by Clay Blair
If viewed as a single convoy, the battle was indeed by far the “greatest success” ever achieved by the Atlantic U-boat force, as Dönitz claimed in his memoir. But the combined confirmed sinkings were significantly less than the Germans claimed: twenty-two ships for 146,596 tons. If viewed as two separate convoys, attacked for the most part by three separate U-boat groups (Raubgraf, Stürmer, Dränger) plus a few nonassigned boats in the area, the results are less spectacular and not records: nine ships for 53,000 tons sunk in Slow Convoy 122; thirteen ships for 93,500 tons sunk in Halifax 229. In any case, assuming forty boats participated, the confirmed sinkings came to an average of about one-half ship per U-boat, no greater success rate than usual.
These two ill-fated convoys sailed during the closing days of the Atlantic Convoy Conference, a time of substantial change in the Atlantic convoy network, an increase in convoy size to sixty ships (plus LSTs) despite the critical shortage of escorts, and the loss of four-rotor naval Enigma. Neither British escort group (B-4 or B-5) was strong enough. Convoy Halifax 229 should have had a rescue ship. Moreover, Western Approaches made a serious mistake in sailing them one after the other on the same track so closely that they appeared to be a single convoy and thus a very rich target worth any risk. Fortunately, the Allies were able to prevent a really hideous massacre by sending surface-ship reinforcements from Iceland and by deploying an umbrella of very-long-range B-24 and long-range B-17 and Sunderland aircraft, which made altogether fifty-four sorties, forcing U-boats off and down and killing one, U-384*
While homebound from these battles on March 18, Max Kruschka in the VII U-621 happened upon a convoy about four hundred miles west of Lorient. This was southbound KMS 111, en route to the Mediterranean. Upon receiving Kruschka’s report, U-boat Control directed all boats and FW-200 Condors that could to home on U-621 and to track and attack these laden ships.
Kruschka doggedly shadowed this rich prey. Three other VIIs, the inbound U-332 and U-634 and the outbound U-632, attempted to close on U-621, but Allied ASW aircraft thwarted them. Hans Karpf in U-632 said he had been forced down “several times,” but he continued his outbound passage. Eberhard Hüttemann in U-332 reported contact, but he was “very low” on fuel and had “no success.” Four homebound IXs and two more homebound VIIs were unable or unwilling to find the convoy and it steamed on, unharmed.
Two nights later, on March 21, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of Squadron 172, piloted by I. D. Prebble, caught Hüttemann in the homebound U-332 on the surface in the Bay of Biscay by moonlight. Prebble dropped six depth charges and severely damaged U-332. Hüttemann played possum until the Wellington left the area, then appealed to U-boat Control for “urgent” assistance. At dawn, Control sent four JU-88s to provide escort for U-332, which could not dive. British Beaufighters also responded, and they shot down two of the four German planes and chased the other two away.* Hüttemann, meanwhile, had repaired U-332 sufficiently to dive to shallow depths. She reached France on March 24, a lucky boat, at least for the present.
During this tough battle on the North Atlantic run, the twenty-eight merchant ships of the “second section” of convoy Halifax 229—designated Halifax 229A—steered a route that was much farther to the north of the U-boats. As planned, four ships put into Halifax and one into St. John’s and a feeder convoy of sixteen ships from Halifax joined the convoy. Of these, one, Lady Rodney, went only as far as St. John’s. After passing that place, Halifax 229A consisted of thirty-eight ships. Four of the thirty-eight aborted (two to Halifax, two to St. John’s), leaving thirty-four. Two others, the American Lone Star and the British Belgian Airman, incurred ice damage and were “detached,” leaving thirty-two merchant ships.
While in far northern waters, the 14,800-ton British whale factory ship-cum-tanker Svend Foyn of Halifax 229A collided with an iceberg on March 19. The sloop Hastings of the convoy’s thin Escort Group 40 fell out to protect her while the crew attempted repairs. Meanwhile, the Treasury-class Coast Guard cutter Bibb, which sailed from Iceland, temporarily reinforced the escort.
All efforts to save the valuable whale factory ship Svend Foyn continued. Four American Coast Guard vessels from Greenland, led by the 240-foot Medoc, arrived to relieve the sloop Hastings. The Svend Foyn’s captain insisted that he could save the ship, but during the night a gale swept the area and she abruptly sank. Of the 195 men on board Svend Foyn, 152 were rescued (128 by Medoc); forty-three were lost.
