310 Personal interview with Ron Brower, Barrow, Alaska, August 9, 2006.
311 Drawn from J. Painter, “Greenland Sees Bright Side of Warming,” BBC News, September 14, 2007; C. Woodward, “Global Warming Is a Boon for Farmers and Fishermen but a Hardship for Ice-Dependent Inuit,” Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 2007; and “Greenlandic Super Potatoes,” The Copenhagen Post, May 18, 2009.
312 Workshop on Conservation of Crop Genetic Resources in the Face of Climate Change, Bellagio, Italy, September 3-6, 2007.
313 More specifically South Asia wheat, Southeast Asia rice, and southern Africa corn. The editors of Science must have also been impressed, as the research appeared there five months later. D. B. Lobell, M. B. Burke et al., “Prioritizing Climate Change Adaptation Needs for Food Security in 2030,” Science 319 (2008): 607-610.
314 W. Schlenker, D. B. Lobell, “Robust negative impacts of climate change on African agriculture,” Environmental Research Letters 5 (2009), DOI:10.1088/1748-9326/5/1/014010.
315 D. S. Battisti, R. L. Naylor, “Historical Warnings of Future Food Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat,” Science 323 (2009): 240-244.
316 The experiment assumed a doubling of atmospheric CO2. R. M. Adams et al., “Global Climate Change and U.S. Agriculture,” Nature 345 (1990): 219-224.
317 E.g., J. E. Olesen, M. Bindi, “Consequences of Climate Change for European Agricultural Productivity, Land Use and Policy,” European Journal of Agronomy 16 (2002): 239-262. G. Maracchi, O. Sirotenko, and M. Bindi, “Impacts of Present and Future Climate Variability on Agriculture and Forestry in the Temperate Regions: Europe,” Climatic Change 70 (2005): 117-135; N. Dronin, A. Kirilenko, “Climate Change and Food Stress in Russia: What If the Market Transforms as It Did during the Past Century?” Climatic Change 86 (2008): 123-150.
318 There’s more to it than just temperature and rain. A key issue is the so-called CO2 fertilization effect. Plants like CO2, so having more of it in the air tends to increase crop yields. Most agro-climate models build in a hefty benefit for this, based on early greenhouse experiments using enclosed chambers. This enables the models to offset a large share of the damages of summer heat and drought, owing to the anticipated fertilizing benefit from elevated CO2 levels. However, more realistic experiments staged outdoors, using blowers over actual farm fields, show a much lower fertilization benefit. This suggests that the models may be seriously underestimating the negative impacts of climate change to world food production. S. P. Long et al., “Food for Thought: Lower-than-Expected Crop Yield Stimulation with Rising CO2 Concentrations,” Science 312 (2006): 1918-1921.
319 For example, crop declines from a doubling of extreme weather events by the 2020s. J. Alcamo et al., “A New Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Food Production Shortfalls and Water Availability in Russia,” Global Environmental Change 17 (2007): 429-444.
320 For example, Russia’s West Siberian, East Siberian, Northwestern, Northern, and Far East regions are all forecast to experience increased cereal and potato productivity by the 2020s, but its Central, Central Chernozem, North Caucasian, Volga-Vyatka, and Volga regions are projected to decline. A. P. Kirilenko et al., “Modeling the Impact of Climate Changes on Agriculture in Russia,” Doklady Earth Sciences 397, no. 5 (2004): 682-685 (translated from Russian).
321 T. Parfitt, “Russia’s Polar Hero,” Science 324, no. 5933 (2009): 1382-1384. See also “Artur Chilingarov: Russia’s Arctic Explorer,” The Moscow News, July 17, 2008.
322 Tom Casey, a U.S. State Department spokesman, said, “I’m not sure whether they put a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a bedsheet on the ocean floor. Either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing.” “Russian Subs Seek Glory at North Pole,” USA Today, August 2, 2007. See also “Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed,” The Guardian UK; “Russia Plants Flag under N Pole,” BBC News; “Russia Plants Underwater Flag at North Pole,” The New York Times; “Russia to Claim Energy Wealth beneath Arctic Ocean,” Pravda; and many others (all August 2, 2007).
