12 1 During these same days the citizens received increasing rumours of disasters in Germany with no sign of sorrow: slaughtered armies, the capture of the legions’ winter quarters, a revolt of the Gallic provinces men spoke of as though they were not misfortunes. As to that war, I propose to explain its causes somewhat deeply and the extent to which foreign and allied tribes were involved in this conflagration. The Batavians formed part of the Chatti so long as they lived across the Rhine; then, being expelled by a civil war, they occupied the edge of the Gallic bank which was uninhabited, and likewise an island close by, which is washed by the ocean in front but by the Rhine on its rear and sides. Without having their wealth exhausted — a thing which is rare in alliance with a stronger people — they furnished our empire only men and arms. They had long training in our wars with the Germans; then later they increased their renown by service in Britain, whither some cohorts were sent, led according to their ancient custom by the noblest among them. They had also at home a select body of cavalry which excelled in swimming; keeping their arms and horses they crossed the Rhine without breaking their formation. . . .
13 1 Julius Paulus and Julius Civilis were by far the most distinguished among the Batavians, being both of royal stock. On a false charge of revolt, Paulus was executed by Fonteius Capito; Civilis was put in chains and sent to Nero, and although acquitted by Galba, he was again exposed to danger under Vitellius owing to the clamour of the army for his punishment: these were the causes of his anger, his hopes sprang from our misfortunes. Civilis, however, who was cunning beyond the average barbarian, bore himself also like a Sertorius or a Hannibal, since his face was disfigured like theirs; in order to avoid being attacked as an enemy, as he would have been if he had openly revolted from the Romans, he pretended to be a friend of Vespasian and enthusiastic for his party; indeed Primus Antonius had actually written to him directing him to divert the auxiliary troops called up by Vitellius and to hold back the legions on the pretext of a German revolt. Hordeonius Flaccus, who was on the ground, had given him the same suggestion, moved by his own partiality toward Vespasian and by his anxiety for the state, whose ruin was sure if war were renewed and all those thousands of armed men burst into Italy.
14 1 So then Civilis, having determined to revolt, concealed for the time his deeper purpose, and being ready to determine his other plans by the event, began to make trouble in the following way. At the orders of Vitellius a levy of the young Batavians was now being made. This burden, which is naturally grievous, was made the heavier by the greed and licence of those in charge of the levy: they hunted out the old and the weak that they might get a price for letting them off; again they dragged away the children to satisfy their lust, choosing the handsomest — and the Batavian children are generally tall beyond their years. These acts aroused resentment, and the leaders in the conspiracy, on which they were now determined, persuaded the people to refuse the levy. Civilis called the leaders of his tribe and the boldest of the common people into a sacred grove under the pretext of giving a banquet, and when he saw that the night and revelry had fired their spirits, he began to speak of the honour and glory of their tribe, then passed on to count over their wrongs, the extortion practised on them, and all the rest of the misfortunes of slavery. “For,” he declared, “we are no longer regarded as allies, as once we were, but as slaves. When does a governor come to us with full commission, even though his suite would be burdensome and insolent if he came? We are handed over to prefects and centurions: after one band is satisfied with murder and spoils, the troops are shifted, and new purses are looked for to be filled and varied pretexts for plundering are sought. We are threatened with a levy which separates children from parents and brothers from brothers, as if in death. Never has the Roman state been in direr straits than now, and there is nothing in their winter camps but booty and old men. Simply lift your eyes and do not fear the empty name of legions. But on our side are our strong infantry and cavalry, our kinsmen the Germans, the Gallic provinces that cherish the same desires as ourselves. Not even the Romans will regard this war with disfavour; if its outcome is uncertain we shall say that it was undertaken for Vespasian; for victory no account is ever rendered.”
