“What about me?” I asked. “Anything about DeLouise?”
“We don't know yet. There's still a lot to check out. If it's here, you'll get it, don't worry.”
We continued in a cordial exchange of conversation, but there was really nothing more to be said. We'd have to go through the files before any conclusions could be drawn.
“OK,” I said as I got up. “I guess my tour of duty for you has ended. Just let me know when I can come and work on these papers. I've still got my own job to do.”
“Sit down,” said Brown politely, “you're not done yet.”
I sat back down on the couch waiting for somebody to say something. Nobody did, so I ventured a question.
“What about the break-in into Armajani's apartment? Anything interesting there?” I asked.
“That yielded only one file,” said Brown. “Eric, let him see it.” He sounded content.
The first document had ten pages. It bore an official Iranian flag in green, white, and red and a green seal. I looked over Eric's shoulder as he went through the pages. It was typed in Arabic script on thin airmail paper.
“It's written in Farsi,” I said, after giving it a first glance behind Eric's shoulder, “because there are few extra letters to Arabic.”
“Can you read Farsi?” asked Eric.
“No. The letters are Arabic, which I can read, but I'd have no clue what they say except for a few words that entered Farsi from Arabic.”
“Never mind,” said Eric, “we made a quick translation,” and handed me a stapled document.
I took the document and started in. The header read “Top Secret” and then came the words “With God Almighty's Blessing.” The letter was dated 13 farvadin 1369 and was addressed to Cyrus Armajani and Farbod Kutchemeshgi.
“What is that date?” asked Brown.
“The Iranian solar calendar,” I volunteered. “Years are numbered by the years since Mohammad's Hegira in 621 A.D., so the Iranian year will be 621 years less than the Gregorian year that began on January 1. That makes the year 1369. Farvadin is April. And since they say in the letter that this is the Islamic Republic Day, I presume the correct date to be April 2,1990.”
The document was titled “Iran's Pride.”
“Before you continue,” Eric said, “I should mention that ‘Iran's Pride’ is a code name assigned to their nuclear weaponization program, which is closely connected to their delivery system, a ballistic missile.”
“OK,” I said, and continued reading from the translation. “Today is Islamic Republic Day. The Great Iranian Islamic nation is about to demonstrate to the world its scientific ability by building an atomic bomb to safeguard our nation's leading position in the region.
“This entire program is subject to the most stringent confidentiality Under orders of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, our president, all activities in this program must be under the guise of ‘intended for civil or peaceful use.’ If asked, we offer the explanation that the purchases of the materials are for ‘civil use such as oil refining, food and dairy production, car and truck manufacture, pharmaceutical research, and drug production.’”
Brown moved to the couch. “We know that Iran is building two uranium-enrichment facilities, which will operate in concert with the larger facility planned at Natanz.”
“Dan was already briefed on that,” said Eric.
“OK,” said Brown.
I scanned through some more pages in the document.
“I see an updated list of materials and equipment the Iranians need. It indicates that quantities and delivery dates would be advised as soon as possible. It includes the potential vendors for the supply.” I paused for a minute and quickly read on. “Here's an interesting part. They write that ‘there have been several sabotage attacks by the Israelis on factories the Iraqis used in Europe and we expect that to happen to our facilities if agents of the Zionist entity or the American infidels discover our nuclear activities. You should engage special means to protect yourselves and be extra careful with respect to your suppliers and vendors. You are not allowed to befriend anyone without our prior approval. Any new approach to you, as benign and as random as it may seem, must be regarded as an attempted contact by the CIA or the Israelis.”
“There's no need to read out the entire document,” said Brown after patiently listening to my reading. “All I want you to do is to quickly compare it with DeLouise's list, the one you saw during the meeting with the Iranians at Guttmacher's office.”
It took me about ten minutes to go through the pages of machinery and chemical compounds, carefully itemized.
