The Silent Deep

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The Silent Deep Page 96

by James Jinks


  FOSM’s Empire

  66. This was later known as the 4th Squadron. 67. TNA/ADM/205/106, Submarine Morale Factors, 1955. 68. John Coote, Submariner (Leo Cooper, 1991), p. 150. 69. Daily Telegraph, Obituary, Vice Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch, 17 August 2007. 70. Tim Clayton, Sea Wolves: The Extraordinary Story of Britain’s WW2 Submarines (Abacus, 2012), pp. 230–31. 71. Daily Telegraph, Obituary, Vice Admiral Sir John Roxburgh, 15 April 2004. 72. John Parker, The Silent Service (Headline, 2002), p. 267. 73. Interview with Rear Admiral John Hervey, 30 January 2013. 74. Brian Lavery, Churchill’s Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1939–1945 (Conway, 2006), pp. 212–13. 75. TNA/ADM/1/19428, Minutes of a Meeting held by VCNS on 3 April 1946, to discuss the size and disposition of the peacetime submarine fleet. 76. TNA/ADM/1/24714, FOSM to Secretary of Admiralty, 3 June 1949. 77. TNA/ADM/1/2379, Minutes of the 30th Submarine Liaison Meeting, 5 September 1952. 78. TNA/ADM/1/24714, Director of Naval Training, 16 November 1953. 79. TNA/ADM/1/24714, Simpson, Minute, 2 February 1954. 80. John ‘Sandy’ Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (HarperPress, 2012), p. 51. 81. Commander J. D. Molyneux, Submarine Basic Training (Ministry of Defence Official Publications, 1958). 82. Woodward, One Hundred Days, pp. 51–2. 83. Sam Fry, Fruitful Rewarding Years: A Submariner’s Story (The Memoir Club, 2006), p. 41. 84. Ibid., p. 42. 85. Interview with Rear Admiral John Hervey, 30 January 2013. 86. Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 45. 87. Ibid., p. 45. 88. Interview with Admiral Sir Peter Herbert, 15 October 2013. 89. Interview with Rear Admiral John Hervey, 30 January 2013. 90. Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 55. 91. Coote, Submariner, p. 157. 92. Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, The Sword of Damocles (Periscope Publishing, 2007), p. 161. 93. Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 56. 94. IWM/16570, Interview with Geoffrey Jaques, 10 June 1996. 95. Coote, Submariner, p. 156. 96. IWM/16570, Interview with Geoffrey Jaques, 10 June 1996. 97. Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles, p. 161. 98. Woodward, One Hundred Days, pp. 55–6. 99. Interview with Rear Admiral John Hervey, 30 January 2013. 100. ‘A Day inside a Clockwork Mouse’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1953. 101. In September and October 1950 Royal Marines from 41 Independent Commando deployed from a US Submarine, the USS Perch, and conducted raids on the Korean mainland. 102. Coote, Submariner, p. 150. 103. Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (Victor Gollancz, 1996), pp. 277–83. 104. TNA/ADM/1/20739, HM Dockyard, Devonport, Operation ‘Black-Currant’ – January, February & March, 1947. Notes on the provision of D.C. supplies from Submarines. 105. TNA/ADM/1/20739, Operation Blackcurrant – Technical Report, 6 September 1947. 106. TNA/ADM/213/595, The Effects of Snorting, from the Royal Navy Physiological Laboratory, April 1947. 107. ‘Five Weeks under Arctic Sea’, Chicago Tribune, 12 September 1948. 108. TNA/ADM/213/881, HMS Ambush, Report of Snort Patrol, 6 March 1948. 109. Mackenzie, Sword of Damocles, p. 164.

