by Clay Blair
Returning to the areas well south and southeast of Madagascar, Gysae saw nothing for days on end, despite frequent use of the helicopter. Finally, on July 29, he found and sank the 5,000-ton British freighter Cornish City and almost got an American Liberty ship as well. A protracted but vain chase of the latter took U-177 to within sixty miles of the southern tip of Madagascar. There, on August 5, the helicopter pilot spotted his first victim, a 4,200-ton Greek, Efthalia Mari, which Gysae sank. The next day the helicopter pilot spotted another lone ship, but a fire broke out in U-177’s engine room and while Gysae was busy dealing with the emergency, the ship escaped. Having sunk six ships for 38,000 tons on this cruise, Gysae went on to France.
The return trip took fifty-eight days; the entire patrol, 184 days. On arrival in Bordeaux on October 1, Gysae left U-177 to command Training Flotilla 25 in the Baltic* Heinz Buchholz, the skipper of U-195, which was undergoing conversion to a cargo vessel, replaced Gysae as skipper of U-177, but two and a half months passed before he sailed on January 1, 1944.
Dommes in U-178 went southabout Madagascar and cruised slowly north in the Mozambique Channel. North of Lourenço Marques on July 4, he sank two freighters: the 2,700-ton Norwegian Breiviken and the 4,800-ton Greek Michael Livanos. He chased another freighter and fired six torpedoes at her but all missed. Reporting these actions to U-boat Control, he added that he was ill but he would carry on.
Convinced that the area north of Lourenço Marques was a rich hunting ground, the ailing Dommes remained more or less in place. His instinct was correct. In the week from July 11 to 16, he torpedoed and sank three more big freighters: the 4,800-ton Greek Mary Livanos, the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Robert Bacon, and the 6,700-ton British City of Canton.
Having expended all of his torpedoes, per new orders, on August 12 Dommes met the eastbound Italian cargo submarine Torelli southeast of Madagascar to give her some fuel. In the interim, U-boat Control had asked Dommes if he and his U-178 were sufficiently fit to go to the island of Penang, Malaysia, for refit and then conduct a full-blown patrol homeward through the Indian Ocean. Dommes had replied in the affirmative. After refueling Torelli, both boats proceeded in company to Penang, arriving on August 29, Dommes completing a patrol of 155 days.* He had sunk six ships for 32,800 tons.
As Dommes was nearing Penang, Dönitz and the OKM decided to establish a U-boat base at that island to accommodate the big German U-cruisers and cargo boats and Italian cargo boats and crews. Subsequently that assignment went to Dommes, who left U-178 in Penang because of illness. The boat’s first watch officer, Hans Spahr, who had been the quartermaster on Prien’s legendary 1939 foray into Scapa Flow in U-47, was named to replace Dommes. Spahr sailed to France on November 27, arriving 178 days later, May 24, 1944. The boat never sailed again.
Werner Hartmann in U-198 also patrolled north of Lourenço Marques. On July 4, he almost committed the sin of sinking a Portuguese neutral. At the last minute of his approach, a sixth sense caused him to abort the attack. Several days later, on July 6 and 7, he sank two freighters: the 4,500-ton Greek Hydraios and the 4,700-ton British Leana. He torpedoed the first and attacked the second with his 4.1” deck gun. After 147 rounds, he sank the battered Leana with a torpedo and captured her captain. Thereafter aircraft based near Durban harassed U-198 almost daily and sometimes several times daily. Nonetheless, on August 1, Hartmann sank another ship, the 8,500-ton Dutch Mangkalibat.
Hartmann then set a course for France. He arrived on September 25, after a voyage of 201 days. His bag was seven confirmed ships for 36,778 tons, which brought his complete bag for the war on U-37 and U-198 to twenty-six ships sunk for 115,778 tons, including one trawler. This was not enough tonnage for Oak Leaves, but Dönitz had another promotion for Hartmann: effective January 1, 1944, he was to command U-boats in the Mediterranean, replacing Leo Kreisch.
