54 Vitellius, however, after the loss of his cause at Cremona, concealed the news of the disaster, and by foolish dissimulation delayed the remedies for his misfortunes rather than the misfortunes themselves. For if he had only acknowledged the truth and sought counsel, he had still some hope and resources left; but when, on the contrary, he pretended that all was well, he made his situation worse by his falsehoods. A strange silence concerning the war was observed in his presence; discussion in the city was forbidden, with the result that more people talked. If they had been allowed to speak, they would have told only the truth; but as they were forbidden, they spread abroad more frightful reports. The generals of the Flavian forces did not fail to increase the rumours by escorting round their camp the Vitellian spies whom they had captured, showing them the strength of the victorious army and then sending them back to Rome. All these Vitellius questioned in secret and promptly had them put to death. Julius Agrestis, a centurion, exhibited notable courage. After many conversations, in which he tried in vain to rouse Vitellius to bold action, he persuaded the emperor to send him to see in person the enemy’s forces and to observe what had happened at Cremona. He did not try to deceive Antonius by any secret investigation, but frankly made known his emperor’s orders and his own purpose, and demanded to see everything. Men were despatched to show him the battle-ground, the ruins of Cremona, and the captive legions. Agrestis returned to Vitellius; and when the emperor denied the truth of his report, and even went so far as to charge him with having been bribed, he said, “Since I must give you a convincing proof of my statements, and you can have no other advantage from my life or death, I will give you evidence that will make you believe.” With these words he left the emperor’s presence, and made good his words by suicide. Some have reported that he was put to death by the orders of Vitellius, but all agree as to his fidelity and courage.
[55] Vitellius ut e somno excitus Iulium Priscum et Alfenum Varum cum quattuordecim praetoriis cohortibus et omnibus equitum alis obsidere Appenninum iubet; secuta e classicis legio. tot milia armatorum, lecta equis virisque, si dux alius foret, inferendo quoque bello satis pollebant. ceterae cohortes ad tuendam urbem L. Vitellio fratri datae: ipse nihil e solito luxu remittens et diffidentia properus festinare comitia, quibus consules in multos annos destinabat; foedera sociis, Latium externis dilargiri; his tributa dimittere, alios immunitatibus iuvare; denique nulla in posterum cura lacerare imperium. sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum hiabat, stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur, apud sapientis cassa habebantur quae neque dari neque accipi salva re publica poterant. tandem flagitante exercitu, qui Mevaniam insederat, magno senatorum agmine, quorum multos ambitione, pluris formidine trahebat, in castra venit, incertus animi et infidis consiliis obnoxius.
55 Vitellius was like a man wakened from a deep sleep. He ordered Julius Priscus and Alfenus Avarus to block the passes of the Apennines with fourteen praetorian cohorts and all the cavalry. A legion of marines followed them later. These thousands of armed forces, consisting too of picked men and horses, were equal to taking the offensive if they had had another leader. The rest of the cohorts Vitellius gave to his brother Lucius for the defence of Rome, while he, abating in no degree his usual life of pleasure and urged on by his lack of confidence in the future, held the comitia before the usual time, and designated the consuls for many years to come. He granted special treaties to allies and bestowed Latin rights on foreigners with a generous hand; he reduced the tribute for some provincials, he relieved others from all obligations — in short, with no regard for the future he crippled the empire. But the mob attended in delight on the great indulgences that he bestowed; the most foolish citizens bought them, while the wise regarded as worthless privileges which could neither be granted nor accepted if the state was to stand. Finally Vitellius listened to the demands of his army which had stopped at Mevania, and left Rome, accompanied by a long line of senators, many of whom were drawn in his train by their desire to secure his favour, most however by fear. So he came to camp with no clear purpose in mind, an easy prey to treacherous advice.
[56] Contionanti — prodigiosum dictu — tantum foedarum volucrum supervolitavit ut nube atra diem obtenderent. accessit dirum omen, profugus altaribus taurus disiecto sacrificii apparatu, longe, nec ut feriri hostias mos est, confossus. sed praecipuum ipse Vitellius ostentum erat, ignarus militiae, improvidus consilii, quis ordo agminis, quae cura explorandi, quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus, alios rogitans et ad omnis nuntios vultu quoque et incessu trepidus, dein temulentus. postremo taedio castrorum et audita defectione Misenensis classis Romam revertit, recentissimum quodque vulnus pavens, summi discriminis incuriosus. nam cum transgredi Appenninum integro exercitus sui robore et fessos hieme atque inopia hostis adgredi in aperto foret, dum dispergit viris, acerrimum militem et usque in extrema obstinatum trucidandum capiendumque tradidit, peritissimis centurionum dissentientibus et, si consulerentur, vera dicturis. arcuere eos intimi amicorum Vitellii, ita formatis principis auribus ut aspera quae utilia, nec quidquam nisi iucundum et laesurum acciperet.