  A New Role

  110. TNA/ADM/205/53, A Balanced Post War Fleet, 1945. 111. TNA/ADM/1/24407, N. Abercrombie to Commanders-in-Chief and Flag Officer (Submarines), etc., 8 January 1948. 112. Quoted in Kemp, T-Class, p. 127. 113. Rear Admiral Martin Wemyss, ‘Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations for the Uninitiated’, RUSI Journal (September 1981), p. 24. 114. TNA/ADM/1/21803, FOSM to Secretary of the Admiralty, The Submarine as an Anti-Submarine Weapon, 6 January 1950. 115. Kemp, T-Class, p. 9. 116. TNA/ADM/1/25252, Memo by Director of Torpedo, Anti Submarine and Mine Warfare, 6 June 1951. 117. TNA/ADM/1/25252, FOSM to Secretary of the Admiralty, Submarine Versus Submarine Trials, HMS Alcide and HMS Truncheon, 14 January 1951. 118. RNSM/A1949, Submarine General Letter, 20 September 1950. 119. TNA/ADM/189/237, Submarine Weapons and Control Systems, Commander S. A. Hammick, May 1958. 120. TNA/ADM/189/237, The Future of the Submarine as an A/S Vessel, by Captain A. R. Hezlet, Staff of Flag Officer Submarines. 121. For more information on sonar development during the early post-war period see Willem Hackman, Seek and Strike: Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914–1954 (HMSO, 1984), pp. 325–54; Norman Friedman, ‘Electronics and the Royal Navy’, in Harding (ed.), Royal Navy 1930–2000, pp. 263–70. 122. Hackman, Seek and Strike, p. 352. 123. The Type 187 was also used in the ‘Porpoise’ class which entered service in the late 1950s, see pp. 129–130. 124. Hackman, Seek and Strike, p. 343. 125. Kemp, T-Class, p. 42. 126. Dan Conley and Richard Woodman, Cold War Command: The Dramatic Story of a Nuclear Submariner (Seaforth Press, 2014), pp. 137–8. 127. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Bodley Head, 1987), p. 227. 128. Fry, Fruitful Rewarding Years, p. 65. 129. TNA/ADM/189/235, Submarine Progress, 1952. 130. Ibid.

  The Early Cold War

  131. Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (John Murray, 2002), p. 79. 132. TNA/ADM/205/83, ACNS Paper, Ships of the Future Navy, 20 April 1949. 133. Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till, ‘Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of Massive Retaliation, 1945–1960’, in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (eds.), Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Macmillan, 1989), p. 278. 134. TNA/CAB/81/132, JIC(46)1(0), Final (Revise), Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions, 1 March 1946. 135. TNA/ADM/1/20030, NID/16, Russian Naval Tactics, 10 October 1946. 136. TNA/ADM/189/237, Discussion to Soviet Scientific Research and Development (Paper read at T.A.S. Conference 1954). 137. Ibid. 138. TNA/ADM/1/24407, Rear Admiral Raw to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Submarine War Plan, Anglo-US Co-Operation. Proposed Further Meeting, 24 July 1951. 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. TNA/ADM/1/24407, Board Minute, 17 August 1951. 142. TNA/ADM/1/24407, Rear Admiral Raw to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Submarine War Plan, Anglo-US Co-Operation. Proposed Further Meeting, 24 July 1951. 143. TNA/ADM/205/106, Eastern Atlantic Submarine Force, February 1955. 144. Ibid. 145. ‘Exercise Mainbrace’, Flight International, 19 September 1952.

  ‘The Admiralty regrets …’

  146. TNA/ADM/1/22713, Loss of HMS Truculent: Admiralty Statement and Report of Board of Enquiry, 1 January 1950–31 December 1950. 147. One cause of the accident concerned navigation lights. In the 1950s ships over 150 feet in length were equipped with 2 white lights with a lower one forward, to distinguish whether the vessel was on the Port or Starboard bow. They were also equipped with red and green bow lights but these were seldom visible at any distance. Prior to the Truculent sinking submarines only carried one white steaming light on top of the periscopes. When Truculent went to Port, the submarine was immediately at risk as the Divina could only see the single small white light on top of the persicope and was unable to determine if the submarine was turning to Port or Starboard. 148. Joel Blamey, A Submariner’s Story: The Memoirs of a Submarine Engineer in Peace and in War (Periscope Publishing, 2002), p. 252. 149. TNA/ADM/116/5821, Board of Inquiry into the loss of HMS Affray, 6 August 1951. 150. Ibid. 151. TNA/ADM/116/5821, Shepherd minute, 4 October 1951. 152. Ibid. 153. TNA/ADM/116/3821, Head of Navy Law, 31 August 1951. 154. TNA/ADM/205/76, ‘A’ Class Submarines – Temporary Ban on Operational Use, 27 April 1951. 155. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 14 November 1951, Vol. 493, Cols. 980–83. 156. Alan Gallop, Subsmash: The Mysterious Disappearance of HM Submarine Affray (The History Press, 2011), p. 152. 157. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 24 January 2012, Vol. 539, Col. 6524. 158. TNA/ADM/189/235, Captain Bertram Taylor, Submarine Progress – 1952, 11 September 1952.

