by James Jinks
The first of NOTC’s rooms is about 16 feet by 8 with light blue walls. Here sit the computer terminals and keyboards which link NOTC to the Prime Minister, to Task Force 345 in the Chiltern chalk at Northwood and with NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe at Mons in Belgium. It is to here that the PM’s National Firing Chain Message, with its coded authentication at the bottom, would come to be fashioned into the PM’s National Firing Directive for onward transmission to Northwood.
From the moment the Prime Minister’s instruction reaches NOTC’s screen, it takes forty minutes to reach the submarine on patrol. Once the submarine has completed its authentications and drills, it takes (as we have seen) a further fifteen minutes for the first Trident to burst out of its tube. So a UK Prime Minister can change the world – and our country – for ever inside an hour. Add on about a further thirty minutes and the missile can reach targets over 4000 nautical miles away from the point where it roars out of the sea. The four clocks on the wall of NOTC’s Communications Room give no hint of possible targets. They are local time, Zulu time, SHAPE time and Omaha time (where the US Strategic Command, STRATCOM, is based).
NOTC’s second room, its registry, is even smaller. Here are kept the super-secret codewords of the firing chain. The third part of the NOTC suite carries the prosaic name of Room 128. This 30 by 30 foot space is the domain of the UK’s nuclear targeteers and contains all the cryptography needed to produce the targeting plans, as directed by the Prime Minister’s message, and to conduct nuclear-weapons release. This material is the most sensitive and most heavily protected in Whitehall and that the UK Armed Forces possess. Despite the calmness of Barry Wells’s team, the lucid matter-of-factness of John Gower’s explanations, the artificial light and the hiss of the air conditioning that makes the submariners feel at home, this understandably creates an atmosphere unlike any other.
Like Tony Blair, Britain’s current Prime Minister, David Cameron, is determined to see the United Kingdom continue as a nuclear-weapons state. As Leader of the Opposition, Cameron visited the Royal Navy’s Devonport dockyard in June 2008, and as part of his tour, spent over two hours on the Trident submarine, HMS Victorious, shortly before it sailed for the first time after its mid-life refit. The firing system was explained to him, including the inner safe and the purposes of its contents in the boat’s control room.118 Very shortly after becoming Prime Minister, David Cameron had to write his letters of last resort. On Thursday, 3 October 2013, we went to interview the Prime Minister in his office in No. 10 Downing Street and asked him how he approached the task:
‘I asked John Major in and asked for his advice and I talked to him about it. I also talked to the Chiefs of Staff, I talked to CDS. But then, in the end, it is you in the office on your own. I sat at that chair and there’s a great big shredder that was placed right here and you write … and then you seal it up. Hopefully nobody will ever see these letters. Each of them goes into the safe of the Trident submarine and then hopefully when you stop being Prime Minister they take it out and burn it and no one will have ever opened it.
‘It is a very big moment,’ admits Cameron. ‘It’s the oddest in a way. You’ve seen Prime Ministers drive up to Buckingham Palace. You’ve seen them walking through the door of No. 10. You can’t really believe you’re doing it yourself, but that bit in your office, writing out the letters, with the shredder … it is such an extraordinary thing to have to do, you can’t really imagine it until you do it.’
Unlike his two predecessors, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, David Cameron has made a number of visits to the Royal Navy’s ‘Vanguard’ submarines. As we have seen, in 2008, as Leader of the Opposition, Cameron made his first visit, to HMS Victorious, while it was undergoing its extended refit. He returned in February 2012, this time as Prime Minister, just as Vigilant was preparing to come out of refit and start sea trials.
