by Clay Blair
Convoy Outbound North 184, composed of thirty-nine merchant ships, was guarded by Canadian Escort Group C-l. The group consisted of six warships: two Canadian destroyers, St. Laurent and the ex-American four-stack St. Croix, the British frigate Itchen, and three Canadian corvettes. The convoy and the escort group were backed up by American Support Group 6, the “jeep” carrier Bogue and her screen of destroyers, fresh from a crash course at the British ASW school. Bogue, newly outfitted with Huff Duff, had her normal complement of twenty-one aircraft, nine Wildcat fighters and twelve Avenger torpedo bombers. The big, tough Avengers could carry four 250-pound depth charges or two depth charges and a Fido.
In the early hours of May 22, Bogue routinely launched a radar-equipped Avenger, piloted by Roger C. Kuhn. About fifty-five miles out from Bogue, Kuhn sighted a U-boat on the surface. She was the Mosel VII U-468, commanded by Klemens Schamong, age twenty-six, making his second patrol. American naval records suggest that Kuhn muffed his attack on U-468 and gave Bogue a wrong position report, hence a relief plane and surface warships could find nothing. Contrarily, Schamong reported to U-boat Control that he had been bombed by aircraft both in the morning and the afternoon and was then pursued and depth-charged by surface escorts for hours. The damage incurred was so severe that he was forced to abort to France, arriving on May 29. His departure reduced Mosel to twenty boats.
Later that morning, another Avenger from Bogue, piloted by Stewart E. Doty, also found a surfaced U-boat. She was the Mosel VII U-305, commanded by Rudolf Bahr, age twenty-seven, also making his second patrol. Doty dropped four depth charges close to U-305, causing extensive damage. Bahr dived to carry out repairs and resurfaced about noon. Waiting overhead was yet another Avenger from Bogue, piloted by Robert L. Stearns, who attacked immediately, dropping four depth charges. Bahr crash-dived and got away from the aircraft and later, from two warships, but U-305 was so badly damaged that Bahr, too, was forced to abort to France, arriving on June 1. His departure reduced Mosel to nineteen boats.
In the afternoon of that same day, May 22, still another Avenger from Bogue, piloted by William F. Chamberlain, sighted a U-boat. She was the VII U-569, commanded by Hans Johannsen, age thirty-two, who was also making his second patrol. Chamberlain attacked, dropping four depth charges in a “perfect” straddle that caused severe damage. A relief Avenger, piloted by Howard S. Roberts, was waiting overhead when Johannsen resurfaced. Roberts dropped four more depth charges in a good straddle and machine-gunned the bridge to prevent the Germans from manning the flak guns.
Johannsen had no intention of fighting back. According to American records, he shamefully ordered the crew to raise a white flag of surrender on the periscope. Working in a hurricane of machine-gun fire, the frenetic crewmen first tied a handkerchief to the periscope, but when it was realized that the handkerchief was too small to be noticed, they substituted a white sheet. Upon seeing this sheet, Roberts withheld fire and guided the Canadian destroyer St. Laurent, commanded by G. H. Stephen, to the scene. As the destroyer approached U-569, Johannsen ordered his crew to scuttle and jump overboard. St. Laurent fished out Johannsen and twenty-four of his crew of forty-six. One injured survivor was sent to a Canadian hospital, the other twenty-four to Washington for interrogation.
Like many Allied warships, Bogue (and her aircraft) had earlier been too loosely credited with U-boat kills. The U-569 was the first kill by Bogue to be confirmed and by the aircraft of any Allied “jeep” carrier unassisted by surface craft. The first Avenger pilot to see U-569, Chamberlain, was awarded a Silver Star. The second Avenger pilot, Roberts, was awarded the DFC.
Richard Becker in the damaged VIID minelayer U-218 avoided attacks by Bogue aircraft, but he did not get away entirely unscathed. One or several surface ships came out of a rain squall, pounced on U-218, and let fly salvos of depth charges. Damaged yet again, Becker spotted and reported the “expected” convoy, then aborted to France. He arrived on June 2, completing a luckless patrol of forty-four days. This departure reduced Mosel to eighteen boats.
