4. Cited in Dietrich Ehlers, Technik und Moral einer Verschwörung, p. 102. It is a common misunderstanding, probably first voiced by Bullock, p. 736 f., that the Kreisau Circle consisted merely of thinkers and that its members were even proud of their contempt for all action; cf. especially Ger van Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand, where ample evidence is presented to refute this notion.
5. See Ehlers, p. 93. For the principle arguments against the German nationalist conspirators see Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, pp. 98 ff.
6. Inquiries among the workers, inspired by the Jesuit priest Alfred Delp, who belonged to the Kreisau Circle, yielded rather discouraging results. Von Trott’s memoranda also speak of widespread passivity in the working class; cf. Hans Mommsen, “Gesellschaftsbild und Verfassungspläne des deutschen Widerstands,” in Schmitthenner and Buchheim, ed., Der Deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler, p. 75. A Social Democratic opinion poll taken in 1942 came to the conclusion: “We will not be able to bring the masses out into the streets”; see Emil Henk, Die Tragödie des 20. Juli 1944, pp. 21 ff., and Allen Welsh Dulles, Germany’s Underground, p. 108. During the war significant resistance by the radical Left existed only after the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union. That resistance came to a focus in the “Rote Kapelle” headed by Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen and Administrative Secretary (Oberregierungsrat) Arvid Harnack; some of the members engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union. In August, 1942, some one hundred persons were arrested in connection with these activities; many of them were executed shortly afterward. Another group around Anton Saefkow was caught early in July, 1944; its fate, as we shall see below, played a part in precipitating Stauffenberg’s decision to act.
7. Ehlers, p. 143. For the biography of Stauffenberg see now Christian Müller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg. Incidentally, when Stefan George died in Minusio near Locarno on December 4, 1933, Stauffenberg with his two brothers and eight other friends of George were at his bedside.
8. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler, p. 138.
9. Speidel, pp. 113 ff. Characteristically, Hitler had waited until a few hours before the meeting to inform the two field marshals that it would take place, and where.
10. A specific motive for Hitler’s sudden departure has been occasionally mentioned. It is said that shortly after Rundstedt and Rommel left, a V-1 that had veered off course struck in the vicinity of the Führer’s headquarters. Actually, we can regard this only as the pretext that Hitler used to avoid the confrontation; for why should a rocket accidentally striking in Margival have made a meeting in distant Roche-Guyon any more dangerous. On the incident itself see Speidel, p. 119.
11. Speidel, pp. 155 ff.
12. Communication to the author from Baroness von Below.
13. Zoller, p. 184. Hitler requested that the clothes “be sent to Fräulein Braun at the Berghof with instructions that she is to preserve them carefully.”
14. Schmidt, Statist, p. 582.
15. Domarus, p. 2127 f.
16. Operation Thunderstorm was initiated abruptly on August 22, 1944, and resulted in the arrest of some 5,000 deputies and functionaries of the former political parties, including such persons as Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher. See Walter Hammer, “Die Gewitteraktion vom 22. 8. 1944,” in Freiheit und Recht, 1959:8–9, pp. 15 ff.
17. W. Scheidt, Gespräche mit Hitler, cited from Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit, p. 588; also Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 588.
18. Quoted in Ehlers, p. 113; see also Zeller, p. 461.
19. The speech is printed in: VJHfZ 1953:4, pp. 357 ff.; the passage quoted is on pp. 384 f.
20. Domarus, p. 2127.
21. Sebastian Haffner in a review in the magazine Konkret, 1964:2 of Kunrat von Hammerstein’s book Spähtrupp.
22. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, p. 367.
23. Schlabrendorff, p. 154.
24. Cited in Bullock, p. 757, n. 1.
25. Speer, p. 406.
26. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, pp. 615, 620 (August 31, 1944).
27. Radio address of January 30, cited in Domarus, p. 2083.
28. Tischgespräche, p. 468; see also p. 376.
29. General Bayerlein, cited in Cartier, Vol. II, p. 274. The description of Hitler is General von Manteuffel’s, cited from Shirer, p. 1091.
30. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, pp. 721 ff.
31. Ibid., p. 740.
32. Domarus, p. 2198.
33. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 115.
34. Le Testament politique de Hitler, p. 67. The preceding quotation is based on a memo to the author from Otto Remer. Remer, in conversation, had reminded Hitler that a few weeks earlier he had called the Ardennes offensive the last chance in this war, and had said that if it failed the whole war was lost.
35. “Lagebesprechung” of April 27, 1945, printed in Der Spiegel 1966:3, p. 42. On planning destruction see Speer, p. 403.
36. Cited in Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, p. 72.
37. Cf. Speer, p. 425. On July 20, 1944, Hitler had told Mussolini that he was “determined to level London completely” by bombardment with V-2 rockets. They would “keep firing at London until the entire city is destroyed.” See Hillgruber, Staatsmänner II, pp. 470 f. The order to defend Paris or reduce it to ashes was issued on August 23, 1944, but was disobeyed by General von Choltitz; see the account by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? The order itself is printed in Jacobsen, 1939–1945, pp. 587 f.