323 ArcticNet is a Canadian government-funded research consortium that coordinates big projects in the Arctic, including the CCGS Amundsen expedition, http://www.arcticnet.ulaval.ca/.
324 The 2007-09 International Polar Year (IPY, www.ipy.org) was an international science program focused on the Arctic and Antarctic that lasted from March 2007 to March 2009. More than two hundred projects, sixty countries, and thousands of scientists participated in IPY. It was actually the fourth such Polar Year, following earlier ones in 1882-83, 1932-33, and 1957-58.
325 2007 was the astonishing record year in which nearly 40% of the Arctic’s late-summer Arctic sea disappeared. See Chapter 5.
326 “A Mad Scramble for the Shrinking Arctic,” The New York Times, September 10, 2008.
327 In 2008 a test shipment of this very pure ore was delivered to Europe from the Baffinland Mine in Mary River. P. 77, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, Arctic Council, April 2009, 190 pp.
328 “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” digital data and USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049, 2008; D. L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324 (2009): 1175-1179.
329 S. G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008.
330 S. G. Borgerson, “The Great Game Moves North,” Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009. See also T. Halpin, “Russia Warns of War within a Decade over Arctic Oil and Gas Riches,” The Times, May 14, 2009; A. Doyle, “Arctic Nations Say No Cold War; Military Stirs,” Reuters, June 21, 2009.
331 M. Galeotti, “Cold Calling—Competition Heats Up for Arctic Resources,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 23, 2008.
332 R. Huebert, “In the Grip of Climate Change: The Circumpolar Dimension,” Session Paper no. 1, 2030 NORTH National Planning Conference, Ottawa, June 1-4, 2009.
333 Canada asserts that the “Northwest Passage” (it actually contains several possible routes) constitutes a domestic waterway, whereas the United States, Russia, and European Union maintain it is an international strait. At present the tacit policy between the United States and Canada is to agree to disagree on this issue.
334 Russia’s aircraft approached but did not enter Canadian airspace. B. Smith-Windsor, “The Perils of Sexing Up Arctic Security,” Toronto Star, June 26, 2009. See also “Two Russian Bombers Fly over Icelandic Airspace,” http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/08/10/two-russian-bombers-fly-over-icelandic-airspace/;IceNews, August 10, 2009; and others.
335 Much of this paragraph and the next are drawn from the work of Rob Huebert at the University of Calgary, “In the Grip of Climate Change: The Circumpolar Dimension,” Session Paper no. 1, 2030 NORTH National Planning Conference, Ottawa, June 1-4, 2009; and the School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, “United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power,” SPP Briefing Papers 2, no.2 (May 2009), 27 pp.
336 R. Huebert, “United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power,” SPP Briefing Papers 2, no. 2 (May 2009), 27 pp.
337 Captain L. W. Brigham, Ph.D., personal communication, June 2, 2009.
338 Reportedly a 2009 “ice exercise” using attack submarines. R. Huebert, “In the Grip of Climate Change: The Circumpolar Dimension,” Session Paper no. 1, 2030 NORTH National Planning Conference, Ottawa, June 1-4, 2009, p. 18.
339 This 2009 directive lists four developments as justification for a change in U.S. Arctic policy, namely “(1) Altered national policies on homeland security and defense; (2) The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region; (3) The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and (4) A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources.” United States White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25, Washington, D.C., January 9, 2009, http://media.
adn.com/smedia/2009/01/12/15/2008arctic.dir.rel.source.prod_affiliate.7.pdf.
340 Personal interview with R. Huebert, Ottawa, June 3, 2009.
341 M. Gorbachev, “The Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk,” October 1, 1987 (Novosti Press Agency: Moscow, 1987), http://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf; see also K. Åtland, Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 3 (2008): 289-311, DOI:10.1177/0010836708092838.
