91. On Halder’s relationship to Hitler cf. Helmut Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler,” in: Die Vollmacht des Gewissens, p. 338, and H. B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, pp. 288 f. Gisevius’s account carries special weight since he was among the sharpest critics of Halder. Also Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler, p. 184.
92. It appears that Canaris and Oster were informed of this plan and approved it—in large part on the grounds that only in this way could the problem of the oath of loyalty to Hitler personally be abruptly eliminated—that problem which had so fateful an effect right up to the twentieth of July.
93. Hans Rothfels, Opposition gegen Hitler, p. 68; also Helmuth K. G. Rönne-farth, Die Sudetenkrise I, p. 506.
94. Ritter, Goerdeler, pp. 198 f. Shortly after the Munich conference Nevile Henderson wrote to the same effect: “As things stand, by preserving peace we have saved Hitler and his regime.” Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, p. 378. Here once again, incidentally, Hitler followed up on his success by promptly dismissing a number of army officers, such as Gênerai Adam, who had emerged as oppositionists, thus snatching important key positions from the Opposition.
95. Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937—1938, p. 166.
96. Ibid., pp. 166–68. All the concomitant circumstances make it plain that the only question at issue was how to set forth in a treaty the actual existing agreement. Of course, in the eyes of the two Western government heads, the conference also aimed at pinning Hitler down and thus making further expansion more difficult for him; but it is significant that all guarantees were merely set forth in supplementary agreements not signed by all the participants.
97. Ibid., p. 167. For the course of the Munich conference cf. Stehlin, pp. 125 f.; Schmidt, Statist, pp. 415 f.; and François-Poncet, pp. 269 ff.
98. Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937–1938, p. 168.
99. Nolte, Faschismus, p. 281.
100. Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 118 f. The original text of the notes (the “Bormann Vermerke”) published in this book have not yet been made available. This, in part, may be the reason that the language and thought have a pithiness hardly characteristic of Hitler. We must also consider that the manuscript undoubtedly was revised and that the passages cited here represent a concentrate from a long-winded text full of outbursts and digressions. Albert Speer, in conversation with the author, has argued that Goebbels must have edited the text extensively, and perhaps written some of it himself; the diction on the whole, Speer points out, is much more in keeping with the Propaganda Minister’s style than with Hitler’s. For Schacht’s testimony cf. IMT XIII, p. 4. A similar remark of Hitler’s is recorded for September, 1938, in the diaries of Helmuth Groscurth: “He [Hitler] said he had been forced to draw back in September and had not reached his goal. He would have to wage war during his lifetime, he went on, for never again would a German enjoy such unlimited trust; he alone could do it. War aims: a) Dominion in Europe b) Domination of the world for centuries to come. The war would have to be launched soon because the others were rearming.” Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, p. 166.
101. Cf. the speech of August 22, 1939, Domarus, pp. 1234 f.
102. IMT XX, p. 397. Keitel declared in Nuremberg that the German offensive capacity would not even have sufficed to break through Czechoslovakia’s border fortifications; IMT X, p. 582.
103. Cf. Gilbert and Gott, pp. 144 ff.
104. See, for example, the report of the British chargé d’affaires in Berlin, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd Series III, p. 277. For the quotation from Das Schwarze Korps, see Bracher, Diktatur, p. 399. Details on reactions to the pogrom in various parts of the Reich in Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg, p. 75.
105. The speech, a key document to the understanding of Hitler’s mentality, is printed in: VJHfZ 1958:2, pp. 181 ff.
106. Notes by Legation Councillor Hewel, ADAP IV, No. 228.
107. Zoller, p. 84; the following quotation is taken from the Proclamation to the German People of March 15, which had evidently been framed before the conversation with Hácha; cf. Domarus, p. 1095.
108. Quoted in Nolte, Faschismus, p. 330; on Chamberlain’s speech in Birmingham cf. Michaelis and Schraepler, XIII, pp. 95 ff.; also Gilbert and Gott, p. 164; and Shirer, p. 454.
109. Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit, p. 153. For Hitler’s later criticism of the operation against Prague, cf. Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 119 f. For the instructions to the press of March 16, 1939, cf. Hillgruber, Strategie, p. 15.
110. Sebastian Haffner, Der Teufelspakt (p. 92), a very stimulating, sharply expressed study, which also contains the reference to the three possible courses open to Hitler.
111. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 157.
112. Thus the record of the conversation among Beck, Chamberlain, and Halifax on April 4, 1939, quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte II, p. 122.
113. Ibid., p. 97.
114. Shirer, p. 454.
115. Gisevius, p. 363.
116. Domarus, pp. 1119 ff.
117. Cf., for example, François-Poncet, p. 282; also Grigore Gafencu, Derniers Jours de l’Europe, pp. 98 ff. For the following cf. Michaelis and Schraepler, XIII, pp. 211 f., 214 f.
118. IMTXXXIV, pp. 380 ff. (120-C).
119. Shirer, p. 471; Bullock (p. 504) expresses a similar opinion.
120. My New Order, 674 ff.
121. Quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte II, pp. 373 f.
122. Notes of Embassy secretary Julius Schnurre on a conversation with Georgi Astachov, the Soviet charge d’affaires in Berlin, on May 5, 1939; cf. ADAP VI, p. 355; also notes of von Weizsäcker on a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Merekalov on April 17,1939; ibid., No. 215.
123. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 348. On Hitler’s hesitation and his wavering attitude, cf. p. 325 f.; also Bullock, pp. 515 f. The remark on the “pact with Satan” was made in a conference on August 28; cf. Halder, Kriegstagebuch I, p. 38.
124. ADAP VI, pp. 514 ff.
125. IMT XXXVII, pp. 546 ff.
126. C. J. Burckhardt, pp. 341 ff.
127. ADAP VI, No. 729.
128. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 235.
129. Georges Bonnet, Avant la catastrophe.
130. Freund, Weltgeschichte III, p. 124; here, too, p. 123, the Polish Foreign Minister’s declaration of August 23, 1939, and, p. 165, the exchange of telegrams between Ribbentrop and Hitler.
131. The Soviet judges succeeded, however, in preventing the admission of the supplementary protocol as evidence, so that it played no further part in the trial.
132. Nolte, Krise, p. 204.
133. Hans-Günther Seraphim, ed., Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs, p. 82. “That is,” Rosenberg commented indignantly, “about the most brazen insult that can be inflicted upon National Socialism.”
134. Report of the secretary, Hencke, dated August 24, 1939, cited in Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 166 ff.
135. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, p. 103. For the remark on unused historic moments cf. Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, p. 122.
136. Six separate versions of this address have been preserved, each differing from the others in its stresses. Cf. the comparative analysis by Winfried Baumgart in VJHfZ 1968:2, pp. 120 ff. The version cited here is to be found in: IMT XXVI, 798-PS (first part) and 1014-PS (second part). Concerning the impression the speech made on its audience cf. Erich Raeder, Mein Leben II, pp. 165 ff. and Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 19 f.
137. W. L. Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 545.
138. From notes by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Sir Orme Sargent, and Lord Halifax, cited in Gilbert and Gott, pp. 320 ff.
139. Birger Dahlerus, The Last Attempt, pp. 104–05; also notes by Sir Nevile Henderson dated August 31, 1939, quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 372 f.
140. Note by Paul Schmidt concerning a conversation between Hitler and Attolico on August 31, 1939, 7 P.M., cited in Freund, Weltgeschichte III,
p. 391. For Directive Number 1 see ADAP VII, pp. 397 ff.
141. In the negotiations with England France expressed the desire not to begin military operations until September 4: to be precise, as Bonnet stressed to Halifax, on Monday evening; cf. M. Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 412 f.
142. Speech of September 1, 1939, The New York Times, September 3, 1939, p. 3.
143. Schmidt, Statist, pp. 463 f.
144. Stehlin, Auftrag, p. 234; also ADAP VII, p. 445. Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 617, points out this noteworthy difference.
145. Gilbert and Gott, pp. 284 f.; see also p. 274 for the following episode.
146. IMT XV, pp. 385 f.
147. Nolte, Krise, p. 205.
148. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 351.
149. Karl Dönitz, Zehrt Jahre und zwanzig Tage, p. 45.
INTERPOLATION III
1. Hitler’s Table Talk, p. 661; also Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, p. 388.
2. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 12; also Tischgespräche, p. 172.
3. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 16.
4. Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, pp. 102 f. In the same conversation Hitler remarked that he would wait until the fall of 1940 before committing the U-boats “with full energy,” but that he hoped “by then to have finished with his enemies” (pp. 92 f.).
5. Thus in a strategy conference of July 31, 1944; cf. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 587; also Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 258.
6. Thus to the members of the Bulgarian regency council during a conversation at Klessheim Palace on March 16, 1944, cited by Hillgruber, Staatsmänner II, p. 377. In the same conversation Hitler remarked that “this war can be waged all the more resolutely the less we imagine that there are any other ways to end it”; ibid., p. 376.
7. The order was couched in the form of a letter that read as follows: “Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility of extending the authorization of physicians to be specified by name so that patients reasonably considered to be incurably ill may, after the most serious consideration of the state of their sickness, be granted a mercy death. Adolf Hitler.” Cf. IMT XXVI, p. 169. However, the euthanasia program could not be carried out to the extent intended, chiefly because of the protests from the churches that soon began.
8. Report of the Security Service (SD) for Domestic Questions dated January 8, 1940, cited in Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, pp. 34 f.
9. Address to the divisional commanders, December 12, 1944; cf. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 718. Also Hitlers zweites Buch, p. 138. Hitler’s various efforts before the outbreak of the war to provide himself with an alibi against the charge of war guilt were so transparent that they proved worthless. Later, explaining his offers for a solution to the questions of Danzig and the Polish Corridor during the last days of August, Hitler himself said bluntly: “I needed an alibi, especially for the German people, to show them that I had done everything possible to preserve peace.” Cf. Schmidt, Statist, p. 469.
10. According to Statistisches Handbuch des Deutschen Reiches the expenditures for armaments during the years of Nazi rule in peacetime were as follows:
Fiscal Year Arms Budget Total Budget
(billions of marks) (billions of marks)
1933–34 1.9 8.1
1935–35 1.9 10.4
1936–36 4.0 12.8
1937–37 5.8 15.8
1938–38 8.2 20.1
1939–39 18.4 31.8
11. Cf. IMT XV, pp. 385 f. (General Jodi’s testimony, with the remark about the “ridiculous’’ reserves; in the same context Jodi also stated that “actual rearmament had to be carried out after the war began.”) Also Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, pp. 4 ff. On the munitions situation cf. i.a. Halder, Kriegstagebuch I, p. 99. On September 1, 1939, the strength of the Luftwaffe was: 1,180 bomber planes, 771 single-engine fighter planes, 336 dive bombers, 408 twin-engine fighters, 40 ground attack planes, 552 transport planes, 379 reconnaissance planes, and 240 naval aircraft. By the end of 1939 an additional 2,518 aircraft were built; in 1940, 10,392; in 1941, 12,392; in 1942, 15,497; in 1943, 24,795; in 1944, 40,953; and even in 1945, 7,541 planes were produced. See Hillgruber, Strategie, p. 38n.
12. Alan S. Milward, in his German Economy at War, was the first to show that the concept of blitzkrieg arose out of more than merely tactical considerations, that it was a method of waging modern war that took account of Germany’s specific situation. Cf. also Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 106 ff.
13. This is the explicit or implicit thesis of Fritz Fischer and his school; see particularly Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht and Krieg der Illusionen; Helmut Böhme, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht; Klaus Wernecke, Der Wille zur Weltgeltung. But see also, for in some cases highly controversial views: Egmont Zechlin, “Die Illusion vom begrenzten Krieg,” in: Die Zeit, September 17, 1965; Fritz Stern, “Bethmann Hollweg und der Krieg,” in: Recht und Staat, Heft 351/352; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Die deutsche Kriegszielpolitik 1914–1918,” in Juli 1914, the German edition of the Journal of Contemporary History, Munich, 1967; and, above all, Karl Dietrich Erdmann in the introduction to: Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, pp. 17 ff.
14. Heinrich Himmler in one of his speeches in Posen (October 4, 1943); Himmler was unquestionably reflecting Hitler’s view as it emerged around this time in, for example, the table talk, and was expressing it in concentrated form; IMT XXIX, p. 172 (1919-PS).
15. Otto Hintze to Friedrich Meinecke; cf. Die deutsche Katastrophe, p. 89.
BOOK VII
1. IMT XXXVII, pp. 466 if. (052-L).
2. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch I, p. 98; cf. also pp. 93 ff. General von Leeb, commander of an army group, spoke of the “insanity of an attack.” See Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, pp. 50 f. Von Leeb also commented on Hitler’s “appeal for peace”: “So the Führer’s speech in the Reichstag was only lying to the German people.” For the alternative of “putting the war to sleep,” cf. the sketch that General Jodi wrote in Nuremberg on “Hitler as a Strategist,” printed in: Kriegstagebuch des OKW (KTB/OKW) IV, 2, p. 1717. For the officers’ opposition during this period as a whole cf. Harold C. Deutsch, Verschwörung gegen den Krieg, pp. 71 ff.
3. Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, p. 76. The Hitler speech cited here has been preserved in several largely consonant versions. One of the two versions used here is Nuremberg Document PS-789 (IMT XXVI, pp. 327 ff.); the other is N 104/3 in the Freiburg im Breisgau military archives; its probable author is Helmuth Groscurth.
4. Churchill, The Second World War II, p. 74.
5. F. Halder, Kriegstagebuch I, p. 302.
6. Lieutenant General Alan Brooke, quoted in Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 147.
7. Cf. Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 191, 192, 225, 332. For the following letter from Mussolini to Hitler see Hitler e Mussolini, Lettere e Documenti, p. 35.
8. Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 235–36.
9. Ibid., p. 267. The preceding remark is cited in Raymond Cartier, La seconde guerre mondiale I, p. 137; cf. also Michaelis and Schraepler, XV, p. 150.
10. So Albert Speer has informed the author; cf. also the above-mentioned sketch by Jodi in KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1718 f., who also, incidentally, credits Hitler with the timely development of a 7.5-centimeter antitank gun.
11. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p, 30.
12. Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, p. 266.
13. Cf. the description in Shirer, Berlin Diary, p. 331.
14. Nolte, Epoche, p. 435.
15. Meinecke, Briefwechsel, pp. 363 f. The Opposition went into a deep depression. Ulrich von Hassell’s diary (Vom anderen Deutschland, pp. 156ff.) speaks of “badly shaken minds” among Oster, Dohnanyi, Guttenberg, and also Goerdeler. Von Kessel, he says, was “wholly resigned and would like to study archaeology.” An anonymous acquaintance in the Opposition camp proved to be representative of a widespread mood: he was “inclined to believe that a man who achieved such successes must be walking with God.” Von Hassell himself
summed up the inner conflict of many conservative Oppositionists in the phrase: “One might feel desperate under the tragic burden of being unable to rejoice in such successes.” For the following episode at Bruly-le-Pêche see Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 170 f.
16. This was Article 8 of the agreement, stating: “The German government solemnly declares to the French government that it does not intend to employ for its purposes those vessels of the French navy now in ports under German control.”
17. Winston Churchill, speech in House of Commons, May 13, 1940.
18. Winston Churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 334 (speech of July 14, 1940).
19. Hitler, My New Order, pp. 836 ff.
20. Karl Klee, Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe,’ pp. 441 f. For Admiral Raeder’s report—which, however, gave the navy a chance for a successful landing “only on the assumption that command of the air is achieved”—see KTB/OKW I, p. 63.
21. Speaking on June 6, 1940, to Sir Edward Spears; quoted in Michaelis and Schraepler XV, p. 261. On November 28, 1940, in a speech to the French Chamber of Deputies, Alfred Rosenberg attempted to. interpret what had happened in the same light: “The decadent successors of the French Revolution have clashed with the first troops of the great German Revolution. With that… this era of 1789 is now approaching its end. In a triumphal victory it has been… crushed when, already rotten, it still arrogantly attempted to go on dominating the destiny of Europe in the twentieth century as well.” Rosenberg, Gold und Blut, p. 7.
22. This fear of American intervention, always present, had been given renewed impetus by Roosevelt’s tough speech of July 19, 1940, which could only be interpreted as a resolute challenge; cf. the notes of Dieckhoff, the German ambassador in Washington, of July 21, 1940, in: ADAP X, pp. 213 f.; also Halder, KTB II, p. 30 (July 22, 1940). From that moment on this fear affected almost all discussions on strategy; cf., for example, Raeder, Mein Leben II, pp. 246 f.; also KTB/OKW I, pp. 88 ff. For an overall view see Friedländer, Prelude to Downfall.
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