3 Friedrich Paulsen, German Education Past and Present, 207.
4 Thomas Mann, “Goethe und Tolstoi,” 376.
5 See L. W. Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors, 196–240.
6 Beck, 340–60.
7 Michael Holquist, “Why Should We Remember Philology?,” 74.
8 Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of the Faculties” in Political Writings, 176–90.
9 Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, 267–77.
10 Daniel Murphy, Comenius: A Critical Reassessment of his Life and Work; Emile Durkheim, The Evolution of Educational Thought, 278–91.
11 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 33–6.
12 On the principle of “self-activity,” see J. A. Green, Life and Work of Pestalozzi.
13 J. G. Herder, Treatise on the Origin of Language, in Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Michael N. Forster, 65–164.
14 See J. H. Pestalozzi, Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt.
15 Friedrich Schiller, On Grace and Dignity, 123–70.
16 My account of kalokagathia is indebted to Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination and Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.
17 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naïve and Sentimental in Literature. The Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes was heated up in the 1690s by Nicolas Boileau and continued throughout the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century. Stendhal’s work “Racine et Shakespeare” (1823–5) arguably resolved the contest in favor of the “moderns.”
18 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, 116–17.
19 Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, 21.
20 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Deducierter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt, die in gehöriger Verbindung mit einer Akademie der Wissenschaften stehe. In J. G. Fichte’s Sämmtliche Werke, 8: 97–204.
21 See J. G. Fichte, On the Nature of the Scholar and Its Manifestations.
22 Deducierter Plan, 123.
23 Deducierter Plan, 153–4. As a nationalist, Fichte believed that all Germans should have access to the new university as faculty and students. See Deducierter Plan, 168.
24 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn.
25 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Platons Werke. On the relationship between Schleiermacher’s work on Plato and his concept of “philosophical theology” see David E. Klemm, “Culture, arts and religion.”
26 Gelegentliche Gedanken, 103–4.
27 Gelegentliche Gedanken, 128–9.
28 Gelegentliche Gedanken, 102–48.
29 Gelegentliche Gedanken, 111–14.
30 Gelegentliche Gedanken, 125–6.
31 See Theodore Vial, “Schleiermacher and the State,” 269.
32 Zur Gründung der Universität Berlin. In Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, 10: 263–89.
33 See especially Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen. In Gesammelte Schriften, 1: 99–254.
34 Zur Gründung, 276–8.
35 Zur Gründung, 265–7. For an in-depth discussion of Humboldt’s plan see Michael Forster, German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond, 103.
36 German Education Past and Present, 200.
37 German Education Past and Present, 199.
38 German Education Past and Present, 206.
39 Nikolaus Strelczyk, Erziehung und Kultur; Klaus Sochatzy, Das Neuhumanistische Gymnasium und die rein-menschliche Bildung.
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, 66.
41 See especially Lecture 5.
42 J.-J. Rousseau, Emile or on Education. See especially Book One, 37–74.
43 The literature on the image of the child in German literature is exceedingly rich. As a starting point, I would recommend H.-H. Ewers, Kindheit als poetische Daseinsform. Studien zur Entstehung der romantischen Kindheitsutopie im 18. Jahrhundert. Herder, Jean-Paul, Novalis und Tieck. See also Egle Becchi et Dominique Julia, Histoire de l’enfance en Occident du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours.
44 See Friedrich Froebel, Autobiography.
45 See F. H. Hayward, “Three Historical Educators: Pestalozzi, Froebel, Herbart,” 17.
46 Friedrich Froebel, Froebel’s Pedagogics of the Kindergarten, or, His Ideas Concerning the Play and Playthings of the Child; J. F. Herbart, Systematische Pädagogik.
47 Evelyn Lawrence, Froebel and English Education.
48 J. F. Herbart, Herbart’s ABC of Sense-perception, and Minor Pedagogical Works.
49 Die Pädagogik Herbarts. Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet.
50 The first edition of Herder’s Volkslieder (1778/89) comprised samples of poetry from as far afield as Peru. In the second edition of this work, entitled Stimmen der Völker in Liedern (1807), Herder extended his curiosity to Madagascar.
