46 1 At the same time there was trouble in Germany. Indeed the Roman cause almost suffered disaster because of the negligence of the generals, the mutinous spirit of the legions, the assaults from without the empire, and the treachery of our allies. The history of this war with its causes and results we shall give later, for the struggle was a long one. The Dacians also, never trustworthy, became uneasy and now had no fear, for our army had been withdrawn from Moesia. They watched the first events without stirring; but when they heard that Italy was aflame with war and that the whole empire was divided into hostile camps, they stormed the winter quarters of our auxiliary foot and horse and put themselves in possession of both banks of the Danube. They were already preparing to destroy the camps of the legions, and would have succeeded in their purpose if Mucianus had not placed the Sixth legion across their path. He took this step because he had learned of the victory at Cremona, and he also feared that two hordes of foreigners might come down upon the empire, if the Dacians and the Germans should succeeded in breaking in at different points. As so often before, the fortune of the Roman people attended them, bringing, as it had, Mucianus and the forces of the East to that point and securing meantime the success at Cremona. Fonteius Agrippa was transferred from Asia, where, as proconsul, he had governed the province for a year, and put in charge of Moesia; there he was given additional troops from the army of Vitellius, which it was wise from the point of view of both policy and peace to distribute in the provinces and to involve in war with a foreign foe.
47 1 Nor were the other nations quiet. There was a sudden armed uprising in Pontus led by a barbarian slave who had once been prefect of the royal fleet. This was a certain Anicetus, a freedman of Polemo, who, having been once very powerful, was impatient of the change after the kingdom was transformed into a province. So he stirred up the people of Pontus in the name of Vitellius, bribing the poorest among them with hope of plunder. Then at the head of a band, which was far from being negligible, he suddenly attacked Trapezus, a city of ancient fame, founded by Greeks at the extreme end of the coast of Pontus. There he massacred a cohort, which originally consisted of auxiliaries furnished by the king; later its members had been granted Roman citizenship and had adopted Roman standards and arms, but retained the indolence and licence of the Greeks. He also set fire to the fleet and escaped by sea, which was unpatrolled since Mucianus had concentrated the best light galleys and all the marines at Byzantium. Moreover, the barbarians had hastily built vessels and now roamed the sea at will, despising the power of Rome. Their boats they call camarae; they have a low freeboard but are broad of beam, and are fastened together without spikes of bronze or iron. When the sea is rough the sailors build up the bulwarks with planks to match the height of the waves, until they close in the hull like the roof of a house. Thus protected these vessels roll about amid the waves. They have a prow at both ends and their arrangement of oars may be shifted, so that they can be safely propelled in either direction at will.
48 1 These events attracted Vespasian’s attention, so that he sent detachments from his legions under the command of Virdius Geminus, whose military skill had been well tested. He attacked the enemy’s troops when they were off their guard and were scattered in their greed for booty, and forced them to their boats; afterwards he quickly built some light galleys and caught up with Anicetus at the mouth of the river Chobus, where he had sought shelter under the protection of the king of the Sedochezi, whose alliance he had secured by bribes and gifts. At first the king sheltered his suppliant with the aid of threats and arms; but after the reward for treachery and the alternative of war were set before him, with the unstable loyalty of a barbarian he bargained away the life of Anicetus, gave up the refugees, and so an end was put to this servile war.
While Vespasian was rejoicing over this victory, for everything was succeeding beyond his hopes and prayers, the news of the battle at Cremona reached him in Egypt. He moved with all the more speed to Alexandria, that he might impose the burden of famine on the broken armies of Vitellius and on Rome, which always needs help from outside. For he was now preparing to invade Africa also by land and sea, situated as it is in the same quarter of the world, his purpose being to shut off Italy’s supplies of grain and so cause need and discord among his foes.