The fast convoy Outbound North 184 passed close to the fast eastbound convoy Halifax 239 on May 21-22. The latter was composed of forty-two merchant ships guarded by British Escort Group B-3, commanded by M. J. Evans. The group consisted of eight warships: two destroyers, Keppel and Escapade, the frigate Towy, and five corvettes, three manned by Free French crews. The warships were backed up by British Support Group 4, the “jeep” carrier Archer and her screen of four destroyers.*
Apparently U-boat Control was unaware that these two opposite-sailing convoys, each supported by a “jeep” carrier group, were passing so close. At first the contact reports from the various boats caused confusion. When Control finally sorted out the situation, it decided to concentrate all available strength on the east-bound Halifax 239, heavily laden with war matériel. Control committed twenty-seven U-boats to this attack: the nine southernmost boats of Mosel and the eighteen remaining boats of the Donau groups, which were breaking off the futile and costly fight with Slow Convoy 130.
Dönitz exhorted the Mosel boats with a challenging personal message:
With the last two North Atlantic convoys we have gotten nowhere.... Now if there is anyone who thinks that fighting convoys is therefore no longer possible, he is a weakling and no true submarine captain. The battle in the Atlantic is getting harder but it is the determining element in the waging of war.
Keep yourselves aware of your high responsibility and do not fail to understand that you must answer for your actions. Do your best with this convoy. We must smash it to bits!
If the circumstances permit, do not submerge from aircraft. Shoot and ward them off. Make surface escape from destroyers whenever possible. Be tough! Get ahead and attack. I believe in you.
The veteran VII U-752, commanded by the old hand Karl-Ernst Schroeter, age thirty, making his eighth patrol, got on the trail of Halifax 239 on the morning of May 23. His report was DFed by the destroyer Keppel, flagship of British Escort Group B-3. The supporting “jeep” carrier Archer launched a Swordfish biplane to run out the Huff Duff bearing. The plane found the U-752 (or another U-boat) but its depth-charge attack apparently failed. Archer then launched a second Sword-fish, armed with eight rockets fitted with 25-pound warheads.† The pilot, Harry Horrocks, astonished to find U-752 running on the surface, dived out of a low-hanging cloud and in quick succession fired four pairs of rockets. The first three pairs were close misses, but the fourth pair hit and penetrated 11-752’$ pressure hull forward of the conning tower near the radio room and captain’s cabin.
The two hits severely damaged U-752, externally and internally, and caused heavy flooding. Schroeter was therefore forced to stop his crash dive and fight it out on the surface with flak guns. By the time he and his gunners got to the bridge, a Martlet from Archer attacked with machine guns. That fire hit Schroeter in the head and killed him instantly and also killed several other crew members. Thereupon, the chief engineer assumed command and ordered the crew to scuttle and abandon ship. As the boat went down bow first, the first watch officer refused to leave the bridge. He called for three cheers to honor the boat and disappeared with her.
The aircraft led the destroyer Escapade of Escort Group B-3 to the scene. She fished out thirteen of U-752’s forty-six-man crew, including one junior officer. Later that day the U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen, age twenty-six, rescued four other lucky German survivors and eventually returned them to France. The U-752 was the first U-boat to be sunk by aircraft from a British “jeep” carrier unassisted by surface ships or land-based aircraft, and the first to be sunk by rockets.
The returns from the dozens of U-boats deployed to the North Atlantic run in the two-week period from May 9 to May 23 were abysmal. Assisted by B-dienst information, they had found six out of seven eastbound and westbound convoys comprising about 277 merchant ships, outwitted only by Halifax 238. From the six convoys found, the U-boats sank only six ships for about 35,000 tons.
In r
eturn, Allied forces sank fifteen U-boats in these convoy battles: seven by land-based aircraft unassisted by surface ships, five by surface ships, two by “jeep” carrier aircraft, and one by a land-based aircraft teamed with a surface ship. No less important, in that same period, Allied forces so badly damaged eight other U-boats that they were forced to abort, one of them escorted by an undamaged boat (U-359) that must be counted as a ninth abort. Total U-boat casualties in this two-week period on the North Atlantic run: a ruinous twenty-four boats.