  The Rise of Underwater Intelligence Gathering and Reconnaissance

  159. Basil Watson, Commander-in-Chief: A Celebration of the Life of Admiral of the Fleet The Lord Fieldhouse of Gosport (Royal Navy Submarine Museum, 2005), p. 42. 160. John Hervey, ‘The Numbers Game’, Naval Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 402–3. 161. TNA/CAB/159/34, JIC(60) 49th Meeting, 29 September 1960. 162. Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (Random House, 1999), pp. 1–25. 163. Jim Ring, We Come Unseen: The Untold Story of Britain’s Cold War Submariners (John Murray, 2001), p. 83. The Royal Navy’s earliest submarine intelligence-g
athering operations against the Soviet Union had occurred in December 1939 and the early part of 1940, when four Second World War submarines – HMS Regulus, HMS Rainbow, HMS Proteus and HMS Perseus – departed Hong Kong for the waters off Vladivostok to determine whether the German Navy was using Russian facilities to train its U-boat crews. The submarines were also under orders to intercept and capture any German merchant ships attempting to enter Russian ports on the Tartary coast, and to obtain data and experience of operating in frozen Arctic conditions; David Webb, ‘Vladivostok’; in Friends of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, All Round Look: Year Book 2002/2003 (Royal Navy Submarine Museum, 2003), pp. 14–18. 164. Young, One of Our Submarines, p. 74. 165. TNA/FO/371/94871, Dinnie to Etherington-Smith, 13 April 1951. 166. TNA/FO/371/94871, Morgan, Minutes, 19 April 1951. 167. TNA/FO/371/86803, Memo, 6 May 1950. 168. TNA/FO/371/94871, Morgan, Minutes, 19 April 1951. 169. TNA/FO/371/100870, Harrison Memo, 8 April 1952. 170. TNA/FO/371/100870, Hohler to Hanna, 30 April 1952. 171. TNA/FO/371/100870, Hanna to Hohler, 1 August 1952. 172. TNA/ADM/1/27784, DNI Memo, 27 February 1953. 173. TNA/ADM/1/24494, DNI Memo, 19 February 1952. 174. Ibid. 175. TNA/ADM/1/27784, Simpson to Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 November 1952. 176. TNA/ADM/1/27784, DNI Memo, 27 February 1953. 177. Coote, Submariner, p. 184. 178. TNA/ADM/1/27784, DNI Memo, 27 February 1953.

  HMS Totem – ‘A Slippery Customer’

