First Armored Division
Foreign Office (Soviet), October 27 letter from
Forrestal, James
Fulbright, J. William
action advocated by
Gagarin (ship)
Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, support by
Gilpatric, Roswell
Governance, dilemma of
Great Britain, skepticism of U.S. position in
“Great Society,”
Gromyko, Andrei, misleading statements of
Guantanamo Bay
strengthening forces in
Guinea
“Hawks,” coining of
Hoover, J. Edgar
Indonesia
Intelligence Community, see also Central Intelligence Agency
Italy, missile deployment in
Jefferson, Thomas
John Pierce (destroyer)
Johnson, U. Alexis
decision on blockade and
as member of Ex Comm
Johnson, Lyndon B.
as member of Ex Comm
Vietnam War and
Joint Chiefs of Staff
invasion recommended by (Oct. 27)
military attack recommended by (Oct. 17)
opinion on air strike
preventive attack on Soviet Union and
use of nuclear weapons and
Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. (destroyer)
Jupiter missiles
Kaiser, Philip M.
Katzenbach, Nicholas
Kennedy, Jacqueline
Kennedy, John F.
acceptance of Khrushchev proposal by (Oct. 27)
advice sought by, conflicting opinions
Ex Comm and decisions of
from officialdom
basis for action of
alternatives
Khrushchev
most difficult decision
opinion on miscalculations
prevention of war
purposefulness
Bay of Pigs and
blockade and
decision on blockade (Oct. 20)
line of interception
on start of blockade
speech announcing blockade (Oct. 22)
support by allies
boarding of ships and
boarding of Bucharest
boarding of Marucla
congressional criticism of
deployment of Air Force and
initial reaction to missiles in Cuba by
invasion and
implications of invasion
increase in overflights ordered (Oct. 26)
military attack and
on readiness for invasion
retaliation for attack on U-2s and
U-2 crash and (Oct. 27)
Khrushchev and
comparison of Khrushchev to himself
decision to give Khrushchev time
J. F. Kennedy’s basis for action
Khrushchev’s deception of
Khrushchev’s liking for
as partners in preventing mutual disaster
question of Khrushchev’s respect for
relations between
Macmillan and
McNamara and
meeting with Gromyko (Oct. 17)
military and
failures of military
strengths of military
missiles in Turkey and
“rules of the precarious status quo” of
secrecy kept by
shying away from Congress by, reasons for
Soviet deception and
Stevenson and
warning by, on use of SAMs
Khrushchev, Nikita S.
acceptance of proposal by (Oct. 27)
allowing time for reactions of
assurances on SAMs by
confusion in Soviet Union and
J. F. Kennedy and, see Kennedy, John F., Khrushchev and
memoirs attributed to
October 22 letter to
October 23 letter from
October 23 letter to
October 25 letter to
October 26 letter from
October 27 letter from
October 27 letter to
peaceful intentions of
proposed communications to
B. Russell and
summit meeting with
support by Latin America as surprise to
Komiles (ship)
Korean War
Laos
Latin America
support by
LeMay, Gen. Curtis, military attack recommended by
Liberty (ship)
Lincoln, Abraham
Lovett, Robert
McCloy, John
McCone, John
as advocate of military action
on invasion
as member of Ex Comm
report on Soviet deployments by
on turning of Russian ships
Macmillan, Harold
support by
McNamara, Robert S.
as advocate of blockade
interception of ships and submarines and
J. F. Kennedy and
lack of control over Navy by
as member of Ex Comm
military deployment for attack and
Navy’s line of interception and
nuclear war and
report on casualties expected in invasion
report on increased activity in Cuba (Oct. 27)
requirements for military action reported by
retaliation for attack on U-2s and
Martin, Edward
decision on blockade and
as member of Ex Comm
Marucla (Liberty ship)
“Munich,”
National Security Act of
National security complex
National Security Council
Berlin threat and (1961)
creation of
formal meeting of (Oct. 20), and decision on blockade
See also Executive Committee of the National Security Council
NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Navy
blockade rules for
deployment of
forces in Caribbean (Oct. 25)
line of interception for
McNamara’s lack of control of
report on submarine movements by
tracking of submarines by
turning of Soviet ships and
See also specific ships
Neustadt, Richard E. “Afterword” by
New York Times
Nigeria
Nitze, Paul
as advocate of military action
as member of Ex Comm
Nixon, Richard M.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
implications of invasion for
support by
Nuclear war
morality of
possibility and implications of
OAS, see Organization of American States
O’Donnell, Kenneth
as member of Ex Comm
Officialdom
Ex Comm
Executive bureaucracy and
mutual dependence and conflict of Presidency and
101st Airborne Division
Operations Coordinating Board (under Eisenhower)
Organization of American States (OAS)
blockade and
decision to blockade and
unanimous support by (Oct. 23)
Ormsby-Gore, David
Pathet Lao
Peace Corps
Pearl Harbor
Planning Board (under Eisenhower)
Poland
Polaris submarines
Polk, James
Presidency
as Final Arbiter
mutual dependency and conflict of officialdom and
problems of
role of
war making as prime example of incompatibility be
tween Congress and
See also specific presidents
“Quemoy-Matsu” formula
Rayburn, Sam
Republicans, security threats and
Reston, James
Roosevelt, Franklin D.
