by Clay Blair
• The new VIIC snort boat U-396, commanded by Ernst-Günther Unterhorst, age twenty-five, en route from Kiel to Norway. On the afternoon of June 28, a Catalina of British Squadron 210, piloted by J. C. Campbell, hit and damaged the U-396. Forced to abort on July 1 owing to carbon-monoxide leakage from her snort, which was damaged in the air attack, the boat reached Bergen on July 3 with several crewmen ill. She did not resail until October.
• The new Type IXC40 snort boat U-865, commanded by Dietrich Stellmacher, age twenty-nine, en route to the Atlantic for a weather patrol. Hit by an unidentified aircraft, Stellmacher was forced to abort to Norway on July 5. After repairs, the boat resailed at the end of the month.
When the thirteen U-boats knocked out in June in Norwegian waters (seven sunk, six forced to abort) are added to the twelve boats hit in these waters in May (seven sunk, five forced to abort), the totals were impressive indeed: twenty-five boats hit; fourteen sunk, eleven forced to abort. In the June sinkings, another 350 experienced German submariners perished or were captured, bringing German personnel losses on U-boats in Norwegian waters during May and June to about seven hundred. The loss of trained personnel was sufficient to cadre fourteen big electro boats, another setback to that program.
THE ARCTIC
On D day in Normandy, there were thirty-two VIIs in the Arctic force. Seventeen were at sea, hunting futilely for Murmansk convoys, which the Allies had suspended temporarily. These boats were organized into two attack groups: Grimm (ten boats) and Trutz (seven boats). The other fifteen were in northern ports from Trondheim to Narvik on standby or in refit.
Upon learning of the Allied invasion, per plan, the chief of U-boats North, Reinhard Suhren, recalled seven of the boats in the Grimm and Trutz groups. They were to proceed “at maximum speed” to Narvik, where they were to refuel and replenish and then standby “in immediate readiness.” The other ten boats of Grimm-Trutz were to remain at sea in a line northeast of Jan Mayen Island to repel putative Allied invaders of northern Norway or to attack Murmansk convoys. Redesignated group Trutz, this line remained in place (with alternating U-boats) until July 1.
After the success of Neptune, the naval phase of Overlord, was assured, Churchill proposed to Roosevelt that the Murmansk convoys be resumed to provide all possible supplies for Stalin’s massive summer offensive (Bagration), which began on June 22. Roosevelt agreed readily.
This decision raised anew the threat posed by Tirpitz to those convoys. Accordingly, the new commander of the Home Fleet, Henry Moore (succeeding Bruce Fraser), drew plans for yet another attack on Tirpitz in mid-July. From Scapa Flow sailed a task force consisting of the battleship Duke of York, three fleet carriers (Formidable, Furious, and the new Indefatigable), four cruisers, and twelve destroyers. Barracuda aircraft from the carriers twice attempted to hit Tirpitz on July 17, but they were thwarted, first by a smoke screen, then by fog.
During these naval actions in July, aircraft of Coastal Command’s 18 Group provided support. They knocked out ten more U-boats: four sunk, six forced to abort. These further losses led Control to abolish the at-sea section of group Mine and to recall those boats to various ports. In brief:
• In the North Sea on July 15, a B-24 of British Squadron 206, piloted by D. W. Thynne, sank the Mine VIIC41 U-319, commanded by Johannes Clemens, age thirty-three. There were no German survivors. Apparently Clemens shot down the B-24 during this attack. Near that place on July 16, a British launch recovered the body of one crew member of the B-24 from a dinghy.
• Off Narvik on July 17, a Catalina of British Squadron 210, piloted by John A. Cruickshank, attacked the Arctic VII U-361, commanded by Hans Seidel, age twenty-six. On the first pass, the depth charges failed to release. On the second, the depth charges fell and sank the boat, but the Germans riddled the Catalina with flak. This fire killed the navigator, gravely wounded the command pilot, Cruickshank, who was placed in a bunk, and seriously wounded three other crew, including the copilot, Jack Garnett, who remained at the controls, assisted by a third pilot, S. I. Fiddler, who was flying his first combat mission.
As the plane approached its home base, Cruickshank insisted that he be carried forward to assist in the landing. He and Garnett put the damaged plane down on the water and then ran it up on the beach. Thereupon Cruickshank, still at the controls, died of his wounds. For this heroic performance, the British awarded Cruickshank a posthumous Victoria Cross, the second of only two such awards to personnel of Coastal Command in the war.
