by Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions
13. Lieutenant Commander William Widhelm, quoted in Belote and Belote, 168.
14. In all the interviews and reminiscences of the Pearl Harbor attackers, the author has not found one reference to the use of voice radio, and many places where voice radio ought to have been used if it was available, but was not.
15. Sakai.
16. Prange, 1990, 28.
17. Prange, 1981, 161.
18. Prange, 1990, 27–8.
19. Prange, 1981, 160–162.
20. Prange, 1981, 268.
21. Aiken.
22. Not all the planned aircraft launched due to deck aborts. One fighter crashed on takeoff. Aircraft totals that hit Pearl Harbor were 183 in the first wave and 167 in the second. Arakaki and Kuborn, 61, 67.
23. Czarnecki, et al. Order of Battle Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941.
24. Lambert and Polmar, 40.
25. The accuracy standard for Japanese dive bombers is not known, but is likely as good or better. This estimate is taken from results achieved by Western dive bombers of the period. Smith, 1981, 37, 41, 53, 68, 69. CEP, Circular Error Probable, is a circle of a radius where 50% of the bombs would fall inside the circle.
26. Prange, 1981, 415.
27. McFarland, 99.
28. Mondey, 36, 73–77.
29. Lambert and Polmar.
30. Prange, 1981, 403.
31. Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3, para. 3a: “The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.”
32. Genda, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 25.
33. Haleiwa, Wheeler, Kaneohe, Bellows, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa.
34. Prange, 1981, 366.
35. Smith, 2001, 40. Note that the total of fighters shown is the 45 planned. There were 2 deck aborts, one from the chutai assigned to the torpedo bombers and one from the groups assigned to Kaneohe Field.
36. Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3.
37. Sakai, 48.
38. Clarke, 15.
39. Arakaki and Kuborn, 47.
40. Willmott, et al, 2001, 63.
41. Willmott, et al, 2001, 63
42. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 101.
43. Prange, 1981, 332, quotes two candidate sets of launch parameters: A) 20 meters altitude, 120 knots, attitude level, and B) 10 meters altitude, 100 knots, and a 1½ degree nose down attitude. He states that the first was selected as being the easiest to execute. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 284, provides a translation of a Japanese staff study which cites the two conditions were A) 20 meters altitude, 140 knots, 0 degrees elevation, and B) 10 meters altitude, 100 knots, 4.5 degrees nose up. The staff study does not indicate that one method was preferred or selected over the other. Genda, in “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation AI,” in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993. 29, gives the conditions as A) 150 knots, 65 foot altitude, and B) 100 knots (with lowered landing gear), 35 foot altitude. Gannon, in Admiral Kimmel and the Question of Shallow Water Torpedoes states that the approach settled on was “20 meters (66 feet) off the deck at 100 knots and with trim set to place the torpedo in the water at 17–20 degree incidence.” Following the author’s experience piloting propeller aircraft, and after discussions with Captain Chris Powers USN (ret.), a former carrier Air Boss and F-18 pilot, it is probable that launching at 20 meters altitude, 140–150 knots, level attitude, gear and flaps up was probably the selected approach. 10 meters at 100 knots would likely be perilously close to stall speed with the heavy torpedo load attached; the 140 knot approach would also allow sufficient speed to pull up and turn after weapons release, to avoid overflying the battleships and getting too close to their defensive AA automatic weapons. Even then, flying this profile in a heavily-laden torpedo bomber within the constraints of Pearl Harbor after clearing the turbulence and updrafts off the buildings of the Naval Supply Base (and while being shot at) would be tricky, requiring airmanship of the first order. Flaps and gear down would prevent immediate acceleration to clear the area and avoid defensive fires, making it a less-preferred method.
44. Aiken, 2001, 47.
45. Gannon.
46. Prange, 1981, 328.
47. Prange, 1981, 367.
48. Lord, 22.
49. www.historynet.com/lieutenant-zenji-abe-a-japanese-pilot-remembers.htm. Italics are the author’s.