After recruiting one merchant seaman from Charlotte Schliemann to replace the three men he had lost early in his patrol, Lüth in U-181 proceeded northward to the island of Mauritius. On July 1, he surveyed the harbor, Port Louis, and saw three freighters, all beyond reach. Over the following two days he sank the 2,800-ton British freighter Hoihow, escaped an air attack, wasted two torpedoes on small coasters, and chased a cruiser westward toward Madagascar. This vain pursuit took U-181 to Tamatave, on the east coast of Madagascar, where on July 15 and 16 Lüth sank two more British freighters sailing alone: the 2,900-ton Empire Lake and the 7,200-ton Fort Franklin.
When U-boat Control learned that Lüth was operating off the east coast of Madagascar, it ordered him to return to Mauritius. In compliance, Lüth headed eastward slowly. Near the island on August 4, 7, and 11, Lüth sank three more British ships sailing alone: the 4,600-ton Dalfram, the 4,400-ton Umvuma, and the 10,500-ton refrigerator ship Clan Macarthur.
Upon learning of these successes, Dönitz recommended to Hitler that Lüth be given Germany’s highest award: Diamonds to the Oak Leaves and Crossed Swords of his Ritterkreuz. Hitler approved and effective August 9, Lüth became the seventh man in the Third Reich and the first in the Kriegsmarine to be so honored.* When Dönitz radioed the news and his congratulations to Lüth, the officers and crew, bursting with pride, celebrated with beer and cognac. Thereafter Control directed Lüth to rendezvous with Bartels in U-197 at a site several hundred miles southeast of Madagascar to obtain new Enigma keys for his voyage home.
By August 15, a serious morale problem had developed on U-197. In the fifty-one days since leaving the Charlotte Schliemann, Bartels had sunk only one confirmed ship, the 9,600-ton Swedish tanker Pegasus. On July 30, he had found, stalked, and attacked a convoy, damaging the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship William Ellery, later towed into Durban. An aircraft thwarted a second attack. When he complained to U-boat Control that he had not only been bombed but also had had two torpedo-pistol failures, Control replied curtly: “Vent your rage” upon the enemy.
Lüth in U-181 reached the rendezvous site on August 17, but there was no sign of Bartels in U-197. Later that night Lüth intercepted a report from Bartels to Control stating that he had sunk another ship (his third on this patrol), the 7,000-ton British Empire Stanley. This action had delayed him and since he was some distance from Lüth, he requested a new rendezvous site more convenient to both U-cruisers.
In the early hours of August 19, Lüth and Bartels met at the new rendezvous. Bartels gave Lüth the new Enigma keys and a second set to pass to Kentrat in U-196. Lüth told Bartels that he had seen four unescorted freighters in the rendezvous area and had shot his last torpedo at one, to no avail. In reply, Bartels said he would remain in the area and try to sink these and/or other ships. Inasmuch as Lüth was low on fuel, he could not tarry a day longer to help spot traffic. He waved good-bye to Bartels and sailed off to the southwest to meet with Kentrat in U-196.
The Allies DFed much of this U-boat chatter and got a rough fix on the site where U-181 and U-197 had met and where Bartels in U-197 had elected to remain. On August 20 several Catalinas of two RAF squadrons flew from a base near Durban to search the site. In the afternoon that day, a Catalina of RAF Squadron 259, piloted by O. Barnett, found U-197 casually cruising on the surface and attacked. Barnett raked the U-cruiser with machine-gun fire and dropped six shallow-set depth charges from an altitude of fifty feet. Bartels responded with his flak guns, then crash-dived. Barnett dropped a smoke float near the swirl, radioed for reinforcements, then circled the smoke for nearly an hour.
Suddenly U-197 surfaced, manned flak guns, and sent out several distress signals, stating that she was under aircraft attack and was “unable to submerge.” At about that time, a Catalina from RAF Squadron 265, piloted by C. E. Robin, arrived and attacked. Like Barnett, pilot Robin raked the U-boat with machine-gun fire and dropped six shallow-set depth charges from an altitude of seventy-five feet. The U-197 blew up, flinging debris high into the air. The two Catalinas circled an ever-widening oil patch, then returned to base, claiming a kill. The claim was correct. The U-197 was lost thi
s day with all hands, the second U-cruiser after Sobe’s U-179 to go down in South African waters.
