by Clay Blair
• Postwar naval propagandist Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, wartime commander of the hunter-killer group built around the “jeep” carrier Guadalcanal which sank Werner Henke in £7-575 and captured him and captured U-505 intact, wrote in the epilogue of his 1957 war memoir, Twenty Million Tons Under the Sea:
Nuremberg was a kangaroo court and a travesty on justice. The trial of Dönitz was an outstanding example of barefaced hypocrisy. His conviction was an insult to our own submariners in the Pacific who waged unrestricted warfare the same as the Germans did in the Atlantic.
In the years since, journalists and scholars have diligently sifted the mass of records of the Third Reich seeking proof that subtly or otherwise Karl Dönitz encouraged a dirty naval war and crimes against humanity at sea. Beyond the allegations produced by the British team at Nuremberg, no evidence to support that view has come to light. Notwithstanding shrill attacks on Dönitz in recent years, the preponderance of existing evidence supports the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the sentence imposed on Dönitz.
Dönitz was deeply loyal to Hitler and the Third Reich. He waged a hard, harsh naval war, but a clean war. Moreover, the thousands of Allied seamen his operations caused to be killed or wounded at sea were not innocent civilian bystanders, like the tens upon tens of thousands of women and children who were killed by Allied bombers in Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin, Bremen, Kiel, and elsewhere. Allied seamen manning merchant ships were as much warriors as were the German submariners.
The U-boat war was not a close-run thing, but rather one more suicidal enterprise foisted on the Germans by Adolf Hitler. According to Alex Niestle, of 859 U-boats that set off on war patrols, 648 were lost (75 percent). Of these, 429 yielded no survivors. Most shocking of all, 215 U-boats (33 percent) were lost on first patrols, usually before the green crews had learned the ropes or inflicted any damage on Allied shipping.
True, Karl Dönitz fought a clean, hard naval war, yet this begs the question. He knowingly and willingly sent tens of thousands of German sailors to absolutely certain death. While not a war crime per se, the fact that he aided and abetted Hitler in this suicidal naval enterprise demands a revaluation of his unusually high standing in the Hall of Warriors.
AFTERWORD
In the preceding pages of this volume, we have from time to time assessed the results of the various phases of the U-boat war from September 1942 to May 1945.
We recognize that those assessments are too much for anyone to hold in mind through so many pages. Therefore it is appropriate at this ending point to repeat the gist of those assessments, to provide a final summing up.
First, it may be useful to recount the phases of the naval war in this volume. We arbitrarily put them at seven.
• September 1942 to November 1942, when the main weight of the U-boat force was shifted from the all-out assault in American waters back to the North Atlantic run, the vital lifeline between the Americas and the British Isles. This renewed North Atlantic campaign was again interrupted, this time by Torch, the Allied invasion of Northwest Africa, on November 8. At that time, almost all available Atlantic-force boats were withdrawn and shifted to the Gibraltar/Morocco or Mediterranean area to counterattack Torch maritime forces.
• December 1942 to April 1943, when the bulk of the U-boat force was again deployed against the North Atlantic run to the British Isles. Owing to ruinous U-boat losses, this campaign was interrupted yet again, in May 1943, to upgrade the inadequate and vulnerable Type VIIs and IXs.
• May 1943 to August 1943, when the Allies mounted a punishing antisubmarine air campaign in the Bay of Biscay, a so-called choke point that U-boats had to negotiate while transiting between their bases in western France and their mid-ocean hunting grounds. In response, Dönitz directed the U-boats to cross this danger area in clutches of three or more boats on the surface, shooting back at the Allied aircraft with an increased array of flak guns, including quad 20mm and rapid-fire 37mm weapons.
• September 1943 to December 1943, when the U-boats again returned to the vital North Atlantic lifeline. By this time, the U-boats had been upgraded, to little effect, with, in addition to the quad 20mm and 37mm flak guns, new radar detectors and improved battery-powered T-5 torpedoes, which could “home” on the acoustic “signatures” of escorts and, to a lesser extent, merchant ships. This renewed campaign on the North Atlantic run was terminated yet again in December 1943, because of heavy U-boat losses, hideous weather, and the perceived need to husband U-boats to counterattack the maritime forces supporting Overlord, the impending Allied invasion of Occupied France.
