by Clay Blair
• The famous veteran IXB U-107, commanded by Volker von Simmermacher. On the night of January 5, an unidentified Allied aircraft attacked U-107 in the Bay of Biscay. Von Simmermacher’s gunners repulsed the aircraft, and the boat reached Lorient on January 8. She did not sail again until May.*
• The new VII U-364, commanded by Paul Heinrich Sass, age twenty-four. On the night of January 30, it is believed, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 172, piloted by Leighton D. Richards, attacked and sank U-364, with the loss of all hands. A further assumption is that flak from the doomed boat shot down the Wellington. However, Alex Niestlé believes that another boat, U-608, shot down the Wellington and that the cause of the loss of U-364 is unknown.
Apart from U-426, which was sunk, two other outbound U-boats were forced back to France by Coastal Command aircraft in the first week of January:
• The VII U-445, commanded by Heinz-Konrad Fenn. In the early hours of January 2, a Halifax of British Squadron 58, piloted by T. A. Griffiths, dropped five depth charges. On return to St. Nazaire on January 10, Fenn went on to other duty. Commanded by a new skipper, the boat resailed on February 1.
• The VII U-373, commanded by Detlev von Lehsten, which sailed on January 1. In the early hours of January 3, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of British Squadron 612, flown by John B. Russell, hit U-373 with depth charges. A B-24 of British Squadron 224, piloted by a Canadian, Harold R. Facey, came up to help and dropped eight more charges. Heavily damaged, von Lehsten limped into Brest on January 4, where he discovered two unexploded depth charges hung up in the superstructure. Authorities ordered U-373 to clear out of the harbor immediately lest the depth charges explode inside the pens. Brave crewmen jettisoned the missiles, and U-373 reentered port for repairs and a snorkel, †
The only U-boat group operating in North Atlantic waters in the first week of January 1944 was Rügen. Composed of eighteen boats (actually seventeen), it was divided into six subgroups of three each. On January 5, thirteen (actually twelve) of these boats were new ones from Germany or Norway commanded by green skippers, including three new Type IXs unsuitable for attacks on heavily escorted convoys but believed to be useful for flak support. A great many of the boats were fitted with new 37mm flak guns; all boats had the Naxos radar detector. One VII, U-972, which sailed from Kiel on November 30, assigned initially to weather reporting, had not been heard from since her last report on December 15 and was assumed to be lost, as was the case, perhaps due to an air attack that has not been identified.
Another VII, outbound from France to Rügen, did not get there either. This was the U’757y commanded by Friedrich Deetz, who had an extra Naxos to give to U-976, which had sailed from Kiel on November 25. On January 8, Deetz happened upon the merged and heavily guarded convoys Outbound South 64 and KMS 38. Two of the fifteen-odd escorts, the British frigate Bayntun and Canadian corvette Camrose, got U-757 on sonar and destroyed her with depth-charge and Hedgehog attacks. The Canadian historian Joseph Schull wrote that the only evidence of a kill was “a vast pool of oil, some bits of wreckage and a uniform cap,” but a kill it was. The loss left the U-976 of group Rügen without a Naxos.
One of the VIIs in Rügen had established another U-boat “record,” of sorts. This was the new U-283. She had been commissioned on March 31, 1943, by Heinz-Günther Scholz. However, the boat sailed from Kiel on January 13, 1944, commanded by another skipper, Günter Ney, who had been a watch officer on the JJ-431 in the Mediterranean for about six months. Born March 7, 1922, Ney was twenty-one years old in January 1944, the youngest officer yet to command a U-boat at the battlefronts.
Initially the Luftwaffe was to assist Rügen with convoy spotting. However, from spies, Control obtained information on the sailing from Gibraltar of a northbound convoy, MKS 35, and directed all its aircraft to assist the group in the Middle Atlantic, Borkum, as will be described. Therefore, in order that Rügen could enhance its chances of finding a convoy, on January 7 Control issued orders for the group to deploy, singly, in roughly north-to-south positions about two hundred miles off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland in the Northwest Approaches. Allied codebreakers decrypted these orders (and others) and thus diverted convoys to the Southwest Approaches and St. George’s Channel into the Irish Sea.