Meanwhile, that same day, Lüth in U-181 and Kentrat in U-196 met per plan and Lüth gave Kentrat a set of the Enigma keys. Although Kentrat had sunk only one ship since leaving Charlotte Schliemann, the 7,300-ton British City of Oran, he generously offered Lüth five torpedoes and some food to extend his patrol, but Lüth declined, stating he barely had enough fuel to reach France. While they were still side by side, they heard the distress signals from Bartels in U-197 and hastily drew up a rescue attempt, communicating visually. When it issued formal orders for the rescue attempt, U-boat Control suggested that the three U-boats cruising homeward very close together on the surface with all flak guns manned could repel any and all air attacks.
Assuming Bartels might still be afloat and coming south in the dark toward them, Lüth and Kentrat plotted the best search pattern to intercept him. Finally it was decided that Kentrat should stay put while Lüth went north toward the site of the attack. Perhaps fortunately for Lüth in U-181 and Kentrat in U-196, foul weather on August 21 grounded all aircraft. After a futile search August from 21 to 24, U-181 and U-196 turned to a course south by west and headed for France.
Both boats got home. Completing a voyage of 206 days, Lüth in U-181 arrived in Bordeaux one day before his thirtieth birthday, October 14, having sunk ten confirmed ships for 45,331 tons. Completing a record voyage of 225 days (that had begun earlier from Kiel), Kentrat in U-196 arrived in Bordeaux on October 23, having sunk only two confirmed ships for 12,285 tons. Lüth went to Hitler’s headquarters on October 25 to receive the two awards won on this patrol (Crossed Swords and the Diamonds)* and later to the Baltic to command Training Flotilla 22. Subsequently, he published a book in collaboration with Ritterkreuz holder Claus Korth. Despite his lackluster performance, Ritterkreuz holder Kentrat was left in command of U-196. However, he did not resail until March 1944.
The overall returns of this extraordinary U-cruiser foray to the Indian Ocean were mixed. Seven U-cruisers sailed. One (U-197) was sunk and one (U-195) aborted. Including the days at sea and ships sunk by those two boats, the foray bagged thirty-six ships for about 200,000 tons in 1,237 patrol days. Thanks to Lüth, Hartmann, Gysae, and Dommes, the overall average return per boat was five ships for about 28,500 tons per patrol. However, the three U-cruisers (U-195, U-196, U-197) sank only seven ships. Not incidentally, the foray caused deep consternation in those waters as well as great disruption in Allied maritime traffic and a diversion of warships to provide added protection.
FIVE
TRIDENT
on the eve of Allied victory in North Africa, Prime Minister Churchill and a large group of senior advisers secretly departed England on the liner/ troopship Queen Mary to confer with President Roosevelt and his senior advisers on future courses of action. The ship arrived at New York without incident on May 11,* and the British party went on to Washington by special train. At Roosevelt’s insistence, Churchill again quartered at the White House.
This Anglo-American conference, code-named Trident, took place over fourteen days from May 12 to 25. In contrast to the conference at Casablanca in January (Symbol), this time the senior American and British military got along well and were in closer agreement as to what to do next in most theaters of the war. The chief decisions were:
• The war against the U-boat force was to continue “with every possible means.” As one measure, the British were to intensify diplomatic pressure on Portugal for authorization to operate aircraft and ships from the Azores to hunt down U-boats more efficiently and protect Allied convoys en route to and from the United States and Gibraltar. † As another measure, John Slessor’s Coastal Command was to mount an all-out series of intense hunter-killer operations (Musketry, Seaslug, Percussion) during the summer months in the Bay of Biscay while the American Eighth Air Force increased daylight bombing raids on the U-boat building yards in Germany.
• As scheduled, Husky, the massive Allied invasion of Sicily, was to take place on the night of July 9-10.
• After the conquest of Sicily, the Allies were to continue operations on a limited scale in the Mediterranean to keep their military forces keenly attuned and, if possible, knock Italy out of the war. Churchill made a strong and emotional case for an invasion of Italy, but Roosevelt and the other Americans opposed it and the matter was tabled. One possibility after Sicily was a simultaneous invasion of the islands of (Italian) Sardinia and (Vichy) Corsica. Reluctant to mount any more land battles in the Mediterranean Basin, the Americans preferred—and offered—a scheme to knock Italy out of the war by airpower alone, but it was tabled as well.