• January 1944 to D day, June 6, 1944, when the U-boats were withdrawn entirely from the Battle of the Atlantic to be further upgraded (or so it was thought) and to man, commission, fit out, and work up a new generation of U-boats, the supposedly war-decisive type XXI electro boats.
• June 1944 to September 1944, the first three months of the Allied invasion of Western Europe, when U-boats attempted to operate against Overlord maritime forces but failed and were forced to abandon all five Atlantic bases in France and flee to Norway or to Germany.
• September 1944 to May 1945, the period of the so-called “renewed” U-boat war, when the U-boats, now equipped with snorkels and based in Norway and Germany, were again thrown against Allied convoys and merchant shipping on the North Atlantic run and in the Irish Sea and English Channel. This final phase of the Battle of the Atlantic was brought to an end when Dönitz, replacing Hitler as chief of state, directed all U-boats to cease fire and surrendered Germany to the Allies.
As we have previously noted in our running assessments, each of the seven phases listed above resulted in a German failure. Contrary to the accepted wisdom or mythology:
• U-boats never even came close at any time to cutting the vital North Atlantic lifeline to the British Isles.
• There was not the slightest possibility that, had they only come into play earlier, U-boats equipped with snorkels or the new type XXI and XXIII electro boats, with their high sprint speed, could have won the Battle of the Atlantic or significantly intervened against Allied shipping.
Figures support the first contention. During the period under examination, from September 1942 to May 1945, according to American and British sources,* the Allies sailed 953 convoys east and west on the North and Middle Atlantic runs. These convoys were composed of 43,526 merchant ships. Of these, 272 were sunk by U-boats. Ninety-nine point four (99.4) percent of all Allied merchant ships sailing in North Atlantic convoys in this period reached their destinations intact.
These figures so completely turn on its ear the accepted wisdom that U-boats came very close to cutting the strategically critical lifeline between the Americas and the British Isles that they warrant restating, elaboration, and a breakdown by year.
First, a list of all transatlantic convoys sailing between the Americas and the British Isles and between the Americas and Gibraltar and the reverse:
Second, a list of convoys on the North Atlantic run only (HX, SC, ON, ONS, UT, TU, CU, UC):
Third, only loaded eastbound convoys on the North Atlantic run-from the Americas to the British Isles (HX and SC):
During this same period, American shipbuilding yards alone turned out the following new ships and their gross registered tonnage:
The German U-boat and crew losses in the same period were devastating:
As for the much-vaunted German snorkel of the wartime era, we have noted repeatedly in the narrative of this volume what an abject failure this device turned out to be. Several of its major shortcomings bear repeating:
• It was a fallacy that the snorkel of that era allowed the U-boat to operate effectively while submerged. Contrary to the general belief, the Germans did not snort continuously, but rather for only about four hours in twenty-four, mainly to charge the main propulsion batteries. During the other twenty hours, the snort was retracted and shut down and the U-boat proceeded at 2 or 3 knots on battery po
wer. Inasmuch as vibration problems restricted snort speed to about 5 knots and contrary currents often slowed or deflected a U-boat proceeding on battery power, a U-boat could rarely make good more than fifty or sixty miles per day. Hence, a snorting U-boat spent the bulk of its patrol time reaching its operating area and returning to base. These considerations therefore limited the boat’s hunting time to merely a few days, all the while virtually immobile.
• Snorkels repeatedly broke down or dunked and flooded, causing extreme discomfort—or illness or death—inside the pressure hulls and probably, in some cases, caused the loss of the boat.
• A snorting U-boat was usually rendered virtually “deaf’ and “blind” because the diesel engines made a terrific racket and the periscopes could not be raised because of vibration and other problems. By sonar and eyesight, Allied antisubmarine forces detected U-boats by the noise and the leaking exhaust smoke of the snorkel In the last year of the war, the Allies perfected a powerful radar of three-centimeter wavelength that could detect a snorkel head despite German efforts to camouflage it with radar-absorbing (stealth) coats of various materials.
