34 None of these facts escaped the knowledge of the Vitellians, for there were many desertions, as is always the case in civil wars; and spies, in their anxiety to inquire into the purposes of the other side, failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens quietly watched for their enemy’s imprudence to end in ruin, and, employing a common substitute for wisdom, waited to profit by their opponents’ folly. They began a bridge and made a feint of crossing the Po in the face of a band of gladiators; they also wished to keep their own men from spending their time in idleness. They arranged some boats at equal intervals, heading upstream, and fastened them together with strong beams at prow and stern. They also cast out anchors to make the bridges more secure; the cables they did not draw taut, but let them hang loose, so that when the river rose the line of boats was lifted without being disturbed. At the end of the bridge a tower was built and raised aloft on the last boat, that they might repulse the enemy by artillery and machines. Otho’s troops had built a tower on the opposite bank and kept shooting stones and firebrands at the Vitellians.
[35] Et erat insula amne medio, in quam gladiatores navibus molientes, Germani nando praelabebantur. ac forte pluris transgressos completis Liburnicis per promptissimos gladiatorum Macer adgreditur: sed neque ea constantia gladiatoribus ad proelia quae militibus, nec proinde nutantes e navibus quam stabili gradu e ripa vulnera derigebant. et cum variis trepidantium inclinationibus mixti remiges propugnatoresque turbarentur, desilire in vada ultro Germani, retentare puppis, scandere foros aut comminus mergere: quae cuncta in oculis utriusque exercitus quanto laetiora Vitellianis, tanto acrius Othoniani causam auctoremque cladis detestabantur.
35 In the middle of the river was an island, which the gladiators were trying to reach in boats, but the Germans swam across and anticipated them. When a considerable number of Germans had crossed, Macer filled some light Liburnian vessels and attacked them with the bravest of his gladiators. But gladiators have not the same steadfast courage in battle as regular soldiers, and now in their unsteady boats they could not shoot so accurately as the Germans, who had firm footing on the shore; and when the gladiators in their fright began to move about in confusion so that rowers and fighters were commingled and got in another’s way, the Germans actually jumped into the shallow water, held back the boats, and boarded them, or sank them with their hands. All this went on under the eyes of both armies, and the keener the delight it gave the Vitellians, the greater the indignation which Otho’s followers felt toward Macer, who was the cause and author of their defeat.
[36] Et proelium quidem, abruptis quae supererant navibus, fuga diremptum: Macer ad exitium poscebatur, iamque vulneratum eminus lancea strictis gladiis invaserant, cum intercursu tribunorum centurionumque protegitur. nec multo post Vestricius Spurinna iussu Othonis, relicto Placentiae modico praesidio, cum cohortibus subvenit. dein Flavium Sabinum consulem designatum Otho rectorem copiis misit, quibus Macer praefuerat, laeto milite ad mutationem ducum et ducibus ob crebras seditiones tam infestam militiam aspernantibus.
36 In fact the battle ended in flight, after the gladiators had succeeded in dragging off the boats that were left. Then they began to clamour for Macer’s life. Wounded as he was by a lance thrown from a distance, they had already attacked him with drawn swords, when he was saved by the intervention of the tribunes and centurions. Shortly after, at Otho’s orders, Vestricius Spurinna left a small garrison at Placentia and came with his cohorts of auxiliaries, Then Otho sent Flavius Sabinus, consul designate, to take command of Macer’s forces. The soldiers were delighted at the change of generals, but the numerous mutinies had made the generals dislike so troublesome a command.
[37] Invenio apud quosdam auctores pavore belli seu fastidio utriusque principis, quorum flagitia ac dedecus apertiore in dies fama noscebantur, dubitasse exercitus num posito certamine vel ipsi in medium consultarent, vel senatui permitterent legere imperatorem, atque eo duces Othonianos spatium ac moras suasisse, praecipua spe Paulini, quod vetustissimus consularium et militia clarus gloriam nomenque Britannicis expeditionibus meruisset. ego ut concesserim apud paucos tacito voto quietem pro discordia, bonum et innocentem principem pro pessimis ac flagitiosissimis expetitum, ita neque Paulinum, qua prudentia fuit, sperasse corruptissimo saeculo tantam vulgi moderationem reor ut qui pacem belli amore turbaverant, bellum pacis caritate deponerent, neque aut exercitus linguis moribusque dissonos in hunc consensum potuisse coalescere, aut legatos ac duces magna ex parte luxus egestatis scelerum sibi conscios nisi pollutum obstrictumque meritis suis principem passuros.