51 Apparently the first German scholar to use this expression was the Enlightenment historian August Schlözer (1735–1809). Having returned from St Petersburg after a long stay there, he was appointed Professor of Russian Literature and History at Göttingen (1769). It was during his tenure at Göttingen that Schlözer published a volume on Icelandic literature, in which he argued that medieval Icelandic sagas were as important for the entire world literature [gesammte Weltliteratur] as were the Anglo-Saxon, Irish, Russian, Byzantine, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chinese literatures. See Galin Tihanov, “Cosmopolitanism in the Discursive Landscape of Modernity: Two Enlightenment Articulations,” 142. Another eighteenth-century luminary who used the term Weltliteratur before it was made famous by Goethe was Wieland. In his formulation Weltliteratur was a synonym of Gelehrsamkeit and Politesse. See Hans-Joachim Weitz, “‘Weltliteratur’ zuerst bei Wieland.” On the connection between worldliness, world literature, and cosmopolitanism as a political idea see also Pauline Kleingeld, “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in late Eighteenth-Century Germany.”
52 Thus, for example, in Mercier’s preface to the French translation of Schiller’s Die Jungfrau von Orleans (1802) one comes across the expression cosmopolitism littéraire, which has a positive connotation. See Galin Tihanov, “Cosmopolitanism in the Discursive Landscape of Modernity: Two Enlightenment Articulations,” 143.
53 The intellectual differences between Wieland, a representative of an earlier and aristocratically-oriented stage in the history of the German Enlightenment, and Goethe whose self-consciousness was tied up with his identity as a member of the middle class, is a big topic that I cannot do justice to here. I shall only mention the fact that unlike Goethe, who went through a stage of nationalistic enthusiasm, Wieland was always inimical to “bardic nationalism” and sharply criticized Klopstock for his affection of a supposedly ancient style of poetry. Indirectly, Wieland’s attack was also aimed at Herder, the young Goethe and other Sturm und Drang authors whose excessive enthusiasm for German culture struck Wieland as both affected and provincial. See Wieland, “Der Eifer, unsrer Dichtkunst einen National-Charakter zu geben.”
54 The literature on Goethe’s idea of Weltliteratur is exceptionally rich and continues to grow. A good starting point is Fritz Strich’s classic work, Goethe and World Literature. In recent decades the topic of Weltliteratur has once again emerged at the forefront of literary critical polemics throughout Western academy. One of the most poignant statements in this debate was made by Franco Moretti. In his essay “Conjectures on World Literature” (2000) Moretti tried to think through the anti-aesthetic implications of globalization and find a way to salvage literature from this fate. In the wake of Moretti’s essay there appeared several important books devoted to the topic of literature in the age of globalization, including What is World Literature? by David Damrosch, Debating World Literature by Christopher Prendergast, and, very recently, Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability by Emily Apter.
55 Goethe said: “If we Germans do not look beyond the nar
row circle of our environment, we all too easily fall into pedantic arrogance. Therefore I look around to foreign nations and advise everyone to do the same on his part. National literature means little these days. The epoch of world literature is at hand and everyone must endeavor to hasten its coming.” See J. P. Eckermann, Conversations with Goethe, 94.
56 Frierdrich Schlegel, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Altertumskunde.
57 See Russell Martineau, “Obituary of Franz Bopp.”
58 On Schlegel’s relationship with Madame de Staël see Pauline de Pange, August Wilhelm Schlegel und Frau von Staël.
59 Klaus Weimar, Geschichte der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, 215–16. It is noteworthy that Germanistik and Indo-Germanistik developed alongside one another, but were frequently conceived as rather different fields. The former was focused on the study of Old German texts, but also included a linguistic component. In the work of some Germanic philologists, such as Lachmann, the linguistic aspect predominated over the literary-interpretive one. Meanwhile, Indo-Germanistik was focused entirely on the study of grammar.