“It looks very similar to the list I gave you earlier,” I said. “DeLouise did a good job by keeping these lists. What I see here partially matches DeLouise's list.”
“It seems that they didn't give him the whole list, just the bits they wanted him to get,” said Eric.
“But DeLouise had two lists, a short one and a longer one. I guess the short one was given to him by the Iranians, and then he probably stole a complete copy from Guttmacher,” I suggested.
“Anything here to confirm the authenticity of this document?” asked Brown.
“The fact that the list checks with DeLouise's adds to its credibility, but a fake document could be copied and that wouldn't convert it to a genuine document. Our analysts will verify authenticity,” chipped in Benny.
“If it's genuine, it's a gold mine,” said Richards, cautiously. “This could save us months of work. Some of the machinery and materials are dual purpose, so I wouldn't be surprised if those vendors don't even know the true intended use of their equipment or materials.”
“I don't think any of them are that naive,” I said. “The smell of money just clouded their judgment more than a little.”
“I'm not giving anyone a clean bill of health,” said Benny. “However, some of the manufacturers of the dual-purpose materials could have been duped by the Iranians.”
“We need to do a lot more research before we jump to conclusions, and this is a perfect time to do it,” added Brown. “After that it's a political decision.”
“We already know some of the names,” said Benny, “but this is the first time our information has been supported by an official Iranian document boasting about their campaign of disinformation.”
“Let's squeeze the juice out of it first,” said Eric, “and then see what to do with the pulp.”
I thought that the next document in the file would shock everyone. It appeared to be a copy of a CIA report on the Iranian nuclear program.
If the document were genuine, then the Iranians had a mole. How else could they have gotten it? At first glance it looked genuine. It had the CIA letterhead and was dated August 1, 1990. Eric narrowed his eyes and read it briefly. Then he handed it over to Benny and said, “Please read it out loud, then tell us what you think.” He seemed to be in a testing mode.
Benny put on his small rimless glasses and read. “This is an updated report concerning Iranian nuclear activity.
“The 1981 Israeli Air Force's bombing of the Iraqi Osiraq reactor and subsequent developments highlighted fairly early on that Iraq was fostering a nuclear weapon interest. Dr. Jafar dhia Jafar, head of Iraq's nuclear weapons effort, has indicated that the Israeli bombing of Osiraq prompted his government to proceed with a secret enrichment program. Although the Israeli attack cost Iraq almost one billion dollars, the world did not punish Israel for its aggression. That caused Iran to resort to subterfuge concerning its own nuclear program.”
Benny put down the document, removed his eyeglasses, and looked at Eric. “What's this bullshit? Is it for real?”
Eric smiled. “Please continue,” he asked.
Benny let out a sigh and said, “Let me read it first.” Five minutes later, Benny came up with an answer: “This is garbage. Somebody was trying to create a document purportedly written by the CIA, while in fact it is a compilation of several different news reports appearing in the media in recent years.”<
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“The problem is that although Iranian sources claim their scientists have the necessary skills and technology to master the construction of an atom bomb, we don't think they do,” said Eric in a decisive tone. “Therefore, they're also working in other directions: purchasing gas centrifuges and developing gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment, and laser isotope separation to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium to build a bomb. Substantial resources and effort are going into gaseous diffusion.”
Benny looked at Eric with a puzzled look. “Is there a purpose for this fake document? Where are the secrets?”
“There aren't any,” said Eric. “Although Iranian agents were having trouble trying to buy essential equipment on the open market, which is now embargoed, we think the Iranians may nevertheless have been successful in their purchasing missions.”
My heart started beating faster. Iranian A-bombs and the trigger in the hands of the ayatollahs?
Eric continued. “Iran is capitalizing on the strong desire of Western technology companies to make sales wherever they can. They look the other way when questions come up about the true end-use of the technology or equipment they supplied. The Iranians are toying with business-hungry companies, and they are able to obtain a considerable amount of proprietary information from these firms for free.”