As for the even more vaunted Type XXI electro boat, designed to provide high sprint speed submerged, its crippling faults bear repeating in detail.#
• Poor Structural Integrity. Hurriedly prefabricated in thirty-two different factories that had little or no experience in submarine building, the eight major hull sections of the Type XXI were crudely made and did not fit together properly.
Therefore the pressure hull was weak and not capable of withstanding sea pressure at great depths or the explosions of close depth charges. The Germans reported that in their structural tests the hull failed at a simulated depth of nine hundred feet. The British reported failure at eight hundred feet, less than the failure depth of the conventional German U-boats. In reality the failure depth was much less.
• Underpowered Diesel Engines. The new model six-cylinder diesels fitted to the Type XXI were equipped with superchargers to generate the required horsepower. The system was so poorly designed and manufactured that the superchargers could not be used. This failure reduced the generated horsepower by almost half: from 2,000 to 1,200, leaving the type XXI ruinously underpowered. Consequently, the maximum surface speed was only 15.6 knots, less than any oceangoing U-boat built during the war and slightly slower than the corvette convoy-escort vessel. The reduction in horsepower also substantially increased the time required to carry out a full battery charge.
• Impractical Hydraulic System. The main lines, accumulators, cylinders, and pistons of the hydraulic gear for operating the diving planes, rudders, torpedo-tube outer doors, and antiaircraft gun turrets on the bridge were too complex and delicate and were located outside the pressure hull. This gear was therefore subject to saltwater leakage, corrosion, and enemy weaponry. It could not be repaired from inside the pressure hull.
• Poor Habitability and Sanitation. As with the types VII and IX, the facilities and amenities provided for the comfort and feeding of the crew did not even meet “minimum” standards of the U.S. Navy. Owing to interconnections of washing and drinking water, the sanitation was deemed to be “inadequate” and “unsafe.”
Finally, a few words about the aircraft as a U-boat killer.
In World War I, when the German U-boat rose to front rank as a naval weapons system, Allied airpower, then also in its infancy, positively sank only one U-boat in four years of the war at sea. The extent to which Allied air patrols harassed and/or drove U-boats off and under, thwarting attacks on shipping, is not known, but it could have been very great.
In preparing his U-boats and crews for warfare in the 1930s, Karl Dönitz, a U-boat skipper in World War I, consistently sneered at the aircraft as a possible U-boat killer. Bridge lookouts on the U-boat, he proclaimed, could see and hear an Allied aircraft before it saw the U-boat, giving it time to dive safely out of sight beneath the sea. Doubtless this mind-set powerfully influenced Dönitz’s failure to demand microwave search-radar and radar-detector technology for U-boats, an enormous lapse, for which the Germans paid a huge price.
At first, it appeared that Dönitz was right. Until the latter months of 1942, Allied aircraft sank very few U-boats unassisted by surface ships. But with the perfection of centimetric-wavelength radar, which was installed in big four-engine long-range bombers such as the B-24 Liberator, the B-17 Flying Fortress, and the British Halifax, land-based aircraft vaulted to top rank as U-boat killers. According to Alex
Niestlé, they sank unassisted 204 U-boats and 30 more in cooperation with surface ships, a grand total of 234, nearly a third of all German losses at battlefronts.
Less impressive but nonetheless significant was the contribution of the smaller Allied aircraft based on “jeep” carders. According to Niestlé these aircraft sank unassisted 39 U-boats and another 12 in cooperation with surface ships. Including land- and sea-based aircraft, Allied air forces were involved in the kill of 285 U-boats at sea. Allied aircraft killed another 39 in bombing raids on bases and shipyards and as a result of aerial mining. All told, Allied aircraft were involved in 324 U-boat kills.