At this time, one U-boat in the North Atlantic found and sank a freighter. She was the VII U-960, a weather reporter commanded by Günther Heinrich, which had sailed from Norway on December 4. His victim was the 7,200-ton American Liberty ship Sumner I. Kimball, a straggler in ballast from convoy Outbound North 219. Near dusk, in heavy seas, Heinrich fired six torpedoes at Kimball and claimed four hits. Kimball got off a distress report with her position but not her name, then she broke in half. In response to her SOS, the British destroyer Forester found the stern of the wreck but no survivors.
Control learned from B-dienst that Kimball had broken in half and that the halves were still afloat. Therefore it ordered Heinrich to return to the scene and sink both halves. Heinrich reported that he found both halves, took photographs, then sank the “largest half” with one torpedo and left the other half floating. He said nothing about survivors. Since none was ever found by the Allies, the loss of Kimball became something of a mystery in merchant-ship circles. After the British Empire Housman, she was only the second freighter lost to U-boats in January 1944. The U-960 reached La Pallice on February 3, where she traded her ineffective quad 20mm flak gun for a 37mm.
Finally mounted at mid-month, Luftwaffe support for Rügen was again disappointing. Foul weather grounded many aircraft. Others incurred engine and radio failures. The searches conducted by those planes that did fly, Control logged, were “not thorough”; position reports on the few contacts made came too late or were in error.
During this cold, miserable, and fruitless deployment, five Rügen VIIs, operating more or less singly, came upon and attacked Allied escorts and freighters from January 14 to January 23. The experienced U-271, U-281, and U-571, commanded by Kurt Barleben, Heinz von Davidson, and Gustav Lüssow, respectively, each shot a T-5 at a “destroyer.” The first, U-271, an ex-flak boat, most likely fired at Vidette or Versatile, escorting the eastbound convoy Halifax 275. The new U-390 and U-471, commanded by Heinz Geissler and Friedrich Kloevekorn, respectively, each shot a three-fan plus a T-5 at freighters. Allied records do not show any hits corresponding to these attacks.
In addition to the aforementioned U-757 and U-972, three other Rügen VIIs were lost in January, making a total of five, or about one-third of that group.
• On the afternoon of January 28, a Sunderland of Australian Squadron 461, escorting the inbound Slow Convoy 151 and Outbound North 221, came upon the U-571, commanded by Gustav Lüssow. In two runs into heavy flak, the pilot, Richard D. Lucas, dropped two salvos of depth charges. After the second salvo, the U-571 blew up in a “huge explosion,” which an airman caught on film. Lucas reported “thirty” Germans in the water, but none survived. He received a DFC for this certain kill.
• On the same day, a B-24 of U.S. Navy Squadron VB 103, providing escort for the same two convoys, found and attacked the ex-flak boat U-271, commanded by Kurt Barleben. The pilot, George A. Enloe, dropped six depth charges that destroyed the boat. There were no survivors.
• On the afternoon of January 29, a B-24 of U.S. Navy Squadron VB 110, commanded by H. H. Budd, found the U-592, commanded by Hans Jaschke. The copilot, who was flying the B-24, attacked into flak hurriedly, dropping depth charges that fell short. Budd then took the controls of the flak-damaged plane and called in two more American B-24s of his squadron. However, Jaschke crash-dived U-592 and escaped.
Later he reported this attack to Control, which logged of this encounter: “Dive-bombed by [B-24] Liberator when surfacing. Eight bombs. Heavily hit in keel.” In fact, the damage was so extensive that U-592 had to abort. At that time, Johnny Walker’s Support Group 2, composed of five sloops, was in that area. Exploiting Enigma and DF intelligence, Walker found and sank the abort
ing U-592 on January 31. The Admiralty credited Walker in Starling plus Wild Goose and Magpie with the kill. There were no German survivors.
Group Rügen was another futile and humiliating German performance. Its boats had not hit a single Allied ship. Six of its number—about one-third—had been lost in January. On the few occasions the vaunted T-5 homing torpedo could be employed, it had malfunctioned or missed. The equally touted 37mm automatic rapid-fire flak gun, replacing the useless quad 20mm, appeared to be yet another failure.
Control dissolved Rügen, but before it was properly replaced, all U-boat operations in the North Atlantic were thrown into great confusion. On January 28, a Luftwaffe aircraft over the Bay of Biscay reported “200 to 300 landing craft” headed east toward Bordeaux. Although the Germans correctly believed an invasion to be highly unlikely at this time or place, the reports could not be ignored. Furthermore, a few hours later, a VII inbound to France from Rügen, the U-302, commanded by Herbert Sickel, seemed to “confirm” a possible invasion force. He reported “25 to 30 smoke trails” with “strong escort” zigzagging at sixteen knots on an easterly course.