Benny didn't comment, but nodded his head and obediently continued reading the document: “The atomic bomb design ‘weaponization’ is the responsibility of the Iranian scientists and technicians. At this time Iran has detailed plans for building an implosion nuclear device containing a mass of highly enriched uranium at its core. They are also purchasing conventional explosives to be put around the central mass to detonate simultaneously. They implode and compress the fissile material into a supercritical mass. At that instant, neutrons are injected into the material to initiate a chain reaction and explosion.”
Eric suddenly moved in. “Benny, no point in reading any more. This is a fake document. The Iranians doctored one of our official publications to make it look like a secret document. They inserted some accurate information, a lot of bullshit, and some half-truths. I wouldn't be surprised if they intended to leak it to a newspaper that would then publish it as a genuine CIA document.”
“As psychological warfare,” I said, “that document could still serve a purpose. By appearing in the media it would achieve two goals. The first would be to embarrass the United States at a crucial point when President Bush is trying to complete his coalition of countries to fight Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. I guess exposing the United States as a leaking sieve would not be too popular with the coalition countries. And if the Iranians could manage to hint that they have a mole within the CIA, then they'd score double. The second goal would be to spread fear among Iran's oil-rich neighbors concerning Iran's nuclear might. That may have a domino effect on the Gulf States and even Saudi Arabia. They could fall into the Iranian's hands like ripe fruit off the tree.”
“Precisely,” said Eric, in one of the very few instances in which he completely agreed with me. Well, after all, I was supporting his line of thinking.
There was a moment of silence in the room. Benny was the first one to break it. “The Iranian document is excellent for us. I could think of some interesting operations following these leads. Israel can't allow the Iranian fanatics to become the new Nazis of the Middle East. We have to believe him when they say they want the Jews thrown into the sea.”
“Would Israel consider preventive measures against the suppliers to Iran?” asked Phil.
“I wouldn't rule anything out,” said Benny candidly. “We could do it ourselves or let the public do a preparatory job.”
“What do you mean?” asked Phil.
“Well, if we leak some of this stuff to the media, or just the identity of the European suppliers, Israel would again be justified in its effort to bury the Iranian nuclear program.”
“I see,” said Phil.
“Let me share with you recent intelligence,” said Benny. “We have indications that the Iranians are negotiating with the Soviets to purchase an advanced AVRII uranium enrichment processor system to be installed at Natanz and at Moallen Kalayeh sites. They plan a ‘close-looped fuel cycle.’ That means that Iran will be able to produce fuel for its nuclear bombs.”
Benny paused, drank a sip of water, and continued. “We know that Iran is also getting technical cooperation from Syria, which in 1989 deployed its Scud-C missiles along its southern border with Israel and equipped the Iranians with sarin nerve gas. Iran may try to use the Scud-C missiles for the delivery of their bomb to Israel.”
“They would have to reduce the bomb's weight first,” said Phil, “otherwise the missiles wouldn't get to Israel from Iran.”
“But from Syria they could,” snapped Benny. “Syrian-Iranian cooperation is not limited to exchange of technical information.”
Phil Richards and Arthur Brown nodded in agreement.
“I'm sure you know,” added Benny in a serious tone, “that Iran has sent several thousand students to Western universities to study physics and chemistry, to acquire the necessary expertise. The Iranians refrain from sending too many students at the same time to the same university or region, to make it difficult for the Western intelligence services to appreciate the number of Iranian students abroad and the technical skills they acquire.”
“Yes, we know that,” said Phil. “We are closely monitoring this activity.”
Benny paused, while we patiently waited for him to continue. I saw how Benny was arming the bomb he was about to drop. Here it came.
“We also know that until 1988 the United States had been providing classified satellite intelligence to the Iraqi government during their war with Iran. Iranian agents in Iraq stole that information. Now the Iranians know what the U.S. can see, and therefore, how to deceive you.”