49 1 While the imperial power was shifting with these world-wide convulsions, Primus Antonius did not behave so blamelessly after the battle of Cremona as before, whether it was that he thought that he had done enough for the war and that everything else would easily follow, or whether success in the case of a nature like his brought to the surface the avarice, arrogance, and other evils that had remained hidden hitherto. He stalked through Italy as it were captured territory; he courted the legions as if they were his own; he used his every word and act to pave his way to power. To inspire the soldiers with a spirit of licence, he offered to the rank and file the places of the centurions who had fallen. The soldiers chose the most turbulent of their number. The ranks were no longer directed by the will of their leaders, but the leaders were at the mercy of the common soldiers’ whims. These acts, which made for mutinies and the ruin of discipline, Antonius presently turned to his own profit. He had no fear of the arrival of Mucianus, although in the event this was more fatal for him than the fact that he had treated Vespasian with little respect.
50 1 Meantime, since winter was approaching and the plains were inundated by the Po, the Flavian troops moved without their heavy baggage. They left at Verona the eagles and standards of the victorious legions, such soldiers as were incapacitated by wounds or years, and also a number who were in good condition; the auxiliary foot and horse with selected legionaries seemed sufficient now that the worst of the war was over. The Eleventh legion had joined them; at first it had hesitated, but, now that the Flavians were succeeding, it became apprehensive because it had not joined them before. Six thousand Dalmatians, a new levy, accompanied them, led by Pompeius Silvanus, an ex-consul. The actual guiding spirit was Annius Bassus, the legionary legate. Silvanus displayed no energy in war, but wasted in mere talk the days for action. Bassus directed him by pretending to defer to him, and continually attended to all necessary operations with unobtrusive activity. The marines at Ravenna now demanded service with the legions, and the best of them were enrolled among them; Dalmatians replaced them in the fleet. The troops and commanders halted at Fanum Fortunae, being uncertain as to the proper course of action, for they had received a report that six praetorian cohorts had left Rome, and they supposed that the passes in the Apennines were guarded. The commanders, too, were alarmed by the lack of supplies, being now in a district completely devastated by the war, as well as by the mutinous demands of the soldiers for the clavarium, as they call the donative. They had provided neither money nor provisions; moreover, their haste and greed in seizing as private booty what might have been stores to draw upon now proved embarrassing.
51 1 I have it from the best authorities that the victors had come to disregard the difference between right and wrong so completely that a common soldier declared that he had killed his brother in the last battle and actually asked the generals for a reward. The common dictates of humanity did not permit them to honour such a murder or military policy to punish it. They put off the soldier on the ground that he deserved a reward greater than could be repaid at once; nor is anything further told concerning the case. And yet a similar crime had happened in civil war before. In the struggle against Cinna on the Janiculum, as Sisenna relates, one of Pompey’s soldiers killed his own brother and then, on realizing his crime, committed suicide. So much livelier among our ancestors was repentance for guilt as well as glory in virtuous action. Such deeds as this and others like them, drawn from our earlier history, I shall not improperly insert in my work whenever the theme or situation demands examples of the right or solace for the wrong.
52 1 Antonius and the other Flavian commanders decided to send their cavalry on ahead and to reconnoitre throughout Umbria, to see if they cou
ld approach the Apennines at any point without danger; they proposed also to bring up the eagles and standards with all the soldiers then at Verona, and to fill the Po and the sea with convoys of provisions. There were some among the commanders who devised reasons for delay; they felt that Antonius was becoming too pretentious, and they hoped to get more certain advantages from Mucianus. For Mucianus, disturbed by the speed with which the victory had been won, and believing that he would have no share in the glory to be gained by the war unless he took Rome in person, kept writing to Primus and Varus in ambiguous terms, saying in one letter that they must follow up their successes and in another dwelling on the advantages of proceeding slowly, so trimming his course that according to the event he might at will repudiate all responsibility for failure or take the credit for success. To Plotius Grypus, whom Vespasian had lately elevated to senatorial rank and put in command of a legion, and to all other officers who were loyal, he wrote admonishing them more frankly; and they all replied, putting the haste of Primus and Varus in an unfavourable light and saying what was likely to please Mucianus. By sending these letters to Vespasian, Mucianus succeeded in preventing the plans and acts of Antonius from being estimated so highly as the latter had hoped.
