Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24)

by Publius Cornelius Tacitus

  5 Corbulo, however, favourably though matters were turning, decided not to press fortune too hard, and forwarded a protest to Vologeses:—”Violence had been offered to his province: siege was being laid to an allied and friendly monarch and to Roman cohorts. It would be better to raise the blockade, or he also would pitch his camp in hostile territory.” The centurion Casperius, who had been selected for the mission, approached the king at Nisibis, a town thirty-seven miles distant from Tigranocerta, and delivered his message with spirit. With Vologeses it was an old and deep-seated principle to avoid the Roman arms; nor at the moment was the current of events too smooth. The siege had been fruitless; Tigranes was safe with his garrison and supplies; the force which had undertaken to storm the position had been routed; legions had been sent into Armenia, and more stood ready on the Syrian frontier to take the offensive by an invasion. His own cavalry, he reflected, was incapacitated by lack of fodder; for a swarm of locusts had made its appearance and destroyed every trace of grass or foliage. Hence, while keeping his fears in the background, he adopted a milder tone, and replied that he would send ambassadors to the Roman emperor to discuss his application for Armenia and the establishment of peace on a firm footing. Monaeses he ordered to abandon Tigranocerta, while he himself began his retirement.

  [6] Haec plures ut formidine regis et Corbulonis minis patrata ac magnifica extollebat. alii occulte pepigisse interpretabantur, ut omisso utrimque bello et abeunte Vologaese Tigranes quoque Armenia abscederet. cur enim exercitum Romanum a Tigranocertis deductum? cur deserta per otium quae bello defenderant? an melius hibernavisse in extrema Cappadocia, raptim erectis tuguriis, quam in sede regni modo retenti? dilata prorsus arma, ut Vologaeses cum alio quam cum Corbulone certaret, Corbulo meritae tot per annos gloriae non ultra periculum faceret. nam, ut rettuli, proprium ducem tuendae Armeniae poposcerat, et adventare Caesennius Paetus audiebatur. iamque aderat, copiis ita divisis, ut quarta et duodecima legiones addita quinta, quae recens e Moesis excita erat, simul Pontica et Galatarum Cappadocumque auxilia Paeto oboedirent, tertia et sexta et decima legiones priorque Syriae miles apud Corbulonem manerent; cetera ex rerum usu sociarent partirenturve. sed neque Corbulo aemuli patiens, et Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur, despiciebat gesta, nihil caedis aut praedae, usurpatas nomine tenus urbium expugnationes dictitans: se tributa ac leges et pro umbra regis Romanum ius victis impositurum.

  6 By the majority of men these results were being acclaimed as a triumph due to the fears of the king and to Corbulo’s threats. Others found the explanation in a private compact stipulating that, if hostilities were suspended on both sides and Vologeses withdrew, Tigranes would also make his exit from Armenia. “For why,” it was asked, “should the Roman army have been withdrawn from Tigranocerta? Why abandon in peace what they had defended in war? Was it an advantage to have wintered upon the verge of Cappadocia in hastily erected hovels rather than in the capital of a kingdom which they had but lately saved? The fact was, the clash had been deferred, so that Vologeses might be pitted against another antagonist than Corbulo, and Corbulo risk no further the laurels earned in the course of so many years!” For, as I have related, he had demanded a separate general for the defence of Armenia, and it was heard that Caesennius Paetus was at hand. Before long he was on the spot, the forces being so divided that the fourth and twelfth legions, reinforced by the fifth, which had recently been called up from Moesia, and the auxiliaries of Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia, were placed at the orders of Paetus; the third, sixth, and tenth legions, and the old troops in Syria, remaining with Corbulo, while the rest were to be employed in conjunction or separately as the course of events should require. However, not only was Corbulo impatient of rivals, but Paetus, for whom it might have been glory enough to rank second to such a leader, treated his achievements with high disdain. “Bloodshed and booty,” he kept repeating, “there had been none; to speak of the storming of cities was nothing but a form of words it remained for himself to impose on the conquered tributes, laws, and Roman jurisdiction in place of a phantom king.”

  [7] Sub idem tempus legati Vologaesis, quos ad principem missos memoravi, revertere inriti bellumque propalam sumptum a Parthis. nec Paetus detrectavit, sed duabus legionibus, quarum quartum Funisulanus Vettonianus eo in tempore, duodecimam Calavius Sabinus regebant, Armeniam intrat tristi omine. nam in transgressu Euphratis, quem ponte tramittebant, nulla palam causa turbatus equus, qui consularia insignia gestabat, retro evasit; hostiaque, quae muniebantur hibernaculis adsistens, semifacta opera fuga perrupit seque vallo extulit; et pila militum arsere, magis insigni prodigio, quia [Parthus] hostis missilibus telis decertat.