37 In certain authorities I find it stated that, prompted by their fear of war or by their disgust with both emperors, whose shameful wickedness was becoming better known and more notorious every day, the armies debated whether they should not give up fighting and either consult together themselves or allow the senate to choose an emperor. This, it is urged, was the reason why the generals on Otho’s side advised delay, and it is said that Paulinus had great hope of being chosen, since he was the senior ex-consul and by his distinguished service had won fame and reputation in his British campaigns. Now while I can grant that there were a few who silently prayed for peace instead of civil strife, and who wished a good and upright emperor instead of the worst rascals alive, still I do not believe that Paulinus, with his practical good sense, ever hoped for such moderation on the part of the people in that most corrupt age that the very men whose passion for war had destroyed peace would now abandon war from love of peace. Nor can I think that the two armies, whose habits and speech were so different, could ever have come to such an agreement or that the lieutenants and generals, most of whom were well aware of their own extravagance, poverty, and crimes, would ever have endured an emperor unless he was foul with vice and under obligations to them.
[38] Vetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque; nam rebus modicis aequalitas facile habebatur. sed ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere. modo turbulenti tribuni, modo consules praevalidi, et in urbe ac foro temptamenta civilium bellorum; mox e plebe infima C. Marius et nobilium saevissimus L. Sulla victam armis libertatem in dominationem verterunt. post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior, et numquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum. non discessere ab armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis civium legiones, nedum Othonis ac Vitellii exercitus sponte posituri bellum fuerint: eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eaedem scelerum causae in discordiam egere. quod singulis velut ictibus transacta sunt bella, ignavia principum factum est. sed me veterum novorumque morum reputatio longius tulit: nunc ad rerum ordinem venio.
38 The old greed for power, long ingrained in mankind, came to full growth and broke bounds as the empire became great. When resources were moderate, equality was easily maintained; but when the world had been subjugated and rival states or kings destroyed, so that men were free to covet wealth without anxiety, then the first quarrels between patricians and plebeians broke out. Now the tribunes made trouble, again the consuls usurped too much power; in the city and forum the first essays at civil war were made. Later Gaius Marius, who had sprung from the dregs of the people, and that most cruel of nobles, Lucius Sulla, defeated liberty with arms and turned it into tyranny. After them came Gnaeus Pompey, no better man than they, but one who concealed his purpose more cleverly; and thenceforth there was never any aim but supreme power. The legions made up of Roman citizens did not lay down their arms at Pharsalia or Philippi; much less were the armies of Otho and Vitellius likely to abandon war voluntarily. The same divine wrath, the same human madness, the same motives to crime drove them on to strife. The fact that these wars were ended by a single blow, so to speak, was due to the worthlessness of the emperors. However, my reflections on the character of antiquity and of modern times have taken me too far afield; now I return to my narrative.
[39] Profecto Brixellum Othone honor imperii penes Titianum fratrem, vis ac potestas pene
s Proculum praefectum; Celsus et Paulinus, cum prudentia eorum nemo uteretur, inani nomine ducum alienae culpae praetendebantur; tribuni centurionesque ambigui quod spretis melioribus deterrimi valebant; miles alacer, qui tamen iussa ducum interpretari quam exequi mallet. promoveri ad quartum a Bedriaco castra placuit, adeo imperite ut quamquam verno tempore anni et tot circum amnibus penuria aquae fatigarentur. ibi de proelio dubitatum, Othone per litteras flagitante ut maturarent, militibus ut imperator pugnae adesset poscentibus: plerique copias trans Padum agentis acciri postulabant. nec proinde diiudicari potest quid optimum factu fuerit, quam pessimum fuisse quod factum est.
39 When Otho left for Brixellum the nominal command fell to his brother Titianus, but the real authority was in the hands of the prefect Proculus. As for Celsus and Paulinus, none made any use of their practical knowledge; with the empty title of generals they only served to cloak the faults of others. The tribunes and centurions knew not what to do, because the better men were thrust aside and the worst held the power; the soldiers were enthusiastic, but they preferred to criticize their generals’ orders rather than to execute them. It was decided to move camp to the fourth milestone from Bedriacum, but the advance was made in such ignorance that, in spite of the fact that it was spring and there were many rivers all about them, the troops were distressed by lack of water. There they discussed the question of a battle, for Otho kept sending dispatches urging them to hurry, while the soldiers kept demanding that the emperor take part in the engagement; many insisted that the troops operating across the Po be called in. It is not so easy to decide what they should have done as it is to be sure that the action they took was the worst possible.