53 1 At this Antonius was indignant, and put the blame on Mucianus, whose base insinuations, as he maintained, had made the dangers that he had run seem trifling; nor did he pick and choose his words, being as he was immoderate in speech and unaccustomed to defer to another. He drew up a letter to Vespasian in a strain too boastful to use to an emperor; and he did not fail to attack Mucianus covertly: “It was I who armed the Pannonian legions. It was I who roused the commanders in Moesia and spurred them on. It was my bold action that broke through the Alps, seized Italy, and blocked the road against any assistance to Vitellius from Germany and Raetia.” As for the disaster inflicted on the discordant and scattered legions of Vitellius by a whirlwind of cavalry and the rout of those troops by a great force of infantry which pursued them for a day and a night, Antonius claimed that these were glorious achievements of which he deserved all the credit. The fate of Cremona he charged up to the chances of war; and pointed out that civil discord in earlier days had caused greater loss and had destroyed more cities. He declared that he did not fight for his emperor with despatches and letters, but with deeds and arms; he made no attempt to dim the glory of those who meantime had quieted Dacia; their desire had been to give Moesia peace, his to give Italy safety and security. It was due to his exhortations that the Gauls and Spains, the strongest part of the world, had turned to Vespasian’s side. “But,” he added, “my efforts will come to nothing if the rewards for dangers run are to be gained only by those who did not face the dangers.” Of all this Mucianus was fully aware, and the result was bitter enmity, fostered more openly by Antonius, with cunning and therefore the more implacably by Mucianus.
54 1 Vitellius, however, after the loss of his cause at Cremona, concealed the news of the disaster, and by foolish dissimulation delayed the remedies for his misfortunes rather than the misfortunes themselves. For if he had only acknowledged the truth and sought counsel, he had still some hope and resources left; but when, on the contrary, he pretended that all was well, he made his situation worse by his falsehoods. A strange silence concerning the war was observed in his presence; discussion in the city was forbidden, with the result that more people talked. If they had been allowed to speak, they would have told only the truth; but as they were forbidden, they spread abroad more frightful reports. The generals of the Flavian forces did not fail to increase the rumours by escorting round their camp the Vitellian spies whom they had captured, showing them the strength of the victorious army and then sending them back to Rome. All these Vitellius questioned in secret and promptly had them put to death. Julius Agrestis, a centurion, exhibited notable courage. After many conversations, in which he tried in vain to rouse Vitellius to bold action, he persuaded the emperor to send him to see in person the enemy’s forces and to observe what had happened at Cremona. He did not try to deceive Antonius by any secret investigation, but frankly made known his emperor’s orders and his own purpose, and demanded to see everything. Men were despatched to show him the battle-ground, the ruins of Cremona, and the captive legions. Agrestis returned to Vitellius; and when the emperor denied the truth of his report, and even went so far as to charge him with having been bribed, he said, “Since I must give you a convincing proof of my statements, and you can have no other advantage from my life or death, I will give you evidence that will make you believe.” With these words he left the emperor’s presence, and made good his words by suicide. Some have reported that he was put to death by the orders of Vitellius, but all agree as to his fidelity and courage.
55 1 Vitellius was like a man wakened from a deep sleep. He ordered Julius Priscus and Alfenus Avarus to block the passes of the Apennines with fourteen praetorian cohorts and all the cavalry. A legion of marines followed them later. These thousands of armed forces, consisting too of picked men and horses, were equal to taking the offensive if they had had another leader. The rest of the cohorts Vitellius gave to his brother Lucius for the defence of Rome, while he, abating in no degree his usual life of pleasure and urged on by his lack of confidence in the future, held the comitia before the usual time, and designated the consuls for many years to come. He granted special treaties to allies and bestowed Latin rights on foreigners with a generous hand; he reduced the tribute for some provincials, he relieved others from all obligations — in short, with no regard for the future he crippled the empire. But the mob attended in delight on the great indulgences that he bestowed; the most foolish citizens bought them, while the wise regarded as worthless privileges which could neither be granted nor accepted if the state was to stand. Finally Vitellius listened to the demands of his army which had stopped at Mevania, and left Rome, accompanied by a long line of senators, many of whom were drawn in his train by their desire to secure his favour, most however by fear. So he came to camp with no clear purpose in mind, an easy prey to treacherous advice.
