In 711, Musa sent an army across the Strait of Gibraltar and devastated Roderick’s forces. Whatever Musa’s intentions for the expedition might have been, the campaign rapidly became one of conquest. The largely Berber force swept across the disorganized peninsula with surprising ease, subjugating the bulk of it within five years. The invaders met little resistance from the inhabitants of most areas and were actively aided by members of the substantial Jewish population, some of whom served in garrisons that were assigned the responsibility to preserve order in captured cities. By 720, the Iberian Peninsula had been pacified, except for a small area in the mountainous north called Asturias.
Central Asia and the Indus River Valley
Some towns in Khorasan took advantage of the civil war between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya (656–661) to assert their independence, but they were almost immediately recaptured. In order to secure its position, the Arab army in the region captured Herat in 660, extending the empire’s frontier considerably eastward. Khorasan was a wealthy province and, as the Sasanians had known, it was the front line in the defense against Central Asian nomads. The new Umayyad dynasty placed a high value on securing control of the area, and in 671 Damascus ordered a massive colonization effort, which resulted in the settlement of 50,000 Arab warriors and their families in Merv. Merv thus reasserted the role it had played under the Sasanians, serving as the primary garrison city in the east. For the next thirty years, Arabs raided across the Amu Darya for the purpose of looting and keeping the area disorganized, but not of annexing it.
Transoxiana, the target of the looting, had long been a cultural melting pot. Most of the area is desert or semidesert, but it was densely settled in the many oases and along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river valleys that bordered it on the south and north, respectively. The two most important cities were Samarqand and Bukhara. Because of the region’s location, it was frequented by merchants from all over Asia, whose activities augmented the wealth derived from agriculture. As a result of its attraction to traders, Samarqand and Bukhara were cosmopolitan centers and numbered among their citizens Zoroastrians, Buddhists, shamanists, Nestorians, and Manichaeans, as well as adherents of other religious traditions. Intellectuals were attracted to the cities, and rich merchants were pleased to patronize them, so the two cities had a reputation for a rich intellectual life.
In 705, Qutayba ibn Muslim became the governor of Khorasan and began his spectacular, albeit destructive, ten-year career as the leader of Umayyad expansion into Central Asia. His task was quite different from that of the other Arab military commanders, who were leading bands of Arab or Berber warriors with nomadic backgrounds, and for whom constant movement was normal. By the early eighth century, tens of thousands of Arabs had assimilated into the local Iranian society in Khorasan, having bought farms or set up businesses. Although they were offered the normal stipend for military service, as well as a share in the loot, many of the Arabs were reluctant to set off on the campaigns. Qutayba was forced to supplement the local Arab contingents with Syrian soldiers and levies of non-Muslim Khorasanis. Qutayba’s army captured Bukhara in 709 after a three-year siege. The ensuing sack of the city resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the destruction of invaluable manuscripts. In 711–712, Qutayba annexed Khwarazm (the lower reaches of the Amu Darya) and Samarqand; and in 713, he subjugated Farghana, the upper valley of the Syr Darya, which today lies in the eastern extremity of Uzbekistan. According to the Arab chroniclers, the conquest of Central Asia was unusually brutal, and Qutayba’s end was equally so: His own troops killed him. Tired of the endless campaigning, both the Arab and the Iranian Khorasanis wanted to return to their families and businesses.
About the time that Qutayba began his conquest of Transoxiana, the conquest of Sind began. Sind was the name Arabs gave to the valley of the Indus River and the territories lying to its east and west. It was one of the cradles of civilization. Like Egypt and Iraq, Sind is a desert in which riverine irrigation produces a large surplus of foodstuffs. The Indus allows a rich agricultural valley to extend for almost four hundred miles through this arid region and made possible the Mohenjo-daro civilization of ca. 2300 B.C.E. Because of the agricultural wealth to be derived from the area, it was contested by neighboring empires and had been controlled by the Sasanians. By the early eighth century, the majority of the population was Buddhist, but Hindus were engaged in an aggressive campaign to become the dominant community. During the first decade of the eighth century, an Arab merchant ship was beached during a storm near the town of Daybul, approximately where modern-day Karachi is located. Pirates plundered the passengers’ possessions and enslaved the women and children. Al-Hajjaj, the governor of Iraq, demanded that the local ruler arrange for the release of the captives and the restoration of their property, but was rebuffed. Al-Hajjaj sent two unsuccessful expeditions against the city, but the third was commanded by his young son-in-law, Muhammad ibn Qasim, who became famous as the conqueror of Sind.
In 711, Muhammad ibn Qasim’s well-equipped army captured Daybul after a fierce siege. Muhammad then moved north up the Indus. He captured the city of Multan in 713 after another arduous siege and overthrew the Hindu ruler there. Many of the local Buddhists, like those in other cities that he captured, welcomed him because they were anxious to be rid of their Hindu rulers, whom they viewed as usurpers. In fact, the bitter sieges of Daybul and Multan were the exceptions in a conquest that was characterized more by voluntary surrenders than by brutality. With the conquest of Multan, Muhammad became the ruler of all of Sind and part of the Punjab, the name given to the area through which five rivers flow to form the headwaters of the Indus. As Muslims were approaching the Pyrenees in Europe, Muhammad ibn Qasim had set up an Umayyad administration over the Indus valley, 5000 miles to the east.