After Bibb peeled off for Iceland, Halifax 229 A was reduced to thirty merchant ships plus its close escort. All these vessels arrived at destinations in the British Isles. In summary, one ship sank after colliding with an iceberg, six aborted to Nova Scotia or Newfoundland because of mechanical or other difficulties or ice damage, but none fell victim to a U-boat.
B-dienst continued to supply timely information to U-boat Control about the convoys on the North Atlantic run. When the Allies commenced renumbering the slow westbound convoys after Outbound North (Slow) 171—to Outbound North (Slow) 1—B-dienst promptly decrypted the change and gave U-boat Control the convoy’s predicted position and routing. At the same time, it provided routing information on the eastbound convoys Halifax 230 and Slow Convoy 123, each comprised of sixty merchant ships.
As related, Allied codebreakers broke back into Triton by March 20. This was a loss of merely ten days of U-boat signal traffic, during which U-boats sank twenty-t two ships from Slow Convoy 122 and Halifax 229. The new break provided information on U-boats with about a two-day lag, but since U-boat groups were formed and ordered to specific areas several days in advance, the breaks were sufficiently current to be of extraordinary tactical value.
U-boat Control formed two new large groups, Seeteufel (Sea Devil) and See-wolf, on March 20. Consisting of sixteen boats (twelve VIIs, four IXC40s), Seeteufel was positioned to intercept Outbound North (Slow) 1. It was made up of three boats from group Stürmer, one boat from group Dränger, one veteran transfer from the Arctic, four new boats from Germany (two IXC40s, two VIIs), and seven boats newly sailed from France, all of which had made one or more patrols. See-wolf consisting of nineteen boats (seventeen VIIs, two IXC40s), was positioned to intercept the eastbound Slow Convoy 123 and/or Halifax 230. It was made up of one boat from group Westmark and two boats from group Raubgraf that had refueled, eight boats from group Stürmer, seven boats from group Dränger, and one veteran boat newly sailed from France.
All told, the two groups, Seeteufel and Seewolf numbered thirty-five U-boats. About one-third (twelve) were on maiden patrols from Germany. Six of those twelve were clumsy IXC40s, unsuitable for convoy warfare in the North Atlantic, but utilized nonetheless to help alleviate the shortage of VIIs and to augment the U-tankers in refueling operations if necessary.
Convoy Outbound North (Slow) 1 sailed from the British Isles on March 17. It was joined the following day by the British Escort Group B-6, commanded by R. Heathcote in the destroyer Fame. His group was also thin: Fame and another destroyer, Viscount, and four corvettes, one of which was manned by Norwegians.
Two of the Seeteufel VIIs made contact with “destroyers” of Outbound North (Slow) 1: the new U-306, commanded by Claus von Trotha, age twenty-nine, and the veteran U-572, commanded by Heinz Kummetat. Control directed four other Seeteufel boats to join U-306 and two other Seeteufel boats to join U-572. The other eight boats of Seeteufel marked time in place.
Two of the eight Seeteufel boats searching for the ships seen by U-306 and U-572 reported enemy forces. The veteran VII U-564, commanded by Hans Fiedler, saw flares and gunfire. He ran at high speed toward the lights and noise but lost them and could not reestablish contact. The VII U-592, a veteran transfer from the Arctic, commanded by Carl Borm, saw what was believed to be a big freighter, guarded by two escorts, but lost sight of the ships in a snow storm. Helmut Pich in the new IXC40 U-168 found Bonn’s three “ships,” but, he reported, they turned out to be three icebergs with an uncanny resemblance to ships.
Correctly assuming Outbound
North (Slow) 1 had slipped by group Seeteufel, U-boat Control redeployed the whole of that group as well as the whole of group Seewolf to intercept the next two eastbound formations, Slow Convoy 123 and Halifax 230. The redeployments resulted in a line of thirty-five U-boats six hundred miles long(!) running southeast from the southern tip of Greenland.
One of the northernmost of the Seeteufel VIIs, Hans Fiedler in U-564, reported a convoy about 150 miles southeast of Greenland. U-boat Control believed it might be Outbound North (Slow) 2, but in reality, it was the opposite-sailing Slow Convoy 123, guarded by the British Escort Group B-2, with a temporary commander in the sloop Whimbrel. The escort was composed of seven warships: two destroyers, the Whimbrel, and four corvettes. In addition, the American Support Group 6, consisting of the “jeep” carrier Bogue and her two American four-stack destroyers (Belknap and George E. Badger), sailed from Argentia on March 20 to reinforce this convoy, catching up the next day.
