Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45

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Hitler’s U-Boat War- The Hunted 1942-45 Page 67

by Clay Blair


  The swarms of aircraft and surface vessels assigned to the two convoys sank six U-boats on October 16 and 17, one of the worst German naval calamities of the war.

  • A B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by Eric A. Bland, found and attacked the new IXC40 U-844, commanded by Günther Moller, age twenty-five. Flying into heavy flak, Bland toggled four depth charges, but none released. The flak from U-844 knocked out both port engines and damaged the port side of the fuselage.

  Tenaciously circling U-844 out of flak range on two engines, Bland radioed for help. A B-24 of British Squadron 59, based in Northern Ireland and piloted by W. J. Thomas, arrived and carried out two attacks on U-844, dropping eight depth charges. The flak from U-844 knocked out Thomas’s starboard inboard engine. Between Thomas’s attacks, Bland boldly ran in, but again his depth charges failed to release and, moreover, his B-24 was so badly wrecked he had to ditch. Pink, a corvette of Gretton’s group, rescued Bland and four others, but two airmen perished. Pink left the convoy and took the airmen to Halifax. Nothing more was ever heard from U-844, which had served merely eleven days in the Atlantic force. Bland received a DSO.

  • Another B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by George D. Gamble, found and attacked the new VII U-964, commanded by Emmo Hummerjohann, age twenty-seven. Flying into intense flak, Gamble dropped four depth charges, then hauled out of flak range and called for a surface escort. This attempt at a coordinated attack could not be carried out, so Gamble attacked U-964 a second time, dropping three depth charges. One hit close and destroyed the boat. Gamble reported thirty-five German survivors in the water, but the surface escorts rescued none. The U-231, commanded by Wolfgang Wenzel, came up and found four of the survivors, but one died during the rescue.

  • A Sunderland of Canadian Squadron 422, piloted by Paul T. Sargent, found and attacked two surfaced U-boats, one of which was likely the new VII U-470, commanded by Gtinter Paul Grave, age twenty-six. Sargent attacked U-470 in the face of heavy flak, dropping three depth charges, all of which fell wide. On a second attack, Sargent toggled three more depth charges, but only two released. These landed in “a perfect straddle” amidships. However, the flak from U-470 and the other U-boat riddled the Sunderland and mortally wounded three crew.

  Pilot Sargent radioed an SOS and steered the crippled plane toward convoy Outbound North (Slow) 20. He made contact with the frigate Drury of Escort Group B-4 and ditched near her. Sargent, who was killed in the crash, won a posthumous DFC. Two of the seven surviving airmen also won DFCs.

  Two B-24s of British Squadron 120, piloted by Harold F. Kerrigan (a Canadian) and Barry E. Peck, who heard radio transmissions from a ditching aircraft, came up and found U-470. Kerrigan attacked first, dropping four depth charges while incurring flak damage. Nonetheless, he attacked a second time and dropped four more charges, one of which fell “very close” to the stem of U-470. Peck then carried out an attack into the face of “a hail of flak,” dropping six depth charges ahead of the boat. On a second run into another “hail of flak,” Peck dropped two depth charges that closely straddled the boat and blew it “clear of the water,” Peck wrote. In between Peck’s first and second attacks, a B-24 of British Squadron 59, piloted by Wesley G. Loney, attacked U-470, dropping four depth charge. These missiles and those of Kerrigan and Peck destroyed U-470, which sank stern first.

  Peck notified Peter Gretton in the destroyer Duncan of this kill, reporting “fifteen to twenty survivors” in the water. He then homed Gretton to the scene. Owing to the presence of other U-boats, Gretton declined to mount a major rescue effort, Peck wrote. Instead, Gretton cruised Duncan through the German survivors at “moderate speed” with grapple nets streamed. Two crewmen of U-470, Gerhard Tacken and Heinz Knappe, caught a net and saved themselves. Forty-six Germans perished. The British divided credit for the kill of U-470 among pilots Kerrigan, Peck, and Loney.

  • Two aircraft returning from convoy escort to Iceland bases found the new IXC40 U-540, commanded by Lorenz Kasch, age twenty-nine. Pilot Eric Knowles in a B-24 of British Squadron 59 attacked first, dropping eight depth charges in two runs. The New Zealand pilot Bryan Turnbull, in a B-24 of British Squadron 120 (who had previously damaged U-135 and U-762), attacked next, also dropping eight depth charges in two runs. Turnbull recalled that both of his salvos closely straddled the boat and broke it in half, and that Knowles in the other B-24 radioed: “You got him, good show!” The British divided the credit for the kill between Knowles and Turnbull and awarded Turnbull a DFC. Although Turnbull notified the surface escorts that he could see “about thirty” German survivors in the water, none was rescued. The U-540, which sailed from a fuel stop in Bergen, Norway, on October 4, had served only fourteen days in the Atlantic force.