Umayyad Administration
Neither Islam nor the Islamic state was fully formed when the Arab armies burst into the Fertile Crescent. Both the religion and the political administration were little more than statements of ideals that would become institutionalized later within a variety of social contexts. The first three caliphs, based in Medina, were in office during a remarkable period (632–656) of expansion out of the Arabian Peninsula. It is safe to say that, although at times they supervised the campaigns, at other times conquests took place so rapidly on remote frontiers that they learned about them long after the fact. They made policy, as well they could, at considerable remove from the new provinces of the emerging empire. When ‘Ali became caliph in 656, a period of confusion set in because of his need to defend his position against his enemies. As a result, he spent most of the time in Iraq, leading his army.
Upon ‘Ali’s death in 661, Mu‘awiya became the new caliph. Rather than moving to Medina, he remained in Damascus, where he had been governor and where his political and military support lay. Thus, Damascus served as the capital of the Umayyad Empire until the Abbasid revolution in 750. Because of the conquests, immense amounts of treasure flowed into the city, and much of it was invested in new palaces, mosques, fountains, and fortifications. Umayyad princes constructed palaces in the city and on the edge of the Syrian desert. Although the caliphs and their officials in Damascus attempted to impose uniform policies throughout the empire, the immense distances and the remarkable cultural differences that were involved forced them to allow many local practices to continue, although officials often tried to adapt local practices to Qur’anic prescriptions.
The Caliphate
As we have seen, the Prophet’s death in 632 presented the Umma with a leadership crisis. Not only did his followers need a new leader, but they also had to confront the question of the nature of their future leadership. The Qur’an had made it clear that Muhammad was the last of the prophets. His teachings regarding any aspect of individual or collective behavior were accepted without question: His authority extended from the prayer mat to the battlefield. What, then, would be the scope of authority of his successor, since he would not serve in the prophetic role?
Moreover, what would be the process of succession? That is, how would his successor be identified, and how would the Prophet’s followers acknowledge his authority?
The Great Mosque of Damascus, built 706–715. Source: Ashmolean Museum; Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, England, U.K.
Given the importance of the issues surrounding the new leadership, it is surprising how little we know about them. The account accepted by most Muslims relates that Muhammad himself did not name a successor, that his death brought about widespread confusion, and that three major factions of Muslims were prepared to go their separate ways by naming a member from their own group as the leader they would follow. This account suggests that Muslim identity had not yet replaced more particularistic ones, even for Muhammad’s earliest converts. Nevertheless, they knew and trusted each other well enough that ‘Umar was able to arrange the acceptance of a candidate acceptable to all three groups. The description of how Abu Bakr was selected echoes the mode of succession familiar to tribal society. Upon the death of the chieftain, the most influential members of the tribe would swear allegiance to the most admired and influential member of the tribe and signify their loyalty to him by clasping his hand. Similarly, ‘Umar persuaded those present in the meeting in Medina to accept Abu Bakr by acclamation, and they offered him their handclasp (bay‘a). This account is plausible, for it seems reasonable that the mode of selection in 632 would resemble the one with which the Muslims were already most familiar. As we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, an important minority of Muslims—the Shi‘ites—were to insist that Muhammad had, in fact, named a successor.
More baffling in the narratives of this crucial period is the silence regarding the nature of the authority that the Umma vested in the new leader. We do not even know for certain the title with which his followers addressed him. Abu Bakr is said to have been the first caliph, a word deriving from the Arabic word khalifa. The Arabic term, however, can connote both deputy and successor, which are clearly distinct meanings. Many histories of this period assume that the title of the caliphs was khalifat rasul Allah, or “successor of the Prophet of God.” Many writers have stressed the political and military responsibilities of the caliph and downplay the spiritual side. No existing document dating from before the mid-eighth century, however, contains the title in question; it first appears only during the caliphate of the Abbasids, the dynasty that overthrew the Umayyads in 750.
On the other hand, it is certain that ‘Uthman, the Umayyad caliphs, and the early Abbasid caliphs all used as their official title khalifat Allah. The latter term conveys the meaning “deputy of God,” which suggests considerable spiritual authority. It is difficult to conclude other than that most Muslims of the first Islamic century considered the caliph to be “deputy of God” and to regard loyalty to him to be indispensable for salvation. His sanction validated the religious obligations that were incumbent upon every believer. The caliphate was a necessary institution for the purpose of defining religious obligations that related to ethics and the ritual of worship. Also, difficult cases that needed interpretation were taken to the caliph for adjudication.