342 This assistance was often done at the grassroots level. For example, by securing research funding to do fieldwork in Siberia, I was able to hire Russian scientists and locals for logistics support and scientific collaboration during this very difficult time.
343 The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, or AEPS, signed June 14, 1991, in Rovaniemi. AEPS is a nonbinding multilateral agreement signed by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States, with participation by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Nordic Sámi Council, USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Environment Program, and the International Arctic Science Committee. See http://arcticcouncil.org/filearchive/arctic_environment.pdf.
344 The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 “to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection” (http://arctic-council.org). Its “member states” are the eight Arctic countries Canada, the United States, Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia; other categories of membership include six “permanent participant” aboriginal groups; and non-Arctic observer states like the United Kingtom, Spain, China, Italy, Poland, and South Korea. The Arctic Council focuses on environmental protection and sustainable development issues; it is strictly forbidden to engage issues of security or territory. Nonetheless it is the premier “Arctic” polity as of 2010.
345 By the turn of the millennium, even before the shock wave of 9/11, things had started to tighten up. People were beginning to consider the prospect of new economic opportunities for oil and gas exploration, shipping, and fisheries made possible by the reduction of summer Arctic sea ice. Under the Putin administration, Russia began funding her own scientists again, while also rolling up the welcome mat for western scientists. I and two graduate students—informed we were no longer allowed to do fieldwork even if escorted by Russian colleagues—packed up and left.
346 ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1042 pp. Available for free download at http://www.acia.uaf.edu.
347 AMSA, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, Arctic Council, 190 pp., April 2009.
348 These things are specifically barred from the Arctic Council’s mandate. The United States would not have supported its creation otherwise. This is perhaps unsurprising, as few, if any, superpowers will cede discussion of military matters to an intergovernmental forum. At high policy levels, U.S. support for the Arctic Council has always been reluctant, unlike lower policy levels, and among scientists, where U.S. support is strong.
349 J. Broadus, R. Vartanov, Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives (Woods Hole, Mass.: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 2002), 60-61.
350 The Canada-U.S. dispute derives from differing interpretations of an 1825 treaty between Great Britain and Russia. However, Norway and Russia announced resolution of their decades-old dispute in April 2010, W. Gibbs, “Russia and Norway Reach Accord on Barents Sea,” The New York Times, April 27, 2010; “Norway, Russia Strike Deal to Divide Arctic Undersea Territory,” The Moscow Times, April 27, 2010; “Thaw in the Arctic, Financial Times, April 29, 2010.
351 UN Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The extension is for the seafloor only, called an “Extended Continental Shelf,” or ECS, extending the standard EEZ up to 350 nautical miles. It does not include control over pelagic fishing as does the standard EEZ.
352 Sweden and Finland do not have coasts fronting the Arctic Ocean. The United States is unable to file an Article 76 claim until it ratifies UNCLOS. However, the United States is behaving as if it has, and has been carrying out the scientific investigations needed to make an UNCLOS Article 76 claim. The United States has also assisted other countries, especially Canada, in the collection of scientific data for their claims.
353 Resolution of Norway’s Article 76 claim was not perfect. The CLCS found that both Russia and Norway have legitimate cases for their overlapping claims in one area of the Barents Sea. The two countries had to reach their own agreement to resolve it. “UN Backs Norway Claim to Arctic Seabed Extension,” Ottawa Citizen, April 15, 2009. They did so in April 2010; see note 350.
354 The so-called “Ilulissat Declaration” was released May 28, 2008. Denmark invited Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States to Ilulissat, Greenland, to craft this statement of these countries’ solidarity and commitment to existing legal frameworks, i.e., UNCLOS. It is widely perceived as a message to other entities, like the European Union, which had been issuing its own documents with proposals for shared Arctic Ocean governance, to stay out. Even the other Arctic countries of Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, and aboriginal organizations, were excluded from the meeting in Ilulissat. See http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.