• Off Narvik on July 17, a B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by Michael George Moseley, sank the newly arrived Arctic VII U-347, commanded by Johann de Buhr, age thirty-two. Although the B-24 was hit by flak, Moseley circled the area for ninety minutes, reporting wreckage and “at least six survivors” in the water. No Germans survived.
• Off Narvik in the same area on July 18, a Catalina of British Squadron 210, piloted by Ronald William George Vaughan, sank the new Arctic boat U-742, commanded by Heinz Schwassmann, age twenty-eight. During this attack, German gunners hit the Catalina with flak, wounding two men and puncturing oil and gasoline tanks, which forced Vaughan to abort and to shut down one engine. He made an emergency landing on friendly waters and beached the aircraft. Vaughan reported “thirty-five to forty” German survivors in the water, but none was ever found.
The stories of the six U-boats damaged by aircraft of Coastal Command’s 18 Group in Norwegian waters in the last two weeks of July are as follows:
• Off Narvik on July 19, a B-24 of British Squadron 86, piloted by W.F.J. Harwood, hit the newly arrived Arctic boat U-968jy commanded by Otto Westphalen, age twenty-four. As related, Westphalen was one of the prosecution’s technical consultants in the sedition trial of Oskar Kusch, but he had opposed the death sentence and had recommended a limited form of clemency. Having incurred one killed and six wounded in this attack, Westphalen aborted to Narvik for repairs and remanning.
• Off Hammerfest on July 19, a B-24 of British Squadron 59, piloted by R. C. Penning, attacked the Arctic boat U-716, commanded by Hans Dunkelberg. The eight depth charges seriously damaged U-716 and she aborted to Hammerfest for repairs.
• Off Narvik on July 19, a Sunderland of Norwegian Squadron 330, piloted by Bredo Thurmann-Nielsen, hit the Arctic boat U-387, commanded by Rudolf Büchler. He aborted to Trondheim for repairs.
• Off Bergen on July 20, a Mosquito of Norwegian Squadron 333, piloted by Rolf Leithe, attacked the new IXD2 snort boat U-cruiser U-863, commanded by Dietrich von der Esch, who was setting off to the Far East with cargo. Leithe fired his 57mm Tsetse cannon and machine guns and dropped two depth charges, which damaged the U-boat. Von der Esch aborted to Bergen for repairs and resailed to the Far East on July 26, via Brazil.
• Off Kristiansund on July 25, two Mosquitos of Norwegian Squadron 333 found the VII snort boat U-244, commanded by Ruprecht Fischer, age twenty-seven, who was en route to reconnoiter Iceland and also to report weather. The pilots, Sigmund Breck and J. A. Stiff, hit the boat with 57mm Tsetse cannon fire that killed one German and wounded eight others. Fischer aborted to Kristiansund for repairs and remanning and resailed on August 23. Pilot Breck was killed in action in December 1944.
• Off Trondheim on July 27, a B-24 of British Squadron 86, commanded by G. G. Gates, hit the new IXC40 snort boat U-865, commanded by Dietrich Stellmacher, age twenty-nine. Heavy flak set on fire two engines of the B-24 and caused other damage, but Gates extinguished the fires and limped home. Stellmacher returned to Trondheim for repairs. He resailed twice in early August, but aborted each time. He finally sailed again on September 8, only to be sunk ten days later, as will be described.
Coastal Command had every reason to walk tall. During seventy-seven days in May, June, and July, it knocked out thirty-seven U-boats in Norwegian waters: seventeen sunk and twenty forced to abort. The British destroyer Milne and submarine Satyr had sunk two other U-boats (U-289, U-987) in this period for a total of nineteen U-boat kills. These Allied successes
further imperiled and disorganized U-boat operations in that area and, of course, prevented the transfer of many U-boats to the English Channel to attack Neptune forces.
The first of the renewed series of Murmansk convoys, JW 59 (thirty-three ships), sailed from Loch Ewe on August 15. Owing to the possibility that the Luftwaffe might take advantage of the long daylight hours and to the certainty of U-boat attacks, Home Fleet commander Henry Moore provided the convoy with a massive British close escort: the “jeep” carriers Vindex and the American-built Striker cruiser Jamaica, seven destroyers, four sloops, two frigates, and five corvettes.*
To assure that Tirpitz could not sail against this convoy, Moore mounted yet another air strike at her in mid-August. This task force consisted of the battleship Duke of York, three fleet carriers (Formidable, Furious, Indefatigable), two American-built “jeep” carriers (the Canadian Nabob and British Trumpeter), three cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and several frigates. Two fleet tankers, escorted by four corvettes, sailed separately in support.