• The colossal Allied invasion of Occupied France, Overlord, was to take place in about one year, on or about May 1, 1944. All other military operations were to be secondary to this undertaking. As a prelude, the combined heavy-bomber offensive against the German war industry and the civilian population (Sickle-Pointblank) was to proceed as designed, building to a climax to coincide with the invasion.
• American forces in the southwest and central Pacific and the Alaska area were to step up counterattacks against Japanese forces. The main objective in the southwest Pacific was still to capture the stronghold of Rabaul, which was to be approached by separate campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The first objective in the central Pacific was the capture of the Gilbert Islands (Tarawa, in particular). The objective in the Alaska area was to eject the Japanese from the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska.
• The Soviet Union and China were to be supported to the greatest possible extent. The Soviet Union was to bring massive pressure on Germany from the east while the Allies brought pressure from the west. China was to be a launching site for a massive heavy-bomber offensive against the Japanese home islands. However, a proposed amphibious invasion of Burma, which would facilitate that objective, was tabled. .
Churchill left Washington via Boeing Clipper on May 25. At President Roosevelt’s request, George Marshall accompanied the Prime Minister to North Africa to confer with Eisenhower, Montgomery, and other military leaders. Marshall was still fundamentally opposed to “periphery-pecking” in the Mediterranean Basin and was determined to do all in his power to limit operations in that area, especially an invasion of the Italian peninsula. Churchill was no less determined to mount an invasion of Italy and hoped to change Marshall’s mind during this trip.
In the middle of the Trident meetings—on May 18—Admiral King revealed to the conferees that he had taken a significant new step to deal with the U-boat menace. He had created within his headquarters a new centralized paper command—designated the Tenth Fleet—which was empowered to coordinate all available information on U-boat operations and to direct American naval countermeasures, such as convoy evasions or hunter-killer operations. For administrative purposes (training, refitting, manning, and so on) American naval forces in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico were to remain under the jurisdiction of Royal Ingersoll’s Atlantic Fleet, the various sea frontiers, and/or special naval commands, but the commander of the Tenth Fleet had authority at any time to order any of these forces to take whatever action he thought necessary, simply by notifying the subordinate commanders and the forces concerned.
The British delegates and the American Army and Army Air Forces chiefs were delighted with this news. As the many historians hostile to King were to emphasize, it seemed that at long last this myopic admiral, fixated on the Pacific war, had recognized the lethality of the U-boat threat and had done something about it. The truth of the matter was that the creation of a Tenth Fleet or a similar organization before the spring of 1943 would have been virtually useless in view of the lack of the oft-mentioned “tools” (land-based aircraft, “jeep” carriers and suitable carrier aircraft and weaponry, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and so on) to carry out its mission.
The organization of Tenth Fleet served another purpose. It became the direct recipient of all naval Enigma
intelligence, which had to be so very closely guarded against leaks. Its senior personnel in Washington, liaising with London over a secure teletype, digested the daily flow of naval Enigma, recommended convoy diversions, and directed other highly secret ASW operations without the need to divulge the reasons for them to subordinate commanders.
On paper, King himself commanded the Tenth Fleet. In actuality it was run by King’s assistant chief of staff, forty-eight-year-old Francis S. (“Frog”) Low, a bright, inventive, and tough-minded Naval Academy graduate, class of 1915. Low had served in submarines in World War I and between the wars. When King was named to command Atlantic naval forces to carry out the Neutrality Patrol in 1941, he chose Low to be his operations officer. When King moved up to commander in chief of the Navy, he brought Low to the Navy Department in the same capacity. During this Washington stint, Low conceived and urged the plan for the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, after which he commanded the cruiser Wichita during Torch. Upon his return to the Navy Department in 1943 to run Tenth Fleet and match wits with Dönitz and U-boat Control, Low was promoted to rear admiral.
There was one large weakness in the Tenth Fleet. The Army Air Forces ASW command, which had grown to twenty-seven squadrons and was scheduled for substantial expansion by year’s end, was not directly and fully under Tenth Fleet control. There still existed an awkward—and hugely wasteful—internal struggle between the Army and Navy over control of land-based ASW aircraft. However, in the continuing and prolonged discussions of this issue in May and June 1943, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and King finally persuaded Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold that all ASW, including land-based air, should be exclusively a Navy responsibility.