The Prime Minister’s third visit to a Trident boat took place on 3 April 2013, when he was flown in a Royal Navy helicopter to meet HMS Victorious as it returned up the Firth of Clyde after completing the Royal Navy’s 100th Vanguard deterrent patrol. He was lowered onto the boat and taken on a detailed tour by Victorious’s CO, Commander John Livesey. The Prime Minister presented two of HMS Victorious’s crew with their Royal Navy Submariner Dolphins, and two other submariners with the Deterrent Patrol Pins. ‘When someone has done a patrol in an SSBN they qualify to wear the Deterrent Pin, which is a silver colour,’ said Livesey. He then handed the Prime Minister another pin. ‘These gold ones are for people who have done twenty patrols.’ ‘Twenty patrols,’ interrupted a shocked Cameron. ‘Twenty deterrent patrols,’ continued Livesey, ‘that amounts to about four years underwater.’ ‘That is amazing,’ said Cameron, holding the gold Deterrent Pin in his hand as Livesey continued. ‘The whole delivering deterrence piece is what is important. The guys do this for months at a time. They take a lot of pride in it. A lot of it is drawn out. It can be eighty days of not a lot happening and then a couple of days of intense activity when it’s all-important that everybody does their job. The pride in having the Dolphins is one thing, delivering deterrence is another thing again.’ The Prime Minister then presented Warrant Officer Joe Brody with the gold Deterrent Pin in recognition of his twenty patrols. ‘Many congratulations. That is a huge achievement,’ said Cameron. ‘Thank you very much indeed.’
As the Prime Minister continued his tour, an article appeared in the Daily Telegraph, in which he explained why, as Prime Minister, ‘with ultimate responsibility for the nation’s security’, he believed the country still required a deterrent.119 His reasoning was not significantly different from Tony Blair’s:
First, we need our nuclear deterrent as much today as we did when a previous British Government embarked on it over six decades ago. Of course, the world has changed dramatically. The Soviet Union no longer exists. But the nuclear threat has not gone away. In terms of uncertainty and potential risk it has, if anything, increased. The significant new factor we have to consider is this: the number of nuclear states has not diminished in recent years – and there is a real risk of new nuclear-armed states emerging. Iran continues to defy the will of the international community in its attempts to develop its nuclear capabilities, while the highly unpredictable and aggressive regime in North Korea recently conducted its third nuclear test and could already have enough fissile material to produce more than a dozen nuclear weapons. Last year North Korea unveiled a long-range ballistic missile which it claims can reach the whole of the United States. If this became a reality it would also affect the whole of Europe, including the UK. Can you be certain how that regime, or indeed any other nuclear-armed regime, will develop? Can we be sure that it won’t share more of its technology or even its weapons with other countries? With these questions in mind, does anyone seriously argue that it would be wise for Britain, faced with this evolving threat today, to surrender our deterrent? At the end of the day these issues are matters of judgment. My judgment is that it would be foolish to leave Britain defenceless against a continuing, and growing, nuclear threat.
Second, to those who say we can not afford a nuclear deterrent, I say that the security of our nation is worth the price. Of course, the deterrent is not cheap – no major equipment programme is. But our current nuclear-weapons capability costs on average around 5–6 per cent of the current defence budget. That is less than 1.5 per cent of our annual benefits bill. And the successor submarines are, on average, expected to cost the same once they have entered service. It is a price which I, and all my predecessors since Clement Attlee, have felt is worth paying to keep this country safe.
All governments should, of course, carefully examine all options, but I have seen no evidence that there are cheaper ways of providing a credible alternative to our plans for a successor and I am simply not prepared to settle for something that does not do the job. Furthermore, trying to save money by just relying on the United States to act on our behalf allows potential adversaries to gamble that o
ne day the US might not put itself at risk in order to deter an attack on the UK. Only the retention of our independent deterrent makes clear to any adversary that the devastating cost of an attack on the UK or its allies will always be far greater than anything it might hope to gain.
…
Third, there are those who say the only way to protect ourselves properly is to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely. Of course, a world without nuclear weapons is a fine ideal. Britain has taken the lead in pushing for progress towards multilateral disarmament. We operate a minimum, nuclear deterrent – and as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review we reduced the scale of our deterrent even further. But in the absence of an agreement to disarm multilaterally, those who want us to give up our nuclear weapons entirely must provide evidence that there is no prospect of the UK facing a nuclear threat. I cannot make that argument. I believe that to disarm unilaterally in the hope that others would follow would be an act of naivety, not statesmanship. It would be seen by our adversaries not as wisdom, but weakness.