Phil Richards, Arthur Brown, and Eric Henderson didn't blink. “That was a strategic decision that was appropriate at the time,” said Eric.
“Some decision,” said Benny, with a hint of mockery. “Take this as an example: knowing the limitations of the U.S. satellites, the Iranians are building large disguised and dispersed bombproof facilities. They are fooling you.”
Eric was not deterred. “Let's work with what we have,” he said, completely undistracted by Benny's criticism. “We know that Iran's uranium-enrichment program is being pushed ahead. They are preparing to convert uranium to enriched uranium metal, a must for an A-bomb. Iran is also working on laser technology to enrich uranium. They are planning a highly advanced laboratory, the Jabr Ibn Hayan at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.”
“Why uranium and not plutonium?” asked Benny.
“Because plutonium requires reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, which in turn requires a reprocessing plant.”
“How do we know that these planned facilities are not for energy-production purposes?”
Eric waved his hand. “Because if they were meant as an alternate fuel supply, why are they planning a heavy-water installation? The Bushehr plant will be operated by light-water reactor. But if they plan on using heavy water, with its extra hydrogen atom, that's an indication that they are making weapons-grade plutonium.”
“I‘ve always believed our own reports that Iran's nuclear weapons program is substantial,” said Benny. “They're not doing it as a public relations stunt. The Iranian clerics really want to export their Islamic revolution by force. With an A-bomb in their arsenal, more people would listen.”
Nobody responded. The room went silent. Brown and Eric were collecting their papers; it seemed that the meeting was ending.
Now it was my chance to turn up the heat. All this political and scientific detail was in my way.
“Eric, I have a question. How long did DeLouise work for you?”
Eric smiled in embarrassed surprise. “What makes you think he ever did?” he asked, while avoiding my eyes and arranging his papers.
“I guess it's true, then,
” I said. I had known the answer already.
“Tell me about it,” countered Eric.
“DeLouise received a tourist visa to the United States on an expired Romanian passport. It's impossible today, and it was definitely impossible in 1957, when Romania was a part of the Communist Bloc. So I gathered the restrictions were deliberately ignored. Given DeLouise's identity, it's obvious who was interested in him. One plus one is two.”
“Not so fast,” said Eric. “It was a one-time deal. In 1957I was still in elementary school, but I recently looked this thing up. DeLouise wanted to emigrate to the United States but he didn't qualify for an immigrant visa because he lacked a sponsor. So he offered us information about recent French nuclear developments in exchange for permanent residence in the United States. The price was right and we agreed. That's the whole story.”
“But why did he receive the visa on his expired Romanian passport rather than on his valid Israeli passport?”
“He didn't qualify for a regular immigrant visa, so the only way to grant him a green card was through the asylum program. Under that program, it would look better to grant the status on a Romanian passport even though it was expired. In fact it even helped, because if ever questioned on that he could claim that his persecution by the government included a denial of a valid passport. Romania was a country with a dictatorial regime, which could explain to any probing eyes why he received asylum. We couldn't offer the same explanation with respect to a democracy like Israel.”
I took a step forward and ventured, “Was DeLouise doubled?” Meaning, was he recruited by the CIA to be a double agent.
“Definitely not,” said Eric. “It all happened after DeLouise had already left the Mossad, and he specifically conditioned the deal on the insistence that no questions concerning Israel or the Mossad be asked during his debriefing. For us, DeLouise was a ‘walk-in,’ a one-time informer.”
I didn't say anything, but Eric's explanation seemed to answer the question I'd been asking myself since September, when I'd received David Stone's memo assigning me to DeLouise's case: why had DeLouise received a U.S. passport on an expired visa? – a circumstance so unusual that it had immediately set off alarm bells in my head. DeLouise's deal with the CIA may have been only a one-time deal but he'd left enough of a trail to help me make a breakthrough in my own case.
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