56 1 While Vitellius was addressing the troops an incredible prodigy appeared — such a flock of birds of ill omen flew above him that they obscured the sky with a black cloud. Another dire omen was given by a bull which overthrew the preparations for sacrifice, escaped from the altar, and was then despatched some distance away and in an unusual fashion. But the most outstanding portent was Vitellius himself; unskilled in war, without foresight, unacquainted with the proper order of march, the use of scouts, the limits within which a general should hurry on a campaign or delay it, he was constantly questioning others; at the arrival of every messenger his face and gait betrayed his anxiety; and then he would drink heavily. Finally, weary of the camp and hearing of the defection of the fleet at Misenum, he returned to Rome, panic-stricken as ever by the latest blow and with no thought for the supreme issue. For when the way was open to him to cross the Apennines while the strength of his forces was unimpaired, and to attack his foes who were still exhausted by the winter and lack of supply, by scattering his forces he delivered over to death and captivity his best troops, who were loyal to the last extremity, although his most experienced centurions disapproved, and if consulted, would have told him the truth. But the most intimate friends of Vitellius kept them away from him, and so inclined the emperor’s ears that useful counsel sounded harsh, and he would hear nothing but what flattered and was to be fatal.
57 1 The action of the fleet at Misenum is an illustration of the weight that a bold stroke on the part of a single individual may have in time of civil strife. It was Claudius Faventinus,º a centurion dishonourably discharged by Galba, who brought the fleet to revolt by forging letters from Vespasian in which he held out to the men a reward for their treason. The fleet was commanded by Claudius Apollinaris, who was neither strong in loyalty nor determined in treachery; and Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor who at that time happened to be at Minturnae, offered himself to lead the rebels. These moved t
he municipal towns and colonies to action. The people of Puteoli became ardent supporters of Vespasian; Capua, on the other hand, was faithful to Vitellius; and so rivalry between communities became a part of the civil war. Vitellius selected Claudius Julianus to reconcile the troops, for when Julianus shortly before had commanded the fleet at Misenum, he had exercised his authority in a mild fashion. The emperor gave him to support his efforts one of the city cohorts and the gladiators that Julianus then commanded. When the two forces were encamped over against each other, Julianus did not long hesitate to join Vespasian’s party; then the combined forces occupied Tarracina, a town which was better defended by its walls and situation than by any ability on the part of the soldiers.
58 1 On hearing this, Vitellius left part of his troops at Narnia with the prefects of the praetorian guard; his brother Lucius Vitellius he sent with six cohorts and five hundred horse to oppose the threatened outbreak in Campania. He himself was sick at heart, but the enthusiasm of the soldiers and the shouts of the people demanding arms gave him fresh spirit, while he addressed the cowardly rabble, whose courage would not extend beyond words, under the unreal and pretentious names of an army and legions. On the advice of his freedmen (for the more distinguished his friends were, the less he trusted them), he ordered the people to assemble in tribes, and administered the oath to the members as they enrolled. Since the numbers were too great, he divided between the consuls the selection of the recruits. On the senators he imposed a contribution of slaves and cash. The knights offered assistance and money, while even the freedmen demanded to be allowed the same privilege. This pretended devotion, which was in reality prompted by fear, resulted in enthusiasm for the emperor; yet most men felt sorry not so much for Vitellius as for the unfortunate position to which the principate had fallen. Nor did he fail personally to appeal to their pity by look, voice, and tears; he was generous and even prodigal in his promises, after the manner of the timid. Nay, he even went so far as to wish to be called Caesar, a title which he had rejected before, but now accepted from a superstitious feeling with regard to the name, and because in time of fear the counsels of the wise and the words of the crowd obtain a like hearing. However, since all movements that arise from thoughtless impulses are strong at first but slacken with time, the senators and knights gradually began to fall away, at first with hesitation and when Vitellius was not present, later in open scorn and indifference, until in shame at the failure of his attempts he excused them from the services which they would not render.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 32