This emphasis on aircraft kills is by no means intended to deprecate the immensely effective work of the warships in convoy escort groups and in hunter-killer support groups or warships operating independently. Altogether, Niestlé writes, Allied warships sank 240 U-boats and shared credit with land- and sea-based aircraft for 42 others. All told, Allied warships were involved in 282 U-boat kills.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
(Note: Ships in the appendices are neither italicized nor listed in the index)
Appendix 2
1. Shared credit with U-402 for 7,460-ton English freighter Empire Sunrise.
2. Sailed from Bergen to North Atlantic, but on 10/6 temporarily diverted with U-611 and U-625 to Narvik. The U-625 remained in the Arctic force, but U-262 and U-611 rejoined the Atlantic force on 11/11.
3. Shared one-third credit with U-438 and U-522 for British freighter Hartington.
4. The British troopship Warwick Castle, in convoy MKF 1, returning to England, November 14, 1942.
5. Inflicted severe damage on the modern American destroyer Hambleton, at anchor in Fédala, Morocco.
6. Includes the British “jeep” carrier Avenger.
7. Sank the 665-foot, 18,000-ton British troopship Ceramic, from which only one of 656 persons survived; sank the British destroyer-tender Hecla, and severely damaged the British destroyer Marne.
8. Including Norwegian corvette Montbretia.
9. British destroyer Firedrake.
10. Accidentally rammed and sunk by U-221.
11. Rammed and sank U-254 on 12/8/42 and damaged herself.
12. Bertelsmann fell ill.
13. Shot down a Sunderland of Canadian Squadron 422.
14. Shared one-third credit with U-123 and U-225 for 7,068-ton British Empire Shackleton.
15. Landed agent in area of Mauritania-Río de Oro, Spanish Sahara.
16. Administered coup de grace to ship damaged by U-202.
17. Shared one-half credit with U-614 for sinking the 9,272-ton British freighter Daghild, which had been damaged by U-402.
18. Laid minefield on 2/1/43 at the western mouth of the Strait of Gibraltar. Victims included the British corvette Weybourn.
19. Shared credit with U-603 for sinking 5,964-ton Norwegian freighter Stigstad.
20. Administered coup de grace to ship earlier damaged by U-638.
21. Detected and reported fast convoy Halifax 229.
22. Shared credit with U-92 for sinking 9,350-ton tanker N. T Nielson Alonso.
23. Shared credit with U-600 for sinking 4,391-ton Norwegian freighter Ingria.
24. Laid mines off Reykjavik, all of which failed. Thereafter served as provisional U-tanker for ten VIIs.
25. Shared credit with U-332 for 5,964-ton Norwegian freighter Stigstad.
26. Detected and reported fast convoy Halifax
229.
27. May have sunk 3,921-ton British freighter Guido.
28. British destroyer Harvester.
29. Control directed U-190, outbound from Kiel on her maiden patrol, to give all possible fuel to Wolfbauer in the XIV tanker U-463 and put into France. This enabled Wolfbauer to refuel many more VIIs.
30. Detected and reported Slow Convoy 122.
31. Shot down Halifax on 3/22, captured one aircrew.
32. Shot down a Wellington.
33. British four-stack destroyer Beverley.
34. To Training Command.
35. Laid minefield at Casablanca on 4/10/43. Sank the French freighter Rouennais.
36. Rammed by U-631 on 4/17. Retired to Training Command.
37. Shot down aircraft on April 5.
38. Laid minefield at Casablanca on 4/11/43. Damaged two freighters. Thereafter refueled around ten IXs in the Azores area.
39. To Training Command.
40. Shot down aircraft in Biscay on 5/17/43.
41. While homebound, badly damaged by a B-24 in the Bay of Biscay.
42. Laid mines in St. George’s Channel.
43. Laid unsuccessful minefield in North Channel on 5/4.
44. Shot down a Swordfish from Biter.
45. Collided with U-600 on 5/5 and both boats returned to France.
46. Collided with U-439 on 5/3, and both boats sank.
47. After one patrol in the Atlantic, transferred to the Arctic.
48. Was to mine Dakar but was hit by a Whitley in Biscay and aborted with damage and wounded skipper.