by Adam LeBor
According to one version, Tito’s name came from his habit of giving brief orders: you – Ti – do that – to. As partisan leader Tito’s masterstroke was a political strategy that focused not just on some distant millenarian dream of a classless society, but also on a ‘national liberation struggle’. First the Germans had to be killed or expelled, and the Yugoslav nations freed from the Nazi terror. Once this was achieved, the partisans would set up a ‘liberation committee’ to run their new territories.
Momcilo (Moma) Markovic, future father–in–law of Slobodan, joined the partisans with his brothers Draza and Brana. (Brana was killed in 1942, but Moma and Draza later became senior politicians in Tito’s Yugoslavia.) Now in his eighties, Draza Markovic lives in Belgrade and vividly recalls his wartime years. ‘My duties as political commissar included moral and political education, explaining the movement and the war itself. We were fighting against the enemy occupiers and also struggling for a new society. But the fight against the enemy came first. That’s why we had wide support, especially from the peasants who faced inconceivable violence and terror.’4
Caught between the Chetniks, the partisans and the Ustasha were Bosnia’s Muslims. Bosnia was part of the NDH, and its leadership courted Bosnia’s Muslims, declaring them to be ‘the flower of the Croatian nation’. This apparent contradiction was resolved by the Ustasha claim that Bosnian Muslims were not really Muslims, but rather were Croats who had converted to Islam under the rule of the Ottoman empire. As such they should be welcomed back into the national fold. (They were also claimed by Serb nationalists.)
Through all these complications one simple truth is evident. Wartime Yugoslavia was a charnel house. Over one million Yugoslavs were killed in the years between 1941 and 1945, but many died at the hands of their compatriots in the civil war. About half of those killed were Serbs.5 Almost a third of all casualties, 328,000, were killed in Bosnia.
In October 1944, when Slobodan was three years old, Tito and the partisans liberated the capital, Belgrade, and then Pozarevac too. The swastika was replaced by the red flag. Across Yugoslavia a new, Communist regime was established. Although Svetozar was not a party member, as a teacher, and a respected pillar of the local community, he was appointed vice president of the regional Popular Front. Like many, Svetozar was duped. The Popular Front was a deception, widely used in eastern Europe as the Communists took over. The idea was to have a political structure controlled by Communists behind the scenes, but with non–Communist figureheads, to disguise its true orientation.
Stanislava had welcomed Tito’s victory. This was the Marxist dream in which she believed. Svetozar had increasing doubts. In Yugoslavia, and across eastern Europe, the educated, the middle class, those who owned property, were seen as the class enemy, and ground down. Bourgeois manners such as Svetozar exhibited – an educated way of speaking, soft hands – were now a sign of shame. Even his beloved Orthodox liturgy was considered suspect. The works of Marx and Lenin were the compulsory new gospel, to be ‘discussed’ at political meetings, discussion being a euphemism for parroting the party line. Conversations with friends and acquaintances were guarded, short, for who could be trusted? Evenings were spent at home, listening to the radio, or reading more party texts.
Yet many accepted all this as the price for building the new Jerusalem. As a loyal party member Stanislava did not question the decisions of the country’s male leaders. Milica Kovac, a widow in her sixties, was a member of the same local Communist Party branch in Pozarevac. ‘Stanislava was as straight as an arrow, and always held her chin high. She was a woman of great energy, with a strong voice that told you about her strength of character. She was a true believer in the idea of communism, and of equality.’6 She was a woman of upright bearing, boundless energy and social conscience, a fine role model for her pupils at the Petar Petrovics–Njegos primary school where she taught, remembers Kovac. ‘She believed that the party had set the right course. That was beyond question. She was a hard–liner. But she did not elaborate about these things. Her energy was dedicated to humanitarian work.’
In 1947, perhaps inevitably, Svetozar Milosevic returned to his beloved Montenegro. A deeply spiritual man, he could not settle in Pozarevac. ‘My father was not unhappy because of political differences with my mother,’ says Borislav. ‘It was much more the ambience in Pozarevac. He could not live in such an atmosphere. It was very provincial, it was a small city, and he was a man of the mountains.’ But Svetozar kept in touch with his family. He wrote and, when he could, he sent money.
Stanislava covered up her sadness at the break–up of her marriage by throwing herself into her work as a teacher and dedicated party member. Certainly everyone knew there was no point trying to hide a single dinar when Comrade Milosevic organised collections for the disadvantaged. Scrupulously honest, she ensured every coin was accounted for. Milica Kovac remembers her as ‘a real party activist, full of enthusiasm for humanitarian and volunteer work. She always insisted on collecting and distributing aid to poor families, especially the Gypsies. She was extremely strict about that. But she liked her word to be the last one. If she put forward an idea, she insisted it was accepted, and followed.’
In Pozarevac the town gossips clucked disapprovingly at Svetozar’s departure. The small town was still a deeply conservative society. Yet nobody could fault Stanislava’s dedication to her sons, or to the cause of Communism. Even nowadays, in a western European welfare state, it is difficult enough for a single parent to bring up children alone. In provincial Serbia during the 1950s this was a feat of Stakhanovite dimensions. The country was still recovering from the ravages of the war. Stanislava’s modest salary was enough to feed and clothe herself and her sons, but only just. The three of them lived in two rooms and a kitchen in a pre–war one–storey house, just off the main street. ‘She dressed modestly, because those were modest times,’ says Milica Kovac. ‘Nobody had money to be elegant or eccentric, especially not provincial teachers. She wore flat shoes, because of her height, and clothes in the usual colours of middle–aged women in those times, brown, black and grey.’
Beneath the modernist veneer of Communism, the country where Slobodan Milosevic grew up was profoundly traumatised. Tito’s Yugoslavia7 was made up of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. But whether in 1920, 1950 or 1990, Yugoslavia suffered from the same two fundamental weaknesses. The first can be described as philosophical. ‘Yugoslavism’, the doctrine of uniting the diverse south Slav peoples in one land, was an idea. For Yugoslavia’s educated, urban population it had great appeal, but high up in the mountains and down in the rural heartlands Yugoslavism took shallow roots. The call of the nation was far more powerful. Especially when in living memory former family friends had slaughtered each other because they had a different nationality.
The second weakness was constitutional. Serbia was the biggest and most powerful of the Yugoslav nations, as they were defined under the constitution. Serbs saw Yugoslavia as a means of ensuring that all Serbs lived in one country, including the Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, even if that country was called Yugoslavia rather than Serbia. So either Yugoslavia would be dominated by Serbia, or it would have to be constructed in such a way that Serbia would be constitutionally constrained. A Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia – dubbed ‘Serboslavia’ – would fuel the nationalist aspirations of the other republics. But a Yugoslavia with a weakened Serbia would increase Serbian resentment and fuel Serbian nationalism.
The Slovenian president Milan Kucan, like Milosevic, was born in 1941. He argues that the first Yugoslavia collapsed because nobody believed in it. ‘Yugoslavia fell apart in seven days in 1941. Nobody defended it because nobody felt it was their homeland. That was the consequence of a dictatorship established under Yugoslavia as Serboslavia. It was not understood as a homeland by Croatians, Slovenes or Macedonians. The raison d’être for the country ceased to exist. In the second Yugoslavia Serbs also often believed tha
t Yugoslavia should also predominantly serve Serbian interests.’8
Even so, after the war, for the young and the believers, these were days of hope. In many ways, Tito’s Yugoslavia was a remarkable creation. It was a multi–national federation, whose borders stretched from Austria, Italy and Hungary in the north to Romania, Bulgaria and Greece in the south. The rich ethnic mosaic also included substantial minorities such as Albanians, Italians, Hungarians, Turks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, along with Gypsies and the remnants of the country’s Jewish community, each with their own language.
Yugoslavia’s diverse cultures spanned European history, boasting a complex heritage of long–vanished empires. Here were the coastal towns of the Roman and Venetian empires, seaside cities such as Trogir and Split, and Dubrovnik, the medieval walled city that was the jewel of the Adriatic. Roman legions had marched through here; as had their successors the janissaries of Suleyman the Magnificent, and Napoleon’s rowdy armies. The Romans had built Diocletian’s palace at Split, the Ottomans the beautiful mosques of Sarajevo and Travnik with their needle–sharp minarets pointing skyward to Allah.