  7 Almost at the same time, the deputies of Vologeses, whose mission to the emperor I have already noticed, returned without result, and Parthia embarked upon undisguised war. Paetus did not evade the challenge, but with two legions — the fourth, at that time commanded by Funisulanus Vettonianus, and the twelfth, under Calavius Sabinus — entered Armenia under sinister auspices. For at the passage of the Euphrates, which the troops were crossing by a bridge, the horse carrying the consular insignia took fright for no obvious reason and escaped to the rear. A victim standing by in the winter camp, while it was being fortified, broke away, dashed through the half-completed works, and made its way of the entrenchments. Fire, too, played on the javelins of the troops — a prodigy the more striking that the Parthian is an enemy whose battles are decided by missiles.

  [8] Ceterum Paetus spretis ominibus, necdum satis firmatis hibernaculis, nullo rei frumentariae provisu, rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum reciperandis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus, quas Corbulo integras omisisset. et capta quaedam castella, gloriaeque et praedae nonnihil partum, si aut gloriam cum modo aut praedam cum cura habuisset: longinquis itineribus percursando quae obtineri nequibant, conrupto qui captus erat commeatu et instante iam hieme, reduxit exercitum composuitque ad Caesarem litteras quasi confecto bello, verbis magnificis, rerum vacuas.

  8 Paetus, however, ignoring the portents, with his winter quarters still inadequately protected, and no provision made for his supply of grain, hurried the army across the Taurus range, with the avowed intention of recovering Tigranocerta and devastating the districts which Corbulo had left untouched. He took, in fact, a few fortified places, and gained a certain amount of glory and plunder, had he but accepted his glory with moderation or kept his plunder with vigilance. But, while he was overrunning in protracted marches districts impossible of retention, the grain he had captured was ruined, and winter began to threaten: he therefore led back the army, and, to give the impression that the war was now closed, indited a letter to the Caesar, as grandiloquently phrased as it was void of content.

  [9] Interim Corbulo numquam neglectam Euphratis ripam crebrioribus praesidiis insedit; et ne ponti iniciendo impedimentum hostiles turmae adferrent (iam enim subiectis magna specie volitabant), naves magnitudine praestantes et conexas trabibus ac turribus auctas agit per amnem catapultisque et balistis proturbat barbaros, in quo[s] saxa et hastae longius permeabant, quam ut contrario sagittarum iactu adaequarentur. dein pons continuatus collesque adversi per socias cohortes, post legionum castris occupantur, tanta celeritate et ostentatione virium, ut Parthi omisso paratu invadendae Syriae spem omnem in Armeniam verterent, ubi Paetus imminentium nescius quintam legionem procul in Ponto habebat, reliquas promiscis militum commeatibus infirmaverat, donec adventare Vologaesen magno et infenso agmine auditum.

  9 In the meantime, Corbulo occupied the bank of the Euphrates, which he had never neglected, with a still closer line of posts; while, to ensure that the task of laying a pontoon should not be impeded by the mounted squadrons of the enemy — already an imposing spectacle, as they manoeuvred in the adjacent plains — he threw across the stream a number of large-sized vessels connected with planking and surmounted by turrets, and, using his catapults and ballistae, forced back the barbarians, the stones and spears being effective at a range with which the counter-discharge of arr
ows was unable to compete. The bridge was now complete, and the hills in front were occupied, first by the allied cohorts, then by a legionary camp, with a speed and a display of strength which induced the Parthians to drop their preparations for invading Syria and to stake their whole hopes upon Armenia; where Paetus, unconscious of the impending storm, was keeping the fifth legion sequestered in Pontus, and had weakened the rest by indiscriminate grants of furlough, till news came that Vologeses was on the march with a formidable and threatening array.

  [10] Accitur legio duodecima, et unde famam aucti exercitus speraverat, prodita infrequentia. qua tamen retineri castra et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Paeto aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset: verum ubi a viris militaribus adversus urgentes casus firmatus erat, rursus, ne alienae sententiae indigens videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat. et tunc relictis hibernis non fossam neque vallum sibi, sed corpora et arma in hostem data clamitans, duxit legiones quasi proelio certaturus. deinde amisso centurione et paucis militibus, quos visendis hostium copiis praemiserat, trepidus remeavit. et quia minus acriter Vologaeses institerat, vana rursus fiducia tria milia delicti peditis proximo Tauri iugo imposuit, quo transitum regis arcerent; alares quoque Pannonios, robur equitatus, in parte campi locat. coniux ac filius castello, cui Arsamosata nomen est, abditi, data in praesidium cohorte ac disperso milite, qui in uno habitus vagum hostem promptius sustentavisset aegre compulsum ferunt, ut instantem Corbuloni fateretur. nec a Corbulone properatum, quo gliscentibus periculis etiam subsidii laus augeretur. expediri tamen itineri singula milia ex tribus legionibus et alarios octingentos, parem numerum e cohortibus iussit.