355 D. L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324 (2009): 1175-1179.
356 The current boundary between Canada and Denmark runs down the center of Lomonosov Ridge, thus both countries have the possibility of proving it is a geological extension of their continental shelves.
357 The Northern Sea Route offers a 35%-60% distance savings between Europe and the Far East. To go from Yokohama to Rotterdam via the Arctic Ocean would take just 6,500 nautical miles, versus 11,200 through the Suez Canal.
358 “Multiyear ice” (MYI) is sea ice that survives through at least one summer, and can grow considerably thicker and harder than “first-year ice” (FYI), normally only one to two meters thick. FYI is easier for icebreakers and fortified ships to pass through than MYI.
359 Russia’s newest nuclear icebreaker, the world’s largest, is named 50 Years of Victory. A. Revkin, “A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic,” The New York Times, August 16, 2008.
360 AMSA 2009, Table 5.2, p. 79.
361 AMSA 2009, p. 72. The “six-thousand” figure includes vessels traveling on the North Pacific’s Great Circle Route between Asia and North America through the Aleutian Island chain, which the United States defines as being within the “Arctic.”
362 Adapted from maps 5.5 and 5.6, AMSA 2009, p. 85.
363 Personal interview with J. Marshall, vice-president, Northern Transportation Co. Ltd., Hay River, NWT, July 6, 2007. For more about this long-running company, now aboriginal-owned, see http://www.ntcl.com/.
364 Personal interview with ConocoPhillips Russia president Don Wallette, January 22, 2007, Tromsø.
365 Because ice is fresh but ocean water salty, pockets of highly saline brine develop within sea ice as it first begins to freeze. As the ice grows over multiple winters, the brine pockets drain and the ice thickens, increasing its strength and hardness.
366 Sea ice, including first-year ice, is always dangerous, and will always be a limiting factor in the Arctic Ocean.
367 Ships must have fortified hulls, powerful engines, and other technical requirements to operate safely in sea ice. A ship’s polar class designates the allowable conditions it can handle (summer or year-round operation, first-year or m
ultiyear ice, etc.). The design requirements for a given polar class are set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) defines a range of categories. The higher the polar class, the more expensive the ship is to build.
368 World fleets typically travel at fifteen to twenty or more knots. A Russian icebreaker can break ice at speeds as high as twelve to fifteen knots, but risks of damage are higher. Six- to ten knots are more typical in ice. Personal communication with Captain Lawson Brigham, November 25, 2009.
369 Canada and Russia maintain that these passages are domestic waters under their control; the United States and others maintain they are international straits and thus freely available to use without declaration or permission. These and other nontrivial impediments to transnational shipping in the Arctic are described in AMSA 2009.
370 I suppose someday there might be more of them—perhaps by 2100 or 2150, if globalization hasn’t collapsed into a pile of fiefdoms—together with booming new Arctic port cities. The geography of distance, along with further sea-ice reductions in store, is just too compelling. But this won’t happen by 2050, the time frame of this book’s thought experiment.
371 Some 1.2 million passengers took cruise ships to the region in 2004; three years later the number had more than doubled. By 2008 some 375 cruise-ship port calls were scheduled for Greenland’s ports and harbors alone (AMSA 2009, p. 79).
372 From personal interviews with Mike Spence, mayor of Churchill, June 28, 2007, and L. Fetterly, general manager, Hudson Bay Port Co. (owned by OmniTRAX), June 30, 2007. Apparently there is a powerful lobby for keeping Canada’s grain running east-west on its longer, nationalized rail link to Thunder Bay, rather than on the shorter, privately held north-south line to Churchill.
373 Permafrost is also commonly studded with massive lenses of ice, which occupy less volume and may drain away entirely if it melts. This sets the stage for some highly irregular ground settling if the permafrost starts to thaw. Trees lean drunkenly and fall over. Oddly shaped sinkholes called “thermokarst” appear and fill with water, and other odd phenomena.
The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future Page 35