When the five losses and six aborts of the boats outbound in May are added to casualties on the North Atlantic ran, the German “losses” from May 1 to May 23 were fifteen sunk and fifteen aborts, a total of thirty, or about 16 percent of the existing 186 boats of the Atlantic U-boat force. Of the approximately 750 German submariners serving on the fifteen lost boats, only thirty-eight survived to become POWs, twenty-five from U-569 and thirteen from U-752. About seven hundred men, fourteen skippers, and Dönitz’s son, Peter, perished at sea.
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC
Dönitz and Control were shocked and grieved over the catastrophic U-boat losses and aborts on the North Atlantic run. The losses, aborts, and failed opportunities, particularly against Slow Convoy 130 by the Donau groups, and against Halifax 239 by the Mosel group, weighed heavily. Control estimated that as of May 23, about thirty-one U-boats (manned by about 1,500 men) had been lost in May alone.* This was well over twice the rate of U-boat losses for the next worst month of the war.
The heavy losses led Dönitz and Control to conclude that the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic run could not be continued until the interim upgrades on the VIIs (heavier flak guns, T-5 antiescort homing torpedoes, Wanze radar detector, and so on) had been completed. In the meantime, U-boats, including Type VIIs, were to patrol areas where it was believed Allied airpower was less strong: the Caribbean Sea, the areas east of Trinidad and Brazil, and the west coast of Africa from Dakar to Freetown and southward.
In a “Heil Hitler” message on May 24, Dönitz announced his decision and exhorted the skippers to do everything possible to prevent a collapse of morale among the crews, stressing that the withdrawal from the North Atlantic run was merely a temporary defensive measure and that in the end the Germans would win the naval war.
One of the withdrawing VIIs was the new U-418, commanded by Gerhard Lange, age twenty-two. He had sailed from Kiel on April 24 and joined the Isar and Donau 1 groups and, like most boats of those groups, he had no success. While U-418 was homebound in Biscay on June 1, a Beaufighter of British Squadron 236, piloted by Mark C. Bateman and W. G. Easterbrook, was over the bay on a special mission. Their “observer” was a visiting Admiralty ASW expert, Francis J. Brookes, who spotted U-418 with binoculars at ten miles. Bateman attacked, firing four 25-pound rockets. These hit and destroyed U-418 with the loss of all hands.† Two days later, a flight of JU-88s jumped another Beaufighter, piloted by Michael Shannon and I. S. Walters. Their observer was the same Admiralty visitor, Francis Brookes. The Germans badly shot up the Beaufighter and mortally wounded Brookes. Shannon limped home and crash-landed at his home base in Cornwall.
In an attempt to disguise the U-boat withdrawal from the Allies, Dönitz directed thirteen VIIs (five from the disbanded group Mosel) to remain in the North Atlantic area as long as possible and broadcast a series of dummy radio messages simulating the operations of several groups. The Allies learned of this deception through timely breaks into naval Enigma, and sank three of the assigned decoys:
• On May 25, a Catalina of U.S. Iceland-based Navy Squadron VP 84, piloted by Robert C. Millard, sank the U-467, en route from the Arctic to the Atlantic. It was the twenty-eighth birthday of the U-boat skipper, Heinz Kummer. There were no survivors.
• On May 28, a B-24 of Iceland-based British Squadron 120, piloted by D. C. Fleming-Williams, sank the new U-304, commanded by Heinz Koch, age twenty-eight. There were no survivors of this boat either.
• On June 2, Johnny Walker’s Support Group 2,* which was en route to reinforce convoy Halifax 24l, found and hunted the veteran U-202, commanded by Gunter Poser, age twenty-six. He was the skipper who had landed four German agents on Long Island the year before. After firing off 250 depth charges over fifteen hours, Walker’s group forced U-202 to the surface, then sank her with twenty-seven rounds of 4” shells. Four sloops of Walker’s group, Kite, Starling, Wild Goose, and Woodpecker, participated in this attack, but sole credit for the kill went to Walker’s flagship, Starling. The British rescued Poser and twenty-nine other Germans, most of them wounded.
