by Clay Blair
Outbound from France, three of the Leuthen boats were detected and attacked by Allied aircraft at night in the Bay of Biscay. The first was Fritz Albrecht, age twenty-three, in U-386. On September 6, he reported—significantly—that his “Wanze failed” to warn of radar-equipped aircraft approaching in the dark. The second was Joachim Deecke in U-584. He also reported that his Wanze gear had failed. However, both Albrecht and Deecke managed to repel the attacking aircraft with flak. Ritterkreuz holder Siegfried von Forstner in U-402 shot down the aircraft attacking him, he reported. None of these attacking aircraft has been identified.
While still outbound, Albrecht in U-386 came upon seven British airmen in a life raft. He considered picking them up but did not because he was outbound on a vital mission and because he suspected that the raft might well be “bait” to make him a target of air attack. Upon his return to France, his flotilla commander, Hans Witt, wrote that Albrecht’s decision to abandon the airmen “was not correct” for he could have later transferred them to an inbound boat. Information about enemy ASW was “so scarce,” Witt continued, “that every opportunity to bring in prisoners must be exploited.” ‡
Three boats aborted for various mechanical reasons. Two more reported “Wanze failures.” These were the Leuthen VII U-666, commanded by Herbert Engel, and the VII U-610, commanded by Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen, age twenty-seven. Both boats aborted to France, but both resailed quickly, the U-666 on September 6, the U-610 on September 12. The third abort was the VII U-413, commanded by Gustav Poel, which carried a special direction-finding team.
Two other new VIIs sailing from Norway that had been directed to enter the Atlantic via the Denmark Strait incurred heavy damage from striking ice and were compelled to abort. These were the U-274, commanded by Günther Jordan, age twenty-four, and the U-963, commanded by Karl Boddenberg, age twenty-nine. Jordan reached Trondheim on September 13. Owing to overcrowded repair facilities, he could not resail until October 13. As a result of these accidents, Control prohibited further use of the Denmark Strait. All new boats were to sail for the Atlantic via the Iceland-Faeroes gap, where, owing to heavy Allied air patrols, the passage was to be made submerged regardless of time lost.
As also related, B-dienst had lost the main Allied convoy codes, but during the summer it had kept track of the convoy cycles by other means. In mid-September, B-dienst was still tracking the cycles by these other means, including straggler routes, and could yet provide useful data to U-boat Control.
There was still little to no help from the Luftwaffe. The Focke-Wulf Condors had never lived up to their fearsome propaganda image. The German airmen assigned to those aircraft remained undertrained and inept at finding convoys. When they did find one, the position they reported was usually wrong, setting in motion U-boat hunts for convoys that were doomed to failure. Berlin sent a few radar-equipped four-engine HE-177s and JU-290s and several six-engine BV-222s, but as the war diary at U-boat Control noted in the fall of 1943, electronic or mechanical failures grounded many planes or rendered them ineffective.
U-boat Control directed group Leuthen toward the old battleground in the Greenland Air Gap. It was to first attack empty westbound convoys (Outbound North, Outbound North Slow), that is, convoys that were moving away from the Iceland air bases rather than eastbound convoys (Halifax, Slow) that were moving toward air bases in Iceland and the British Isles. After refueling in the distant western Atlantic from U-460, the group would then attack eastbound convoys on the way homeward.
Dönitz radioed the group an exhortatory message: “The Führer is watching every phase of your struggle. Attack! Follow up! Sink!”