  • The corvette Sunflower of Gretton’s Escort Group B-7, commanded by J. Plomer, who had earlier sunk U-638, attacked and sank the VII U-631, commanded by Jürgen Krüger. She was the boat that had rammed U-455 and disabled her own four bow tubes, but had been refused permission to abort. There were no survivors of U-631,

  • The new frigate Byard of British Escort Group B-4 found and sank the new Type IXC40 U-841, commanded by Werner Bender, age twenty-six. Byard fished out twenty-seven survivors of U-841, who revealed that shortly before sailing from Trondheim on October 4, popular second watch officer Ernst Huffmann (son of a general) had committed suicide when the Gestapo found “secret documents,” including Enigma keys, left behind in his hotel room.

  Like the new IXs U-844 and U-540, which sailed from Norway and had been sunk, the U-841 had served in the Atlantic force less than two weeks. The assignment to these North Atlantic convoy battles of Type IXs, which Control had earlier barred from such activity because they were not suitable, probably resulted from a desire to bring all possible flak arrays into play.

  As a result of conflicting position reports, U-boat Control bollixed the follow-up attacks on convoys Outbound North 206 and Outbound North (Slow) 20. The veteran VII U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen, correctly reported that the convoy had deviated to a southwesterly course. The new VII U-413, commanded by Gustav Poel, which also carried special direction-finding gear and an operating team, wrongly reported that Outbound North (Slow) 20 had deviated to a northwesterly course. Choosing Pod’s report (deemed to be more reliable because of the direction-finding team) over Hungershausen’s, Control sent group Schlieffen in the wrong direction.

  Control later characterized the attack on these convoys as a “setback.” Indeed so. The U-boats sank only one freighter, the straggler from Outbound North (Slow) 20. On the other side, the sinking of six U-boats was another smashing victory for the defense. To the German submariners at sea pursuing convoys, this battle made it quite clear that for a U-boat on the North Atlantic run to remain on the surface and fight it out with aircraft was as suicidal as it was in the Bay of Biscay.

  STILL MORE GERMAN FAILURES ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC RUN

  At Control, the supposed successes of group Leuthen against surface and air escorts in September outweighed the disastrous failures of groups Rossbach and Schlieffen in October. Hence Control had not the slightest intention of scaling back or canceling operations on the North Atlantic run.

  The loss of U-tankers, most recently U-460, seriously cramped operations in that area, especially in the distant western Atlantic near the Grand Banks. To carry on, Control was compelled to divert the two remaining XB minelayers in the Atlantic force to be provisional refuelers. These were the new U-219 and U-220, commanded by the old hands Walter Burghagen, age fifty-two, who had entered the Imperial Navy in World War I, and Bruno Barber, age thirty-nine, respectively. Burghagen in U-219 sailed from Norway on October 22 to back up the Type XIV tanker U-488. At about the same time, Barber in U-220, who had planted a minefield off St. John’s, Newfoundland, on October 9, was also directed to assist U-488, either by giving her surplus fuel or taking on her surplus fuel so U-488 could race to France, fill up, and return.

  So valuable were these two Type
XB provisional refuelers that Control directed two new flak boats, U-256 and U-271, to protect them and the even more valuable Type XIV tanker, U-488, at the refueling rendezvous. In addition, Control restricted all future refueling operations to nighttime, and directed that in event of an Allied air attack, the tankers were to submerge while the U-boats waiting to refuel repelled the aircraft with flak guns.

  Taking advantage of Enigma decrypts and DFs of U-boat radio chatter, the Allies continued to focus hunter-killer operations against the U-tankers. While pursuing U-488, Avengers and Wildcats of the “jeep” carrier Core tangled with two U-boats.

  • On October 20, pilots Charles W. Brewer and Robert W. Hayman came upon the VII U-378, commanded by Erich Mäder, who had earlier sunk the Polish destroyer Orkan. The pilots attacked and sank U-378. There was one survivor, the quartermaster Karl-Heinz Brunkhorst, but he was lost when the ship that saved him went down.*

  • On the next day, October 21, aircraft from Core, assisted by Catalinas, found and attacked the flak boat U-271, commanded by Kurt Barleben, age thirty-four, who was seeking the tanker U-488 to offer protection. One German gunner was killed and others wounded, but U-271 survived the attack. However, she was so badly smashed up that Barleben had to abort to France.