The French soldiers had bequeathed a love of wine and liberty. Like many foreign visitors they, too, were entranced by the fiery temperaments and almost oriental cheekbones of the country’s women, whom they christened ‘petit–chat’, now shortened to the slang word picka, an altogether less gallant term. Rome, Istanbul, and Paris all left their legacy, and Vienna too, which once ruled Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. The Habsburg spirit of civic pride lived on in the spacious squares and ornate apartment buildings of cities such as Zagreb and Novi Sad, in the former Habsburg territory of Voivodina, and stolid municipal buildings painted the characteristic Habsburg ochre stood as far south as Bosnia.
Tito had created eastern Europe’s own mini–Soviet Union, a diverse ethnic mix held together under the Marxist mantra of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’. The idea behind Brotherhood and Unity was admirable, if optimistic. The memories of the ghastly atrocities committed by the Chetniks, Ustasha and partisans were to be buried, and a new Yugoslav identity formed. Tito believed, probably correctly, that any genuine examination of wartime activity would pull his nascent country apart in bloody recriminations. But fifty years later, the price of his failure to come to terms with Yugoslavia’s past would be high indeed. Wartime memories, and victims, of massacre and murder did not fade away. Instead, like ice–age mammoths, they were perfectly preserved under Communism’s permafrost, ready to be dug up – sometimes literally – and displayed as proud symbols of victimhood when Yugoslavia began to collapse.
Tito’s six federal republics enjoyed considerable autonomy, and were run by their own Communist parties. But this autonomy existed only within the overarching state framework of the Federal Republic, which was responsible for national matters such as defence and national economic and foreign policy, conducted – in theory at least – in the spirit of brotherhood and unity. This was a delicate balancing act. Unlike France or Germany, Yugoslavia was not a nation–state. It was a state of six nations. The existence of, for example, the Serbian Communist Party, in the Serbian republic, allowed nationalist–minded comrades to assert some control over the destiny of their homeland. But at the same time, the fact that nation–based political structures existed at all gave nationalists a framework in which to operate.
Alone among eastern European Communist leaders Tito had broken with Stalin and survived. After the war Stalin had determined to Sovietise the country and install a pro–Moscow regime. Alex Bebler, later Yugoslav ambassador at the United Nations, recalled: ‘Russian [army] officers started behaving as if they were the masters and wanted to command our unit. Our officers did not like it and began to protest. Our officers were all partisans who fought in the war, and naturally objected to being deprived of their commands.’9
Stalin soon discovered that when he pushed in Belgrade, unlike in Warsaw or Budapest, the local Communists pushed back. Angry at resistance to his plans, he expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform (the international Communist organisation) in March 1948. At first, many Yugoslav Communists simply could not comprehend what had happened. There was fear, confusion, even suicides. Others proved more ideologically nimble. Draza Markovic observed: ‘We had looked to Moscow absolutely. Without any question, Moscow was the centre. But the Russians told so many lies about us, that we were revisionists, traitors, agents of the West and liars, so eventually it was not so hard to take that step.’ Fearful of Soviet armed intervention – for which preparations were indeed made – Tito launched a terror campaign. An Orwellian shift in propaganda announced the new party line, that yesterday’s black was now today’s white, and Moscow was no longer the benevolent uncle but a deadly enemy. Those Yugoslavs who were already suspect, or who switched allegiance from Moscow to Belgrade too slowly, were sent to a concentration camp on Goli Otok, an island in the Adriatic.