56 While Vitellius was addressing the troops an incredible prodigy appeared — such a flock of birds of ill omen flew above him that they obscured the sky with a black cloud. Another dire omen was given by a bull which overthrew the preparations for sacrifice, escaped from the altar, and was then despatched some distance away and in an unusual fashion. But the most outstanding portent was Vitellius himself; unskilled in war, without foresight, unacquainted with the proper order of march, the use of scouts, the limits within which a general should hurry on a campaign or delay it, he was constantly questioning others; at the arrival of every messenger his face and gait betrayed his anxiety; and then he would drink heavily. Finally, weary of the camp and hearing of the defection of the fleet at Misenum, he returned to Rome, panic-stricken as ever by the latest blow and with no thought for the supreme issue. For when the way was open to him to cross the Apennines while the strength of his forces was unimpaired, and to attack his foes who were still exhausted by the winter and lack of supply, by scattering his forces he delivered over to death and captivity his best troops, who were loyal to the last extremity, although his most experienced centurions disapproved, and if consulted, would have told him the truth. But the most intimate friends of Vitellius kept them away from him, and so inclined the emperor’s ears that useful counsel sounded harsh, and he would hear nothing but what flattered and was to be fatal.
[57] Sed classem Misenensem (tantum civilibus discordiis etiam singulorum audacia valet) Claudius Faventinus centurio per ignominiam a Galba dimissus ad defectionem traxit, fictis Vespasiani epistulis pretium proditionis ostentans. praeerat classi Claudius Apollinaris, neque fidei constans neque strenuus in perfidia; et Apinius Tiro praetura functus ac tum forte Minturnis agens ducem se defectoribus obtulit. a quibus municipia coloniaeque impulsae, praecipuo Puteolanorum in Vespasianum studio, contra Capua Vitellio fida, municipalem aemulationem bellis civilibus miscebant. Vitellius Claudium Iulianum (is nuper classem Misenensem molli imperio rexerat) permulcendis militum animis delegit; data in auxilium urbana cohors et gladiatores, quibus Iulianus praeerat. ut conlata utrimque castra, haud magna cunctatione Iuliano in partis Vespasiani transgresso, Tarracinam occupavere, moenibus situque magis quam ipsorum ingenio tutam.
57 The action of the fleet at Misenum is an illustration of the weight that a bold stroke on the part of a single individual may have in time of civil strife. It was Claudius Faventinus,º a centurion dishonourably discharged by Galba, who brought the fleet to revolt by forging letters from Vespasian in which he held out to the men a reward for their treason. The fleet was commanded by Claudius Apollinaris, who was neither strong in loyalty nor determined in treachery; and Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor who at that time happened to be at Minturnae, offered himself to lead the rebels. These moved the municipal towns and colonies to action. The people of Puteoli became ardent supporters of Vespasian; Capua, on the other hand, was faithful to Vitellius; and so rivalry bet
ween communities became a part of the civil war. Vitellius selected Claudius Julianus to reconcile the troops, for when Julianus shortly before had commanded the fleet at Misenum, he had exercised his authority in a mild fashion. The emperor gave him to support his efforts one of the city cohorts and the gladiators that Julianus then commanded. When the two forces were encamped over against each other, Julianus did not long hesitate to join Vespasian’s party; then the combined forces occupied Tarracina, a town which was better defended by its walls and situation than by any ability on the part of the soldiers.
[58] Quae ubi Vitellio cognita, parte copiarum Narniae cum praefectis praetorii relicta L. Vitellium fratrem cum sex cohortibus et quingentis equitibus ingruenti per Campaniam bello opposuit. ipse aeger animi studiis militum et clamoribus populi arma poscentis refovebatur, dum vulgus ignavum et nihil ultra verba ausurum falsa specie exercitum et legiones appellat. hortantibus libertis (nam amicorum eius quanto quis clarior, minus fidus) vocari tribus iubet, dantis nomina sacramento adigit. superfluente multitudine curam dilectus in consules partitur; servorum numerum et pondus argenti senatoribus indicit. equites Romani obtulere operam pecuniasque, etiam libertinis idem munus ultro flagitantibus. ea simulatio officii a metu profecta verterat in favorem; ac plerique haud proinde Vitellium quam casum locumque principatus miserabantur. nec deerat ipse vultu voce lacrimis misericordiam elicere, largus promissis, et quae natura trepidantium est, immodicus. quin et Caesarem se dici voluit, aspernatus antea, sed tunc superstitione nominis, et quia in metu consilia prudentium et vulgi rumor iuxta audiuntur. ceterum ut omnia inconsulti impetus coepta initiis valida spatio languescunt, dilabi paulatim senatores equitesque, primo cunctanter et ubi ipse non aderat, mox contemptim et sine discrimine donec Vitellius pudore inriti conatus quae non dabantur remisit.