38. Goebbels, cited in Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, p. 51.
39. Printed in KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1701 ff. Cf. the description in Gerhard Boldt, Die letzten Tage, p. 15.
40. Zoller, p. 150.
41. Guderian, p. 376; also Boldt, pp. 26 f. The doctor mentioned was Dr. Giesing; cf. the account in Maser, Hitler, pp. 350 f.
42. Zoller, p. 230. “From time to time,” the report continues, “he raised his eyes to the portrait of Frederick the Great that hung above his desk and repeated his saying: ‘Ever since I have come to know men, I love dogs.’ ”
43. Ibid., pp. 204, 232.
44. Speer, p. 399.
45. Zoller, pp. 29 f. During a military conference in January Hitler wondered “whether a new shell ought not to be made now, after all” (Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 867), and when General Karl Wolff visited him on April 18, Hitler elaborated on his “plans for the near future.” See Eugen Dollmann, Dolmetscher der Diktatoren, p. 235.
46. Cited in Görlitz and Quint, p. 616; see also Domarus, pp. 2202 ff.
47. Speer, p. 426.
48. The “flag order” is printed in Jacobsen, 1939–1945, pp. 591 f. The so-called Nero Command is printed in KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1580 f.
49. Trevor-Roper, ed., The Bormann Letters, p. 198.
50. Speer, p. 440.
51. Ibid., p. 453.
52. Bullock, pp. 780 f.
53. Statement by Frau Inge Haberzettel, one of the Propaganda Minister’s secretaries. Cf. the description in Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 100. For Ley’s death rays see Speer, p. 464.
54. Speer, p. 463. For the following description of Hitler, see p. 464.
55. Ibid., p. 474. There are many witnesses to the attitude of Goebbels; the remark quoted here is taken from the “Lagebesprechung” of April 23, 1945; see Der Spiegel, 1966:3, p. 34.
56. Speer, p. 475.
57. Ibid., p. 459.
58. Karl Koller, Der letzte Monat, pp. 19 ff.
59. The witnesses to the course of events are chiefly: Keitel, Jodi, General Christian, Colonel von Freytag-Loringhoven, Lorenz, Colonel von Below, and Fräulein Krüger, who was Bormann’s secretary. Our account largely follows that of Trevor-Roper, who checked the statements of these witnesses and extracted the points of essential agreement; see Last Days, pp. 118 f.; also the statement of Gerhard Herrgesell, one of the stenographers, in: KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1696 f.
60. See the transcript of this account in Koller, p. 31.
61. Quoted by Trevor-Roper, Last Days,
p. 127.
62. Speer, p. 480; but see also p. 485.
63. Quoted in Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 128.
64. Speer, p. 483.
65. Le Testament politique de Hitler, p. 61 (February 4, 1945).
66. Ibid., pp. 57 ff. (February 4, 1945).
67. Ibid., pp. 87 ff.; 129 if. (February 14 and 25, 1945). Hitler made very similar remarks in a military conference of March 5, 1943; see Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 171; see also the comparable early comment in Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 115.
68. Ibid., pp. 101 ff. (February 17, 1945). The opening of the campaign in the East actually was postponed for a few weeks, but this decision was not due solely to Mussolini’s invasion of Greece. Questions of weather, of time for the deployment of allies, and so on, played a part. Cf. the study “Hat das britische Eingreifen in Griechenland den deutschen Angriff auf Russland verzögert oder nicht?” (on file at the Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt Freiburg im Breisgau). See also Hillgruber, Strategie, p. 506. Hitler himself, moreover, sometimes said just the opposite, at least to Mussolini; cf. the reference in Nolte, Epoche, p. 586.
69. Le Testament politique de Hitler, p. 78.
70. Ibid., p. 108 (February 17, 1945). For Trevor-Roper’s comment see pp. 46 f. Hitler’s opinion agrees amazingly with a remark of the French writer Drieu la Rochelle, who toward the end of 1944, shortly before his suicide, explained the defeat as follows: “The reason for the collapse of German policy lies not in its lack of moderation, but in its lack of decisiveness. In no field was the German revolution pushed ahead far enough…. The German revolution dealt far too circumspectly with the old men in business and in the army; it spared too much of the old bureaucracy. This double mistake was exposed on July 20. Hitler should have struck harshly at the disloyal Left, but also shown no mercy to the disloyal Right. Because he did not strike, or did not strike hard enough, the irreparable consequences emerged, with an increasingly dire effect, in the course of the war. In all the occupied countries of Europe German policy proved to be burdened by all the prejudices of superannuated rules of warfare and outmoded diplomacy; it was unable to exploit the novelty and breadth of the magnificent mission that had been offered to it; it proved incapable of transforming an old-fashioned war of conquest into a revolutionary war. It believed it would be able to reduce the violence of warfare to a minimum in order to win over European public opinion—and was forced to see this opinion turning against itself because it was offering the European public nothing new and compelling.” Cited in Nolte, Faschismus, p. 380.
