freighter City of Perth. Walter Göing in U-755 got a 1,100-ton French freighter. In addition, Johann-Qtto Krieg in U-81 sank two sailboats and a small vessel for an aggregate 454 tons.†
Thus twelve vessels that were sunk by U-boats in the Mediterranean during March 1943 totaled 46,800 tons. Since the positions of lost merchant ships were not announced, this tonnage loss contributed to the general misimpression that U-boats in March 1943 came close to cutting the vital lifeline between the Americas and the British Isles.
In the months of April and May 1943, when the Allies finally closed the vise on Axis forces in Tunisia, thereby gaining control of all of North Africa, the Mediterranean U-boats achieved very little. The high scorer was Wilhelm Franken in U-565, who sank the 5,600-ton American freighter Michigan and the 4,400-ton Free French vessel Sidi-Bel-Abbés, employed as a troopship for Senegalese infantry. Five hundred and sixty-seven men perished in the troopship sinking. These victories earned Franken a Ritterkreuz‡ X Walther Huth in U-414 hit two British freighters, the 6,000-ton Empire Eve, which sank, and the 7,100-ton Fort Anne, which limped into port. Mehl in U-371, Kelbling in U-593, and Göing in U-755 each got a small freighter.
In summary, during the five months from January to June 1943, the twenty-odd U-boats in the Mediterranean force sank thirty Allied ships and nine sailing craft. The vessels included two British warships (minelayer/cruiser Welshman, LCI 162) and one ASW trawler (Jura). Italian submarines sank one other British warship (corvette Samphire) and the ASW trawler Tervani. These thin results were of no real help to the besieged Axis armies in North Africa and, as Dönitz continued to insist, doubtless the boats could have achieved much more on the “decisive” North Atlantic run. Even so, Hitler insisted that the Mediterranean force be maintained at twenty-plus U-boats.
As in prior months, losses in the Mediterranean force were heavy in the period from January 1 to June 1, 1943: eleven U-boats and about five hundred crew, many of them the most experienced submariners in the Kriegsmarine.*
• On the afternoon of January 13, Ville de Québec, one of the sixteen Canadian corvettes participating in Torch, got a strong sonar contact about ninety miles east of Oran while escorting the sixteen ships of convoy TE 13 eastbound from Gibraltar to North African ports. Her skipper, A.R.E. Coleman, notified the other four Canadian corvettes of the convoy escort group, then let go a pattern of depth charges.
His target was the U-224, commanded by Hans-Karl Kosbadt, who had only just entered the Mediterranean on January 9 and had a tanker in his periscope crosshairs. The explosion blew U-224 to the surface, bow first. Turning to ram, Coleman opened fire with his cannons and machine guns and smashed into U-224 forward of the conning tower. Within four minutes, U-224 had disappeared. Coleman reported that a “tremendous underwater explosion” followed and that “pieces of clothing, insulating material and woodwork” rose to the surface amid a “great pool of oil.” It was only ten minutes from first contact to kill. Another Canadian corvette, Port Arthur, rescued the sole survivor, the first watch officer Wolf Dietrich Danckworth.
On January 20, the U-301, commanded by Willy-Roderich Körner, sailed from La Spezia on her second Mediterranean patrol. Körner had orders to intercept an Allied convoy eastbound from Gibraltar. In order to do so, he had to drive full speed on the surface. Shortly after dawn the next morning, the British submarine Sahib, commanded by J. H. Bromage, who was returning from a war patrol to his tender in Algiers, spotted U-301 running on the surface toward his periscope. When the range had closed to four thousand yards, Bromage fired a full bow salvo. One or two torpedoes hit, and the U-301 blew up and sank immediately. Sahib rescued one nineteen-year-old German, the midshipman Wilhelm Rahn, a lookout who had been thrown into the water by the force of the explosion.†
• While approaching a small coastal convoy about one hundred miles west of Tobruk on February 17, U-205, commanded by Friedrich Bürgel, was detected on sonar by one of the four escorts, the British destroyer Paladin. The destroyer ran down the sonar bearing and threw over a salvo of five depth charges set for one hundred feet. Some of these exploded close to U-205 and the damage they inflicted compelled Bürgel to surface and scuttle.
