by Simon Heffer
Hankey described Lloyd George as ‘totally innocent’ of collusion, and said the war secretary had written to Asquith to say so – ‘I cannot restrain, nor, I fear, influence Northcliffe.’89 Asquith simply did not believe him.90 Geoffrey Dawson (né Robinson), editor of The Times, later told Lloyd George he had written the leader on his own initiative, without any prompting from Northcliffe, because he disliked the sound of the new arrangement, details of which had been given to him by Carson (and also picked up during a Sunday at Cliveden from Waldorf Astor). However, Northcliffe, by this stage, because of his loathing of Asquith, intriguing in favour of Lloyd George, had visited him at the War Office at 7 p.m. on 3 December, so he may not have been blameless in the matter, though Aitken maintained that Dawson ‘knew more than Northcliffe did.’91 That Asquith could not bring himself to believe his war secretary was not intriguing against him with the hated Northcliffe meant their relationship was in ruins; even had he known what Dawson claimed to be the truth, the absence of trust made future cooperation impossible.
It did not help that Asquith relied on McKenna, whose hatred of Lloyd George was unbounded, for counsel in these troubled hours. McKenna, who had agreed with Runciman as long ago as August that the government had run its course, told him to face his rival down and construct a new administration, presumably without Lloyd George.92 Asquith, in his letter that Monday morning, conceded he would not sit on the war committee, but insisted it would be subservient to him: ‘The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy. The Agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee.’93 Asquith’s confidence should have been boosted when, during 4 December, Curzon, Chamberlain and Cecil visited him to announce that they, and Walter Long, the president of the Local Government Board, did not imply by their desire for a reconstruction that he should retire: ‘They did not believe anybody else could form a Government, certainly not Mr Lloyd George,’ Crewe noted afterwards.94 Asquith took this to mean they would support him, and it made him bolder against Lloyd George. He was wrong. Long especially was far from sure Asquith should stay, since he shared Lloyd George’s view on the conduct of the war.
At 4 p.m. on 4 December Asquith told MPs he had seen the King and had submitted the resignations of his colleagues; and the Sovereign had agreed to a reconstruction. The King (who told Asquith ‘that I had the fullest confidence in him’) had consulted Haldane on whether, if asked to dissolve Parliament – something the King wanted to avoid – he had the right to refuse.95 Haldane said the King could only act on the advice of a responsible minister – his prime minister – and if he chose to reject that advice the prime minister would resign and he would have to choose another. The King seemed prepared to do this, Haldane (who regarded Lloyd George as ‘really an illiterate with an unbalanced mind’) having warned him not to enter into some sort of negotiation about who might end up as his prime minister.96 Parliament was adjourned, and would not reassemble for any meaningful business until the 12th. Stamfordham had seen Hankey that afternoon, and told him that he and the King regarded Lloyd George as a ‘blackmailer.’97 The King’s private secretary was so alarmed by developments that he even asked Hankey whether he thought the King should take more of a role in government. Hankey, fortunately for the monarchy, strongly advised against this, however dire the circumstances.
On the evening of 4 December Law turned up to see Asquith, urging him to go through with the plan as agreed the previous evening, for the sake of stability, with Lloyd George controlling the war committee. Asquith would not budge, and Law stressed that if he did not he could not count on Unionist support. Asquith summoned Grey, McKenna, Runciman, Samuel and Lewis Harcourt, the former colonial secretary, to Downing Street to ask their advice. They agreed that Lloyd George’s proposals ‘would be an abdication of Asquith’s position and be inconsistent with his responsibilities.’98 They told Asquith he should resign, and put the onus on Lloyd George to form a government. Asquith told them he feared, in that case, a Lloyd George–Carson government, with Labour breaking away and breeding a sizeable pacifist movement. He then wrote his second letter of the day to Lloyd George; and, in respect of the war committee, told him: ‘I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a Committee could be made workable and effective without the Prime Minister as its Chairman.’99 That chairmanship might be delegated sometimes to a subordinate, but if Asquith were to retain his authority as prime minister he would have to chair the war committee. He also insisted Balfour sit on it; and objected to Carson’s participation.