  179. Marine radars: X-band require small antennas, while S-band need larger antennas, are capable of long-range detection and can be used in bad weather. 180. Quoted in Kemp, T-Class, p. 61. 181. Coote, Submariner, p. 185. 182. Ibid., p. 180. 183. Quoted in Kemp, T-Class, p. 134. 184. Ibid., p. 180. 185. Ibid. 186. Ibid. 187. TNA/ADM/1/28932, Draft Letter to Commanders-in-Chief, 21 June 1955; references to HMS Mercury were removed from the final letter that was circulated around the fleet. 188. See Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (HarperCollins, 2010). 189. TNA/ADM/1/28932, HMS Totem, Report of Operation Cravat, 26 March 1954. 190. Ibid. 191. Ibid.; Indefatigable and Implacable were aircraft carriers being used at the time as training ships. 192. Coote, Submariner, p. 192. 193. TNA/ADM/1/28932, HMS Totem, Report of Operation Cravat, 26 March 1954. 194. Ibid. 195. TNA/ADM/1/28932, Mackay to Commanders-in-Chief, 20 June 1955. 196. Coote, Submariner, p. 192. 197. ‘(O) II’ probably means the modified ‘Ognevoy’ class destroyers of the ‘Skory’ class. 198. TNA/ADM/1/28292, HMS Trenchant, Report of Proceedings – HM Submarines Sentinel and Trenchant, 12 November 1954. 199. TNA/ADM/1/28292, Minutes by Director of Naval Intelligence and Director of Undersurface Warfare, 13 August 1954. 200. TNA/ADM/1/28932, Minute by Head of M Branch, 27 January 1955. 201. Ibid. 202. Coote, Submariner, p. 193. 203. Ibid. 204. LHCMA, Tony Beasley Manuscript, July 2008. There is some confusion as to whether the submarine involved in this incident was HMS Turpin or HMS Totem. Beaseley’s manuscript fails to mention the name of the submarine, but his description of the incident is almost identical to Coote’s description of an incident in Coote, Submariner pp. 192–3. Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (HarperCollins, 2010), p. 138, mentions HMS Turpin, but notes that the CO was Coote. Coote was CO of Totem at the time, not Turpin. 205. Coote, Submariner, p. 193. 206. LHCMA, Tony Beasley Manuscript, July 2008. 207. Ibid. 208. Ibid. 209. Ibid. 210. Ibid. 211. Coote, Submariner, p. 193. 212. See Grove, Vanguard to Trident, Ch. 3. 213. Watson, Commander-in-Chief, p. 34. 214. Aldrich, GCHQ, pp. 125–48. 215. Michael S. Goodman, ‘Covering Up Spying in the “Buster” Crabb Affair: A Note’, The International History Review, 30:4 (2008), pp. 768–84. 216. TNA/ADM/205/110, Inglis (DNI) to FOSM, 19 October 1956. 217. ‘Guppy’ was an acronym for ‘Greater Underwater Propulsive Power’. Stickleback was a recently converted ‘Guppy IIA’ with improved sonar performance. 218. Coote, Submariner, p. 207. 219. The ‘L’ class was a Soviet pre-war submarine design still in service although in steadily diminishing numbers in the 1950s. 220. TNA/ADM/205/110, Coote, USS Stickleback, October 1956. 221. Coote, Submariner, p. 208. 222. TNA/ADM/205/110, Coote, USS Stickleback, October 1956.

  Operation ‘Nightjar’

  223. Kemp, T-Class, p. 130. 224. Arthur Bivens, From Sailboats to Submarines (Infinity Publishing, 2004), p. 131. 225. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Admiralty to FOSM, 22 November 1956. 226. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Head of M Branch Minute, 20 November 1956. 227. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Admiralty to FOSM, 19 November 1956. 228. TNA/ADM/1/28939, FOSM, Operation Nightjar, Annex Delta, Instructions for the Conduct of Patrols, 17 November 1956. 229. TNA/ADM/1/28939, HMS Tabard, Operation Nightjar, 19 December 1956. 230. TNA/ADM/1/28939, HMS Artful, Operation Nightjar, 16 December 1956. 231. TNA/ADM/1/28939, HMS Tabard, Operation Nightjar, 19 December 1956. 232. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Admiralty to FOSM, 30 November 1956. 233. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Inglis to VCNS, Submarine Patrols, 19 December 1956. 234. TNA/ADM/1/28939, First Lord’s (Lord Hailsham) comments on reports of patrols carried out by HM Submarines Artful and Tabard – Operation Nightjar, November 1957. 235. TNA/ADM/1/28939, Elkins to Inglis, 29 November 1956. 236. Tirante was another Guppy IIA submarine. 237. TNA/ADM/205/110, Elkins to Mountbatten, 31 December 1956. 238. Ibid. 239. Ibid. 240. TNA/ADM/205/169, Inglis to Mountbatten, 4 February 1957. 241. Ibid. 242. TNA/ADM/205/169, Mountbatten to Burke, 4 February 1957. 243. TNA/ADM/205/169, Burke to Mountbatten, 3 March 1957. 244. TNA/ADM/1/28944, Operation OFFSPRING (HMS/M Tabard Submarine patrol), 1957. 245. Interview with Richard Heaslip, 18 December 2013. 246. TNA/ADM/1/28933, Operation SANJAK (HMS/M Turpin Submarine patrol), 1954–1955; ADM/1/28932, Operation TARTAN (HMS/M Turpin Submarine Patrol), 1954–1955; TNA/ADM/1/28944, Operation OFFSPRING (HMS/M Tabard Submarine patrol), 1957; TNA/ADM/1/29321, Operation TRIPPER, 1957–9; TNA/ADM/1/29327, Operation ORION, 1958; TNA/ADM/1/29329, Operation ADAMIS, 1958–1959.