  10 The twelfth legion was called to the scene, and the measure by which he had hoped to advertise the increase in his forces revealed their inadequacy. Even so, he might still have held the camp and foiled the Parthian by a strategy of delay, had he possessed the strength of mind to stand either by his own decisions or by the decisions of another. As it was, no sooner had the professional soldiers given him courage to face an urgent crisis than he changed front, and, reluctant to seem dependent on outside advice, passed over to the opposite and more disadvantageous course. So now, leaving his winter quarters and clamouring that not moat or rampart but men and arms were the means assigned him for dealing with a foe, he led on his legions as if to contest a pitched field; then, after the loss of one centurion and a few soldiers whom he had sent ahead to inspect the enemy’s force, he retraced his steps in trepidation. And as Vologeses had pressed the pursuit less keenly than he might, his inane self-confidence returned, and he posted three thousand picked infantry on the neighbouring heights of the Taurus, where they were to bar the passage of the king: the Pannonian squadrons, also, composing the flower of his cavalry, were stationed in a part of the plain. His wife and son found concealment in a fortress known as Arsamosata, to which he allowed a cohort by way of garrison; thus dispersing a force which, if concentrated, might have coped more effectively with its shifting adversary. Only with a struggle, it is said, could he be brought to admit the hostile pressure to Corbulo. Nor was there any haste on the part of Corbulo himself, who hoped that, if the dangers came to a head, the glory of a rescue would also be heightened. Still, he ordered a thousand men from each of the three legions, with eight hundred auxiliary horse, and a body of similar strength from the cohorts, to prepare themselves for the road.

  [11] At Vologaeses, quamvis obsessa a Paeto itinera hinc peditatu inde equite accepisset, nihil mutato consilio, sed vi ac minis alares exterruit, legionarios obtrivit, uno tantum centurione Tarquitio Crescente turrim, in qua praesidium agitabat, defendere auso factaque saepius eruptione et caesis, qui barbarorum propius suggrediebantur, donec ignium iactu circumveniretur. peditum si quis integer, longinqua et avia, vulnerati castra repetivere, virtutem regis, saevitiam et copias gentium, cuncta metu extollentes, facili credulitate eorum, qui eadem pavebant. ne dux quidem obniti adversis, sed cuncta militiae munia deseruerat, missis iterum ad Corbulonem precibus, veniret propere, signa et aquilas et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus tueretur: se fidem interim, donec vita suppeditet, retenturos.

  11 Vologeses, on the other hand, though he had information that Paetus had beset the routes with infantry here and cavalry there, made no change in his plan, but by force and threats struck panic into the mounted squadrons and crushed the legionaries; of whom a solitary centurion, Tarquitius Crescens, had courage to defend the tower which he was garrisoning, repeating his sorties and cutting down the barbarians who ventured too close up, until he succumbed to showers of firebrands. The few infantrymen unhurt took their way to the distant wilds: the wounded made back for the camp, exulting in their fear the prowess of the king, the fierceness and numbers of the tribes, in one word everything, and finding easy belief among listeners agitated by the same alarms. Even the commander offered no resistance to adversity, but had abdicated all his military functions after sending a second petition to Corbulo:—”He must come quickly and save the eagles and standards, and the name which was all that was left of an unhappy army; they, meanwhile, would preserve their loyalty while life held out.”

  [12] Ille interritus et parte copiarum apud Syriam relicta, ut munimenta Euphrati imposita retinerentur, qua proximum et commeatibus non egenum, regionem Commagenam, exim Cappadociam, inde Armenios petivit. comitabantur exercitum praeter alia sueta bello magna vis camelorum onusta frumenti, ut simul hostem famemque depelleret. primum e perculsis Paccium primi pili centurionem obvium habuit, dein plerosque militum; quos diversas fugae causas obtendentes redire ad signa et clementiam Paeti experiri monebat: se nisi victoribus immitem esse. simul suas legiones adire, hortari; priorum admonere, novam gloriam ostendere. non vicos aut oppida Armeniorum, sed castra Romana duasque in iis legiones pretium laboris peti. si singulis manipularibus praecipua servati civis corona imperatoria manu tribueretur, quod illud et quantum decus, ubi par eorum numerus aspiceretur, qui adtulissent salutem et qui accepissent! his atque talibus in commune alacres (et erant quos pericula fratrum aut propinquorum propriis stimulis incenderent) continuum diu noctuque iter properabant.