U-boat Control took countermeasures at once. It diverted five VIIs* that were outbound from France to the location of the supposed invasion force. Next it directed all Rügen boats (then about eighteen) to cease anticonvoy operations and rush to the location at high speed on the surface “regardless of enemy aircraft.” These steps were in motion when, eight hours after the Luftwaffe report, Sickel in U-302 submitted a second report stating that the “smoke trails” were actually from “fishing trawlers.” Thereupon Control canceled the invasion alert and released all U-boats involved to resume anticonvoy operations.
U-BOAT ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC
While group Rügen patrolled the North Atlantic in January, a smaller group, Borkum, hunted in the Middle Atlantic between Gibraltar and the Azores. Control believed that Borkum consisted of eleven boats on January 3, but one boat, U-645, had been sunk on Christmas Eve, leaving ten, and two were aborting: the U-275, whose skipper, Helmut Bork, claimed sinking two destroyers on January 1 (not confirmed) but had been felled by appendicitis, and the new IXC40 U-541, which had been damaged by an aircraft. The skipper of the latter, Kurt Petersen, claimed he had sunk a total of “five destroyers” on this patrol, a record. However, none was ever confirmed. While inbound to France on the night of January 6, unidentified Allied aircraft hit both U-275 and U-541, but they reached French bases. Assigned to the anti-invasion group Landwirt, the U-275 did not sail again until June.
Unaware of the loss of U-645, Control divided Borkum into three subgroups of three boats. Its task was to intercept the slow Mediterranean-British Isles northbound convoy MKS 35. As related, it was to be assisted by JU-290s on reconnaissance patrols. However, Control was not yet aware that MKS 35 had sailed two days earlier than expected, that it had merged at sea with convoy Sierra Leone 144, and that the combined formation was to be supported not only by land-based air but also by the “jeep” carrier Block Island’s hunter-killer group, which departed Casablanca on January 8. The Block Island group was also to support the southbound convoys Outbound South 64 and KMS 38.
In compliance with standing orders, all Borkum boats had been fitted with the new 37mm flak guns. The impending convoy attack was to be a battle test for the gun, believed to be the perfect answer to Allied aircraft. “The development of the automatic 37mm flak gun was carried out with greatest rapidity,” Control told Borkum on January 5. “Delivery on board was effected without the usual thorough tests, with a view to the quickest possible equipment of U-boats. It is therefore urgently necessary quickly to receive reports from the front on experiences with this weapon, so that if necessary the guns produced by serial [i.e., mass] manufacture, now running at full speed, may be improved.” In clear weather with unrestricted visibility, the boats were to charge batteries in daytime, using the 37mm to repel Allied aircraft.
Like most U-boat groups that operated in the dangerous Middle Atlantic area, group Borkum was massacred. Its demise was a vivid example of Allied air and naval ASW maturity in the Atlantic in early 1944.
While proceeding to new positions, two Borkum boats had brief encounters with the enemy.
• On the night of January 3, the U-305, commanded by Rudolf Bahr, who had sunk the Canadian destroyer St. Croix on an earlier patrol, shot T-5s at the Card group on Christmas Eve, and fired a T-5 at a “destroyer” on January 2, repelled an aircraft attack. Three nights later, January 6, Bahr came upon several ships of British Escort Group 6, which were guarding convoys Outbound South 64 and KMS 38. He fired three torpedoes at the warships. One or more hit the British frigate Tweed on the starboard side and she sank in two minutes. The other warships rescued only forty-four crew of Tweed. Bahr lost one officer in this engagement.
• That same night, the U-270, commanded by Paul-Friedrich Otto, came under attack by a B-17 Flying Fortress of British Squadron 206, newly based in the Azores. In his bombing run, the pilot, A. J. Pinhorn, severely damaged U-270, but Otto shot down the B-17 with the loss of all hands. The damage forced Otto to abort. Assigned to Landwirt, the U-270 did not sail again until June. His departure left Borkum with only seven U-boats to attack the oncoming merged convoys MKS 35 and Sierra Leone 144.
Control twice moved the Borkum lines southward and, based on reports from a JU-290, consolidated them into a single line of eight boats (actually seven) on January 9. In the late afternoon of January 11, the westernmost boat, Rudolf Bahr in U-305, found and reported the convoy. He attempted to shadow, but a “destroyer” drove him off and down and he lost contact.