  To replace the failed group Schlieffen, on October 24 U-boat Control directed the formation of a new group, Siegfried. In its final configuration, Siegfried was comprised of eighteen U-boats. Of these, eleven, or almost two-thirds, were commanded by green skippers; six in new boats from Norway and five in experienced boats from France. Owing to the absence of U-tankers, Control was compelled to order Siegfried to attack eastbound convoys, thereby bringing the fuel-low U-boats closer to French bases, but also closer to the most effective Allied land-based air.

  From timely Enigma decrypts, the Allies were aware of group Siegfried. To avoid this line, they diverted all eastbound Halifax and Slow convoys—those with valuable cargoes—to a southerly course. At the same time, Allied authorities designated the empty ships of convoy Outbound North 207 a “bait convoy,” and deliberately sent it directly at group Siegfried to seek a naval confrontation. For this purpose the Outbound North 207 was massively protected. The Canadian Escort Group C-l, the British “jeep” carrier Biter, which sailed inside the convoy, and a MAC ship provided close escort. The famous British Support Group B-2, commanded by Johnny Walker, to which the new British “jeep” carrier Tracker had been attached, patrolled nearby, as did Peter Gretton’s Support Group, B-7. Land-based Coastal Command aircraft of all types lent added support.

  The battle commenced on the morning of October 23. A B-24 of British Squadron 224, en route to Gretton’s B-7 group to airdrop some radar spare parts, sighted a U-boat of group Siegfried. This was the new VII U-274, commanded by Günther Jordan, age twenty-four, ten days out from a fuel stop in Norway. The pilot, Edward Jacques (Billy) Wicht, a Swiss serving in the RAF, attacked with eight rockets, gave the alarm, and dropped a smoke float. Gretton in the destroyer Duncan accompanied by his other destroyer, Vidette, raced to the float, trailed by the slower corvettes. Meanwhile, Wicht drove the U-274 under with gunfire and dropped two depth charges.

  Upon gaining a sonar contact, Duncan twice attacked U-274 with her Hedgehog and Vidette carried out a depth-charge run. These attacks destroyed the boat with the loss of all hands. The kill was confirmed by what Gretton described as “gruesome evidence” that rose to the surface. Johnny Walker, who had not yet got a U-boat kill this trip, radioed Gretton congratulations. “We were delighted to have wiped the eye for once of the leading expert in the Navy, who had forgotten more about ‘pinging’ than any of us had ever learnt,” Gretton wrote with modesty in his memoir. The British divided credit for the kill among Wicht’s B-24, Duncan, and Vidette.

  Three days later, on October 26, one of eight B-24s of Canadian Squadron 10, based at Gander, Newfoundland, which came out to escort Outbound North 207, sighted another Siegfried boat. She was thought to be the VII U-420, commanded by Hans-Jürgen Reese, age twenty-five, which, in early July, had been badly damaged by aircraft of the same squadron. This second assault on the supposed U-420 was mounted by pilot R. M. Aldwinkle. On the first pass, five of six depth charges failed to explode and the other fell wide. On the second pass, after a brief gun duel, the U-boat dived and Aldwinkle dropped a Fido homing torpedo (called “Zombie” by Canadians), but it probably missed or malfunctioned. On a third pass, Aldwinkle dropped two more depth charges that exploded close to the U-boat. The Admiralty credited him with the kill of U-420, but Niestlé has concluded that the boat was lost to unknown causes.

  Into this great congregation of Allied ships and aircraft in mid-Atlantic came two more American “jeep” carrier groups. The first was the Block Island, newly assigned to Atlantic ASW operations and equipped with long-range, radar-equipped, night-flying Avengers. The Block Island group relieved the “jeep” carrier Core and her screen. The second “jeep” carrier was the Card, which had resupplied in North Africa. The main mission of the Block Island and Card carrier groups was to sink the tanker U-488 and the XB provisional tankers U-219 and U-220.

  The Block Island group DFed a refueling rendezvous of U-488, and other boats on the night of October 25-26. Two four-stack destroyers of the screen, Parrott and Paul Jones (both veterans of the Asiatic Fleet of 1942), found U-488, but they botched the attack and the harassed tanker got away. However, the boats seeking fuel from U-488 had to endure more days of anxiety.

