by James Jinks
Roake, who unlike Hurley did know where the submarine was and what it was doing, later wrote that he felt like:
David against Goliath, in my small diminutive ‘T’ boat of some 1,320 tons carrying out a tiny pin prick of an operation against a colossus. We were on our own with the nearest support and succour thousands of miles away. While this is normally nothing unusual; for a submarine in our situation – endurance becomes of paramount importance, coupled with the need for anything detectable, such as the snort mast being exposed for the minimum of time.259
He later wrote that the crews of the ‘T’ boats that conducted intelligence-gathering operations in northern waters in the mid- to late 1950s ‘really were “Cold War Warriors” ’.260 But, as these accounts make clear, the Royal Navy’s new underwater warriors desperately needed new chariots to replace their Second World War-era submarines.
3
‘A New Epoch’: Towards the Nuclear Age
The present day submarine is the cheapest warship per ton to build, it provides the finest form of naval training and opportunities of command in peace and the present man power of the submarine branch is less than 3% of the Navy. Apart from blowing the submarine trumpet, doesn’t a large proportion of the Navy’s future lie in this direction?
Rear Admiral George B. H. Fawkes, Flag Officer Submarines, 1954–5.1
We are calling this ship Dreadnought because it is opening a new epoch just as was the old Dreadnought, built fifty years ago.
The Earl of Selkirk, First Lord of the Admiralty, July 1959.2
The arrangements made with the United States to help with the building of Dreadnought have proved an absolute godsend and it is a fact that not one single piece of United States equipment arrived a day late at Barrow [the Vickers shipyard]. This has enabled us to concentrate on learning the complex lessons of how to build a nuclear submarine.
Admiralty presentation to Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, May 1962.3
THE COLD WAR FLEET
While Royal Navy ‘T’ class submarines were conducting intelligence-gathering operations against the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, discussions were taking place inside the Admiralty about what to replace them with. By the early 1950s, the post-war conception of very fast underwater submarines, such as HMS Explorer and HMS Excalibur, had given way to a requirement for submarines with very large submerged endurance and high, quiet (non-cavitating) speeds. Throughout the 1950s, the Admiralty embarked on an ambitious construction programme, building twenty-three new submarines and modernizing a further eighteen with the overall aim of converting its entire fleet of snort-fitted submersibles into submarines that were fully effective in the submarine versus submarine role, giving the Royal Navy a powerful addition to its anti-submarine forces.
Alongside the ‘T’ conversions and streamlined ‘T’ class submarines, fourteen of the sixteen ‘A’ class were taken into the dockyards and streamlined between 1955 and 1960, a process that involved the removal of the external torpedo tubes and the fitting of a new lightweight, aluminium superstructure. The Bridge was also raised and the bow modified, giving the submarines a flatter profile. The batteries were enlarged, although the original motors remained. As more and more submarines of both classes were taken into the dockyards for modernization, the Submarine Service struggled to maintain a fleet of sufficient size to meet requirements. Towards the end of 1951, the service had concluded that, with just fifty-three submarines in the fleet, it could no longer meet its peacetime training commitments and that it did not possess enough submarines to fight a future war. A large submarine fleet was required because at the very beginning of any conflict there would be very few US submarines operating in European waters (see here).4
The Second World War had also shown that submarines were seldom mechanically satisfactory for operations against an enemy after three years’ service, and with refit periods lasting between eighteen and twenty months, combined with expected losses, the Admiralty concluded that it would struggle to maintain adequate numbers in any prolonged conflict. Wartime experience had also shown that the submarine was an effective weapon not because it was invulnerable, but because it was readily replaceable. Although the Royal Navy had started the Second World War with just fifty-four submarines and in the course of six years lost over seventy, the total number at the end of the war was over double what it had been at the beginning. This was largely because the ‘T’ and ‘U’ class designs were sufficiently advanced when the war started for them to be easily built in quantity.5 Post-war studies carried out by FOSM indicated that on the outbreak of a future war the Navy’s operational submarine strength would initially rise as reserve submarines were reactivated but that in a prolonged conflict the number of operational submarines would fall steadily due to losses.