58 On hearing this, Vitellius left part of his troops at Narnia with the prefects of the praetorian guard; his brother Lucius Vitellius he sent with six cohorts and five hundred horse to oppose the threatened outbreak in Campania. He himself was sick at heart, but the enthusiasm of the soldiers and the shouts of the people demanding arms gave him fresh spirit, while he addressed the cowardly rabble, whose courage would not extend beyond words, under the unreal and pretentious names of an army and legions. On the advice of his freedmen (for the more distinguished his friends were, the less he trusted them), he ordered the people to assemble in tribes, and administered the oath to the members as they enrolled. Since the numbers were too great, he divided between the consuls the selection of the recruits. On the senators he imposed a contribution of slaves and cash. The knights offered assistance and money, while even the freedmen demanded to be allowed the same privilege. This pretended devotion, which was in reality prompted by fear, resulted in enthusiasm for the emperor; yet most men felt sorry not so much for Vitellius as for the unfortunate position to which the principate had fallen. Nor did he fail personally to appeal to their pity by look, voice, and tears; he was generous and even prodigal in his promises, after the manner of the timid. Nay, he even went so far as to wish to be called Caesar, a title which he had rejected before, but now accepted from a superstitious feeling with regard to the name, and because in time of fear the counsels of the wise and the words of the crowd obtain a like hearing. However, since all movements that arise from thoughtless impulses are strong at first but slacken with time, the senators and knights gradually began to fall away, at first with hesitation and when Vitellius was not present, later in open scorn and indifference, until in shame at the failure of his attempts he excused them from the services which they would not render.
[59] Vt terrorem Italiae possessa Mevania ac velut renatum ex integro bellum intulerat, ita haud dubium erga Flavianas partis studium tam pavidus Vitellii discessus addidit. erectus Samnis Paelignusque et Marsi aemulatione quod Campania praevenisset, ut in novo obsequio, ad cuncta belli munia acres erant. sed foeda hieme per transitum Appennini conflictatus exercitus, et vix quieto agmine nives eluctantibus patuit quantum discriminis adeundum foret, ni Vitellium retro fortuna vertisset, quae Flavianis ducibus non minus saepe quam ratio adfuit. obvium illic Petilium Cerialem habuere, agresti cultu et notitia locorum custodias Vitellii elapsum. propinqua adfinitas Ceriali cum Vespasiano, nec ipse inglorius militiae, eoque inter duces adsumptus est. Flavio quoque Sabino ac Domitiano patuisse effugium multi tradidere; et missi ab Antonio nuntii per varias fallendi artis penetrabant, locum ac praesidium monstrantes. Sabinus inhabilem labori et audaciae valetudinem causabatur: Domitiano aderat animus, sed custodes a Vitellio additi, quamquam se socios fugae promitterent, tamquam insidiantes timebantur. atque ipse Vitellius respectu suarum necessitudinum nihil in Domitianum atrox parabat.
59 While the occupation of Mevania had terrified Italy and had seemed to start a new war, it was also true that the timid retreat of Vitellius had increased the favourable feeling toward the Flavian party. The Samnites, Paelignians, and Marsians were jealous because Campania had anticipated them, and eagerly undertook all services required by war with the enthusiasm that attaches to every new devotion. Nevertheless, the army had been greatly exhausted by a severe winter storm while crossing the Apennines, and when the troops, though undisturbed by any enemy, found difficulty in struggling through the snow, the leaders realized what risks they would have run, had not that fortune which often served the Flavian commanders quite as much as wisdom turned Vitellius back. In the mountains they met Petilius Cerialis, who had escaped the pickets of Vitellius by disguising himself as a peasant and using his knowledge of the district. Cerialis was closely connected with Vespasian, and being himself not without reputation in war, was made one of the commanders. Many have reported that Flavius Sabinus also and Domitian had an opportunity to escape opened to them. Emissaries of Antonius by various cunning arts made their way to them and showed them the place to which to flee and the protection that they would have. Sabinus offered the excuse that his health was not fitted to stand fatigue or to engage in a bold enterprise; Domitian had the courage, but, in spite of the fact that the guards Vitellius set over him promised to join him in flight, he feared that they were planning treachery. And yet Vitellius himself out of regard for his own relatives, cherished no cruel purpose against Domitian.