The U-270, commanded by Paul-Friedrich Otto, age twenty-six, who was in the center of the Leuthen patrol line, reported a westbound convoy on September 19. Control received his report with some reserve, Godt noted in the war diary, “Since dead reckoning on convoys is no longer accurate because data are lacking.” Otto had found not one westbound convoy but two: Outbound North 202, plus Outbound North (Slow) 18, which Western Approaches had ordered to merge. Altogether there were sixty-eight merchant ships. They were protected by seven warships of Canadian Escort Group C-2 (the destroyers Gatineau and Icarus, frigate Lagan, three corvettes, and a trawler), commanded by P. W. Burnett of the Royal Navy; nine warships of British Escort Group B-3 (the destroyers Escapade and Keppel, frigate Towey, five corvettes, and an ASW trawler), commanded by M. B. Evans of the Royal Navy; and five warships of the new Canadian Support Group 9 (the destroyer St. Croix, frigate lichen, and three corvettes), commanded by C. E. Bridgeman, also of the Royal Navy. Total: twenty-one escorts (five destroyers, three frigates, eleven corvettes, two trawlers) plus land-based aircraft and the experienced MAC ship Empire MacAlpine*
U-boat Control finally conceded that the convoy reported by Otto in U-270 was probably the fast Outbound North 202. Accordingly, Control directed Otto to send beacon signals and authorized him to attack. In response, Otto fired a T-5 homing torpedo at an escort, the British frigate Lagan. He claimed only a hit for damage— the first confirmed T-5 hit of the war—but in fact Lagan was a wreck and twenty-nine of her crew were dead and one was missing. The tug Destiny towed Lagan to port, escorted by the trawler Lancer, but she was not repaired. Early in this confrontation, a Hedgehog exploded accidentally on the deck of the British destroyer Escapade, killing twenty-one men and forcing her to abort as well.
As the other twenty Leuthen boats raced toward Otto’s contact position, radar-equipped B-24 and surface escorts sank two. These were the U-341, commanded by Dietrich Epp, age twenty-six, and the U-338, commanded by Manfred Kinzel, age twenty-eight. Pilot J. F. Fisher of the Newfoundland-based Canadian Squadron 10, newly equipped with very-long-range B-24s, was credited with sinking Epp’s U-341 with depth charges on September 19. Fisher and two other Canadian B-24 pilots of Squadron 10 had escorted Prime Minister Churchill and party returning from the Quadrant meetings on the battlecruiser Renown, and were on the way home to Canada. At the time, pilot John K. Moffatt of British Squadron 120, who had earlier sunk U-189, was credited with sinking Kinzel’s U-338 with depth charges and a Fido the next day, September 20, but in a postwar reappraisal, credit for the kill was withdrawn, and the cause of the loss of U-338 remains unknown. There were no survivors from either U-boat.
Two other U-boats eluded the convoy screen and shot torpedoes. Hubertus Purkhold, age twenty-seven, in U-260, reported “two or three hits [but] without detonations,” perhaps duds or very distant depth charges. Horst Hepp, age twenty-five, in the new U-238, who had survived the accidental sinking of his first command (U-272) in the Baltic, hit two 7,200-ton American Liberty ships in ballast, the Theodore Dwight Weld, which sank, and the Frederick Douglass, which was commanded by an African-American skipper, Adrian Richardson, and which had a net defense streamed. When a torpedo ran through or around the net and hit Douglass in her after cargo hold, some of the crew panicked. The men failed to close the engine-room hatch and prematurely launched lifeboats. Had these cowards remained on the ship, as did the skipper, Richardson, it might have been saved, Samuel Eliot Morison wrote. But it fell behind the body of the convoy, and later that day Otto Ferro, age thirty-two, in U-645, sank her, to share credit with Hepp in U-238.
That night, September 20-21, a dozen boats closed the convoy and eight of them shot T-5 homing torpedoes at escorts.
• Rudolf Bahr, age twenty-seven, in U-305, claimed sinking two “destroyers” in two separate attacks. In reality he missed one escort but twice hit the Canadian destroyer St. Croix (ex-American four-stack McCook), which sank with the loss of sixty-six of 147 men.
• Oskar Curio, age twenty-five, in U-952, hit and sank the British corvette Polyanthus. Fourteen hours later the British frigate Itchen fished eighty-one survivors of St. Croix from the frigid waters and one from Polyanthus.
• Six other boats claimed sinking or probable sinkings of destroyers, but none of these claims were ever confirmed.
Much pleased
by these aggressive attacks on the escorts-—and the apparent success of the T-5 Zaunkönig “antidestroyer” homing torpedo—Control logged seven “destroyers” and three freighters for 15,500 tons sunk and three other “destroyers” probably sunk.*
Two boats of group Leuthen fell out. The first was the U-386, commanded by Fritz Albrecht, who had incurred “heavy damage” from depth charges. The second was the U-603, commanded by Rudolf Baltz, age twenty-three, who was last to sail from France and could not get to the battle scene in time. Control first instructed Baltz to refuel from the tanker U-460 and get ready for action later, but when it received the abort notice from Albrecht in U-386, it told him to give his spare fuel to Baltz. However, this rendezvous was thwarted by Allied aircraft and U-603 refueled from U-460 as originally instructed, but was again delayed in joining Leuthen.