15 1 His words won great applause, and he bound them all by their national oaths and barbarous rites. Men were despatched to the Canninefates to join them to their plan. The Canninefates live in part of the island; in origin, speech, and courage they are equal to the Batavians, but inferior to them in number. Presently by secret messages they won over to their cause auxiliary troops from Britain and the Batavian cohorts that had been sent into Germany, as I have stated above, and which were at that time stationed at Mogontiacum. There was among the Canninefates a man of brute courage named Brinno, who was of illustrious descent; his father had dared to commit many hostile acts and had shown his scorn for Gaius’ absurd expeditions without suffering for it. The very name of his rebellious family therefore made Brinno a favorite; and in accordance with their tribal custom the Batavians set him on a shield and, lifting him on their shoulders, chose him as their leader. He at once called in the Frisians, a tribe living across the Rhine, and assailed by sea the winter camp of two cohorts which were nearest to attack. The Roman troops had not foreseen the assault, and even if they had, they did not have enough strength to keep off the enemy: so the camp was captured and plundered. Then the enemy attacked the Roman foragers and traders who were scattered about the country as if it were a time of peace. At the same time they threatened to destroy the Roman forts, which the prefects of the cohorts burned, for they could not defend them. The Roman ensigns and standards with all the soldiers were concentrated in the upper part of the island under the leadership of Aquilius, a centurion of the first rank; but they had rather the name than the strength of an army: for when Vitellius had withdrawn the effective cohorts, he had gathered a useless crowd from the nearest cantons of the Nervii and Germans and burdened them with arms.
16 1 Thinking it best to proceed by craft, Civilis promptly rebuked the prefects for abandoning their forts, and declared that he would crush the revolt of the Canninefates with the cohort under his command; they were to return each to his winter quarters. It was clear that treachery lay behind his advice and that the cohorts when scattered could be more easily crushed; likewise it was plain that the real leader in this war was not Brinno but Civilis; the proofs of this gradually appeared, for the Germans, who delight in war, did not long conceal the facts. When treachery did not succeed, Civilis turned to force and organized the Canninefates, the Frisians, and the Batavians, each tribe in a troop by itself: the Roman line was drawn up to oppose them not far from the Rhine, and the vessels which had been brought here after the burning of the forts were turned to front the foe. The battle had not lasted long when a cohort of the Tungriº transferred its standards to Civilis, and the Roman soldiers, demoralized by this sudden betrayal, were cut down by allies and foes alike. There was the same treachery also on the part of the fleet: some of the rowers, being Batavians, by pretending a lack of skill interfered with the sailors and combatants; presently they began to row in the opposite direction and bring the sterns to the bank on which the enemy stood; finally, they killed such of the helmsmen and centurions as did not take their view, until the entire fleet of twenty-four vessels either went over to the enemy or was captured.
17 1 This victory was glorious for the enemy at the moment and useful for the future. They gained arms and boats which they needed, and were greatly extolled as liberators throughout the German and Gallic provinces. The Germans at once sent delegations offering assistance; the Gallic provinces Civilis tried to win to an alliance by craft and gifts, sending back the captured prefects to their own states and giving the soldiers of the cohorts permission to go or stay as they pleased. Those who stayed were given honourable service in the army, those who left were offered spoils taken from the Romans. At the same time in private conversation he reminded them of the miseries that they had endured so many
years while they falsely called their wretched servitude a peace. “The Batavians,” he said, “although free from tribute, have taken up arms against our common masters. In the very first engagement the Romans have been routed and defeated. What if the Gallic provinces should throw off the yoke? What forces are there left in Italy? It is by the blood of the provinces that provinces are won. Do not think of Vindex’s battle. It was the Batavian cavalry that crushed the Aedui and Averni; among the auxiliary forces of Verginiusº were Belgians, and if you consider the matter aright you will see that Gaul owed its fall to its own forces. Now all belong to the same party, and we have gained besides all the strength that military training in Roman camps can give; I have with me veteran cohorts before which Otho’s legions lately succumbed. Let Syria, Asia, and the East, which is accustomed to kings, play the slave; there are many still alive in Gaul who were born before tribute was known. Surely it was not long ago that slavery was driven from Germany by the killing of Quintilius Varus, and the emperor whom the Germans then challenged was not a Vitellius but a Caesar Augustus. Liberty is a gift which nature has granted even to dumb animals, but courage is the peculiar blessing of man. The gods favour the braver: on, therefore, carefree against the distressed, fresh against the weary. While some favour Vespasian and others Vitellius, the field is open against both.” 18 In this way Civilis, turning his attention eagerly toward the Germanies and the Gauls, was preparing, should his plans prove successful, to gain the kingship over the strongest and richest nations.
But Hordeonius Flaccus furthered his enterprises at first by affecting to be unaware of them; when, however, terrified messengers brought word of the capture of camps, the destruction of cohorts, and the expulsion of the Roman name from the island of the Batavians, he ordered Munius Lupercus, who commanded the two legions in winter quarters, to take the field against the foe. Lupercus quickly transported to the island all the legionaries that he had, as well as the Ubii from the auxiliaries quartered close by and a body of Treviran cavalry which was not far away. He joined to these forces a squadron of Batavian cavalry, which, although already won over to the other side, still pretended to be faithful, that by betraying the Romans on the very field itself it might win a greater reward for its desertion. Civilis had the standards of the captured cohorts ranged about him that his own troops might have the evidence of their newly-won glory before their eyes and that the enemy might be terrified by the memory of their defeat; he ordered his own mother and his sisters, likewise the wives and little children of all his men, to take their stand behind his troops to encourage them to victory or to shame them if defeated. When the enemy’s line re-echoed with the men’s singing and the women’s cries, the shout with which the legions and cohorts answered was far from equal. Our left had already been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian horse, which at once turned against us. Yet the legionary troops kept their arms and maintained their ranks in spite of the alarming situation. The auxiliary forces made up of the Ubii and Treveri fled disgracefully and wandered in disorder over the country. The Germans made them the object of their attack, and so the legions meanwhile were able to escape to the camp called Vetera. Claudius Labeo, who was in command of the Batavian horse, had been a rival of Civilis in some local matter, and was consequently now removed to the Frisii, that he might not, if killed, excite his fellow-tribesmen to anger, or, if kept with the forces, sow seeds of discord.
19 1 At this time a messenger dispatched by Civilis overtook the cohorts of Batavi and Canninefates which were on their way to Rome in accordance with the orders of Vitellius. They were at once puffed up with pride and insolence: they demanded a gift as a reward for their journey; they insisted on double pay and an increase in the number of cavalry; these things, it is true, had been promised by Vitellius, but the cohorts’ real purpose was not to obtain their demands, but to find an excuse for revolt. In fact by granting many of their demands Flaccus accomplished nothing except to make them insist all the more on things which they knew he would refuse. They treated him with scorn and started for Lower Germany to join Civilis. Hordeonius summoned the tribunes and centurions and consulted them as to whether he should check the disobedient troops by force; then, moved by his natural timidity and the terrors of his subordinates, who were distressed by the uncertain temper of the auxiliaries and by the fact that the legions had been filled up from a hasty levy, he decided to keep his soldiers in camp. Next, repenting of his decision and influenced by the very men who had advised it, he wrote, as though purposing to follow himself, to the commander of the First legion, Herennius Gallus, stationed at Bonn, to keep the Batavi from passing; and added that he would press hard on their rear with his troops. Indeed the Batavi might have been crushed if Hordeonius on one side and Gallus on the other had moved their troops from both directions and caught the foe between them. Flaccus abandoned the undertaking and in a second letter warned Gallus not to alarm the Batavians as they withdrew: this gave rise to the suspicion that war was being begun with the approval of the Roman commanders, and that everything that had happened or that men feared would come to pass was due not to the inactivity of the soldiers of the power of the enemy, but to treachery on the part of the generals.