So as the 101st Vanguard submarine patrol begins, a credible and continuous independent nuclear deterrent remains a crucial component of our national security. It is an insurance policy that the United Kingdom cannot do without. That is why I am determined that we will maintain and renew it for generations to come.120
This was a theme upon which Cameron expanded during our interview in October 2013, when asked if he subscribed to the analysis advanced by Sir Frank Cooper, former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, that a British Prime Minister would never give up Britain’s place as a nuclear-weapons state as long as the memory of 1940, standing alone and the Battle of Britain remained fresh. Then a small group of highly trained young men, operating a small amount of very high-quality equipment, was all that prevented the United Kingdom disappearing as an independent nation. ‘I obviously feel the 1940 example strongly in a lot of ways,’ said Cameron sitting in his No. 10 office: ‘You can’t not think that just through those doors there, this amazing decision, correct decision was made to fight on and that is an electrifying thought when you’re Prime Minister. But to me the nuclear deterrent argument has always been much more about a dangerous world where others have nuclear weapons, where you might be subject to blackmail. I was brought up somewhere between Aldermaston and Greenham Common. My mother was the local magistrate who had to deal with all the protestors and the whole argument about nuclear deterrence was part of my childhood. So I came down on one side of the argument and I haven’t changed my mind since.’121
But Cameron does admit that ‘it’s not unthinkable at some time in the future someone will come to a different decision. I don’t think Britain will give up nuclear deterrence altogether. I think that is out. I’d be very surprised if that happened in my lifetime. What I’m saying is that, at the moment, we have a deterrent that is the real thing, that is the genuine article, it’s as good as it could be, it is submarine-based, it’s continuously at sea and all the rest of it. I think there are people in politics like the Liberal Democrats arguing for deterrence lite. I think the arguments don’t stack up. But could I envisage a future Prime Minister thinking, well, maybe it’s worth the risk. I wouldn’t take that view, but the argument’s out there. I think the idea of a Prime Minister giving up nuclear weapons altogether, I don’t think that would happen.’122
The implications of doing so would certainly be wide reaching, not only for the United Kingdom, but the United States and the NATO Alliance. Since 1963 the United Kingdom independent nuclear capability has also been part of NATO, providing the Alliance’s members with protection under the ‘NATO Nuclear Umbrella’. The importance of this contribution is often forgotten in the domestic debate on the UK’s continuation as a nuclear-weapons state, but it plainly matters to the NATO Alliance. As David Cameron welcomed HMS Victorious back from the 100th deterrent patrol, the NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, wrote to the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, to thank the United Kingdom for its nuclear commitment to the NATO Alliance:
Dear Secretary of State,
As our most recent strategic concept highlighted, the greatest responsibility of the alliance is to protect and defend our territory and populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
A great example of this has been the UK’s independent strategic nuclear forces which, through their constant vigilance and professionalism over these past 45 years, have helped ensure the freedom and security of the allies.
These important UK capabilities will continue to play a crucial role as part of NATO’s appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces that both deter and defend against threats to our alliance.
With that in mind, I would wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the UK on the successful conclusion of the 100th patrol undertaken by the Vanguard class of submarine under Operation Relentless.
I would be grateful if you could please pass on my thanks to all those Royal Navy personnel who undertake these patrols, their families and those who support this operation for their dedication to this vital mission.
Yours sincerely,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen.123
Two political events in 2014/2015 had the potential to cause complications for the ‘successor’ programme. The first was the September 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence during which the separatist Scottish National Party, which has long favoured unilateral nuclear disarmament, vowed to remove Trident and the ‘Vanguard’ class submarines from Scotland in the event of a yes vote. UK Government spokesmen repeatedly insisted that ‘unilateral disarmament is not an option. We are not planning for Scottish independence and as such it is difficult to estimate the total costs, or how long it would take, to replicate the facilities at Faslane, but it would likely cost taxpayers billions of pounds and take many years.’124 On 18 September 2014 Scotland voted against becoming an independent country by 55 per cent to 45 per cent. A yes vote would certainly have given the SNP a mandate to remove Trident from Scotland, but exactly how this would have been achieved remains unclear.
