(Translated by David P. Schweikard.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Karl Marx
Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (1843). In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1976, vol. 1, pp. 201–333.
Zur Judenfrage. In Ruge, A. & Marx, K. (eds.): Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1. und 2. Lieferung. Paris 1844. Repr. in Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1976, vol. 1, pp. 347–77.
Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. In Ruge, A. & Marx, K. (eds.): Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1. und 2. Lieferung. Paris 1844.
Repr. in: Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1976, vol. 1, pp. 378–91.
Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844). In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1968, Ergänzungsband: Schriften bis 1844—Erster Teil, pp. 465–588. English edition: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers 1975, vol. 3, pp. 229–346. Quoted as Manuscripts.
Auszüge aus James Mills Buch ‘Élémens d’économie politique’. Trad. par J.T. Parisot, Paris 1823. In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1968, Ergänzungsband: Schriften bis 1844—Erster Teil, pp. 443–463. English edition: Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique. In Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers 1975, vol. 3, pp. 211–28. Quoted as Excerpts.
Die heilige Familie oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Literarische Anstalt (J. Rütten) 1845. Repr. in Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1980, vol. 2, pp. 5–223.
Die deutsche Ideologie. In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1969, vol. 3, pp. 9–530.
English edition: The German Ideology. In: Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers 1976, vol. 5, pp. 27–611. Quoted as Ideology.
Das Kapital (erste Auflage). In Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1983): Gesamtausgabe (= MEGA2), herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion u. v. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands; ab 1998 fortgeführt von der Internationalen Marx-Engels-Stiftung. Berlin: Dietz 1983, Zweite Abteilung, vol. 5. Quoted as Kapital.
Das Kapital (vierte Auflage). In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1972, vol. 23. English Edition: Capital. Volume I. London: Penguin Books 1990. Quoted as Capital.
Kritik des Gothaer Programms. In Marx, K. & Engels, F., Werke, herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED. Berlin: Dietz 1976, vol. 19, pp. 15–32. Quoted as Kritik.
Contemporary primary sources
Bauer, B., Das entdeckte Christentum. Zürich/Wintherthur, 1843.
Bauer, B., Die Judenfrage. Braunschweig: Verlag von Friedrich Otto, 1843.
Cieszkowski, A. von, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie. Hamburg: Meiner, 1981.
Feuerbach, L. (anonymus), Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit. Nürnberg: Verlag J.A. Stein 1830. Repr. in Feuerbach, L., Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Schuffenhauer. Berlin: Akademie, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 175–515.
Feuerbach, L., Das Wesen des Christenthums. Leipzig: Verlag Otto Wiegand, 1841. Repr. of the second edition in Feuerbach, L., Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Schuffenhauer. Berlin: Akademie 1984, vol. 5.
Feuerbach, L., ‘Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie’, in Ruge, A. (ed.): Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik. Zürich: Winterthur, 1843, vol. 2, pp. 62–86. Repr. in Feuerbach, L., Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Schuffenhauer. Berlin: Akademie, 1982, vol. 9, pp. 243–63.
Feuerbach, L., Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. Zürich/Winterthur: Verlag des literarischen Comptoirs, 1843. Repr. in Feuerbach, L., Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Schuffenhauer. Berlin: Akademie, 1982, vol. 9, pp. 264–341.
Hegel, G. W. F., Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg und Würzburg: Verlag Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807. Repr. in Hegel, G. W. F., Gesammelte Werke, ed. W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede. Hamburg: Meiner, 1980, vol. 9.
Hess, M., Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften (1837–1850), ed. A. Cornu and W. Mönke. Berlin: Akademie, 1961.
Stirner, M., Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum. Leipzig: Otto Wiegand, 1845. English edition: The Ego and Its Own, translated by David Leopold. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Strauß, D. F., Das Leben Jesu. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1835.
Secondary sources
Angehrn, E. & Lohmann, G. (eds.), Ethik und Marx. Moralkritik und normative Grundlagen der Marxschen Theorie. Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum/Hain, 1986.
Archibald, W. P., Marx and the Missing Link: Human Nature. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989.
Breckman, W., Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Brudney, D., Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Buchanan, A. E., Marx and Justice: The radical critique of liberalism. Totowa: Rowman & Allan Held, 1982.
Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Expanded edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Cohen, M. et al. (eds.), Marx, Justice, and History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Hartmann, K., Die Marxsche Theorie. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970.
Lange, E. M., Das Prinzip Arbeit. Drei metakritische Kapitel über Grundbegriffe, Struktur und Darstellung der ‚Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie’ von Karl Marx. Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1980.
Leopold, D., The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Magnis, F. von, Normative Voraussetzungen im Denken des jungen Marx (1843–1848). Freiburg: Alber, 1975.