60 For example, during the period from 1812 to 1826 lecture courses focused on Das Nibelungenlied were offered 53 times at different universities throughout Germany. See Geschichte der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, 220–3.
61 On the professionalization of philology and Lachmann’s career see Geschichte der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, 224–33.
62 See Hans-Martin Gauger, Wulf Oesterreicher, Rudolf Windisch, Einführung in die romanische Sprachwissenschaft, 14–17.
63 E. R. Curtius, “Bonner Gedenkworte auf Friedrich Diez zum 15. März 1944.”
64 Auerbach, Erich, “Philology and Weltliteratur.”
65 Auerbach, “Philology and Weltliteratur,” 7.
CHAPTER 24
ETHICS
PAUL KATSAFANAS
24.1 INTRODUCTION
AT the close of the eighteenth century, Kant attempted to anchor morality in freedom. Subsequently, a series of nineteenth-century thinkers, though impressed with the claim that there is an essential connection between morality and freedom, argued that Kant misunderstood the nature of the self, agency, freedom, the individual, the social, the natural sciences, and philosophical psychology. I trace the way in which several central figures rethought the connection between morality and freedom by complicating the analyses of the aforementioned notions. In particular, I discuss Schiller’s demand for a unified self; Hegel’s attention to the socially and historically situated agent; Feuerbach’s and Büchner’s turn to natural science; Marx’s materialism; Schopenhauer’s philosophical psychology; and Nietzsche’s attempt to anchor normative demands in will to power.
24.2 THE KANTIAN ATTEMPT TO ANCHOR MORALITY IN FREEDOM
Consider particular moral demands, such as a prohibition on theft. This prohibition can be viewed as an imperative constraining our will: do not steal. But how are we to justify such a claim? Kant offers an extremely influential argument that no external grounding for normative requirements is possible; any attempt to locate the ground of morality in the word of god, the fabric of the universe, or the dictates of nature would render morality a submission to external, alien influences.1 Instead, these moral norms must be sourced in the self. But not just any part of the self: if the will simply does the bidding of some desire or urge, that too will count as submission to something external to the will. Instead, the will must view itself “as the author of its principles independently of alien influences” (G 4: 448). If we consider a normative principle—or, as Kant puts it, a “law”—that constrains the will, then the will must give itself this law:
Hence the will is not merely subject to the law, but subject to it in such a way that it must be regarded as also giving law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author). (G 4: 431)
Anything less would render the will heteronomous, or unfree:
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it…in the character of any of its objects—the result is always heteronomy. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to the will. (G 4: 441)
Thus, according to Kant, no external authority binds me to normative principles; rather, I bind myself to principles, and therein arises their claim to authority over me. Moreover, I act freely when I act on these self-imposed principles. So freedom is not mere independence from external influences or determinants; rather, freedom consists in binding myself by principles that I have imposed on myself.
Kant claims that although the authority of norms is explained by the fact that we impose them on ourselves, the content of these norms is not up to us: the injunction “be autonomous!” imposes determinate constraints on what can be willed. The core idea is that in order to impose norms on ourselves at all, there are certain standards to which we become inescapably committed.