Several other U-boats braved the heavy escort screen to shoot on the second night, September 21-22. Gerhard Kluth, age twenty-five, new skipper of U-377, claimed damage to a “destroyer” and a freighter of 5,000 tons but neither report has been confirmed in postwar records. An as yet unidentified aircraft hit U-377, wounding Kluth in both arms. Upon receipt of his report, Control directed Kluth to abort and rendezvous with Albrecht’s aborting U-386, which had a doctor on board, then return to France in company. Paul-Friedrich Otto in U-270, who had made first contact with the convoys, claimed sinking a “destroyer,” but this success could not be confirmed either. An escort depth-charged U-270 so closely that it cracked her hull, forcing Otto to abort as well. Control directed Otto to rendezvous with the aborting U-386 and U-377. Kluth in U-377 met U-386 and got medical assistance, but Otto in U-270 found neither boat. However, all three eventually limped into France.
As the two convoys plodded westward with fifteen U-boats in pursuit, an Allied escort sank one more German in the early hours of September 22. She was the U-229, commanded by Robert Schetelig, age twenty-four. Credit for her kill went to the senior escort officer, M. J. Evans in the British destroyer Keppel. Catching sight of U-229, Evans opened fire and rammed her, crashing over the U-boat’s aft deck. When the two vessels separated, Evans hurled ten shallow-set depth charges at U-229 and the boat upended and sank. No German survived.
The next day, September 23, the new U-422, commanded by Wolfgang Poeschel, age twenty-three, was very nearly lost. The boat reported that a “Halifax” attacked it with depth charges and gunfire. The boat incurred damage, two men were seriously wounded, and one slightly wounded. When Poeschel requested medical assistance, Control set up a rendezvous with the tanker U-460, which finally took place on September 29.
As the convoys closed on the Newfoundland Bank, they entered dense fog, which grounded the land- and sea-based aircraft escort. Taking advantage of the absence of air escorts, several more U-boats got by the screen to shoot.
• Horst Hepp in the U-238, the most successful, claimed sinking four freighters for 19,000 tons. In fact, he sank three, two Norwegian* and one British, for 15,900 tons, bringing his confirmed bag for this first patrol to four and a half freighters for 26,636 tons, the best performance by any skipper on the North Atlantic run in many months.
• Herbert Engel in the U-666 sank with a T-5 the frigate Itchen, which had on board the eighty-one survivors from St. Croix and the one survivor from Polyanthus. The explosion blew Itchen to pieces with a frightful loss of life. Only three men from the three warships survived, one from St Croix, two from Itchen.
• Oskar Curio in U-952 claimed sinking a “destroyer” with a T-5 and damage to two freighters for 16,000 tons. In fact, he sank the 6,200-ton American freighter Steel Voyager and hit another, the Liberty ship James Gordon Bennett, but that torpedo was a dud.
• Helmut Manseck in U-758 claimed sinking a “destroyer” and a freighter but neither could be confirmed. Manseck was also badly depth-charged by escorts and had to haul away for repairs.
The dense fog, fuel shortages, and fatigue thwarted further U-boat attacks on the two convoys. In a detailed analysis of this battle, which was unearthed later by Allied intelligence, † Admiral Dönitz and U-boat Control declared a smashing victory for group Leuthen. As expected, the Germans wrote, the skippers, using the T-5 Zaunkönig homing torpedo to great advantage, had destroyed the “outer” and “inner” rings of surface escorts, sinking twelve and probably sinking three more; in all, fifteen. Had it not been for the onset of heavy fog on the second and third days, the U-boat attack on the main body of merchant ships would have resulted in a massacre. As it was, the Germans went on, the U-boats sank nine merchant ships for 46,500 tons and damaged two others.
“This convoy operation, the first in months, brought a complete success,” Dönitz wrote in the conclusion to the report. “The new weapons proved their worth in every respect.. ..” He went on to say that “special recognition is due to all U-boats that took part in this operation as pioneers in the renewed convoy war. Their readiness for and their coolness under stress has justified the confidence of all U-boat men in the new weapons and has pointed the way clearly onwards and upwards to the crown of the U-boat career, the convoy battle.”