In June 1953, FOSM submitted a paper to the Admiralty on the ‘Future Composition of the Submarine Fleet’, in which he argued that:
The present fleet of 53 boats normally contains at least 14 refitting, leaving 39 in commission for operations, submarine and A/S training and trials. The present submarine Priority list requires 22 submarines to be continuously employed for submarine and A/S training and trials, and even so not all commitments can be met. We have already declared 21 submarines to N.A.T.O. for operations in home waters, and 12 in the Mediterranean, leaving only 6 for trials and training. The 21 submarines for operations is a very small force only capable of maintaining 7 submarines or so on patrol at a time. Our fleet is therefore insufficient even to meet our present N.A.T.O. commitments. Casualties would cause the situation to deteriorate still further, and if these are as high as those of the last war, the total submarine fleet will fall from 53 to 29 before new construction becomes available. This would cause a corresponding reduction in the number of submarines available both for operations and training.6
FOSM wanted to increase the overall size of the submarine fleet by retaining older submarines in service after new construction became available after 1954. In order to maintain an adequate force, a number of old ‘S’ class submarines were commissioned back into the Royal Navy. In 1949 there were just three ‘S’ class submarines in service. By 1953 there were thirteen, and by 1955 fifteen.7 The Navy was even forced to commission some of the smaller pre-Second World War ‘U’ class submarines, two of which, HMS Upstart and HMS Untiring, were returned from Greece in 1952 (they had been loaned to the Greek Navy) and operated in the Royal Navy until 1956. In 1955–6 the total number of active Royal Navy submarines came to a post-war peak of forty-three. Fourteen more were in reserve or under refit.8
1956 also saw the launching of the initial two members of the first class of post-war conventional submarines designed and built for the Royal Navy; they were known as the ‘Porpoise’ class. Described by FOSM as ‘virtually improved “T” Conversions’, they and their incrementally improved ‘Oberon’ successors eventually became the backbone of the Royal Navy’s conventional submarine fleet throughout much of the Cold War. Their design incorporated all the experience gained from wartime operations, trials with surrendered U-boats, and the British ‘T’ conversions. They were a little bigger and slightly shorter than the ‘T’ conversions and were designed from the outset to be deep-diving and capable of a submerged endurance of fifty-five hours at 4 knots, nearly three times that of previous British submarines. Great attention was given to habitability, with the incorporation of air conditioning, and the six bow torpedo tubes had rapid-reloading gear so that a second salvo of torpedoes could be fired very soon after the first.
The ‘Porpoise’ class also incorporated a number of innovative design features such as a new diesel electric-drive system and a series of acoustic-isolation measures, such as resilient mountings, which reduced vibrations transmitted to the hull. This all resulted in a class of submarine that was ‘significantly quieter at a given speed either on electric motors or main engines than any known class in Western or Soviet Navies’, including the US Navy ‘Guppy’ class.9 The Porpoises were so
quiet that their radiated noise was reduced to just 3 per cent of the previous norm.10 They were also equipped with greatly improved sonar: the Type 187, a medium-range passive directional-listening set that was housed in a distinctive enclosed dome on the front of the submarine, as well as the Type 186, an offshoot of a complex series of programmes into fixed shore-based passive sonar undertaken by the Admiralty in the early 1950s under the codename Project Corsair.11 The Type 186 was fitted in the saddle tanks on each side of the submarine’s hull and was capable of detecting snorting submarines from sixty to eighty miles away.
Although the ‘Porpoise’ design was conceived in 1946, it was only completed in 1950, and though the first submarine, HMS Porpoise, was ordered in 1951, construction at Vickers-Armstrongs, Ltd, Shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness did not begin until June 1954 due to concerns within the Admiralty about the complexity of the design. Admiralty studies indicated that in the event of war the industrial capacity existed to lay down eighteen ‘Porpoise’ class submarines each year. But due to the complexity of the design it would take around two years to complete them, meaning replacements would only enter service in sufficient numbers to keep the strength of the submarine fleet at around thirty submarines. Many argued that if the Navy built a class of smaller, simpler submarine, of around 1000 tons, compared to Porpoise’s 2000 tons, construction would only take a year, meaning the fleet could return to full strength in two years, with numbers increasing steadily thereafter.12 The Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare argued for ‘simplicity’ and ‘something much smaller’:
Our early submarines were simple in the extreme and have only become complicated as the result of a long, slow process of evolution. Although there was always some very sound and logical reason for each new complication, alteration or addition which applied at the time, the same good reason may not still apply under present or future operation conditions.13
Arguments in favour of something smaller and simpler were fuelled by the change in the envisioned wartime role of the Royal Navy’s submarines. As we have seen, by 1952 the Navy believed that ‘Our submarines are most unlikely to be called upon to fight a war against large convoys in the Atlantic … We have, on the other hand, various duties for them to fulfil [anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, clandestine patrols] which might well be undertaken by a submarine of small tonnage and we have limited financial and shipbuilding facilities which will not support a large building programme of large submarines.’14 On 1 January 1952, the Director of Plans suggested the Royal Navy ‘should explore the minimum characteristics of a submarine that would be capable of carrying out our requirements with a view to replacing some or all of the PORPOISE class by a larger number of small submarines in programmes after 1953/54 and particularly in an emergency war programme’.15