71. Cf. Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 175.
72. Hitler’s political and personal testaments are both printed in: N.B. 3569-PS.
73. The original text of this document was destroyed; it is given here in von Below’s reconstruction as cited by Trevor-Roper, Last Days, pp. 194 f.
74. See Lev Bezymenski, The Death of Adolf Hitler, p. 72; cf. also Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 196.
75. Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 198.
76. The Russian commission’s autopsy report, Document 12, claims that remains of a crushed ampoule of poison were found in the mouth of the corpse, which it believed to be Hitler. But the report does not mention the distinct odor of bitter almonds given off by cyanide compounds, which was observed in the other bodies. German participants have denied that any fragments of skull could have been found, given the degree to which the flames consumed the body; cf. Maser, Hitler, pp. 432 f. Given Hitler’s fear that his suicide might be unsuccessful, it is not out of the question that he may have bitten a poison capsule and simultaneously pressed the trigger of his gun. Bezymenski’s effort (p. 72) to exclude this possibility by referring to the “foremost Soviet forensic scientist” is not convincing, not even in the manner of presentation. For the statements of eyewitnesses see Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 201.
77. Statement of Otto Günsche, cited in Maser, Hitler, p. 432. The previous statement was made by the guard Hermann Karnau; see the detailed quotation in Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, p. 324, n. 40.
78. Bezymenski alleges (pp. 66 f.) as the motive for Soviet secrecy that the results of the medical investigation were being withheld in case “someone might try to slip into the role of the Führer saved by a miracle.” Also, the aim was to exclude all possibility of error. There is no need to comment on the first argument, since silence could only give support to the claim that the Führer was still alive, and in fact did. The second argument is also scarcely convincing, since the credibility of the autopsy record could not increase in the course of years. For the various rumors see Trevor-Roper, Last Days, Preface; he also gives an illuminating account of his vain efforts to obtain information or co-operation from the Russians.
CONCLUSION
1. Trevor-Roper, Last Days, p. 45.
2. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 212.
3. Photo in the author’s possession.
4. Hitlers Zweites Buch, p. 174, and Mein Kampf, p. 646. Cf. also Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 62 f. (February 4, 1945): “Germany had no choice…. We could not rest content with a sham independence. That might be enough for Swedes or the Swiss, who are always willing to be put off with empty promises so long as their pockets are filled. The Weimar Republic asked for nothing more. But the Third Reich could not be content with such a modest claim. We were condemned to wage war.”
5. Tischgespräche, p. 273; also Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 105.
6. Best known, and frequently cited in German apologetic works, is Winston Churchill’s statement in Great Contemporaries, p. 226: “Whatever else may be thought about these exploits, they are certainly among the most remarkable in the whole history of the world.”
7. Le Testament politique de Hitler, p. 139 (February 26, 1945).
8. Tischgespräche, p. 489.
9. Hitler to the Munich court during his trial, February 26, 1924. See Boepple, p. 110.
10. Cf. Minutes of the Conference of the Expanded Executive Committee of the Communist International, Moscow, June 12–13, 1923, cited in Nolte, Theorien, p. 92. The speech is highly interesting because, contrary to all the conspiratorial theories that circulated later, it takes seriously the idea of Fascism as a catch-all for the masses disappointed with socialism.
11. Nietzsche, The Dawn (Morgenröte), aphorism 534.
12. Speech of January 25, 1939, cited in Jacobsen and Jochmann, Ausgewählte Dokumente, p. 9. For the remark on German Social Democracy, cf. Libres propos, p. 36. American social scientists, in order to avoid the peculiar moral problems of terminology, have introduced the concept of “modernization” into the discussion. The Fascist systems in Italy or Germany, it is argued, represent above all stages in the process of repressing traditional social structures. Much of this argument fails to consider adequately that “modernization” can be only one interpretative aspect and that Fascism cannot be defined exclusively by its attitude toward the process of industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization. A detailed and satisfying study remains to be published. Cf. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization; H. A. Turner, Jr., “Faschismus und Anti-Modernismus,” in: Faschismus und Kapitalismus in Deutschland, pp. 157 ff., with further references.
13. At the beginning was the celebrated article in the New York Post of December 20,1941, on the gassing of a thousand Warsaw Jews.
14. Bertolt Brecht, “An die Nachgeborenen” (“To Posterity”), in: Selected Poems, trans. H. R. Hays, New York, 1947, p. 173.
15. Carlo Sforza, European Dictatorships, pp. 138 f.
16. Cf. Nolte, Theorien, p. 71.
17. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 212.
18. Ibid., pp. 150, 262, 264.
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