Responding to Bahr’s report, three other Borkum boats attempted to attack the convoy that night. The U-641, commanded by Horst Rendtel, heard explosions and chased but a diesel engine failed and she was forced to dive to make repairs. The U-382, commanded by a new skipper, Rudolf Zorn, who had sunk the American destroyer Leary on this patrol, shot a T-5 at a “destroyer” but missed. In return, escorts depth-charged U-382 so badly that Zorn was forced to abort. The ex-flak boat U-953, commanded by Karl-Heinz Marbach, shot a T-5 at a corvette that missed. In return, escorts hunted him for thirteen harrowing hours with depth charges and Hedgehogs.*
That day, January 11, two Avengers from Block Island, piloted by Leonard L. McFord and Willis D. Seeley, found the Borkum boat U-758, commanded by Helmut Manseck. In addition to two depth charges each, the Avengers were fitted with new and powerful armament: eight 3.5” rockets.
Braving the heavy flak, McFord and Seeley attacked with the rockets and then with depth charges. These hits seriously damaged U-758, forcing Manseck to abort. He reached St. Nazaire on January 20, at which time he returned to Germany to commission a big “electro boat.” Assigned to Landwirt, the U-758 did not sail again until June. Her abort and that of U-382 left Borkum with merely five boats.
In view of the losses and aborts, Control disbanded Borkum. Four of the remaining five boats went north to join group Rügen west of Ireland. The other, U-953, sailed south to conduct an individual patrol off Casablanca and returned to La Pallice on February 20. Remarkably, only one of the four Borkum boats reassigned to Rügen actually got there and Allied forces sank her as well as two others. A fourth disappeared from unknown causes. In brief;
• On January 13, destroyers of the Block Island group found and attacked the aborting Borkum VII U-382, commanded by Rudolf Zorn, who, as related, had sunk the American destroyer Leary. Zorn escaped and reached St. Nazaire on January 26, at which time he left the boat to command another. Assigned to Landwirt, the U-382 did not sail again until June.
• On the night of January 13, a Wellington of British Squadron 172, based in the Azores and piloted by a Canadian, W. N. Armstrong, found the U-231, commanded by thirty-three-year-old Wolfgang Wenzel. In two runs into flak, Armstrong dropped six depth charges that wrecked the U-231 beyond saving. The plane could not remain at the scene, however, because flak from the U-boat had badly wounded one of the a
irmen, B. W. Heard, whose leg had to be amputated.
With his boat flooding heavily aft, Wenzel ordered abandon ship. An American intelligence report stated the following: “Sometime during the abandoning of his boat, Wenzel, probably in a fit of despondence, attempted suicide by firing a revolver bullet into his mouth.” Astonishingly that bullet “lodged harmlessly ... in the back of the neck and most crew members were unaware of the event.”
All fifty men on U-231 escaped from the sinking boat in rafts and dinghies, but seven soon died of exposure. About thirteen hours later, on January 14, two aircraft from the Block Island found the survivors. Two four-stack destroyers of the Block Island screen, Bulmer and Parrott, † picked up the surviving forty-three Germans and transferred them to the carrier, which arrived in Norfolk on February 3. A doctor on Block Island removed the bullet in Wenzel’s neck.
These prisoners were the first to be captured from a U-boat fitted with the new 37mm high-angle automatic flak gun. The five-man gun crew criticized it severely, one gunner stating it was “useless” for operations on U-boats. It was too delicate, too prone to jam, and too likely to break down. In order to keep the gun battle-ready, it was necessary to surface and spend thirty minutes a day on maintenance (greasing and cleaning) and to carry out a “complete overhaul” once a week.*
• On January 14, the ex-Borkum U-377, commanded by Gerhard Kluth, reported to Control that he had been attacked by aircraft but apparently the damage was not crippling. The next day, Kluth said he had come upon a hunter-killer group and shot T-5s from his bow and stern tubes but probably achieved no hits. Nothing further was heard from U-377. It is possible that these as yet unidentified warships sank U-377 or one of her own torpedoes circled back and destroyed the boat. On January 15, Control logged a fragmentary distress message: “Hit by torpedo, boat badly damaged, am sinking.” However, Control doubted this message came from U-377 or any other U-boat since it was believed that a torpedo hit would instantly destroy the boat, making it impossible to get off an SOS.