While convoy JW 59 was traversing the Arctic seas, Moore launched the attack on Tirpitz on August 22. Again the aircraft encountered dense fog and again the attack failed. Moore then hauled away westward to refuel so that a second attack could be mounted on August 23 or 24, weather permitting.
That day, August 22, the veteran Arctic boat U-354, commanded by Hans-Jürgen Sthamer, sailed from Narvik and came upon a section of Moore’s task force. Sthamer fired a FAT spread and a T-5 quickly, then dived. A FAT hit and wrecked the Canadian “jeep” carrier Nabob, and the T-5 blew off the stern of the 1,300-ton British frigate Bickerton, killing more than forty men. Nabob limped to Scapa Flow but did not sail again as a warship; the British destroyer Vigilant sank the stricken Bickerton. Had the Germans been fully aware of these successes at that time, doubtless they would have awarded Sthamer a Ritterkreuz, but he did not live to amplify his flash report.
In the meantime, a half dozen U-boats had converged on convoy JW 59. The first to shoot was Ulrich Pietsch in U-344. He fired a FAT spread and claimed he sank a 5,500-ton Didog-class British light cruiser. In actuality, he hit and sank the sloop Kite, formerly of Johnny Walker’s famous Support Group 2. Other British warships recovered only six of Kite’s gallant two-hundred-man crew.
Pietsch in U-344 continued to dog convoy JW 59. On August 24, a Sword-fish from Vindex, piloted by G. Bennett, sank U-344 with the loss of all hands. Having hit and wrecked Nabob and Bickerton, Sthamer in U-354 raced farther north and joined the attack on JW 59. Four warships of the convoy close escort trapped and sank U-354 with the loss of all hands. The Admiralty credited this kill to the destroyer Keppel, the sloops Mermaid and Peacock, and the frigate Loch Dunvagen*
Among the several other Arctic U-boats that shot at convoy JW 59, none made greater claims than Hans-Gunther Lange in U-71L He reported he had hit the Soviet battleship for damage, sunk one of the Soviet destroyers, damaged a Soviet submarine, and sunk a British destroyer. U-boat Control accepted these claims and Dönitz awarded Lange & Ritterkreuz on August 26 while the boat was still at sea. However, Allied records do not confirm any of these claims.
Home Fleet commander Moore’s task force struck again at Tirpitz on August 24 and 29. One armor-piercing 1,600-pound bomb from a Barracuda aircraft penetrated eight decks, but it failed to detonate. Having done no further harm to Tirpitz, Moore returned his task force to Scapa Flow in a glum mood. Thereafter London gave RAF Bomber Command responsibility for destroying Tirpitz. A special force of twenty-seven Lancaster four-engine heavy bombers, each with one 12,000-pound “Tallboy” bomb, attacked Tirpitz on September 15. One bomb hit in her forward section, flooding that area and putting an end to Tirpitz as a warship. The Lancasters attacked her again on October 19, but failed to do any damage. Finally on November 12, Lancaster bombers with Tallboy bombs got two or three direct hits. The great ship turned turtle. In this brief finale, 950 of the crew of 1,630 perished.
Convoy JW 59 reached Kola Inlet on August 28, without the loss of any merchant ships. That same day the return convoy, RA 59A (nine merchant ships) left Kola Inlet, guarded by the massive returning escort of JW 59. The Arctic U-boats attempted to attack this formation but none had any luck. On September 2, a Swordfish from Vindex, piloted by F.G.B. Sheffield, teamed up with the veteran destroyers Keppel and Whitehall and the sloops Mermaid and Peacock, and sank the new U-394, commanded by Wolfgang Borger. There were no survivors of this boat.
The next Murmansk convoy, JW 60 (thirty merchant ships) sailed from Loch Ewe on September 15. Its close escort included the British “jeep” carriers Striker and Campania. The convoy reached Kola Inlet on September 23 without loss. On September 25, some of the escort forces returned with the reverse convoy, RA 60. By chance, the convoy overran the Arctic boat U-310, commanded by Wolfgang Ley, who gave the alarm and sank the empty American Liberty ship Edward H. Crockett and the empty British Liberty ship Samsuva. In turn, it was thought that Swordfish from the Campania sank with the loss of all hands the VII U-921, commanded by Alfred Werner. However, in a recent reassessment, the Admiralty declared the loss of U-921 was due to unknown causes.