The confirmed sinkings and damage were much, much less: not fifteen escorts sunk but only three of twenty-two (the destroyer St. Croix and frigate Itchen of the new Canadian Support Group 9,* and the corvette Polyanthus)’, not nine but six of sixty-eight merchant ships sunk; not two but only one damaged. Total: ten vessels out of ninety in the two convoys sunk, hardly the “complete success” German propagandists, echoing Dönitz, proclaimed. The most remarkable aspect of this operation was that a green skipper, young Horst Hepp in the maiden patrol of U-238, accounted for four and a half of the six merchant ships sunk.
In achieving this alleged great victory, the Germans wrote, their own losses were “in no way proportionate to the losses of the enemy.” Unaware as yet that the U-341 had been lost during the assembly phase of group Leuthen, the Germans assumed that not three but only two U-boats had been sunk by the enemy (U-229, U-338) and two U-boats forced to abort; the true figure was three aborts (U-270, U-377, U-386). Assuming 130 Allied personnel on each of the fifteen escorts sunk, the Germans calculated, or about two thousand men as against one hundred personnel on the two lost U-boats, the ratio of casualties was twenty to one in favor of the Germans. “Added to this,” the Germans gloated, “were the losses in merchant ship personnel who must be almost as valuable to the enemy as the personnel of the escort vessels.”
As for tactics and equipment, Dönitz and U-boat Control had several important points to make.
• On the first day, a U-boat near the convoy attacked by an aircraft flashed “A/A defense,” but too few U-boats remained on the surface to supply flak support. To avoid errors and the possibility of misjudgments, Control therefore ruled that in the future it and it alone would give the order “A/A defense.” All boats were expected to comply expeditiously in order to hasten assemblies at the convoy.
• The new Wanze radar detector “stood the test [of battle] well,” especially on the foggy days. However, it was apparent from the experiences of boats in group Leuthen, as well as the boats attempting the Strait of Gibraltar in September, that the enemy—contrary to predictions from German electronic engineers—had developed centimetric-wavelength radar that Wanze could not detect. The next generation of radar detectors (FuMBs), Naxos, which could detect centimetric-wavelength radar, had been successfully battle tested and all U-boats were to be fitted with it as soon as possible. Meanwhile, skippers were encouraged to use the Aphrodite radar decoy “as often as possible and above all in great numbers.” Unknown to the Germans, the Allies had developed an even more powerful radar with a narrower beam that operated in the three centimeter range and was undetectable by Naxos.
• While the quad and twin 20mm flak arrays were great steps forward, Dönitz and Control recognized the need for improved, more powerful flak guns. Therefore, to replace the quad 20, the Kriegsmarine had ordered rush production of the new automatic 37mm naval
flak gun that fired “a new and absolutely deadly type of ammunition,” giving the gun twice the range and lethality of the quad 20 and a much greater possibility of destroying attacking aircraft. Beyond that, an even more powerful and deadly twin 37mm naval flak gun was under high-priority development.
• Inasmuch as “faultless navigation” and position reporting was absolutely essential for the massing of groups for a successful convoy battle, “new” navigational aids were being battle tested. One such device was the “gyro-sextant,” which made it possible for a U-boat to determine its position (although not precisely) by stars at night, even when no horizon was visible. Meanwhile, “all possible means for improving the accuracy of a U-boat’s position must therefore be utilized.”
• Unimportant radio chatter by U-boats must be eliminated. Only matters of tactical importance should be transmitted on the convoy circuit. Above all, Control admonished, “do not afflict the morale of others with tales of terror.”
While some of the material in this special analysis of group Leuthen might be dismissed as merely morale-building for the hard convoy battles to come, one matter is unequivocally clear. The Germans had wildly misjudged the effectiveness of the T-5 Zaunkönig homing torpedo against escorts. It was too slow, too sensitive, and still had too many bugs. The confirmed results—as opposed to the claimed results—were no better than what could have been achieved by an all-out attack on the escort forces with ordinary air or electric torpedoes with contact or magnetic pistols. Moreover, alerted to the deployment of the Zaunkönig from Enigma decrypts, the Allies had already developed a counterweapon. Dubbed the “Foxer,” it was a simple but effective noisemaker towed well behind the escort to attract the homing torpedo.*