In December 1952, the Submarine Service issued a staff requirement for a class of simple, less capable and general-purpose submarines. Initially known as the 1953 design, the ‘Boreas’ class were intended to be submarines of about 1200 tons, with a submerged ‘high quiet speed’ and a high rate of battery charging, rather than high surface speed. The torpedo armament would be small, with four tubes forward and two aft, and the position of the auxiliary machinery was planned with self-noise very much in mind. Machinery was grouped away from sonar sets and the Sound Room and new hovering gear was included in order to eliminate propeller noise. There was also a serious debate about whether to use one or two propeller shafts. One was much quieter, but two provided an important backup should one of the two shafts fail while the submarine was at sea. By late 1954, the Admiralty planned to build six twin-screw ‘Boreas’ class submarines, followed by possibly nine single-screw versions, some of which would be powered by HTP machinery.16
However, the ‘Boreas’ class was terminated in 1955 after the Navy concluded that such a small submarine would be too reliant on frequent support from depot ships, many of which would be vulnerable to attack in war, especially one that involved the use of nuclear weapons.17 Thereafter the Submarine Service reverted back to the original ‘Porpoise’ design, construction of which had been authorized on 15 June 1954. However, the first of class, HMS Porpoise, did not emerge from Vickers until April 1958 due to construction of the second experimental HTP submarine, HMS Excalibur, which was also being built at Barrow.18
THE UK NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
Meanwhile, the United States Navy had decided to go in an entirely different direction pregnant with possibilities for the future. In July 1951, the US Congress authorized the construction of the US Navy’s first submarine powered by a nuclear source, USS Nautilus. In May 1950, when the British learned that the US intended to build an atomic submarine, the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, enquired about the status of the British atomic-submarine programme. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Hall, informed Attlee that ‘We have hitherto preserved the strictest secrecy about our preliminary work on the atomic submarine in order to avoid the slightest chance of advancing in any way its similar construction in Russia.’19 By 1950, the small team of naval officers and Royal Naval Scientific Service staff attached to the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) at Harwell, known as ‘the T party’, had concluded that an atomic reactor suitable for submarine propulsion was practicable. In October 1950 the Defence Research Policy Committee concluded that the development of such a submarine was a research project of the first importance.20 In December 1949, a three-stage Research and Development programme was formulated, with Stage I consisting of Admiralty and AERE design studies into a submarine, nuclear reactor and associated power plant. It also involved the construction of a prototype for running tests to prove design features, endurance and performance and to determine shielding requirements. Providing Stage I was successful, Stage II would consist of the design of an experimental operational submarine, for construction within 5–6 years, with sea trials in eight years. Stage III involved construction of a fleet of nuclear submarines from 1959 onwards.21
Crucially, by 1950, an important obstacle to any UK nuclear-submarine programme had been removed. By June 1950, AERE was reporting that by 1953 production of fissile material was expected to exceed the immediate needs of the Ministry of Supply. It was therefore in a position to allocate a small amount of fissile material, enough to power one nuclear submarine, with the possibility of further supplies for twelve additional submarines.22
Royal Navy support for a nuclear-submarine programme increased throughout the early 1950s and senior officers were rightly worried about being left behind in an important new technological field. From a strategic point of view, the Navy recognized that nuclear power had the potential to increase the effectiveness of the submarine by allowing it to operate at far greater distances from bases, which could be situated further away from possible sources of attack. From the tactical point of view the Navy was also attracted to the potentially high submerged speed and endurance of nuclear submarines, which promised to significantly increase their attacking capability, making it much easier for submarines, once detected, to both force their way through opposition, carry out attacks and escape from any counter-attacks, particularly in heavy weather when surface ships’ speed would be reduced. It was also argued that nuclear submarines had the potential to reduce the value of anti-submarine aircraft, as well as making submarines difficult targets for other submarines.23
The Admiralty recognized that in any future war its existing conventional submarines would need support in enemy waters for considerable periods against air and surface oppositions. The greatly increased mobility and virtual avoidance of having to operate on the surface afforded by a nuclear submarine would, the Admiralty recognized, make operations far less hazardous than they had been before. But equally, after some analysis highlighted the threat of atomic submarines, the Navy concluded that:
The atomic submarine will be a much more effective weapon, and much more difficult to counter by surface forces, aircraft or our own submarines, than any submarine so far
produced. Our experience in the last two wars shows that, given a large enough effort, our enemies could, by the use of submarines, reduce this country to a condition in which she would cease to be an effective participant in war. It follows that the possession of atomic submarines by Russia would materially reduce the effort required to achieve this result, and that their advent therefore constitutes a grave disadvantage to us.24
This particular Admiralty paper concluded that ‘while this country could be forced out of a war by the use of submarines, it is unfortunately a fact that our own submarines … could never, by themselves force Russia out of a war. It follows, therefore, that the development of nuclear propulsion for submarines is likely to do this country more harm than good.’25 So the sense of transformational possibility aroused by the prospect of nuclear-powered true submarines was tinged with anxiety.
By the 1950s, the Navy suspected that the Soviet Union was also attempting to construct its own nuclear submarines. Intelligence reports indicated that the Russians had made little progress with developing the German HTP machinery, which assessments concluded ‘was allowed to proceed in a rather haphazard fashion’.26 Intelligence assessments estimated that the Russians were unlikely to be more than two years behind the United States in developing a nuclear submarine. In fact, the Soviets had secretly started developing their first nuclear-powered submarine in late 1952.27 The prospect of the Soviets operating nuclear submarines worried the Admiralty. As one brief pointed out: