Eisenhower shared Dulles’s fury. In the afternoon of October 30, while meeting with Arthur Flemming, the director of defense mobilization, to review the global impact of the Israeli invasion upon the world’s oil supplies, Eisenhower said he was “extremely angry” at his allies. He expected that world oil markets would be thrown into disarray, that the British and French would soon need to find alternative sources of oil and would find themselves “short of dollars to finance these operations.” Anticipating a sudden increase in his leverage over his ill-behaved friends, Eisenhower mused that Britain and France were going to have a rough time of it, and should be left “to boil in their own oil, so to speak.”33
One week away from a presidential election, Eisenhower had to face the domestic politics of the crisis. In a harsh attack, Adlai Stevenson denounced the “blundering vacillation” of the Eisenhower team toward events in Hungary and the Middle East. He claimed Dulles had appeased the Soviets over Hungary while alienating America’s closest friends, including Israel. Adams, in a telephone call with Dulles, confessed his own concerns about how Eisenhower “looks to the country and to the world.” The British and the French had “trapped” us, he said, and he implied that the allies had made Eisenhower look weak. He suggested that the president should address the nation and explain America’s response to the growing crisis. Dulles agreed.34
That evening the UN Security Council debated a resolution calling for Israel to withdraw its forces from Egypt. In an unprecedented development, the United States and the Soviet Union supported the measure, but Britain and France vetoed it. The next day, October 31, with the Egyptians having scorned the Western ultimatum, British and French forces began to bomb Egyptian airfields, ports, railways, and radio towers. They justified these air attacks as a necessary preliminary operation before their troops could land and secure the canal. Eisenhower and the United States had been ignored. The crisis in Suez had cleft the Western alliance in two.35
Emmet Hughes described the atmosphere in the White House on October 31 as “thick and heavy with righteous wrath against Britain.” The president seemed deflated by the treachery of his wartime allies. “I just don’t know what got into those people,” he sighed. “It’s the damnedest business I ever saw supposedly intelligent governments get themselves into.” Eisenhower at last consented to Adams’s request that he speak to the nation on television, triggering a whirlwind of activity as the staff now drafted and redrafted the president’s remarks. Eisenhower hit golf balls on the White House lawn while Hughes raced to write a 15-minute speech that recounted the recent events, explained American policy, and avoided too much direct criticism of America’s NATO allies. At four minutes before 7:00 p.m. Hughes handed Eisenhower the last page of text, typed in large print, with key passages underlined for emphasis. Dressed in a trim gray suit, seated at his desk in the Oval Office under glaring spotlights, Eisenhower “seemed the most calm man in the room.” At 7:00 on the dot the president began to speak.36
His remarks aimed above all to reassure the public that the events in Hungary and Suez would not lead to an American war. He spent half his time praising the courageous Hungarians for their devotion to freedom and calling on the Soviets to respect Hungarian independence. He then admonished the British and French for violating Egypt’s sovereignty, though he hastened to condemn Egypt’s behavior in purchasing Soviet weapons and nationalizing the Suez Canal. The invasion he described as an “error.” America, he pointedly said, “was not consulted in any way” beforehand. He insisted that the whole affair be taken to the United Nations and resolved with respect for international law. “There can be no peace without law,” he concluded. “And there can be no law if we invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends.”37
The Los Angeles Times praised Eisenhower’s “calm, mature appeal” for peace and justice and applauded the nation’s “competent pilot.” But the Washington Post editorial page, while admitting that the mess in the Middle East was not Eisenhower’s fault, nonetheless stated that “American policy—or lack of policy—has failed.” And columnist Walter Lippmann, a reliable critic of the administration, piled on. Eisenhower’s criticism of Israel amounted to a “grave mistake.” Lippmann saw Nasser as an “implacable enemy” with a plan to “become master of the Arab world,” and all Eisenhower seemed to offer was appeasement. The results spoke for themselves: the fires of war now burned across the Middle East, NATO was shattered, the Soviets were running roughshod over Hungary, and Eisenhower’s call for peace was ignored. If Eisenhower was going to show leadership, and actually impose order on these sad events, he had waited long enough.38
VI
Anyone wishing to make the case for Eisenhower as a master of the arts of politics and diplomacy need only look to the first 10 days of November 1956. In these anxious hours any mistake or miscalculation could have led to global war. Eisenhower demonstrated uncanny discipline, steadfast leadership, and cool judgment. No less than John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Eisenhower managed the dispute over Suez with assurance and wisdom that headed off what could easily have become a far more deadly conflagration.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 1 the president convened the National Security Council. The discussion turned first to Eastern Europe. CIA director Dulles informed the group that “a miracle” had occurred in Hungary. In order to ease popular unrest, the Hungarian communist leadership, with Soviet approval, had installed the moderate Imre Nagy as prime minister, hoping he could use his popularity with the people to stem the rebellion. The Soviet troops, which for days had been locked in fierce conflict with the Hungarians, appeared to be withdrawing. Nagy, perhaps inflamed by the intense anti-Soviet emotions in the streets of Budapest, asserted Hungary’s independence. On October 30 he announced the end of one-party rule in Hungary and the revival of multiparty democracy. This opened the way to the formation of a coalition government made up of members of the once-outlawed noncommunist parties. On October 31, in his boldest move, Nagy declared the Hungarian government’s intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Astonishingly the Soviets made no move to challenge Nagy’s apostasy.39
While the NSC cheered this outcome as a defeat of Soviet imperialism in Europe, the apparent Soviet tolerance for Nagy’s neutralist actions presented the Western powers with a dilemma. By appearing to respect Hungary’s independence, the USSR positioned itself on the moral high ground at the United Nations, from which it could more effectively denounce the invasion of Egypt. Soviet restraint in Hungary therefore only intensified the need for Eisenhower to keep up American criticism of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez, lest the United States be seen as condoning aggression at the very moment the Soviets were tolerating Hungarian neutralism.
This concern not to be outfoxed by the Soviets and to avoid being tarnished by the brush of old-fashioned European colonialism preoccupied Eisenhower. “These [colonial] powers were going downhill,” he stated emphatically. “How could we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world?” Nothing would ever induce the United States to “abandon” its oldest allies. Still, he insisted, “if we did not do something to indicate some vigor in the way of asserting our leadership, the Soviets would take over the leadership from us.” For this reason he and Foster Dulles together worked out the language of a fairly mild resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations—where the British and French could not exercise a veto. The resolution called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of combatant forces from Egypt. At the same time, on Eisenhower’s orders, Dulles announced that the United States would suspend all shipments of military supplies to the “area of hostilities.” Since the United States had already suspended military sales to Egypt, this effectively meant cutting off military aid to Israel.40
This was an unprecedented, even shocking step: one week before the presidential election, Eisenhower announced a cutoff of military aid to Israel at the very moment Is
rael was fighting an Arab state with clear Soviet sympathies. And his secretary of state strongly agreed with the decision. In response to a vigorous challenge launched in the NSC by Harold Stassen, who argued for accepting the Israeli seizure of Sinai as a fait accompli and backing Israel, Dulles bristled: “We do not approve of murder. We have simply got to refrain from resort to force in settling international disputes.” Throughout the crisis Eisenhower consistently held to this position, even though some in his cabinet and many in the press disagreed. He went so far as to record his views in a secret “memorandum for the record.” He wrote that Israel should not assume “that winning a domestic election is as important to us as preserving and protecting the interests of the United Nations and other nations of the free world in that region.” Eisenhower did not veer from this belief.41
Indeed the president personally shaped American policy in these trying days. Following the long and tumultuous debate among the NSC members on November 1, Eisenhower sent a short strategy paper to Dulles so there could be no ambiguity about the policy he wanted. “The United States must lead,” he wrote. The first order of business was to secure a cease-fire in Egypt. Eisenhower feared that if the United States did not act quickly, the USSR would introduce a “harshly worded resolution” against Britain, France, and Israel, compelling a U.S. veto and thus “putting us in an acutely embarrassing position.” Above all, “the Soviets must be prevented from seizing the mantle of world leadership.” In essence Ike wanted to discipline his own side in the cold war so he could sustain the narrative that the Soviet Union, not the Western powers, was the true source of conflict and trouble in the world.42
On the afternoon of November 1 Dulles flew to New York to make his case at the UN. He proposed a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all combatant forces and urged all UN members to refrain from sending any military supplies to the conflict zone. In fact Dulles wanted to do more than squelch a brush-fire war in Sinai. Speaking before the General Assembly, on the world stage, Dulles sought to portray America as an impartial adjudicator of world affairs. In a moving and obviously heartfelt address, he told the General Assembly, “The United States finds itself unable to agree with three nations with which it has ties of deep friendship, of admiration and of respect, and two of which constitute our oldest and most trusted and reliable allies.” It was a public slap in the face for Britain and France.
Dulles acknowledged that Egypt was hardly blameless in the affair and had aggravated relations with its neighbors. But if, “whenever a nation feels it has been subjected to injustice, it should have the right to resort to force in an attempt to correct that injustice, then I fear that we should be tearing the [UN] Charter into shreds, that the world would again be a world of anarchy, that the great hopes placed in this Organization and in our Charter would vanish.” Unlike so many interventions at the UN, Dulles’s speech won great acclaim. His resolution garnered 64 votes, with only five nations—Britain, France, and Israel, joined by Australia and New Zealand—voting against. The world had rallied to America’s leadership.43
That evening Eisenhower used a major speech to reinforce Dulles’s message. Though he had canceled all but one of his campaign events because of the world crisis, Ike knew his appearance before 18,000 wildly enthusiastic Republicans in Philadelphia’s Convention Hall would draw the nation’s attention. Rising above partisan politics, he reminded his listeners of the grave events in the world: “We have heard with deep dismay the crack of rifle fire and the whine of jet bombers over the deserts of Egypt.” In such an anxious time, he asked, what does American stand for? “What are the marks of America—and what do they mean to the world?” He gave a clear answer: Americans believed in the rule of law. That principle had won the admiration of so many millions of the world’s peoples. America was a land without “class or caste,” a country that did not judge a man by his “name or inheritance.” It was America’s mission to uphold the rule of law around the world. “There can be no second-class nations before the law of the world community.”
Eisenhower acknowledged that the crisis in the Middle East posed “a test of our principles” because it asked Americans to choose between friendship with old allies and respect for the law. But America had made its choice and would uphold the integrity of the law of nations. “We cannot proclaim this integrity when the issue is easy—and stifle it when the issue is hard.” Law must govern nations just as it must govern free peoples. “We cannot and we will not condone armed aggression, no matter who the attacker and no matter who the victim.” More than a campaign speech, Eisenhower’s remarks revealed his deep devotion to a world based upon law rather than force.44
These dual public speeches by Dulles and Eisenhower put heavy pressure on the British prime minister. Eden, who for so many years had labored in Churchill’s shadow, believed that his coup against Nasser would secure his place among the great British leaders of the century. He wanted to show the world that the British Empire endured. But it had all turned to ashes in his mouth. Not only had the U.S. president firmly rebuked the British, but the UN—following America’s lead—had spoken almost with one voice to condemn the invasion of Egypt, to denounce the warlike actions of the Anglo-French forces, and to demand the withdrawal of all combatants.
And Eden faced even more terrible news: his actions had placed Britain’s oil supply in jeopardy. In retaliation for the invasion of Suez, the Syrians destroyed three pipelines that carried oil from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Mediterranean for shipment to Europe. These pipelines carried 500,000 barrels of oil a day and amounted to a quarter of Europe’s Middle East imports. And the Egyptians sank old trawlers and barges in the narrows of the Suez Canal itself to halt all traffic—a sure way to interrupt the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. In a matter of weeks, British oil supplies would dry up. Eden had brought world opprobrium on Britain and placed his country on the brink of an economic crisis.
When, on November 3, Eden defended his Suez policy in the House of Commons, Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell ripped into him, calling on Eden to accept the UN cease-fire or risk shaming Britain in the eyes of the world. In a tumultuous debate Labour members shouted down the government ministers with cries of “Resign!” Huge crowds staged antiwar protests in Trafalgar Square. Even reliably pro-Tory newspapers such as the Times of London and the Observer denounced Eden’s policy as ill-conceived and illegal.
Eden had gone too far to flinch now, however. Late in the evening of November 3, while French and British aircraft continued to bomb Egyptian targets, the pain-wracked but impeccably groomed prime minister appeared on British national television. He confidently explained that the lessons of appeasement from the previous war demanded a confrontation with Nasser. “There are times for courage, times for action, and this is one of them.” It was Nasser, not Britain, who threatened world peace with his illegal seizure of the canal and his terroristic border raids against Israel. These actions had in turn triggered the Israeli invasion. Britain and France merely wished to restore order, ensure the smooth functioning of the canal, and separate the warring parties. Nasser’s failure to respond to the Anglo-French request to withdraw from the Canal Zone had made the use of force inevitable. It was strong medicine, Eden implied, but Nasser would have to take it until he was cured of his aggressive habits.45
Britain and France, then, would move ahead with their plans for a land invasion of the Suez Canal. Hoping to forestall this, the Canadian delegation at the UN, with strong American backing, proposed the creation of a UN peacekeeping force that would enter the Canal Zone and do the job that Britain had arrogated to itself. On the evening of November 3 the UN endorsed this proposal by an overwhelming vote of 57–0. The British and French abstained. But it was a race to see who would get there first: British and French soldiers or the blue-helmeted UN troops.46
In the midst of this whirlwind Eisenhower faced more unsettling news. Very late on the night of November 2, Foster Dulles had been taken to Walter Reed Hospital after suffering severe stom
ach pain. The doctors initially thought he might have appendicitis, but it soon became apparent that the 68-year-old had colon cancer. On November 4 surgeons removed a tumor from his large intestine. Eisenhower visited Dulles soon after the surgery and remarked to Gen. Leonard Heaton, the surgeon who had so recently opened up the president’s own abdomen, “Take good care of the boy. I need him.”47
Dulles remained at Walter Reed for the next two weeks and did not return to full-time work until January. In the meantime Herbert Hoover Jr., son of the former president and an engineer with an extensive background in the oil business, stood in as acting secretary of state. The absence of Dulles did not substantially change U.S. policy, though it left Eisenhower without his most loyal, most reliable lieutenant. Eisenhower and Dulles were not warm friends, although they spoke on the phone almost every day, sometimes two or three times a day, and had developed a close partnership. Dulles served the president like a lawyer serves his most important and valuable client: with tenacity and obsequious devotion. Dulles would take the reins of U.S. foreign policy again, but the cancer never retreated. He had only a little more than two years left to live.
VII
Just as Eisenhower began to despair about the Middle East, terrible news arrived from Hungary. The Soviets were invading again, and this time they meant to win.
The Soviet Union had installed Imre Nagy in power on October 24 with the intention of using this moderate and reform-minded leader to quell the Hungarian uprising. Instead Nagy had been captured by the euphoria of the anti-Soviet rebellion and declared Hungary’s intention to leave the communist bloc, setting off a panicked reaction in the Kremlin. Khrushchev and his colleagues worried that if Hungary could slip away from communist control just when Egypt, a potential client state, was being invaded by the Europeans, the West would have delivered a dual blow to Soviet prestige. In a secret meeting on October 31, Khrushchev and the Soviet Presidium ordered the preparation of Operation Whirlwind: the repression of the Hungarian Revolution by over 60,000 Soviet troops.48
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