Another of the Mosel boats assigned to decoy duty was Erich Topp’s famous boat, U-552, commanded by Klaus Popp. She had sailed from Brest to the North Atlantic on April 4 but, like most U-boats, had achieved no successes. On May 27, while she was homebound, a B-24 of British Squadron 59, piloted by an Australian, H.A.L. (Tim) Moran, found U-552. In two attacks, Moran dropped eight depth charges. The U-boat survived but was severely damaged, Popp reported to Control. She could dive only to ninety-eight feet, and all her flak guns were destroyed. Control diverted Kurt Lange in the outbound U-455 to provide “fuel and material” to U-552, then proceed on patrol. This rendezvous took place on June 7 and, as a consequence, Popp was able to limp into St. Nazaire on June 13. The boat did not sail again until early October.
Another of the returning decoys was the VII U-650, commanded by Ernst von Witzendorff. On June 23, a B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by John Wright, who had earlier damaged the VII U-456, found and attacked von Witzendorff. Wright dropped a 600-pound bomb that exploded, but Wright saw no solid evidence of a sinking. In fact, U-650 was severely damaged and limped into St. Nazaire with Luftwaffe escort. The boat did not go on patrol again until January 1944.
Yet another of the returning decoys was the veteran U-575, commanded by Günther Heydemann, age twenty-six, completing his eighth patrol. The boat had left France in late April and had joined groups Amsel and Elbe in attacks against convoys Outbound North (Slow) 5 and Slow Convoy 129. In neither of these two battles had U-575 shadowed well nor fired any torpedoes. Upon her return to France on June 11, Heydemann left the boat for other duty. On July 3, Dönitz awarded him a Ritterkreuz.†
All other decoys soon returned to France, replaced by new boats from Germany on maiden patrols or transfers from the Arctic. Control forbade the green but eager skippers of the new decoys to carry out any attacks on shipping until the period of the new moon in early July. All boats were to be especially alert to repel Allied air attacks, running on electric motors when surfaced at night rather than diesels, so the bridge watch could better hear approaching planes.
Although the waters in the Gibraltar-Azores area had become quite perilous because of increased numbers of British and American B-24s and Catalinas based at Gibraltar and Port Lyautey, Morocco, political considerations in Berlin apparently demanded that Dönitz do all he could to redress the Axis setback in North Africa and to help prevent or at least interfere with an expected Allied invasion of Sardinia, Sicily, or Italy. Therefore on the same day that Dönitz ordered the U-boats to withdraw from the North Atlantic run, May 24, he directed Control to form a new group by May 31 to attack UG and GU convoys. More specifically, Control logged, the group was to attack convoy UGS 9, apparently put onto this target by B-dienst or other intelligence sources.
This new group, Trutz (Defiant), was initially composed of sixteen VIIs, eight from the disbanded group Mosel and eight newly sailed from Germany or France. The group was to include three Ritterkreuz holders: Hans Trojer in U-221, Siegfried Strelow in U-435, and Günther Krech in U-558. Apparently unknown to the Germans, the Allies assigned American Support Group 6 (the “jeep” carrier Bogue and four four-stack destroyers) to reinforce the escort of UGS 9. In a change of tactics, for the first time Bogue’s skipper, Giles E. Short, was permitted to operate independently of the convoy close escort—to range afield and run down nearby Huff Duff contacts.
Southbound to
join the Trutz patrol line on May 25, Ritterkreuz holder Günther Krech in U-558 happened upon the eastbound Slow Convoy 131. This was comprised of thirty-one merchant ships guarded by British Escort Group 6, commanded by R, Heathcote in the destroyer Viscount, and also by J. W. McCoy’s Support Group 3. Inasmuch as “all available” U-boats were en route to Trutz by different routes, Control logged, none could immediately join Krech to attack this target. Control therefore authorized Krech to attack alone until Allied aircraft appeared, in which case, Krech was to break off operations.
Other U-boats heard these reports. Four inbound VIIs and another southbound Trutz VII, the new (7-957, commanded by Kurt Pressel, age thirty-two, attempted to join the attack, but none succeeded. While boldly maneuvering close for a daylight submerged attack, Krech in U-558 was detected by the numerous escorts and severely depth-charged. Later in the day, while making a second submerged attack, he was again detected and attacked by aircraft and surface escorts. Krech escaped but was forced to haul off to make repairs. He lost contact with Slow Convoy 131, which continued its voyage to the British Isles without further threats from U-boats.