  12 Corbulo, undismayed, left part of his forces in Syria to hold the forts erected on the Euphrates, and made his way by the shortest route not destitute of supplies to the district of Commagene, then to Cappadocia, and from Cappadocia to Armenia. Over and above the usual appurtenances of war, the army was accompanied by a large train of camels loaded with corn,º so that he had means of defence as well against hunger as the enemy. The first of the beaten army whom he met was the leading centurion Paccius, soon followed by a crowd of private soldiers, whose contradictory excuses for their flight he answered by advising them to return to their standards and test the mercy of Paetus:—”For his own part, he was implacable, except to conquerors.” At the same time, he went up to his own legionaries, encouraged them, reminded them of their past, and pointed to fresh glory:—”Their goal was not the Armenian villages or towns, but a Roman camp and in it two legions as the reward of their labour. If the glorious wreath which commemorated the saving of a Roman life was conferred on the individual soldier by the hand of his emperor, how inestimable the meed of honour, when the rescued were seen to be in equal numbers with the rescuers!” Animated with a common alacrity by this appeal and others similar, the troops — some of whom, with brothers or relatives in danger, had incentives of their own to fire them — marched day and night at their best speed without a break.

  [13] Eoque intentius Vologaeses premere obsessos, modo vallum legionum, modo castellum, quo imbellis aetas defendebatur, adpugnare, propius incedens quam mos Parthis, si ea temeritate hostem in proelium eliceret. at illi vix contuberniis extracti, nec aliud quam munimenta propugnabant, pars iussu ducis, et alii propria ignavia aut Corbulonem opperientes, ac vis [si] ingrueret, provisis exemplis Caudinae Numantinaeque [pacis; neque] eandem vim Samnitibus, Italico populo, aut [Hispanis quam] Parthis, Romani imperii aemulis. validam quoque et laudatam antiquitatem, quotiens fortuna contra daret, saluti consului
sse. qua desperatione exercitus dux subactus primas tamen litteras ad Vologaesen non supplices, sed in modum querentis composuit, quod pro Armeniis semper Romanae dicionis aut subiectis re[g]i, quem imperator delegisset, hostilia faceret: pacem ex aequo utilem. ne praesentia tantum spectaret: ipsum adversus duas legiones totis regni viribus advenisse; at Romanis orbem terrarum reliquum, quo bellum iuvarent.

  13 With all the more vigour did Vologeses press the besieged, at one time threatening the legionary encampment, at another the fort which sheltered the non-combatants; venturing closer in than is usual with the Parthians, on the chance of luring the enemy to an engagement by his rashness. His opponents, however, could with difficulty be drawn from their quarters and confined themselves to defending the fortifications; some by command of the general, others from cowardice or a desire to wait for Corbulo, coupled with the reflection that, if the attack were pressed home, there were the precedents of the Caudine and Numantine disasters. “Nor, indeed,” they argued, “had the Samnites, a tribe of provincial Italy, the strength of the Parthians who rivalled imperial Rome. Even the stout and lauded ancients, whenever fortune registered an adverse verdict, had taken thought for their lives!” Beaten though he was by the despondency in the ranks, the general’s first letter to Vologeses was couched less in the terms of a petition than of a protest against his armed action on behalf of the Armenians, always under Roman suzerainty or subject to a king selected by the emperor. “Peace was an interest of both parties alike: the king must not look solely to the present — he had come up against a couple of legions with the full forces of his realm. Rome had the world in reserve, with which to support the war.”

  [14] Ad eo Vologaeses nihil pro causa, sed opperiendos sibi fratres Pacorum ac Tiridaten rescripsit; illum locum tempusque consilio destinatum, quid de Armenia cernerent; adiecisse deos dignum Arsacidarum, simul ut de legionibus Romanis statuerent. missi posthac Paeto nuntii et regis conloquium petitum, qui Vasacen praefectum equitatus ire iussit. tum Paetus Lucullos, Pompeios et si qua C[a]esa[res] obtinendae donandaeve Armeniae egerant, Vasaces imaginem retinendi largiendive penes nos, vim penes Parthos memorat. et multum in vicem disceptato, Monobazus Adiabenus in diem posterum testis iis quae pepigissent adhibetur. placuitque liberari obsidio legiones et decedere omnem militem finibus Armeniorum castellaque et commeatus Parthis tradi, quibus perpetratis copia Vologaesi fieret mittendi ad Neronem legatos.