50. Prange, 1981, 269–70.
51. The office of the Chief of Naval Operations knew in July 1941 that the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm had made fin modifications to its Mark XII aerial torpedo so it could be employed in water as shallow as 24 feet. According to Gannon in Admiral Kimmel and the Question of Shallow Water Torpedoes, this information was not provided to the Pacific Fleet Commander, a charge Gannon repeated at the National Press Club on 6 November 2003. However, in Gannon’s 2001 defense of Kimmel, Pearl Harbor Betrayed, he admits that Kimmel was warned by the CNO that ships in harbor should not be assumed to be safe from torpedoes. See 175–177. Thanks to Captain William O’Neil USNR (ret) for noting the discrepancies.
52. Toland, 185
53. The primary testimony on this discussion is Prange, 1981. Prange never mentioned that the Japanese considered this option. Willmott, et al, 2001, 81. It is unlikely that they considered using 250-kg GP bombs against torpedo nets, as the first wave D3A Val dive bombers were assigned to OCA, and the Japanese had shown resistance throughout the process to changing aircraft assignments. The Japanese 250-kg bombs with their 0.2 second delay fuzes could have been effective if adequate delivery accuracy was achieved. However, this solution would delay the torpedo bombers’ attack, which the Japanese did not relish.
54. Toland, 196. Willmott, et al, 2001, 81.
55. Werneth, 160–161.
56. Fuchida was in Japan at that time recuperating from broken ankles suffered during the Battle of Midway.
57. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 283–4.
58. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 202.
59. Willmott, et al, 2001, 63.
60. Smith, 1999, 61.
61. Smith, 2005, 155. Presumably this is per aircraft, and not per shotai.
62. OEG 431, 3.
63. There are many examples in Edwards.
Chapter 5: Pre-Attack: Training, Rehearsals, Briefings and Contingency Planning
1. David Aiken, Pearl Harbor History Associates, letter to the author.
2. Prange, 1981, 328–330.
3. Prange, 1981, 382.
4. Prange, 1981, 384.
5. There were five other plans to cover the possibility that the fleet was outside of Pearl Harbor, but no details are available.
6. Prange, 1981, 344.
7. Prange, 1981, 351.
8. Prange, 1981, 351.
Chapter 6: Execution of the Attack
1. Stillwell, 1981, 6.
2. Burlingame, 153.
3. Prange, 1981, 384.
4. Prange, Goldstein, Dillon, 1990, 34.
5. Agawa, 257.
6. Exact times are impossible to determine. Wheeler and Kaneohe were struck within minutes of each other. Kaneohe is a ten minute flight from Wheeler. It apparent that the standard track chart of the Japanese approach taken out of the official Navy account, Campaigns of the Pacific War, is incorrect, as it shows the Kaneohe attackers overflying Wheeler en route to their target. The Kaneohe attackers more likely split off upon landfall and headed directly to their target, perhaps along the northeast coast or slightly inland. Willmott, et al, 2001, 123.
7. Smith, 2001, 40. Aiken, 48. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 293.
8. Aiken, 48–52.
9. Aiken, 48. The cruisers were Raleigh (CL-7) commissioned in 1924, and Detroit (CL-8) commissioned in 1923. These ships participated in the Aleutians campaigns.
10. Lord, 65.
11. Aiken, 51.
12. This time is in accordance with New Orleans (CA-32) and Bagley (DD-386) ARs, those ships being pierside in the Navy Yard along one of the direct attack lanes for the torpedo bombers. Aiken indica
tes that the first Japanese torpedo against Battleship Row hit the water at 0757.
13. Likely the dredge that was working the channel south of Battleship Row.
14. Toland, 214.
15. Aiken, 50–51.
16. Aiken, 50–51.
17. Aiken, 51.
18. Commanding Officer, USS Nevada, Report of December 7, 1941 Raid, BB36/A9/A1615, December 1941.
19. Aiken, 51.
20. Madsen.
21. Slackman, 130.
22. Stillwell, 1981, 11.
23. Stillwell, 1981, 13.
24. David Aiken, from a forthcoming article on the attack.
25. Werneth, 43.
26. Prange, 1981, 535. Smith, 1999, 63, claims that the second wave dive bombers were given new orders while airborne to attack targets of opportunity, principally any heavy ships that had survived the earlier attacks. It is more likely, given the state of Japanese radio communications and airborne command and control, that these instructions were given prior to launch.
27. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 101.
Chapter 7: Assessment of the Attack
1. Ensign Taisuke Maruyama, quoted in Werneth, 177.
2. The CinCPAC Action Report gives these times as that required to bring the full anti-aircraft battery into action, which they said was based on the ships’ after-action reports. However, reading the ships’ reports, they almost always reported the time when they first opened fire (often with only one gun or a machine gun), not when the full battery was manned and ready. CincPAC had a vested interest in reporting a quick time, since it reflected on his efforts training the fleet and the readiness level he required in port.
3. Aiken, 50–52.
4. The US Naval War College Maneuver Rules (May, 1940) assigned a “Life” to each ship in terms of equivalent penetrating 14-inch shell hits. The battleships at Pearl Harbor had Life values of between 16.1 and 18.5 (Department of Intelligence, Naval War College. “Blue and Orange Fleets.” TEC-1B-36, June, 1936). The Japanese 18-inch aerial torpedo was valued at 3.0 equivalent penetrative 14-inch shell hits. Additional torpedo hits within 15 minutes of another had their effect increased by one-third, by two-thirds for any succeeding hits after that. Four hits achieved within 15 minutes would be scored as 3 + 4 + 5 + 5 = 17. Nevada and Oklahoma had a Life of 16.1, Pennsylvania and Arizona 17.2 and 17.1 respectively, New Mexico 17.3, Tennessee and California 17.7, and Maryland and West Virginia 18.5. The bonus value for hits within a small spaced of time reflects the fact that flooding would not have a chance to disperse over the full width of the compartment, and the free surface effect would accentuate the list. Longer intervals between hits also allowed ship’s damage control teams to control flooding and to counterflood.
5. OEG 428.
6. Washington (BB-47) was partially completed but had to be expended due to limits imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty.
7. Firemain water was used in some spaces for dewatering using eductors.
8. The “World at War” television series featured comments from Fuchida, who claimed that the attack on Taranto was of great interest to the Japanese.
9. The “Torpedo Attack Plan Against Ships Moored Around Ford Island” from Prange, 1981, 385.
10. Toland, 213. Utah had its main battery turrets removed and the barbettes enclosed within wooden deck houses. Otherwise, her superstructure was intact and her lattice foremast in place, making it impossible to believe that anyone would mistake her for Enterprise or Lexington. Toland’s description of her “stripped decks covered with planks,” implying that she looked enough like a carrier to justify the attack, is misleading. She looked enough like an operational battleship to neophyte torpedo bomber crews skimming over Pearl City 60 feet above the water to have them decide to attack. For pilots with twelve days in transit to brush up their ship identification skills, pilots who were warned about the presence of Utah, the error remains inexcusable. De Virgilio, 64, states that “Despite popular belief the Japanese did not mistake the Utah for an American aircraft carrier.” Aiken also attests from veterans’ interviews that the Japanese misidentified Utah as an operational battleship.
11. Aiken, 48.
12. During the war, the US WW I-vintage light cruisers operated out of South American ports patrolling for German merchant raiders and blockade runners. This was useful duty, but certainly not one that would have an impact on the course or outcome of the war in the Pacific. Sinking them would have had limited value to the Japanese.
13. Slackman, 77.
14. Aiken, correspondence with the author.
15. Prange, Goldstein, Dillon, 1993, 287. This could also describe Mori’s effort, where he broke off from attacking Helena to attack California.
16. Goldstein and Dillon, 1991, 173.
17. Commander, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, to The Chief of the Bureau of Ships. Subject: USS Arizona (BB 39)—War Damage Report. C-L11-1/BB/NY10 Serial Y-02149, 7 October 1943.
18. Memorandum for File, ANALYSIS OF THE LOSS OF ARIZONA, 31 October 1944. In Christopher C. Wright (ed), “The US Navy’s Study of the Loss of Battleship Arizona.” Warship International, Vol. No. 39, No. 3, 2002. 285.
19. Stillwell, 1991. De Virgilio, 1997.
20. The official American report gives the attack duration at 15 minutes. One Japanese veteran estimated the duration at 20 minutes from when the first bomb hit Ford Island to when he delivered his torpedo.