Two other Seeteufel VIIs closed on Fiedler’s position: the new U-415, commanded by Kurt Neide, age twenty-six, and the veteran U-663, commanded by Heinrich Schmid. Fiedler and Schmid saw and reported the carrier Bogue sailing in the center of the convoy. U-boat Control responded that the sinking of the carrier was “particularly important for the progress of convoy operations” but the U-boats were not to pursue it to the point that they “let other chances slip.”
The Bogue, commanded by Giles E. Short, contributed little to nothing on this, her second patrol. One reason was the wretched weather. As on her first patrol, gale-force winds and heaving seas restricted aircraft operations, this time to only four days. By coincidence, on the day U-boats discovered her, March 26, she aborted and returned to Argentia with her two four-stack destroyer screen. Owing to weather damage and a faulty catapult, she went onward to the Boston Navy Yard for several weeks of repairs. Contrary to some accounts, Bogue had not yet helped close the Greenland “Air Gap.”
On the following day, March 27, Halifax 230 overtook Slow Convoy 123. This fast convoy was guarded by the British Escort Group B-l, commanded by E. C. Bayldon in the destroyer Hurricane. The group consisted of eight warships: Hurricane and two other destroyers, one frigate, and four corvettes. Bayldon had anticipated assistance from Bogue and her screening destroyers, but Bogue’s abort precluded any warship augmentation.
The northernmost of the Seewolf boats, the new VII U-305, commanded by Rudolf Bahr, found Halifax 230. She shadowed the convoy for a few hours but lost it in foul weather. Nonetheless U-boat Control directed that all sixteen boats of group Seeteufel and the ten most northerly boats of group Seewolf—twenty-six boats—were to seek out and attack the convoy, Halifax 230. One boat of each group could not comply owing to the need to refuel from a U-tanker, but the other twenty-four closed on U-305. Four boats (U-523, U-591, U-610, U-631) made contact with the convoy, but its escorts, responding to Huff Duff, sonar, or radar contacts, drove them off. Six other boats (three IXC40s and three VIIs) were low on fuel and broke off to find the U-tanker.
The remaining twenty U-boats trailing Halifax 230 ran into atrocious weather, a gale of near hurricane force, on March 28. Moreover, that day long-range and very-long-range aircraft from Iceland appeared, forcing the boats to submerge. On top of that, high winds and pitching seas scattered the convoy. As a result, the reports to U-boat Control were fragmentary and unhelpful. The U-591 saw seven freighters and five “destroyers,” but aircraft drove her down. The U-632 saw a tanker with “aircraft escort” but lost it almost immediately. The U-618 saw a freighter escorted by a “destroyer” but could not attain a shooting position before the ship pulled away.
By March 29 the winds were blowing from the southwest at hurricane force. U-boat Control urged the boats to put the wind at their backs and use its force to help them pull ahead of the convoy for one last attack before it reached Hudson-range from Iceland. This was an impossible order. Hubertus Purkhold in the experienced U-260 logged:
Pursuit broken off. While trying to run before the storm at full speed, the boat plunged [under] twice. By blowing tanks, putting my helm hard over and reducing speed I managed to hold her reasonably well on the surface. To remain on the bridge was impossible. In just half an hour the captain and the watch were half drowned. Within a short time five tons of water cascaded into the U-boat through the conning-tower hatch, the voice pipe and the diesel air intake.
The chase turned into a first-class fiasco. Few boats could catch up with the convoy. One Seeteufel boat that did, the experienced U-610, commanded by Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen, sank one ship, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship William Pierce Frye. None of the other thirty-four boats comprising groups Seeteufel and Seewolf sank a ship. Nor were any U-boats of these groups lost.
As related, on March 25, a B-17 of British Squadron 206 sank the VII U-469, which was awaiting escort duty with the blockade-runner Regensberg, subsequently lost. Two days later, the same B-17 with a new aircrew, commanded by A.C.I. Samuel, got the IXC40 U-169, commanded by Hermann Bauer, age twenty-five, also ten days out from Kiel. In what was doubtless the least memorable battle cry of Coastal Command in the entire war, Samuel reported that the U-boat sank almost vertically, “like a dose of Enos’s,” the trademark of an English brand of liver salts.