The general form of Kant’s argument is familiar: we are committed to acting autonomously. Acting autonomously requires acting on a law or principle. The law cannot be hypothetical, that is, tied to the realization of some goal or the satisfaction of some inclination, because the will would then be determined to action by something external to itself (i.e. an inclination or goal). Instead, the law must be categorical; it must be unconditionally valid. Kant states the content of this law as follows: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4: 421). He argues that this law—the Categorical Imperative—rules out certain actions, thereby yielding determinate constraints on permissible actions. So, the formal conception of freedom yields a substantive or contentful conception of which norms we are committed to acting upon.2
Thus, Kant summarizes his project as follows: “We simply showed by developing the generally received concept of morality that an autonomy of the will is unavoidably bound up with it, or rather its very foundation” (G 4: 445). Kant’s claim to have “simply” showed this is open to dispute: his arguments face objections at each turn. It is notoriously difficult to show how commitment to the Categorical Imperative is supposed to follow from Kant’s initial conception of agency, and even if we can do that, there are reasons for doubting that the Categorical Imperative can generate any substantive conclusions about what there is reason to do.3
Nonetheless, Kant’s methodology is extremely attractive: he locates the ground of morality within the self, and in particular within the free self. The demands of morality and the requirements for freedom coincide. While the details of Kant’s approach are widely rejected, this framework is enormously influential. Thus, to cite two early examples, Fichte accepts Kant’s claim that the source of morality must be within self-legislation: “the ethical drive demands freedom—for the sake of freedom.”4 Schelling famously claims that “the beginning and end of all philosophizing is freedom!”5
These claims are taken up in different ways by a host of later thinkers, including Schiller, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Each of these thinkers in one way or another links morality to freedom. But the connection ceases to be so straightforward: Kant’s single-minded focus on individual autonomy is complicated by attention to several additional factors. These include a demand for a unified self; a claim that Kant’s individualistic approach ignores the way in which the individual is determined by and derivative of the social; an appreciation for the successes of science, which leads to a demand for materialistic explanations of topics traditionally treated by philosophy; and a deeper study of philosophical psychology. Each of these topics is investigated by philosophers subsequent to Kant, and developed in different ways. The connection between morality and freedom, while preserved in these thinkers, becomes more complex and in some cases more diffuse. Moreover, the approaches that become dominant toward the end of the nineteenth century make the project of justifying our traditional normative commitments seem i
ncreasingly unlikely. This comes to a head with Nietzsche, so I will end with him.6
24.3 SCHILLER AND THE ASPIRATION FOR A UNIFIED SELF
Friedrich Schiller was impressed by Kant’s attempt to anchor morality in freedom: “certainly no greater words have been spoken by a mortal than these Kantian ones, which are at once the content of his whole philosophy: be self-determining!”7 Schiller accepts two key components of Kant’s philosophy: his claim that an action has moral worth only if it is done for the sake of duty, and his claim that moral principles must be justified by reason alone. However, Schiller is troubled by an implication of Kant’s account of freedom that I will explain in this section: namely, that freedom is compatible with inner division.
Schiller accepts a version of the Kantian distinction between reason and sensibility. The individual, Schiller tells us, has two aspects: a rational nature, manifest in judgment and self-conscious thought, and a sensible nature, manifest in sense perception and affects.8 These two aspects of human nature can be related in three different ways.9
First, the individual might be dominated by his sensible nature, merely acting on whichever inclination happens to arise. “Prey to desire,” he “lets natural impulse rule him unrestrainedly” (GD, 280/147). Schiller terms such an individual ochlocratic (i.e. ruled by a mob). Schiller denounces this type of individual, claiming that he is analogous to a failed state in which citizens do not acknowledge the legitimacy of their sovereign (GD, 282/148).
Second, the individual might be dominated by his rational nature; Schiller takes Kant to endorse this state of the soul (GD, 282–5/148–50). Schiller terms such an individual monarchic; his rational nature rules his sensible nature with “strict surveillance” (GD, 281–2/148). He claims that the monarchic agent is better off than the ochlocratic agent, for his actions will be in accordance with the balance of reasons, and will have moral worth.
Although the monarchic agent is superior to the ochlocratic agent, Schiller finds something problematic about both of these agents: namely, the fact that one part of the individual dominates the other part. “This much is clear: that neither the will…nor the affect…ought to use force” (GD, 279/146). He endorses a third state: harmony between the rational and sensible parts of the soul. A harmonious individual would have affects that incline her to pursue the very same ends that rational thought inclines her to pursue. Like the monarchic agent, her actions would be in accordance with the balance of reasons. But unlike the monarchic agent, there would be no struggle, no antagonism, in the soul of this agent. Her whole being would incline her in one direction:
The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century Page 88