Esher, predictably, was au courant with events, and even ahead of them. That day he wrote to Haig that ‘in view of Lansdowne’s Memorandum and of the reluctance of Asquith to give a decision on Man Power, Food, etc, I think Lloyd George was more than justified in resigning.’100 That had not happened quite yet. Esher continued: ‘It is hoped by his friends that he will become Prime Minister. It is realised that Asquith would lead an opposition, and that in less than two months LG would be beaten in the H of C, and we should have a general election.’ Such expectation might explain why Esher, who despised Lloyd George, was so sanguine about his taking over. But he also realised that Asquith’s methods were untenable: ‘It may be the only method of extricating ourselves from an inertia that is going to lose the war.’ He also saw how things would change. ‘If LG does become Prime Minister, then his only chance of success is to govern for a time as Cromwell governed … It is no use to make a coup d’état unless you are ready with the whiff of grapeshot.’ He grasped what made Asquith’s rival different. ‘The organizing of our resources is the objective of Lloyd Georgism.’
The next morning Lloyd George received Asquith’s letter. ‘Indignant’, according to Scott, he said the whole affair ‘was only another illustration of the indecision and vacillation on the part of the Prime Minister which had proved so ruinous in the conduct of the war’. This time he really did resign, in a hair-splitting letter to Asquith in which he (fairly) accused him of a history of delays and hesitations and (unfairly) said his ‘supreme control of the war’ would have been unaffected had he stuck to their initial agreement.101 He showed Asquith’s letter to Law, for whom it was a defining moment: ‘I came definitely to the conclusion that I had no longer any choice, and that I must back Lloyd George in his further action.’102 Conveniently, Lloyd George made no allusion to The Times’s leading article. Derby resigned too, while protesting – with more sincerity than his former master – his loyalty to Asquith: he would visit Downing Street shortly before Asquith went to Buckingham Palace to offer his resignation, to implore him to accommodate Lloyd George, but to no avail. Curzon, Chamberlain and Cecil visited again and told Asquith that, given he had altered the circumstances by rejecting Lloyd George’s terms, the only option was for the whole government to resign. Cecil suggested that the ‘finest and biggest thing’ Asquith could do would be to offer to serve under Lloyd George, a suggestion Chamberlain noted was ‘rejected with indignation and even with scorn.’103 Chamberlain too was reluctant to serve, but Curzon and Cecil told him sharply that, if asked, it would be his duty to do so. Cecil followed up this verbal plea with a letter, arguing ‘on national grounds’ for Asquith to do this, but met with the same refusal.104
Asquith summoned his other Liberal colleagues, and Arthur Henderson, at 5 p.m. and read them his reply to Lloyd George, and Lloyd George’s letter of resignation: they agreed with Asquith. Later in the meeting Carson brought a letter from Law withdrawing Unionist support, and Balfour, still ill, tendered his resignation; he told Asquith he thought ‘a fair trial should be given to War Council à la George.’105 This was a betrayal of Asquith by the Unionist to whom he was closest, and to whom he had shown conspicuous loyalty. Nearly a year later Mrs Asquith asked Balfour’s
long-time friend the Earl of Wemyss: ‘Has it ever struck you Arthur is jealous of Henry? It took me a long long time to even suspect such a thing.’ Wemyss answered: ‘Has it ever struck me?!! My dear, what do you take me for? Don’t you know what Arthur is? Everyone has long known Arthur is jealous of Henry – very natural too.’106
Balfour’s resignation made Asquith see the impossibility of carrying on, so at 7.30 p.m. he resigned too. Cynthia Asquith, dining with her father-in-law that evening, found him ‘rubicund, serene, puffing a guinea cigar (a gift from Maud Cunard) and talking of going to Honolulu.’107 His serenity may be explained by his conviction, which Lady Cynthia discerned, that even if Lloyd George were asked to form a government, it could not last long. Mrs Asquith ‘looked ghastly ill – distraught’, and Lady Cynthia retailed the gossip that the King was ‘very terribly distressed’ and had allegedly said: ‘I shall resign if Asquith does.’108 He offered Asquith the Garter, which he declined. In his diary that day the King recorded: ‘I fear it will cause a panic in the city and in America and do harm to the Allies. It is a great blow to me and will I fear buck up the Germans.’109
The King saw Law late on 5 December and asked him whether he could form a government. Law said he doubted it, but would report in the morning. According to a note taken by Stamfordham, he told the Sovereign: ‘The one essential thing is a reformed War Committee, which could meet daily, and if necessary twice a day; come to prompt decisions upon which equally prompt action must be taken. The present War Committee has become almost impotent.’110 Law told the King he had asked Asquith to make this reform and been rebuffed; and that he was sure Lloyd George could form a government. In case Law was thinking of seeking a dissolution, the King, who deeply abhorred the idea of an election in wartime, said he would not grant one. Law urged him to reconsider, because he wished to retain the right to ask for a dissolution if his colleagues would not back Lloyd George. Law also told the King that Lloyd George believed the war had been ‘mismanaged’.111 Stamfordham noted: ‘To this the King demurred and said that the politicians should leave the conduct of the War to experts.’ He could not have made his view of Lloyd George clearer.
Thus Law left having not declined the job, but waiting to discuss with Asquith whether the Liberal leader would serve under him – which would change matters considerably. Law first saw Lloyd George, who, uncertain of his standing among Unionists but aware of his unpopularity among his former Liberal colleagues, said he thought a Law administration including Asquith might be the best option. Law went to Downing Street, where Asquith was dining with Crewe, and asked whether he would serve under him, or, if not, under Balfour (whom no one had yet consulted). Asquith refused and resumed his dinner.
The next morning Law, Lloyd George, Carson and Aitken met at Law’s house, and decided to sound out Balfour, who knew how little regard Lloyd George had had for his work at the Admiralty. Lloyd George had made no secret to his co-conspirators of what he thought of Balfour, but recognised the enormous clout Balfour had in his party, and how impossible it would be to proceed without his approval. Balfour was asked to a conference the King had summoned that afternoon, to include also Asquith, Law, Lloyd George and Henderson, so the King could try to persuade them to work together in Britain’s interest. The meeting was on Stamfordham’s and Hankey’s initiative, with Law’s full support. Balfour, not merely an ex-prime minister but one who had served in cabinet office on and off for thirty years, was asked to arrive half an hour early. The King sought his opinion, and Balfour told him that ‘the War Committee, as hitherto constituted, had proved an ineffective and unworkable body, and reform was necessary if the War was to be carried out successfully.’112 He believed no government without Asquith would survive. When the full meeting started Henderson endorsed this. A new attempt was made to persuade Asquith to serve under Law, who said his Unionist colleagues would not serve under Asquith; but he refused to commit himself without consulting his colleagues. That was despite Balfour’s urging him to do so, and pointing out that he, as an ex-prime minister, had happily served under Asquith. It was agreed that if Asquith decided to serve then Law would try to form a government; if not, the task would fall to Lloyd George.
