This telegram did not quite square with Bethmann’s rosy optimism so he deleted this last sentence from the dispatch before showing it to the Emperor; and no doubt he murmured something about the Ambassador’s “emotional approach,” for he afterwards annotated the document: “Submitted to His Majesty. His Majesty disapproved of Lichnowsky’s point of view.” After this it was not difficult for the Chancellor to show the Kaiser the reply he had sent Lichnowsky in the morning. “We would not be able to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia Our mediation activities must be confined to a possible Austro-Russian clash…” Bethmann’s negative stand, of course, was due to the fact that mediation of any kind was bound to restrain Austria in her “final reckoning with Serbia.” But in order not to annoy Britain he suggested direct conversations between Austria and Russia, and ended with a rebuke for Lichnowsky. “I therefore request you most urgently to advocate in London the necessity and the possibility of localisation.”[370]
There is no indication that the Kaiser criticised Bethmann’s actions but his misgivings were well founded; for the Chancellor took his leave about 7p.m. to hurry back to Berlin, where he spent the evening committing irretrievable blunders. As a result July 27th was fated to go down into history as a turning point in the events leading to the first world war.
Bethmann-Hollweg failed to perceive that the severity of Austria’s demands had begun to arouse suspicion as to Germany’s intentions in the Balkans. He therefore was blind to the dangers stemming from the altered climate. Awaiting him on his desk was the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. As this document had been presented to the Austrian authorities thirty-six hours earlier, and promptly rejected by them as “inadequate,” he scarcely glanced at it. The Serbian Legation had been so slow to decode and translate the communication that only now was a copy available. It was even more conciliatory than Tschirschky had predicted. Indeed, Serbia had practically swallowed the whole of Austria’s impossible demands. Even when she demurred over the establishment of an Austrian agency in Belgrade, on the grounds that this would constitute an infringement of sovereignty, her tone was accommodating. “If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not in the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers.”
The well-meaning Bethmann-Hollweg was every bit as disastrous as the unscrupulous Prince Bülow. He was utterly unable to grasp the significance of the Serbian reply. Its compliance had changed everything. Austria’s demands had been framed to provoke a refusal; the fact that the Serbs had virtually accepted them had thrown a spanner into the works, destroying all possibility of localising the quarrel. The suspicions that had been rising in Europe now seemed wholly justified. If Austria-Hungary could reject such a yielding reply and order mobilisation, it proved that she was not interested in redressing a wrong, but in extending her influence in the Balkans; and, since she would not dare to behave in such a high-handed way without the backing of Berlin, it was obvious that Germany was on the move.
The crisis immediately took on a sinister aspect. Men of moderate opinion, such as Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, who on the morning of the 27th had been urging “pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav states no matter what their conduct,” suddenly found the ground cut from beneath his feet; while men like Sir Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, a rabid Germanophobe who for years had been talking about “the German menace,” moved into the ascendancy. It looked as though Germany was ready to provoke war in order to secure the supremacy of Europe.
The obtuse Bethmann-Hollweg remained oblivious to the revulsion of feeling that had taken place against Germany. Although the red lights were flashing wildly he saw none of them. Even a chilling communication from London did not induce him to alter his course. The peaceable Serbian reply, Sir Edward Grey had told Prince Lichnowsky angrily, was due to Russian pressure and should it not be “accepted by Vienna as a foundation for peaceful negotiations… it would be absolutely evident that Austria was only seeking an excuse for crushing Serbia. It was plain that Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to accept it as a direct challenge. The result would be the most frightful war that Europe had ever seen, and no one could tell to what such a war might lead” “I found the Minister irritated for the first time,” ended Lichnowsky. “… everybody here is convinced that the key to the situation is to be found in Berlin, and that, if peace is seriously desired… Austria can be restrained from prosecuting, as Sir Edward Grey expressed it, a fool-hardy policy.”[371]
Bethmann-Hollweg remained inflexible. Germany had promised to support Austria-Hungary whatever action she saw fit to take and Germany could not break her word. He not only failed to see that the Serbian reply had created new circumstances, but that it offered Germany a heaven-sent opportunity to extricate herself from a perilous situation. The only compromise he made was to forward Sir Edward Grey’s telegram to Vienna, apologetically asking Count Berchtold to consider it in order to humour London.