20 1 When the Batavi were approaching the camp at Bonn, they sent a messenger ahead to set forth to Herennius Gallus the demands of the cohorts. This messenger said that they were not making war on the Romans on whose behalf they had often fought, but that they were weary of their long and profitless service and longed for their home and a life of peace. If no one opposed them they would pass without doing any harm; but if armed resistance were offered, they would find a path with the sword. When Gallus hesitated, the soldiers urged him to try the issue of battle. Three thousand legionaries and some cohorts of Belgians, which had been hastily raised, as well as a band of peasants and foragers, unwarlike but bold before they met actual danger, burst out of all the gates at once to surround the Batavi, who were inferior in numbers. But they, being veterans in service, gathered in solid columns, with their ranks closed on every side, secure on front and flanks and rear; so they broke through our thin line. When the Belgians gave way, the legion was driven back and in terror rushed for the rampart and gates of the camp. At these points there were the greatest losses: the ditches were heaped high with bodies and our men died not only by the sword and from wounds, but also from the crush and very many by their own weapons. The victors avoided Cologne and made no other hostile attempt during the rest of their march; they excused the battle at Bonn on the ground that they had asked for peace, and when this was refused, had consulted their own interests.
21 1 The arrival of these veteran cohorts put Civilis in command of a real army, but being still uncertain what course to adopt and reflecting on the power of the Romans, he had all his forces swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent a delegation to the two legions which after their recent defeat had retired to the camp called Vetera, bidding them take the same oath. They replied: “We do not follow the advice of a traitor or of enemies. Our emperor is Vitellius, for whom we will keep faith and fight to our last breath: no Batavian deserter therefore shall play the arbiter of Rome’s destiny, but rather let him expect the punishment his crime deserves.” On receiving this reply Civilis, hot with rage, swept the whole Batavian people into arms; the Bructeri and Tencteri joined, and the Germans, summoned by messengers, hurried to share in booty and glory.
22 1 To meet this threatening war that was rising from many quarters the commanders of the legions, Munius Lupercus and Numisius Rufus, began to strengthen the palisade and rampart of their camp. They tore down the buildings that had been erected during the long peace, and which in fact hadº grown into a town not far from the camp, for they did not wish them to be of service to the foe. But they did not take sufficient care to have supplies collected; they allowed the troops to pillage: so that in a few days the soldiers’ recklessness exhausted what would have met their needs for a long time. Civilis took his post in the centre of his army a
long with the pick of the Batavi, and to make a more frightful appearance, he filled both banks of the Rhine with bands of Germans, while his cavalry ranged the open plains; and at the same time the ships moved up stream. On one side were the standards of the veteran cohorts, on the other the images of wild beasts taken from the woods and groves, which each tribe carries into battle: these emblems, suggesting at once civil and foreign wars, terrified the besieged troops. In addition the besiegers were encouraged by the extent of the Roman ramparts, which had been built for two legions, but which now had barely five thousand armed Romans to defend them; there was, however, also a crowd of sutlers who had gathered there at the first trouble and who assisted in the struggle.
23 1 Part of the camp lay on a gentle slope; part could be approached on level ground. Augustus had believed that these winter quarters could keep the Germanies in hand and indeed in subjection, and had never thought of such a disaster as to have the Germans actually assail our legions; therefore nothing had been done to add to the strength of the position or of the fortifications: the armed force seemed sufficient. The Batavi and the peoples from across the Rhine, to exhibit their individual prowess more clearly, formed each tribe by itself and opened fire first from some distance; but when most of their weapons stuck uselessly in the towers and battlements and they were suffering from the stones shot down on them, with a shout they assailed the ramparts, many raising scaling-ladders, others climbing on a “tortoise” formed by their comrades. Some were already in the act of mounting the walls, when the legionaries threw them down with their swords and shields and buried them under a shower of stakes and javelins. These peoples are always at first too impetuous and easily emboldened by success; but now in their greed for booty they were ready to brave reverses as well, venturing even to use siege machines also, which they are not accustomed to employ. They had no skill in these themselves: deserters and captives taught them how to build of timber a kind of bridge, to put wheels under the structure, and then to push it forward, so that some standing on the top might fight as from a mound and others concealed within might undermine the walls; but stones shot from ballistae broke up the rude structure, and when they began to prepare screens and sheds, the Romans shot blazing darts at these with cross-bows, and threatened the assailants also with fire, until the barbarians, despairing of success by force, changed to a policy of delay, being well aware that the camp had provisions for only a few days and that it contained a great crowd of non-combatants; at the same time they counted on treachery as a result of want, and on the uncertain faith of the slaves and the chances of war.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 36