  Pin-Pricking a Colossus

  247. Except where otherwise indicated, the source for the following account of Taciturn’s operation is RNSM/A2000/065, M. J. Hurley, ‘Early T Boat Patrols in the Cold War’ (undated and unpublished manuscript). 248. Surgeon Captain W. J. Forbes Guild, ‘Submarine Living’, paper to ‘Submarine Medicine and Submarine Living’, the Symposium of Underwater and Aviation Medical Problems at the R. N. Air Medical School, November 1961. 249. Kemp, T-Class, p. 75. 250. RNSM/A2000/065, Hurley, ‘Early T Boat Patrols in the Cold War’, (undated and unpublished manuscript). 251. Watson, Commander-in-Chief, p. 43. 252. Ibid. 253. Except where otherwise indicated, the source for the following account of Turpin’s operation is Alfred Roake, ‘Cold War Warrior’, Naval Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, October 1994, pp. 363–72; the USS Pueblo was an American electronic intelligence and signals intelligence ship which was captured by North Korea on 23 January 1968. 254. Watson, Commander-in-Chief, p. 43. 255. TNA/ADM/205/110, Reid to Mountbatten, Submarines for Jet 56, 8 March 1956. 256. Roake, ‘Cold War Warrior’. 257. Ibid. 258. RNSM/A2000/065, M. J. Hurley, ‘Early T Boat Patrols in the Cold War’ (undated and unpublished manuscript). 259. Roake, ‘Cold War Warrior’. 260. Ibid.

  3 ‘A NEW EPOCH’: TOWARDS THE NUCLEAR AGE

  1. TNA/ADM/205/106, Fawkes to Mountbatten, 1955. 2. Friends of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, All Round Look: Year Book 2010/2011 (Royal Navy Submarine Museum, 2010), p. 14. 3. TNA/ADM/205/163, presentation to Thorneycroft, u/d (May 1962).

  The Cold War Fleet

  4. TNA/ADM/1/24496, EE, 24 October 1952. 5. TNA/ADM/1/24897, Minutes of Controller’s Meeting with Flag Officer (Submarines) held at Bath, 17 March 1953. 6. TNA/ADM/1/24897, FOSM to Secretary of the Admiralty, 5 June 1953. 7. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Bodley Head, 1987), p. 229. 8. Ibid., pp. 403–9. 9. TNA/ADM/302/223, Submarine Detection … The Present State of the Art and Future Trends, August 1963. 10. Robert Bud and Philip Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories, 1945–1990 (Science Museum, 2002), pp. 166–7. 11. Norman Friedman, ‘Electronics and the Royal Navy’, in Harding (ed.), The Royal Navy 1930–2000: Innovation and Defence (Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 263–
70; Bud and Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, p. 170; Willem Hackman, Seek and Strike: Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914–1954 (HMSO, 1984), pp. 352–3. 12. TNA/ADM/1/24494, Memorandum on the Characteristics Required by British Submarines, January 1952. 13. Ibid. 14. TNA/ADM/1/24494, Director of Plans, Submarines Required for a War with Russia, 1 January 1952. 15. TNA/ADM/189/235, Submarine Progress, 1952. 16. TNA/ADM/205/106, FOSM, Present Construction and Modernisation, 1955. 17. David K. Brown and George Moore, Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design since 1945 (Chatham Publishing, 2003), p. 117. 18. Declan O’Reilly, ‘Explorer and Excalibur: The Walter Boat, High Test Peroxide and British Submarine Policy 1945–1962. A Study in Technological Failure?’, in Martin Edmonds (ed.), 100 Years of the Trade: Royal Navy Submarines, Past, Present & Future (Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 2001), pp. 68–74.

 

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