Aca Singer, later head of Yugoslavia’s Jewish community, and a prominent Belgrade banker in the 1970s and 1980s, was a prisoner at Goli Otok, sent there in 1951. Singer was no Stalinist, but his criticism of the government and his Jewish origins made him suspect. On Goli Otok the camp bosses demanded ever more fervent pledges of allegiance to Tito. This was a macabre new twist for Singer, a survivor of several Nazi camps including Auschwitz. ‘On Goli Otok you had to prove that you were pro–Tito, not pro–Soviet. The Germans did not ask me in Auschwitz to say Heil Hitler, but there I had to praise Tito, and shout “Long live Tito”.’10
In the West, Tito’s break with Stalin was greeted with euphoria. A Communist country that had leapt free of Moscow was a dream come true for Cold War policymakers. Material, military, and most of all, lavish economic aid poured into the renegade Marxist state. Washington supported the start of the series of loans from the IMF and World Bank that would prop up the Yugoslav economy for the next three decades. Yugoslavia’s geographical position in the heart of Europe, between Vienna and Istanbul, and its long Adriatic coastline gave it vital strategic importance for the United States and western Europe. Western tax–payers’ dollars for many years paid Yugoslav wages, viewed by European and American policymakers as a price well worth paying.
The break with Stalin signalled not only a massive influx of western aid, but also the start of a liberalisation unmatched in the rest of the Communist world. As Tito positioned himself as a buffer between the capitalist and Communist blocs, and billions of dollars poured in, the repression eased. Pozarevac transformed from a sleepy provincial settlement into a bustling regional centre. Pavements were laid, roads were asphalted and buildings went up. More shops opened, and eventually, a department store.
The town’s cinemas reflected Yugoslavia’s position perched between east and west. Cinema–goers could watch Dial M for Murder, westerns with Doris Day or admire Marilyn Monroe, as well the best of the 1950s Soviet film industry. ‘From the early 1950s we felt that we were back in Europe. We listened to Radio Luxembourg, especially at night. We knew about the latest new films, American, British and French new wave. We talked about films and music like young people in the west,’ remembers Seska Stanojlovic, a childhood friend of Slobodan Milosevic, and now a journalist with the Belgrade liberal news weekly Vreme. The two first met at the age of five, on a school holiday to the eastern Serbian mountains. Like all Yugoslav children they played not cowboys and Indians but partisans and Germans. Plenty of women had fought with the partisans, but Stanojlovic, like every girl, was forced to play a nurse. Slobodan was almost certainly a partisan.
In many ways Titoist Yugoslavia in the 1950s resembled austere post–war Britain. The state always provided just about enough, but luxuries were rare and there was little choice. Clothes and shops were drab. As Stanojlovic noted, everyone had but one of everything. But nobody froze or starved, even if supper was often bread covered with dripping or home–made jam. There was no television or central heating. Boilers were fired up with wood and coal, to warm enough water for a bath. Yet there was a fee
ling of optimism in the air, that fundamentally Tito was steering a good course, and life was getting better.
Although Stanojlovic’s family were members of the haute bourgeoisie, who had once owned considerable property, as a schoolgirl she was a loyal Communist. ‘My mother and my grandmother were quite rich. We had a big house and some land, but it was nationalised. My grandmother was angry, but I was a small child, and I just accepted that we were growing up in this kind of society. We accepted this idea of a new society, that we were all equal, as something normal, that this is how we have to grow up.’
Slobodan’s doting mother attempted to fill the vacuum left at home by the departure of her husband. Stanislava Milosevic became the centre of her son’s childhood universe. Stanislava was an ambitious woman for her children as well as herself. Other mothers made do with whatever clothes were to hand when they dressed their children for school. But Stanislava took care every day to send Slobodan out in a fresh white shirt, like a junior version of the Communist official she hoped he would be. The serious young boy made few friends at school and avoided sports. ‘Stanislava was a protective and dominant mother. Slobodan did not even go to the gym in case he sweated and caught a cold,’ says Milica Kovac. Milosevic gained the nickname ‘silky’. He never got into a fight, or raided the orchards in the lush farmland around Pozarevac. Friendless and fatherless, mocked for his weediness and unwillingness to join the rough and tumble of the playground, the young schoolboy instead took refuge in his studies. Milosevic spent his spare time writing for the school magazine and working for the pupils’ Communist youth organisation. And still, there was something different about the young Slobodan. Not exactly a star quality, but an aura of, at the very least, unusual determination. ‘Slobodan was his own person,’ said Seska Stanojlovic. ‘He was an excellent student. Even at that time it was clear to me that he was absolutely devoted to his personal ambitions.’