McLellan, D., The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. London: Macmillan, 1969.
Meikle, S., Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx. London: Duckworth, 1985.
Moggach, D., The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Moggach, D. (ed.), The New Hegelians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Moggach, D., ‘German Idealism and Marx’, in J. Walker (ed.), Historical, Social, and Political Theory (= Volume 2 of N. Boyle (ed.): The Impact of Idealism—the Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 189–242.
Nielsen, K. & Patten, S. C. (eds.), Marx and Morality (= Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume VII). Edmonton, 1981.
Peffer, R. G., Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Quante, M., Hegel’s Concept of Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Quante, M., ‘Kommentar’, in Marx, K., Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2009, pp. 209–411.
Quante, M., ‘After Hegel. The Realisation of Philosophy through Action’, in Moyar, D. (ed.), Routledge Companion to 19th Century Philosophy. London, Routledge, 2010, pp. 197–237.
Quante, M., ‘Recognition as the social grammar of species being in Marx’, in Ikäheimo, H. & Laitinen, A. (eds.), Recognition and Social Ontology. Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 239–67.
Quante, M., ‘Recognition in Capital’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), pp. 713–27.
Rosen, Z., Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
Rosen, Z., Moses Hess und Karl Marx. Hamburg:
Christians, 1983.
Schmidt am Busch, H.-C. & Zurn, C. F. (eds.), The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010.
Thomson, E., The Discovery of the Materialist Conception of History in the Writings of the Young Karl Marx. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004.
Wood, A., Karl Marx. London: Routledge, 1981.
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1 Marx used a French translation of Mills Elements of Political Economy (London, 1821).
CHAPTER 9
DILTHEY (1833–1911)
RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL
9.1 INTRODUCTION
WILHELM Dilthey was born in Biebrich on the Rhine in 1833 and grew up with the expectation that he would follow his father as a chaplain to the House of Nassau. He started his university studies in religion and philosophy in Heidelberg, but when Kuno Fisher was fired for his liberal views, Dilthey transferred to Berlin to continue his studies. There Dilthey also attended the lectures of some of the great historians and students of culture of the nineteenth century: Boeckh, Bopp, Jacob Grimm, Ritter and Ranke. He became less interested in religious issues per se but always remained interested in the effects of religions on history and human life. Dilthey wrote his dissertation on Schleiermacher’s ethics under the direction of the philosopher Friedrich Trendelenburg. In 1864, the same year that he completed the dissertation he also published his Habilitationsschrift on moral consciousness. His first teaching appointment away from Berlin was at Basel, where he was appointed as a professor of philosophy in 1867. He also taught in Kiel and Breslau. In 1882 he was able to return to the Berliner Universität and succeed Rudolf Hermann Lotze in the chair of philosophy that Hegel had once filled. Until his death in 1911, he would be one of the most influential intellectual figures there and at the Prussian Academy of the Sciences.
Dilthey is often called a philosopher of life, but this does not mean that he is especially interested in the biological conditions of human existence. Life is conceived in historical terms and regarded as the context that frames the overall givenness of things. This contextual approach to life allows Dilthey to consider both the physiological conditions of human life as well as the reflective transcendental conditions for understanding what is given in historical experience. What Dilthey means by the given is not the sense-content of the positivists, but life as the unfathomable source and context of all experience. As he writes in his 1892 essay “Life and Cognition”: “no matter how hard I struggle to obtain the pure experience of the given, there is no such thing. The given lies beyond my direct experience. …Everything, absolutely everything that falls within my consciousness contains the given as ordered or distinguished or combined or related, that is, as interpreted in intellectual processes.”1 The given is not an immediate present available to observation, but a mediated presence that needs to be placed in context. Life is that ultimate context which we cannot transcend or go behind. Every given of experience is already part of some larger whole called life.
9.2 THE HUMAN SCIENCES AND THE REFLEXIVE AWARENESS OF LIVED EXPERIENCE
Dilthey’s most important contribution to philosophy was to rethink the nature of the human sciences. With the great strides made in historical awareness in the nineteenth century and the increasing tendency of psychological research to move away from philosophy and focus on experimentation, Dilthey considered it urgent to reflect on these newly developing disciplines to explore their scientific status. Could they be integrated into the system of the natural sciences? Positivists such as August Comte certainly thought so. According to Comte the task of the natural sciences is to gather facts and correlate them. Using that model, he argues that the facts gathered by historians should be correlated under the heading of a new science of sociology that completes the systems of the natural sciences. History is thereby reduced to the study of social interactions and institutional forces. The role that individuals play in history is minimized and this is reinforced by Comte’s dismissal of psychology. He discounts the reliability of introspection and claims that whatever we need to explain about individual human behavior can be done by means of biology and sociology alone.