The second event was the May 2015 general election. Within days of taking over as Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary in October 2013, Vernon Coaker visited the BAE Shipyard in Barrow to display his personal commitment to Labour retaining an independent deterrent and continuing with the ‘Successor’ programme. ‘In an uncertain and unpredictable world in which other nations possess nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation remains a deep concern, Labour believes it is right that the United Kingdom retains the minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent.’125 But given the Labour party’s tendency to neuralgia on the nuclear-weapons front, it looked unlikely that a future Labour Government would go straight into ‘Main Gate’ discussions without a review first. ‘We will continue to look at ways in which the Successor programme can be delivered efficiently, through the strategic defence and security and zero based spending reviews we have pledged to conduct under a Labour government,’ said Coaker.126 Yet if such a review (a) lingered long or (b) plumped for an alternative system or (c) went for three Successors instead of four, the 2028 target would be missed and CASD, at the very least, broken for a time, as the Vanguards left service.
Another complication in the months leading up to the election was the increased support for the SNP. Numerous polls projected the SNP securing 54 of Scotland’s 59 seats, seriously weakening Labour’s ability to secure enough seats to form a majority government. If the projections were accurate and Labour failed to secure the necessary seats outside of Scotland it would have to either govern as a minority government or attempt to form a coalition with other parties. One possible outcome was a Labour and SNP coalition, with the SNP holding the balance of power in any negotiations. The SNP’s leader, Nicola Sturgeon, initially said that the non-renewal and removal of Trident from the Clyde was a red-line issue in any post-election negotiations but she later appeared to change position and said that the SNP would simply vote agains
t the ‘Main Gate’ decision when the vote was held in Parliament.127
Despite this apparent shift, the Conservative Party was quick to exploit the possibility of a Labour/SNP coalition. In early April 2015, with less than a month to go until the election, the Conservative Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, put Trident at the heart of the election debate and claimed that in order to secure support from the SNP the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, would compromise national security and ‘stab the United Kingdom in the back’ by negotiating away Trident and abandoning any plans to go ahead with the ‘Successor’ programme. A furious Miliband retorted: ‘National security is too important to play politics with. I will never compromise our national security, I will never negotiate away our national security’, and the Labour Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander, insisted that ‘Labour’s commitment to continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent was not up for negotiation. The experts say that will require four submarines, we will review that pending any technological advance.’128
On 7 May 2015 a Conservative Government was elected with a 12-seat overall majority (331 seats to Labour’s 232) on, amongst many other pledges, a mandate to renew Trident and maintain CASD.129 The Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, confirmed in Parliament on 8 June 2015, that the Government is ‘committed to replacing all four Vanguard submarines with new submarines that will serve this country until at least 2060’.130
Given the Conservative majority, ‘Successor’ will almost certainly go ahead. But the Conservative Government can no longer count on the support of the Labour Party, which on the morning of Saturday 12 September 2015, in the Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre at Westminster, elected the veteran left-wing rebel and Islington North MP, Jeremy Corbyn, as Leader of the Labour Party.
In the hours following his victory, Corbyn, then Vice Chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, made it clear that he intended to take a different approach towards nuclear policy. ‘My views on Trident are very well known,’ he told Channel 4 News. ‘There has to be a discussion about that, and I’m hoping that the party will come together around this issue. We don’t need nuclear weapons.’131 There are deep divisions within the Labour party, with many MPs, including the also newly elected Deputy Leader, Tom Watson, in favour of the ‘Successor’ programme. ‘I think the deterrent has kept the peace in the world for half a century and I hope we can have that debate in the party’, said Watson.132