[40] Non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti confluentis Padi et Ardae fluminum, sedecim inde milium spatio distantis, petebant. Celso et Paulino abnuentibus militem itinere fessum, sarcinis gravem obicere hosti, non omissuro quo minus expeditus et vix quattuor milia passuum progressus aut incompositos in agmine aut dispersos et vallum molientis adgrederetur, Titianus et Proculus, ubi consiliis vincerentur, ad ius imperii transibant. aderat sane citus equo Numida cum atrocibus mandatis, quibus Otho increpita ducum segnitia rem in discrimen mitti iubebat, aeger mora et spei impatiens.
40 Setting out as if they were starting on a campaign and not going into battle, they aimed to reach the confluence of the Po and the Adua, sixteen miles away. Celsus and Paulinus refused to expose their soldiers, weary as they were with their march and weighed down with baggage, to the enemy, who, unencumbered with baggage, after marching hardly four miles, would not lose the opportunity to attack them either while in disorder on the march or while scattered and engaged in fortifying camp. Thereupon Titianus and Proculus, being defeated in council, sought refuge in the imperial authority. And it is true that a Numidian arrived post-haste with imperative commands from Otho, who, sick of delay and too impatient to rest on hope, rebuked his generals for their inaction and ordered them to bring matters to an issue.
[41] Eodem die ad Caecinam operi pontis intentum duo praetoriarum cohortium tribuni, conloquium eius postulantes, venerunt: audire condiciones ac reddere parabat, cum praecipites exploratores adesse hostem nuntiavere. interruptus tribunorum sermo, eoque incertum fuit insidias an proditionem vel aliquod honestum consilium coeptaverint. Caecina dimissis tribunis revectus in castra datum iussu Fabii Valentis pugnae signum et militem in armis invenit. dum legiones de ordine agminis sortiuntur, equites prorupere; et mirum dictu, a paucioribus Othonianis quo minus in vallum inpingerentur, Italicae legionis virtute deterriti sunt: ea strictis mucronibus redire pulsos et pugnam resumere coegit. disposita Vitellianarum legionum acies sine trepidatione: etenim quamquam vicino hoste aspectus armorum densis arbustis prohibebatur. apud Othonianos pavidi duces, miles ducibus infensus, mixta vehicula et lixae, et praeruptis utrimque fossis via quieto quoque agmini angusta. circumsistere alii signa sua, quaerere alii; incertus undique clamor adcurrentium, vocantium: ut cuique audacia vel formido, in primam postremamve aciem prorumpebant aut relabebantur.
41 On the same day, while Caecina was busy with the construction of his bridge, two tribunes of the praetorian cohorts came to him and asked for an interview. Caecina was preparing to hear their proposals and to make counter propositions when suddenly scouts reported that the enemy was upon them. The conversation with the tribunes was broken off, and so it remained uncertain whether they were attempting some plot or treachery, or rather had in mind some honest purpose. Caecina, dismissing the tribunes, rode back into camp, where he found that Fabius Valens had ordered the signal for battle to be given and that the troops were under arms. While the legions were casting lot for positions in the line, the cavalry charged, but, strange to relate, they were kept from being driven back within their entrenchments by an inferior force of Otho’s troops only through the courageous action of the Italian legion. This at the point of the sword compelled the beaten cavalry to wheel about and renew the battle. The legions of Vitellius formed in line without disorder,º for although the enemy were close by, dense thickets made it impossible to see their arms. On Otho’s side the generals were nervous, the soldiers disaffected towards the generals, wagons and camp-followers were mixed in confusion with the troops; moreover, the road, with deep ditches on either side, was narrow even for an army which was advancing quietly. Some of the troops were gathered about their proper standards, others were hunting to find theirs. From every side rose confused shouts of those running to their places or calling their comrades; soldiers rushed to the front or slunk to the rear as courage or fear prompted in each case.
[42] Attonitas subito terrore mentis falsum gaudium in languorem vertit, repertis qui descivisse a Vitellio exercitum ementirentur. is rumor ab exploratoribus Vitellii dispersus, an in ipsa Othonis parte seu dolo seu forte surrexerit, parum compertum. omisso pugnae ardore Othoniani ultro salutavere; et hostili murmure excepti, plerisque suorum ignaris quae causa salutandi, metum proditionis fecere. tum incubuit hostium acies, integris ordinibus, robore et numero praestantior: Othoniani, quamquam dispersi, pauciores, fessi, proelium tamen acriter sumpsere. et per locos arboribus ac vineis impeditos non una pugnae facies: comminus eminus, catervis et cuneis concurrebant. in aggere viae conlato gradu corporibus et umbonibus niti, omisso pilorum iactu gladiis et securibus galeas loricasque perrumpere: noscentes inter se, ceteris conspicui, in eventum totius belli certabant.