21. The official Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships recorded that Arizona sounded the air raid alarm at 0755.
22. Stillwell, 1991, 233.
23. The numbers of torpedo hits has been a subject of considerable debate. Some historians argue for more hits than were finally decided upon by Navy salvage and repair crews. They argue that some of the torpedoes may have hit near the blast hole caused by an earlier torpedo, and thus did not leave an individual hole in the ship. The ships were moored so close together that the shock of a hit on one ship was often misinterpreted as a hit aboard other ships, inflating the reports by witnesses.
24. The British attack at Taranto was executed at night, against a very heavy and alert AA defense employing blinding searchlights, and with the lines of approach defended by barrage balloons and torpedo nets. There were considerably fewer attackers to split the enemy fire, and they arrived in two waves, allowing more fire to be concentrated on each aircraft.
25. Prange, 1981, 382.
26. Peattie, 146.
27. During modifications all of the battleships received a heavily-augmented AA armament, including 5”/38 guns in either single or twin enclosed armored mounts. The heavy automatic weapons (40mm and 1.1”/75 guns) were mounted in gun tubs surrounded by splinter shields.
28. OEG 431, 10.
29. Nathan Okun, correspondence with the author.
30. 81 D3A Vals were planned, with three deck aborts.
31. Prange, 1981, 536.
32. Damaging near misses (DNM) are scored if the near miss required shipyard assistance to repair the damage, thus disregarding incidental fragmentation damage. The Pennsylvania (BB-38) DNM was on the dock off the bow which caused fragmentation damage in an area where the ship was also damaged by fire and fragments from explosions on the Cassin (DD-372) and Downes (DD-375). Not included are one near miss on Cummins (DD-365), which dented some bulkheads, put two holes in the superstructure, and wounded three, or those that inflicted incidental damage on Rigel (AR-11), multiple near misses which caused about 150 small holes in the port quarter (repaired by ship’s force) and destroyed a motor whale boat in the water, with a total of seven wounded. These bombs might have been aimed at New Orleans (CA-32) or San Francisco (CA-38) in the shipyard.
33. Smith, 2005, 174, puts the hit percentage at “between 26 percent and 27 percent.” However, he counts as hits fragmentation damage against Cummings (DD-365), Rigel (AR-11), and New Orleans (CA-38). New Orleans’ damage was similarly inconsequential, consisting of a few dozen holes in thin plating, none of which impaired the ship’s
combat capability, and an easily-repaired severed aviation fuel line, with no personnel casualties. These have not been assessed as hits or DNMs as they contributed nothing to the Japanese mission objectives.
34. Smith, 2005, 152.
35. Striking Power of Air-Borne Weapons, 15.
36. Air Operations Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 87.
37. Fuchida attested that he considered ordering an attack on Nevada, so presumably he felt he had the command and control to order such an attack to occur or not to occur.
38. Stillwell, 1981, 148.
39. Madsen, 15–16.
40. Madsen, 17.
41. Cohen, 112.
42. Lord, 150.
43. “Gedunk” was sailor’s slang for snacks such as ice cream and candy bars. This vehicle is also known as the “Roach Coach.” The traditional announcement on the 1MC, “the Roach Coach is making its approach,” is often banned by modern skippers.
44. Slackman, 126–7.
45. Okun, correspondence with the author.
46. Arakaki and Kuborn, 76.
47. Peattie, 113.
48. Peattie, 133.
49. Peattie, 44–45.
50. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 142–3.
51. Prange, 1981, 533.
52. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 280.
53. Military Analysis Division, 2.
54. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 290.
55. Peattie, 146.
56. Lord, 139.
57. Lord, 110.
58. Lambert and Polmar, 109–150.
59. Some of this strafing may have been conducted by bombers, but Japanese veterans did not indicate that bombers engaged in much strafing. Some of the damage might actually have been caused by AA rounds descending from the harbor. It is impossible to separate out these actions from those of the fighters. The extent of strafing of civilian targets was much less than initially reported.
60. Prange, 1981, 529.
61. Slackman, 148.
62. Wallin, 195.
63. Washington Naval Treaty, Chapter II Part 3 Section 1.
64. Stephen, 99.
65. Stephenson, www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=8601.1080