[60] Duces partium ut Carsulas venere, paucos ad requiem dies sumunt, donec aquilae signaque legionum adsequerentur. et locus ipse castrorum placebat, late prospectans, tuto copiarum adgestu, florentissimis pone tergum municipiis; simul conloquia cum Vitellianis decem milium spatio distantibus et proditio sperabatur. aegre id pati miles et victoriam malle quam pacem; ne suas quidem legiones opperiebantur, ut praedae quam periculorum socias. vocatos ad contionem Antonius docuit esse adhuc Vitellio viris, ambiguas, si deliberarent, acris, si desperassent. initia bellorum civilium fortunae permittenda: victoriam consiliis et ratione perfici. iam Misenensem classem et pulcherrimam Campaniae oram descivisse, nec plus e toto terrarum orbe reliquum Vitellio quam quod inter Tarracinam Narniamque iaceat. satis gloriae proelio Cremonensi partum et exitio Cremonae nimium invidiae: ne concupiscerent Romam capere potius quam servare. maiora illis praemia et multo maximum decus, si incolumitatem senatui populoque Romano sine sanguine quaesissent. his ac talibus mitigati animi.
60 On arriving at Carsulae, the leaders of the Flavian party rested a few days and waited for the eagles and standards of the legions to come up. They also regarded with favour the actual situation of their camp, which had a wide outlook, and secured their supply of stores, because of the prosperous towns behind them; and at the same time, as the troops of Vitellius were only ten miles away, they hoped to have conferences with them and to bring them over. The soldiers objected to this policy and preferred a victory to peace; they were opposed to waiting even for their own legions, which would share in the booty as well as the dangers. Antonius assembled his troops and pointed out that Vitellius still had an army whose allegiance to him would be doubtful if the soldiers were given a chance to deliberate, but which would be dangerous if driven to despair. “The beginning of civil wa
r,” he said, “is necessarily left to fortune; but victory is always secured by strategy and wise counsel. The fleet at Misenum and the lovely district of Campania have already deserted Vitellius, and he now has nothing left out of the whole world but the land that lies between Tarracina and Narnia. We gained a full measure of glory in the battle of Cremona, but by the destruction of Cremona won greater unpopularity than we could wish. Therefore we should not long to capture Rome so much as to save it. You will have greater rewards and the greatest possible fame if you aim to secure without bloodshed the safety of the senate and the Roman people.” These arguments and others to the same effect quieted the soldiers’ impatience.
[61] Nec multo post legiones venere. et terrore famaque aucti exercitus Vitellianae cohortes nutabant, nullo in bellum adhortante, multis ad transitionem, qui suas centurias turmasque tradere, donum victori et sibi in posterum gratiam, certabant. per eos cognitum est Interamnam proximis campis praesidio quadringentorum equitum teneri. missus extemplo Varus cum expedita manu paucos repugnantium interfecit; plures abiectis armis veniam petivere. quidam in castra refugi cuncta formidine implebant, augendo rumoribus virtutem copiasque hostium, quo amissi praesidii dedecus lenirent. nec ulla apud Vitellianos flagitii poena, et praemiis defectorum versa fides ac reliquum perfidiae certamen. crebra transfugia tribunorum centurionumque; nam gregarius miles induruerat pro Vitellio, donec Priscus et Alfenus desertis castris ad Vitellium regressi pudore proditionis cunctos exolverent.
61 Not much later the legions arrived at Carsulae. The terrifying report that the Flavian army had been reinforced caused the cohorts of Vitellius to waver: no officer urged them to fight, but many to desert, rivalling one another in handing over their centuries and squadrons as a gift to the victors and as a security for their own reward later. From them the Flavians learned that Interamna in the neighbouring plain was defended by four hundred horse. Varus was despatched at once with a force in light marching order. He killed a few of the garrison when they resisted; the majority threw down their arms and begged for pardon. Some, escaping to the main camp, caused utter consternation there by exaggerated accounts of the bravery and the numbers of their enemies, which they gave to mitigate their own disgrace for having failed to hold their post. With the Vitellians there was no punishment for cowardice; those who went over to the Flavians received the rewards of their treachery; the only rivalry left was in perfidy. Among the tribunes and centurions desertions were frequent; for the common soldiers had remained steadfastly loyal to Vitellius until now; Priscus and Alfenus by abandoning the camp and returning to Vitellius set them all free from any shame of treachery.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 205