The next pair of Murmansk convoys got through with minor damage. Convoy JW 61 (thirty merchant ships) left Loch Ewe on October 20 under heavy escort, including the British “jeep” carriers Nairana, Tracker, and Vindex. The Arctic U-boats attacked the convoy on October 26-27 and claimed one “destroyer” sunk and four “destroyers” damaged with T-5s. However, no hits were confirmed and the convoy arrived at Kola Inlet without loss on October 28. The reverse convoy, RA 61 (thirty-three merchant ships), sailed on November 2. The Arctic boat U-295, commanded by Günter Wieboldt, hit and damaged the British frigate Mounsey with a T-5. She limped back into Kola Inlet. The rest of the convoy reached Loch Ewe on November 9 without loss.
To keep the Arctic boats supplied with T-5s, FATs, and other arms, two VIIF torpedo-supply boats, U-1060 and U-1061, plied between Germany and Norway. On October 19, while U-1060, commanded by Herbert Brammer, was in Narvik, an inbound Arctic boat, the veteran U-957, commanded by Gerd Schaar, who had just won a Ritterkreuz,* collided with a German freighter and had to be decommissioned in Narvik. Schaar and the crew of U-957 boarded the U-1060 to return to Germany.
While U-1060 was southbound on October 27, a swarm of aircraft from the new British fleet carrier Implacable attacked her and her minesweeper escort. One bomb sank the minesweeper. Another fell precisely through the conning-tower hatch of U-1060, killing her skipper, Brammer, and eleven other crew and causing so much damage that the boat had to be beached in Fleina. Control logged that of the total of 144 men on U-1060, seventy-one had been rescued, including Schaar and twenty-seven of the crew of U-957, but that sixty-one men of the two crews were still “missing.”
Aware of this sitting duck, Coastal Command dispatched aircraft to demolish her on November 4. The aircraft were two B-24s of Czechoslovak Squadron 311 of 18 Group, piloted by F. Pavelka and A. Sedivý, and two Halifaxes of British Squadron 502, piloted by W. G. Powell and H.H.C. Holderness. The attacks by these planes finished U-1060.
At about this same time off Bergen, Allied aircraft of 18 Group disabled the other VIIF torpedo-supply boat, U-1061, commanded by Otto Hinrichs. On the night of October 30, a Leigh Light-equipped Wellington of Canadian Squadron 407, piloted by J. E. Neelin, and a B-24 of British Squadron 224, piloted by W. S. Blackden, converged on U-1061 and “heavily damaged” her with depth charges, but she limped into Malöy. U-boat Control logged that “attempts will be made to repair her as she is particularly valuable.”
U-BOATS DEPLOYED FROM FRANCE IN JULY
Overlord ground forces in Normandy consolidated the beachhead in June but were unable to “break out” as planned, owing to the fierce resistance of the Germans in the bocage (hedgerow) country. This intense ground warfare and the relentless Allied air attacks on French railroads, highways, and bridges crippled the logistical pipeline between Germany and the U-boat bases on the French Atlanti
c coast.
During that same time, the surviving U-boats of the defensive group in France, Landwirt, were unable to interdict significantly the massive flow of Allied men and materiel across the English Channel. Owing to the effectiveness of Allied air and surface ASW forces—especially Coastal Command aircraft—even the “Sunday Punch” snort boats continued to fail.
The experience of June had demonstrated anew that submarines were useless against alert invasion forces. Indeed, as Herbert Werner in U-415 wrote, these U-boat sorties from French bases were virtually “suicide” missions with no prospect of success, despite the repeated exhortations from Dönitz and Godt. Moreover, the continuing loss of battle-experienced submarine personnel needed to cadre the new electro boats could not be tolerated much longer.
Nevertheless, under the circumstances, the U-boat arm could not simply quit. Despite losses, an effort to assist the ground forces had to be made for as long as possible. Herbert Werner notwithstanding, there were many U-boat skippers and crews who actually demanded the authority to sail against the Allies.
The production of “small battle” fleet units (“chariots,” “midget” submarines, explosive-filled motor boats, and so on) had lagged badly.
The most important of these vehicles, the Biber and Molch, were far from ready on D day. However, the Germans launched one-man Neger and Marder “chariots” against Overlord forces from the French channel port Villers-sur-Mer on the nights of July 5-6, July 7-8, July 20-21, and August 3^, and perhaps other nights. These craft completely wrecked the old Polish-manned British light cruiser Dragon; sank the British destroyers his and Quorn; the British minesweepers Cato, Magic, and Pylades; the British ASW trawlers Gairsay and Colsay; and the 800-ton British auxiliary Fratton. Neger and Marder losses were very high.*