But he made no effort to prevent Berchtold from taking the fateful step of declaring war on Serbia. Lying on his desk was a telegram from Tschirschky advising him that Berchtold planned to make this move within the next forty-eight hours so as to put an end to the mounting pressure for mediation. Bethmann-Hollweg still clung to the fantasy that localisation was possible.
Chapter 15. Armageddon
The Kaiser reacted quite differently from his Chancellor when he read the Serbian reply, which did not reach him until the following day, the 28th. “A brilliant performance for a time-limit of only 48 hours. This is more than one could have expected! A great moral success for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl ought to have remained quietly in Belgrade! After such a thing, I should never have ordered mobilisation.”[372]
William II always reacted emotionally, and because he was not troubled by the wooden logic that plagued Bethmann-Hollweg, he was far more perceptive. He saw at once that Germany and Austria were being placed in an invidious position by their uncompromising attitude towards the Serbian note. Even more significant, he once again was seized by fright. He had in front of him Grey’s icy interview with Prince Lichnowsky, in which the Foreign Secretary insisted that the key to the situation lay in Berlin and that if Germany desired peace he was convinced that she could restrain Austria. Apparently Bethmann had hesitated before sending this alarming dispatch to the Kaiser, for at the bottom Jagow had written: “Shall this telegram be submitted to His Majesty?” and Bethmann had replied: “Early to-morrow morning to the New Palace by messenger.”
The dispatch made a profound effect on William II. He did not want a European war, only a European victory. And he suddenly saw that he was standing far closer to the edge of the precipice than he had imagined. In a flash all his martial ardour vanished. The dozens of marginal annotations he had made, with their peremptory demands and their fierce bravado, were instantly forgotten. From now onwards the Kaiser was interested only in maintaining peace. From now on, everything he did was born of a frantic effort to stop the cumbersome machine in time to avoid a crash. An overpowering fear had taken possession of his soul.
At 10 a.m. he sat down and wrote Bethmann-Hollweg a memorandum; the first memorandum that he penned since the beginning of the crisis. “After reading over the Serbian reply… I am convinced that on the whole the wishes of the Danube Monarchy have been acceded to. The few reservations that Serbia makes… could be settled by negotiation. It contains the announcement orbi and urbi of a capitulation of the most humiliating kind, and as a result every cause for war falls to the ground.
“Nevertheless, the piece of paper, like its co
ntents, can be considered as of little value so long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters and masters of evasion. In order that these beautiful promises may be turned to truth and facts, a douce violence must be exercised. This should be so arranged that Austria would receive a HOSTAGE [Belgrade] as a guarantee for the enforcement and carrying out of the promises… In case Your Excellency shares my views, I propose that we say to Austria: Serbia has been forced to retreat in a very humiliating manner, and we offer our congratulations; naturally, as a result, EVERY CAUSE FOR WAR HAS VANISHED. But a GUARANTY that the promises WILL BE CARRIED OUT is unquestionably necessary. That could be secured by means of the TEMPORARY military occupation of a portion of Serbia… Your Excellency will submit a proposal to me along the lines sketched out; which shall be communicated to Vienna.”[373]
Thus William II, for the first time since the crisis had begun, made a move to restrain Vienna. Bethmann-Hollweg did not receive the Kaiser’s message until early afternoon, and by this time he, too, was growing worried. Austria had declared war at 11 a.m. and already there had been repercussions from Russia. At 1 p.m. a report was received from St. Petersburg saying that reservists were being called to the colours. He therefore did not demur at the Emperor’s instructions and drafted a telegram for Vienna. But he could not bring himself to use the Kaiser’s strong language. There was no sentence saying bluntly, “every cause for war has vanished.” The message was toned down and softened, until it became a series of suggestions rather than a command. Apart from this, he even managed to shift the emphasis so that the suggested peace move, instead of being a matter of necessity and common sense, was presented as a question of tactic so “that responsibility for the extension of the war” should “fall on Russia.” And finally, although he warned the German Ambassador to discuss the plan “thoroughly and impressively with Count Berchtold,” he reduced the urgency by warning him: “You will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back.”