British Coastal Command Squadron 190, a Catalina outfit based at bleak Sullom Voe in the Faroe Islands, was favorably placed to kill U-boats outbound from Germany to join the Atlantic force or boats of the Arctic Norway force in nearby waters. On March 26, one of the Catalinas of Squadron 190, piloted by J. Fish, found a new VII of the Arctic Norway force unalertly traveling from Bergen on the surface. She was the U-339, commanded by Georg-Wilhelm Basse, age twenty-five. Fish dropped six depth charges which savaged U-339, forcing Basse to abort and limp to Trondheim. From there U-339 returned to the Baltic, where, owing to the damage, she was retired to the Training Command, a school boat that never left the Baltic again. Basse was assigned to commission and command another new VII destined for the Arctic force.
The last Allied convoy to be found and attacked in the North Atlantic in March 1943 was Sierra Leone 126, the first convoy from that place since the previous October. It was thinly guarded by five warships: three frigates and two sloops. A Focke-Wulf Condor patrol found it on March 27, west northwest of Cape Finisterre. U-boat Control directed five boats outbound from France to attempt an interception.
Two of the five U-boats locked onto the convoy and chased it for four days. These were Ritterkreuz holder Otto von Bülow in the veteran U-404 and the experienced U-662, commanded by a new skipper, Heinz-Eberhard Müller, age twenty-seven. Aided by radar the frigate Röther carried out six separate attacks, dropping seventy-five depth charges. Nonetheless, in a remarkable five-torpedo salvo on March 29, Müller in U-662 sank the 6,200-ton British freighter Empire Whale, wrecked another 6,900-ton British freighter, the Umaria (sunk by the escorts), and damaged yet another British freighter, the 7,200-ton Liberty ship Ocean Viceroy. On that day and the next, von Bülow in U-404 sank two British freighters: the 8,800-ton Nagara and the 7,000-ton Empire Bowman. Totals: four ships for about 29,000 tons sunk, one ship of 7,200 tons damaged.
U-boat Control was naturally pleased with the outcome, noting the excellent cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the U-boats. Control expressed the hope that this tenacious attack would persuade the Allies to sail Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys farther to the west, beyond range of most Allied ASW aircraft and where the U-boats had greater sea room for operations.
Notwithstanding the unfavorable weather on the North Atlantic run, the Atlantic U-boat force ran up a noteworthy record of sinkings in the month of March: eighty-four merchant ships for 505,000 tons, plus the British destroyer Harvester As a result, Axis submarine successes in all areas of the world in the month of March were 110 merchant ships for 635,600 tons, the third-highest monthly total of the war after June and November 1942. Twenty-eight of the victims (25 percent) for 190,000 tons (38 percent) were United States vessels
, the rest British or British-controlled. The breakdown of all sinkings by Axis submarines in March by areas of operation:
ShipsG.R.T.
Arctic 3 18,245
Atlantic 84 504,575
Mediterranean 12 46,823
Indian Ocean 11 65.966
Total 110 635,609*
The numerous reasons for the sharp spike in sinkings in the North Atlantic run in March bear repeating:
• The accurate and timely flow of information on Allied convoys from the codebreakers at B-dienst and, oppositely, the temporary loss of naval Enigma by Allied codebreakers.
• The gradual expansion of the Atlantic U-boat force to a peak strength of 171 U-boats by April 1, which enabled Control to deploy enough boats to form several patrol lines up to six hundred miles long simultaneously.
• The concentration of U-boat groups in the Allied “Air Gap” southeastward of Greenland, which in March only the handful of very-long-range B-24s of Coastal Command Squadron 120 in Iceland could reach and patrol effectively.
• The presence of two XIV tankers (U-461; U-463) near the North Atlantic run, which permitted some VIIs to remain on station longer and to chase convoys at their highest speed.
• The more effective communications and cooperation between the Luftwaffe Condors and the U-boats in eastern Atlantic waters.
• The unflagging zeal of nearly all U-boat crews to achieve successes against the Allies in order to offset the German setbacks in the Soviet Union and North Africa and to avenge the intensified Allied heavy-bomber raids (Sickle) on civilians in the large German cities.
• Possibly a greater number of torpedo hits with the looping FAT torpedoes and a higher percentage of lethal hits with the Pi2 magnetic pistols in the nose of the electrics.
• In too many instances, the thinning out of close convoy escorts and the inability of aircraft from the “jeep” carrier Bogue to fly on account of foul weather and/or mechanical defects.