The confusion over the nature of the early caliphate appears to be the result of two important developments in the nature of the institution. (We shall explore these developments in more detail later.) The first was the emergence of a schism within the Umma, clearly apparent by the mid-eighth century, over the nature of caliphal qualifications and authority that led to the distinction between Sunni Muslims and Shi‘ite Muslims. The second was the fact that, by the late ninth century, caliphs in fact no longer participated in making religious law. Sunni scholars writing after that time, whose accounts are our primary sources for learning about early Islamic history, wrote from a perspective that has shaped our understanding of the period. They had no experience of a caliph with spiritual authority, and they were hostile to the Shi‘ites, who insisted on the need for one.
What does seem clear is that, from an early time, caliphs were addressed by the title amir al-mu’minin. This is variously translated as “Commander of the Faithful” or “Prince of the Believers.” The title denotes no specific functions, but can imply supreme military and political power, as well as responsibility for the preservation of the integrity of the religious community. The vast majority of Sunni Muslims have been willing to concede that the first four caliphs fulfilled these functions in admirable form. They generally refer to them as the “rightly guided” caliphs, whose integrity should be the model for all subsequent Muslim leaders. As we shall see, the Umayyad caliphs gradually lost the support of important sectors of the Umma. Not only was their dynasty overthrown, but the role of the caliphate was altered, as well.
The Administration of Non-Muslims
Within a remarkably short time after Abu Bakr became the caliph in 632, the complexities of the caliphal office multiplied exponentially. Initially responsible for the welfare of a small Arab society, the caliph was suddenly governing a huge, heterogeneous, and complex empire. It is not unrealistic to assume that when Abu Bakr was the caliph, he knew personally a large proportion of the people for whom he was responsible. Within a handful of years, however, any new caliph was confronted with the need to provide security and justice for millions of people scattered over thousands of miles of territory. The conquest was in many ways as unexpected for the Arabs as for the conquered peoples, and the new rulers had to improvise policy. It turned out to be quite simple: Leave the normal routines of life undisturbed for the conquered peoples, collect the taxes, keep the Arab soldiers at a social and religious distance from the natives, and implement the teachings of the Qur’an as fully as possible.
As Abu Bakr’s military campaigns consolidated Medina’s control over the northern section of the peninsula and entered the frontier zones of neighboring empires, the Muslim armies increasingly confronted Christian Arabs. Deeper into Syria and Iraq, the armies found that the majority of both the settled and nomadic populations were Christian or Jewish. The accounts of the surrender of Syrian cities were written years after the events in question, and they contain much confusing and contradictory information. Accounts from both the Christian and Muslim chronicles suggest that the initial phase of the campaign was violent, entailing the pillaging and destruction of property (including orchards and livestock), indiscriminate killing, and the enslavement of considerable numbers of the local population. The visit of the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab to Jerusalem in 638 seems to have marked a turning point in this regard. From this point on, a regularized administration and a more lenient policy characterized relations with the Christian and Jewish populations.
As the conquests became consolidated, the Arab rulers found that the administrative policies of the Byzantines and Sasanians offered them contrasting models of governing a multireligious society. Whereas the Byzantine authorities sought to enforce religious uniformity within their realm, the religious pluralism within the Sasanian domain had forced the rulers to develop a practical compromise with their subjects’ religious communities. Occasionally, Jews and Christians had even asked the Sasanian government to intervene in quarrels within their communities in order to determine policy regarding doctrine and leadership. By the end of the sixth century, the government had recognized the highest-ranking rabbi in Iraq as the legitimate ruler of the Jewish community. He was responsible for the collection of taxes and for the administration of justice (according to Jewish law) within the Jewish community. The Nestorians and Monophysites were also organized as religious communities, and the Nestorians were beginning to administer church law to the entire community. The Sasanian government thus granted a certain degree of autonomy to religious communities and guaranteed them military protection. The quid pro quo was that the non-Iranian, non-Zoroastrian subjects were required to pay a head tax in return for security.
The Arabs found the Sasanian religious policy to be more relevant to their needs than the Byzantine model. The Qur’an could be adduced as evidence that people with the
ir own scriptures should not be persecuted; Muslims were a tiny minority within their own empire and could hardly expect to emulate the Byzantine persecution of other faiths; and the Sasanian policy offered a welcome source of revenue from non-Muslims. The Arabs referred to Jews and Christians by the Prophet’s term, “People of the Book,” and they were allowed, and expected, to continue practicing their religion. They and other non-Muslims who possessed their own scriptures and who paid taxes to the Muslims for protection were called the ahl al-dhimma, meaning “protected peoples.” A person who belonged to such a community was a dhimmi. Dhimmis were often retained as local officials in conquered areas, without regard to their religious affiliation. Even devotees of religions that might appear to be compromised by polytheism were often granted the status of protected peoples. The Zoroastrians of Iran, the Buddhists of Central Asia and Sind, and the Hindus of Sind were initially persecuted because of their polytheism, but most such communities became the beneficiaries of a laissez-faire religious policy.
A History of the Muslim World to 1405 Page 9