What was Bethmann-Hollweg playing at? He was so mesmerised by detail that his chief concern was to save face with Austria. Perturbed though he was, he did not realise, even at this late hour, that he was standing on the brink of war. Privately he still believed that his good relations with Sir Edward Grey would save the situation. “Bethmann’s and Berchtold’s policy of invading Serbia,” wrote Admiral Tirpitz, “was based on the expectation that the love of peace shown by England in recent years would go so far as to cause the Czar, if the worst came to the worst, to refuse his patronage to the Serbs, or to leave him to fight a continental war without England’s help.”[374]
The German Chancellor’s picture of himself riding on a noisy but fairly safe train driven by England, was far from reality. The truth was that the engine driver had jumped off three days earlier, and the train was hurtling blindly through Europe dependent for its salvation on pure chance. On July 25th, the day that Austria rejected the Serbian reply, Sir Eyre Crowe had written a Foreign Office minute that had been adopted as British policy. “The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia. It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown down to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretext, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged. I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris…”[375]
Although Sir Edward Grey continued to work for a peaceable solution he accepted this crucial dictum and made no attempt to influence or restrain Russia. And by doing so he relinquished control of the European crisis. He allowed Britain to be towed in Russia’s wake in exactly the same way that Germany permitted itself to be dragged after Austria. Neither nation had the least idea that the other was not in the operator’s seat. Thus Europe lurched and jolted towards war.
Rumours of troop movements in Russia began to trickle into Berlin, late on the night of the 28th, while Bethmann-Hollweg was pressing the idea of mediation on Austria. The Chancellor became uneasy and suggested that the Kaiser send a personal telegram to the Czar. “It is with the gravest concern,” wired William, “that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country.[376] You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest, as well as all Sovereigns, to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this politics play no part at all.
“On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin. Willy.”[377]
Strangely enough the Kaiser’s telegram, dispatched around midnight, was crossed by an urgent appeal from the Czar — two cries for help passing each other in the darkness.
The Czar to the Emperor
Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914
HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, NEW PALACE
Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia, shared fully by me, is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me, and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.
NICKY[378]
The Czar’s telegram was sent at two in the morning. The “pressure” to which he referred was the desire of his military advisers for general mobilisation — even though the order would make a European war almost a certainty. They argued that the Austrian declaration against Serbia had already rendered a conflict inevitable, and that since Russian mobilisation was slower than anyone else’s it ought not to be delayed. But although fear provided the main impetus, there were aggressive voices as well: voices that scorned the talk of self-defence and openly favoured war with Germany. These were the ultra-conservative army leaders who believed that only the battlefield could cure Russia’s deep social unrest; and the Pan-Slav school who talked of the glittering prizes the Balkans would offer when Germany was defeated. Whatever the argument, almost everyone agreed that although Russia was not fully prepared the moment was right for a showdown: France would stand by her ally, and it seemed likely that England would stand by France.
Until now M. Sazanov had refused to listen to the military. Although he had persuaded the Czar to agree to a partial mobilisation order against Austria, he was so eager to give mediation a chance he had not put the edict into operation. He had requested direct talks with Vienna and was still waiting for a reply. But when he heard of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, he threw in his hand and no longer opposed the High Command.
The Czar knew from Sazanov’s attitude that the request for general mobilisation would soon be put before him. It was delivered, in fact, nine hours after his telegram to the Kaiser, and he reluctantly and sadly gave his assent to it. Before the order could become effective, however, the signatures of three other ministers were necessary; and one of them, the Minister of Marine, could not be found, and would not be back in the capital until evening. M
eanwhile, the Russian Foreign Secretary received a message from Vienna, flatly refusing the Russian invitation which had been made four days earlier to hold direct talks on the Austro-Serbian conflict. The Austrian Ambassador, M. Szapary, called on Sasanov to try and explain his country’s point of view. “While we were thus engaged in a confidential exchange of views,” said Szapary, “Sazanov heard by telephone that we had bombarded Belgrade. He became like a man beside himself… ‘You only wish to gain time by negotiation, but you go ahead and bombard an unprotected city!’[379] He went on to denounce Austria in the most excited fashion.”[380]
By nightfall the military had received the third signature and one of the officers left for the Post Office to send the fatal message. Just as he was setting out, however, the Czar received a second telegram from the Kaiser. “It would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict,” wrote William II, “without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable, and as I already telegraphed you my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course, military measures on the part of Russia, which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening, would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid, and jeopardise my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help.”[381]
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