When the U-boat suddenly came into view, the Paladin and another escort, the destroyer Jervis, and a South African Air Force plane pounced. This as yet unidentified aircraft delivered a well-executed attack with guns and depth charges, forcing some Germans on the deck to jump into the water. The wild hurricane of gunfire from Paladin, which by accident killed four of her own men and seriously wounded four others, drove the rest of the Germans over the side. The abandoned U-205 remained on the surface, circling at about nine knots on her electric motors. Unable to bring Paladin alongside, her skipper launched a whaler with a two-man boarding party, Sidney Constable and Kenneth J. Toy. While the party boarded U-205, Paladin and Jervis fished out forty-two German survivors, including Bürgel.
Although U-205 appeared to be slowly flooding, Constable entered her and went below. In his official report, Paladin’s skipper wrote:
On descending [Mr. Constable] found the boat in almost complete darkness and loose gear in considerable confusion.... [He] then proceeded forward to try and find the captain’s cabin. This he found on the port side, his orders being to search for [confidential] books. These were found in a small cupboard near the deck and was shut but not locked. These were passed up the conning tower together with the commanding officer’s binoculars, a superb pair, and a small wireless set. In the Control Room a small cupboard was found of which half was open, the other locked. This was full of books and these in their turn were passed up. In a desk a number of files and notebooks were found.... In all, a very large number of books were recovered.*
Meanwhile the British authorities present at the scene decided that there was a slim chance that U-205 could be “captured.” Accordingly, the British corvette Gloxinia was detached from another small convoy passing nearby and ordered to serve as the towing vessel. After an arduous struggle, Gloxinia finally managed to attach a three-and-a-half-inch steel cable to the still slowly circling U-205 and headed directly for shore at Ras el Hilab Bay, one hundred miles west of Tobruk. About three hours later Gloxinia entered the bay with her tow but by that time U-205 was heavily flooded, and when Gloxinia reduced speed, the U-boat sank stern first in ninety-six feet of water,†
• In the same area two days later, February 19, a Wellington of British Squadron 38, piloted by I. B. Butler, who was providing air escort for a small British convoy, XT 3, spotted another Medit
erranean veteran, U-562, commanded by Horst Hamm. Butler’s attack was not successful, but he dropped two smoke floats and one of the convoy escorts, the destroyer his, fell out to investigate. Isis could not get a sonar contact, but nonetheless she threw over a single depth charge. The senior escort, the destroyer Derwent, joined Isis but could not get a sonar contact either. Derwent ordered yet another destroyer of the escort group, Hursley, to join Isis for a protracted hunt, whereupon Derwent returned to the convoy.
After searching for about one hour, the new arrival, Hursley, got a sonar contact and attacked with a single salvo of depth charges. Thereupon his came up and carried but four consecutive attacks. Then Hursley ran in and fired the sixth salvo of depth charges but before they exploded, U-562 suddenly surfaced momentarily, merely one hundred feet away. In this brief glimpse, the British saw that U-562’s conning tower was “badly buckled.” Doubtless she incurred further damage as she dived again directly into the sixth depth charge salvo. Hursley carried out two further attacks and Isis one before the sonar contact faded away.
Altogether Isis and Hursley conducted nine separate depth-charge attacks, firing fifty-nine missiles. They were certain that they had killed the U-boat, but naval authorities ordered them to remain in the area and hunt for positive evidence. The corvette Hyacinth and two other Royal Navy vessels joined this hunt, but none of the ships could find a thing. Later, however, the Admiralty credited Butler’s Wellington and the Isis and Hursley with the kill of U-562 at that time and place. There were no survivors.
• On the morning of February 23, an Allied aircraft reported a U-boat on the surface off the port of Algiers. This was the newly arrived U-443, commanded by Konstantin von Puttkamer. The British ordered a hunter-killer group of four de stroyers to carry out a chase: Bicester, Lamerton, Wheatland, and Wilton.