42 The sudden consternation and fright of Otho’s men were changed to indifference by an unwarranted joy, for some men were found who spread the false report that the army of Vitellius had deserted him. It was never discovered whether this rumour was spread by Vitellian scouts or whether it started on Otho’s side through treachery or by chance. In any case Otho’s men lost all enthusiasm for battle and actually cheered their foes; but the Vitellians received their cheers with hostile murmurings, and this made Otho’s men fear treachery, for most of them did not know the reason for the cheering. Then the Vitellians charged: their lines were intact; they were superior in strength and in numbers. However, Otho’s troops put up a brave resistance in spite of their disordered ranks, their inferior numbers, and their fatigue. The fact that in places the ground was encumbered by trees and vineyards gave the battle many aspects: the troops fought now hand to hand, again at a distance; they charged now in detachments, again in column. On the raised road they struggled at close quarters, pressing with the weight of their bodies behind their shields; they threw no spears, but crashed swords and axes thor helmets and breastplates. They could recognize one another, they could be seen by all the rest, and they were fighting to decide the issue of the whole war.
[43] Forte inter Padum viamque patenti campo duae legiones congressae sunt, pro Vitellio unaetvicensima, cui cognomen Rapaci, vetere gloria insignis, e parte Othonis prima Adiutrix, non ante in aciem deducta, sed ferox et novi decoris avida. primani stratis unaetvicensimanorum principiis aquilam abstulere; quo dolore accensa legio et impulit rursus primanos, interfecto Orfidio Benigno legato, et plurima signa vexillaque ex hostibus rapui
t. a parte alia propulsa quintanorum impetu tertia decima legio, circumventi plurium adcursu quartadecimani. et ducibus Othonis iam pridem profugis Caecina ac Valens subsidiis suos firmabant. accessit recens auxilium, Varus Alfenus cum Batavis, fusa gladiatorum manu, quam navibus transvectam obpositae cohortes in ipso flumine trucidaverant: ita victores latus hostium invecti.
43 In the open plain between the Po and the road two legions happened to engage. On the side of Vitellius was the Twenty-first, also called the Rapax, a legion long renowned; on Otho’s was the First Adjutrix which had never been in an engagement before, but which was enthusiastic and eager to win its first success. The First cut down the front ranks of the Twenty-first and captured their eagle; thereupon shame at this loss so fired the Twenty-first that they drove back the First, killed their commander, Orfidius Benignus, and captured many colours and standards. In another part of the field the Fifth charged and routed the Thirteenth legion; the Fourteenth was surrounded by a superior force which attacked it. Otho’s generals had long before fled. Caecina and Valens began to strengthen their forces by bringing up reserves; and a new reinforcement came when Varus Alfenus arrived with the Batavians. They had routed the gladiators who had crossed the river in boats, by meeting them with cohorts which cut them down while still in the water. So in the full flush of victory they assailed the enemy’s flank.
[44] Et media acie perrupta fugere passim Othoniani, Bedriacum petentes. immensum id spatium, obstructae strage corporum viae, quo plus caedis fuit; neque enim civilibus bellis capti in praedam vertuntur. Suetonius Paulinus et Licinius Proculus diversis itineribus castra vitavere. Vedium Aquilam tertiae decimae legionis legatum irae militum inconsultus pavor obtulit. multo adhuc die vallum ingressus clamore seditiosorum et fugacium circumstrepitur; non probris, non manibus abstinent; desertorem proditoremque increpant, nullo proprio crimine eius sed more vulgi suum quisque flagitium aliis obiectantes. Titianum et Celsum nox iuvit, dispositis iam excubiis conpressisque militibus, quos Annius Gallus consilio precibus auctoritate flexerat, ne super cladem adversae pugnae suismet ipsi caedibus saevirent: sive finis bello venisset seu resumere arma mallent, unicum victis in consensu levamentum. ceteris fractus animus: praetorianus miles non virtute se sed proditione victum fremebat: ne Vitellianis quidem incruentam fuisse victoriam, pulso equite, rapta legionis aquila; superesse cum ipso Othone militum quod trans Padum fuerit, venire Moesicas legiones, magnam exercitus partem Bedriaci remansisse: hos certe nondum victos et, si ita ferret, honestius in acie perituros. his cogitationibus truces aut pavidi extrema desperatione ad iram saepius quam in formidinem stimulabantur.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 191