  That same day, October 26, a B-24 found and attacked the VII U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen. Intercepting and decrypting a report of this attack by gunfire and depth charges, Allied codebreakers surmised that it probably was carried out by a B-24 of Canadian Squadron 10. The U-91, which had been out from France thirty-six days and was seeking the VII U-584 to give her fuel, was not seriously damaged.

  Two days later, on the morning of October 28, two aircraft from Block Island found the XB provisional tanker U-220, commanded by Bruno Barber, and her flak-boat escort, U-256, commanded by Wilhelm Brauel. It was believed that Avenger pilot Franklin M. Murray and Wildcat pilot Harold L. Handshuh sank U-220 with the loss of all hands and so severely damaged U-256 that Brauel, like Barleben in the other flak boat, U-27I, was forced to abort to France. However, Niestlé writes that Brauel in JJ-256 logged an underwater telephone exchange with Barber eight hours later that day, which raises doubt about the kill of U-220 that morning.

  On the next day, October 29, Peter Gretton’s Support Group B-7, which had switched from the “bait convoy” Outbound North 207 to the next convoy sailing west, Outbound North 208, found a shadower. She was the new VII U-282, commanded by Rudolf Müller, age twenty-six, who was merely ten days out from a fuel stop in Norway on his first patrol. The British destroyers Duncan and Vidette and corvette Sunflower of Gretton’s group sank U-282 by Hedgehog. “Even more gruesome and more numerous” evidence rose to the surface, Gretton wrote, confirming the kill, but there were no German survivors. After this victory—the group’s third kill in as many weeks—Gretton returned to the British Isles with the fast eastbound convoy Halifax 263.* U-boat Control did not learn of the loss of U-282 for weeks.

  Hunting the XIV tanker U-488 and/or the XB provisional tanker U-219, the Card group got good Huff Duff bearings on October 30-31. As it turned out, the prey was neither U-488 nor U-219, both of which had run south to less hostile waters, but rather the VII U-584, commanded by Joachim Deecke (who had landed four saboteurs in Florida in June 1942) and the U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen, which was to give U-584 some fuel to get home.

  Late on the afternoon of October 31, Avenger pilot Wilma S. Fowler from Card found U-584 and U-91. In response to his alarm, two other Card Avengers, piloted by Letson S. Balliett and Alexander C. McAuslan, soon arrived. After putting up desultory flak, Hungershausen in U-91 dived and escaped. Left alone, Deecke in U-584 also dived, but too late. Avenger pilots Fowler and Balliett dropped Fidos that hit and destroyed U-584 with the loss of
all hands.

  Wrongly assuming Hungershausen in U-91 to be a U-tanker, the commander of the Card group, Arnold J. (“Buster”) Isbell, was more than annoyed that she got away. He therefore sent one of his screen, the four-stack destroyer Borie, commanded by thirty-year-old Charles H. Hutchins, in pursuit. In the early hours of November 1, Hutchins got a radar contact. It was not U-91 but rather a veteran of the Arctic, U-405, commanded by Rolf-Heinrich Hopmann, who was a ripe thirty-seven years old and thirsting for a fight.

  The battle that ensued over the next hour and twelve minutes was one of the closest and most intense of the Atlantic naval war. When Borie closed, guns blazing, U-405 dived. Owing to a defect in Borie’s depth-charge racks, Hutchins unintendedly unleashed a monstrous barrage on Hopmann. The impact of these close explosions blew U-405 to the surface, whereupon Borie attempted to ram. However, the motion of the heavy seas thwarted Borie and she came down on U-405’s bow section very gently and hung up. Locked in a deadly V, the opposing crews shot at one another at extreme close quarters. The exposed Germans incurred very heavy casualties. The grinding of the vessels opened deep gashes in Borie’s hull but not that of U-405.

  When the two ships separated, they each shot a torpedo at the other, but both missed. Thereupon Hutchins outmaneuvered Hopmann and gained an advantageous position that enabled him to fire three shallow-set depth charges from his throwers in a good straddle. These explosions and two solid hits on U-405’s bridge by Borie’s 4” guns fatally holed the U-boat. About twenty surviving Germans threw dinghies over the side and jumped into the sea. In a maneuver reminiscent of that of the American destroyer Roper’s toward the survivors of U-85, Hutchins, believing Borie was threatened by another U-boat, plowed through the Germans in the water and hauled away, leaving the few who survived to fend for themselves. None lived.

 

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