The Liberals confirmed Asquith in his view. They felt it would be a Lloyd George government in all but name, with a problem of divided leadership. Lloyd George protested his own desire for a reconciliation with Asquith, but none was in sight. Asquith sent a note to Law in the early evening denying he had any ‘personal feeling of amour propre in the matter’ but that for him to serve would be ‘an unworkable arrangement’.113 Law answered: ‘I greatly regret your decision’; and told the King at 7 p.m. he could not form a government. Asquith wrote to Mrs McKenna that ‘I have been through the Hell of a time for the best part of a month, and almost for the first time I begin to feel older. In the end there was nothing else to be done, tho’ it is hateful to give even the semblance of a score to our blackguardly press.’114 He knew he had chosen to be ‘out in the cold’. To Sylvia Henley he wrote: ‘This is a bit of a cataclysm, isn’t it?’115
Thus on Law’s advice the King asked Lloyd George, who had gone to the Palace with him, to form a government; he undertook to try. Those around him (including Miss Stevenson) genuinely believed he did not wish to be prime minister, but would have preferred Law to do it while he controlled the war – as he had wanted with Asquith. Law later stated that he thought he could have formed a government, but did not do so for two reasons. The first was: ‘I was not at all sure that I was equal to such a position at such a time … Lloyd George was marked out in the public mind as the alternative to Asquith’.116 The second was that while he felt he could rely on the Unionists to support Lloyd George, he did not feel he could rely on the Liberals to support him. Lady Lee declared Law was ‘in a complete funk’.117 Lloyd George told Miss Stevenson after seeing the King: ‘I’m not at all sure I can do it. It is a very big task.’118
He and Law had been talking all day about possible appointments. With Carson they stayed at the War Office until after midnight, and agreed the next morning that Lloyd George should talk to the Labour Party about the possibility of their supporting him, because he wished, as Asquith had done, to include some Labour ministers so the government could be truly representative of the nation. This was essential, because with the exception of Addison, whose career had relied partly on his exceptional talents as a doctor and expert on poverty, but even more on the patronage of Lloyd George, no former Liberal ministers would serve under him. (Addison, in any case, joined the Labour Party in 1923, and served in Attlee’s cabinet into his eighties.) Lloyd George’s former Liberal colleagues otherwise believed he could not long survive in office, because the Liberal Party would go against him and with Asquith, who had no intention of relinquishing its leadership. They also believed Asquith would have more influence on events outside an administration that contained Lloyd George than within it; and as Asquith had shown great loyalty to his colleagues, they repaid it with distaste for Lloyd George and his methods, manner and naked ambition, and regarded him as having engaged in treachery.
None of his former colleagues was prepared to concede that Asquith’s direction of the war had been unequal to the demands of the conflict. They remained loyal to him not simply because many had old ties to him, and owed their careers to him, but because they felt he genuinely had done the best possible job in the circumstances forced upon him. Also, they respected the way in which he had tried to uphold Liberal principles in a context that had become entirely anathematical to him; and, above all, they deplored Lloyd George. Yet, objectively, Asquith was not running the war well, and he was exhausted; and Lloyd George did have not just energy, but ideas, and the Unionists certainly felt that the break with the past that he represented was an essential one.
Aware of the delicacy of his position, Lloyd George saw Robinson, the editor of The Times, and asked him to tell Northcliffe not to make his task even more difficult by allowing his newspaper to assu
me ‘too intimate a knowledge of his actions and intentions’ and to resist ‘too much vituperation.’119 The Mail took little notice, bidding good riddance to what it called ‘the Haldane Gang’ – maintaining Northcliffe’s fiction that the outgoing government had been a conspiracy of pro-Germans – and trumpeting the arrival of Lloyd George even before he had kissed hands with the King. None of this helped him in his task.
At Lloyd George’s behest Derby tried to persuade the Earl of Rosebery, the former prime minister, to become Lord Privy Seal, which he thought would have added credibility to the ministry; but Rosebery refused, to the delight of the Unionists, who had received the suggestion ‘unfavourably’ because of Rosebery’s capricious and often destructive conduct, as a former prime minister, towards other parties since 1895 when he lost office.120 Rosebery mocked Derby’s ‘preposterous mission’ to persuade him to join the ministry in a ‘consultative capacity’.121 ‘There was not a word about policy. I was to give a blank cheque to a man whose policy I have disapproved of more often than most people. And whether consultative or not I should have to attend the House of Lords, which I have not entered for five and a half years and which I hope never to see again.’