Rusk, Dean
advises Dobrynin of blockade (Oct. 22)
Jupiter missiles and
as member of Ex Comm
Russell, Bertrand
Russell, Richard B.
Salinger, Pierre
Scali, John
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.
Foreword by
Senegal
Senghor, Leopold
Shoup, Gen. David M.
Sorensen, Theodore
as member of Ex Comm
as opponent of air strike
Soviet Union
alert of forces of
Berlin blockade as reciprocal act of
confrontation in U.N. and
consequences of deception by
demands of
J. F. Kennedy’s basis for action with
letter from Foreign Office of (Oct. 27)
naval base for
preventive attacks on
reciprocal withdrawal of missiles and
refusal of, to recognize blockade
turning of ships of
use of SAMs by
Spanish-American War
Stalin, Joseph
State Department
charges in function of
draft reply to Khrushchev by (Oct. 27)
Khrushchev’s October 26 letter and
missiles in Turkey and
post-invasion government for Cuba and
“Status quo, rules of the precarious,”
Stevenson, Adlai
as advocate of reciprocal withdrawal
confrontation with Zorin of
as member of Ex Comm
Strategic Air Command, deployment of
Sweeney, Gen. Walter C., Jr.
Synopsis of events
Tass
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell
as member of Ex Comm
preparations for invasion and
Thompson, Llewellyn
Tojo, Hideki
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Touré, Sekou
Truman, Harry S
Tuchman, Barbara
Turkey
attack on
implications of invasion for
removal of missiles from
U Thant
United Nations
confrontation at
moratorium suggested by
United States Information Agency (USIA)
Victory, meaning of
Vienna (Austria), summit meeting in
Vietnam War
War
incidence of undeclared
See also Congress, war making as prime example of incompatibility between presidency and; Nuclear war; specific wars
War of 1812
Warsaw Pact
Wilson, Donald
Wilson, Woodrow
World War, First
World War, Second
World War Three
Zorin, V. A., confrontation with
* According to Theodore Sorensen, “The odds that the Soviets would go all the way to war, he [John Kennedy] later said, seemed to him then ‘somewhere between one out of three and even’” (Kennedy [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], p. 705).
* Other accounts supplement his discussion. For these accounts, see p. 175. In the paragraphs that follow, we have drawn on some of them.
* According to memoirs attributed to Khrushchev, “Our goal was…to keep the Americans from invading Cuba, and, to that end, we wanted to make them think twice by confronting them with our missiles” (Khrushchev Remembers [Boston: Little, Brown, 1970], p. 496). This account avoids any discussion of the deception involved.
* Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972).
* Dean Acheson, “Homage to Plain Dumb Luck,” Esquire, February, 1969.
* The preceding paragraphs are adapted from Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
* U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings, Part I, Testimony of Richard E. Neustadt, March 11, 1963, p. 97.
* The preceding paragraphs are adapted from Neustadt, op. cit.
* If one includes all instances in which American armed forces were used by Executive discretion—military as well as presidential—against the forces and persons of other countries without a declaration of war, the list numbers over one hundred. For a partial listing, see U.S., Department of State, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Force, memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State, 3rd rev. ed., 1934. Among the more important were Polk’s occupation of the Mexican border territory, Wilson’s interventions in Mexico and Siberia, and interventions in the Dominican Republic by no fewer than four Presidents.
* See Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease 1939–1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 67–71; also Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 174–76.
* On Friday, Oct. 26, Khrushchev sent two letters to President Kennedy. The first, not made public, apparently took the “soft” line that Russia would remove its missiles from Cuba in return for ending of the U.S. quarantine and assurances that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. The second took a harder line seeking the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in return for taking Russian missiles out of Cuba. [A notation from Congressional Quarterly]
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