Dilthey by contrast aims to characterize historical life in ways that reflect some of the aspirations of German idealism while replacing its speculative approach with serious empirical research. The post-idealistic emphasis on gathering data and determining the facts was a tendency that Dilthey welcomed. However, he warns that positivism has a reductionist conception of facts. Facts of consciousness do not manifest the same atomistic features as facts of nature. If we think of inner experience in terms of an introspective turning our eyes inward, then psychology cannot advance very much. It would be a low level natural science. Therefore, Dilthey resists modeling inner experience on outer experience. Being truly empirical requires us to be aware of what distinguishes a subject matter. Here Dilthey takes his cue from his Aristotelian dissertation director, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. What distinguishes states of consciousness is that they form a continuum that allows us to describe them phenomenologically. We do not need to capture a state of mind in an introspective camera flash. Instead we can trace it as it develops. Consciousness is holistic and can be described accordingly.
Dilthey offers an empirical approach (Empirie) that is not reducible to the empiricism (Empirismus) adopted by the natural sciences. He attempted to develop a new conception of the sciences that would reexamine Kant’s critical project of founding the natural sciences. This came to be his main project, namely to supplement Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with a “Critique of Historical Reason.” Kant’s foundation of the sciences was focused on Newtonian physics and conceived explanation in mechanistic terms. Kant dismissed the speculations of rational psychology and had reservations about empirical psychology. Doubts about our ability to introspect led him to propose that we study mental life in relation to human behavior. He suggested we replace psychology with a pragmatic anthropology that would not attain the level of a universally valid (allgemeingültige) theoretical science, but would be generally useful (gemeinnützig). Dilthey’s response to this is to broaden the idea of the theoretical sciences to also include those disciplines that study history, society, and human life. These disciplines should not be relegated to being merely pragmatically useful supplements to the natural sciences. His first essay on this topic was called “On the Study of the History of the Sciences of Human Beings, Society and the State” and was published in 1875. Gradually he came to call these the Geisteswissenschaften. Literally this means the sciences of spirit, where spirit refers to the historical life of human beings. Dilthey makes it clear that spirit is not to be understood as existing independently from matter. All the sciences of the human spirit have a natural base. We will therefore simply call the Geisteswissenschaften the “human sciences.” They include not just the humanities, but also what are called the “social sciences.”
In the early 1880s while still teaching in Breslau, Dilthey wrote an important programmatic draft for Book Four of his Introduction to the Human Sciences. In this so-called Breslau draft, he reconsiders the conditions of consciousness that make experience possible. Everything we experience “is a fact of consciousness and accordingly is subject to the conditions of consciousness”2 (SW1, 247). But these conditions are not rooted in the self of the cogito. For Dilthey, the ego is not a condition of consciousness, but its product. Before we can have a focused or reflective self-consciousness, there is a reflexive awareness (Innewerden) of how things are possessed in consciousness. Reflexive awareness involves a direct self-referential relation. This indexical condition accompanies the presence of any content of consciousness with the awareness that it is there in consciousness. Similarly, what is there can be located within the overall nexus of consciousness and related not only to what is thought, but also to what is felt and willed. What is given in reflexive awareness is experienced as being real and possesses the certainty (Gewissheit) of immediate knowledge (Wissen). However, certa
inty is subjective and is not to be confused with the reliability (Sicherheit) that constitutes the objective cognition (Erkenntnis) aimed at by epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie).
Our immediate knowledge of facts of consciousness and the certainty of reflexive awareness do not come with any of the intellectual distinctions between inner and outer, form and content, subject and object that characterize the pure thought of Kant’s epistemic ego. If we are to arrive at the cognitive stage of an epistemology of the human sciences, the total content and nexus of the facts of consciousness must be subjected to self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung). Self-reflection provides “the foundation for action as well as for thought. It seeks not only the conditions that give our statements about what is real their evident certainty, but also the conditions that guarantee the will and its rules their rightness or justness” (SW1, 268). Dilthey concludes that epistemology will remain overly tied to the natural sciences unless it is framed by a more encompassing self-reflection. Another way to put this is that the bare transcendental unity appealed to by Kant to ground the experience of objects of nature must be replaced with a holistic sense of selfsameness (Selbigkeit) that orients our lived experience of any aspect of the external world.
It is within the nexus of total consciousness that self-reflection can begin to differentiate between facts of consciousness and facts of the world. Facts that are perceived as existing in my consciousness are grasped as part of inner perception and lead to a sense of self that can come to distinguish itself from a world. However, this distinction between self and world is not derivable from the intellect alone. Our belief in the reality of the external world is based primarily on felt resistance to practical impulses of the will rather than on inferences rooted in a causal theory.
The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century Page 34