by Luke Harding
The day after Litvinenko’s death, Lugovoi and Kovtun had visited the British embassy. They met Brenton’s deputy Sian MacLeod and his security officer David Chitty. The two Russians insisted they had nothing to do with the murder – and signed declarations to that effect.
Subsequently, the room was tested for contamination. Scientists picked up traces of polonium. The highest readings came from Kovtun’s chair – four to five becquerels per centimetre squared. They found it at the table in front of which Kovtun had been sitting, and in the storage hole where he’d left his mobile phone. ‘He sat in a chair. We had to burn the chair,’ Brenton said.
Actually this wasn’t quite true. Embassy staff locked the conference room used by Lugovoi and Kovtun, with the chairs still in it. Only a small number of diplomats knew about the radiation. Paul Knott, the embassy’s second secretary, told his colleagues the room wasn’t available because he’d ‘lost the key’. The atmosphere at the time was ‘sort of Le Carré’, he said, adding: ‘We had that Cold-War-is-here-again feeling. We knew things were worsening. But to do what they did in the heart of London seemed to us incredible.’
Brenton was an unusually frank diplomat. His reward was a campaign of Kremlin-sponsored harassment: the pro-Putin youth group Nashi picketed his public events, jumped in front of his car, and waved unflattering placards outside the embassy. The placards bore a photo of the ambassador with the word ‘Loser’ stamped in red ink across his forehead.
*
Days after my first break-in I had had my own meeting with MacLeod and an embassy security officer. I’d reported the intrusion to the Guardian and mentioned it to the embassy’s press attaché, who suggested I drop by. The venue for our chat was the embassy’s secure room from which mobile phones were banned. It looked rather like a music studio; a map of the Russian Federation hung on a wall. The room appeared to be the only part of the building which Putin’s security agents were unable to bug.
The conversation was helpful. And demystifying. It turned out the embassy knew all about FSB burglaries. They were Moscow’s worst-kept diplomatic secret, I learned. British and US diplomats and Russian nationals working for western missions found themselves on the receiving end of demonstrative break-ins. So, I later discovered, did Russian opposition activists. Recently, the break-ins had grown more frequent. ‘We don’t talk about it publicly. But no, you’re not going mad,’ the officer told me. ‘There’s no doubt this was the FSB. We have a thick file of similar cases. Generally we don’t make a fuss.’
The FSB’s tactics were weird, to say the least. They included defecating in loos, and not flushing afterwards; turning off fridges while the occupant was away on holiday; and introducing items of low value, like a cuddly toy, which hadn’t been there before. Sometimes a TV remote control would vanish, only to reappear weeks or months later. The same break-in team would install listening devices. Apparently, our flat was now bugged. ‘There’s not much you can do about them. Trying to identify or remove them will merely trigger the FSB’s return,’ the officer said.
On the surface, the FSB’s methods looked like bad-taste practical jokes. Actually, the KGB knew that such tactics – repeated over time – could have a destructive effect. The KGB developed and codified these techniques in the 1960s and 1970s. They had a name: operational psychology.
The Stasi, East Germany’s secret police, and the KGB’s sister organisation, employed the same tactics against dissidents, church leaders and others. One former Stasi officer told me proudly: ‘We always did it better than the Russians.’ Such methods were wonderfully deniable. It was easy to deride anyone who complained of sprite-like intrusions by unknown third parties as paranoid and mad.
I discovered that Stasi officers had written entire theses about what they called Zersetzung. The word in German means corrosion or decay. The goal of this harassment – in which the state’s hand remained hidden – was to ‘corrode’ a target so he or she ceased all hostile anti-state activity. With me, that appeared to be writing articles on themes the FSB deemed unacceptable. In the GDR, Zersetzung became a pseudo-scientific discipline. Putin had certainly come across Zersetzung when he served as a junior KGB spy in Dresden.
The embassy officer told me there was no evidence the agency hurt children, despite the ominous window left open next to my son’s bed. This was somewhat consoling.
*
That summer I received a letter from the FSB. It said that the agency had opened a criminal inquiry into Berezovsky’s Guardian interview. It added that Berezovsky had taken part in activities against state power, an offence under Russia’s penal code, article 278. An FSB agent called our Moscow office. He informed me I was being summoned as a ‘witness’ in connection with the case. I was to report to Lefortovo Prison. Oh, and I’d need a lawyer.
Three weeks later, I turned up outside Lefortovo jail. The letter had indicated the address – Energeticheskaya St 3a – useful since Lefortovo didn’t appear on maps. The building was as forbidding as I’d imagined, set among anonymous grey apartment blocks. There was a single tree in the courtyard. I entered through a heavy metal door with my lawyer, Gari Mirzoyan. Inside there was a large waiting room. It was devoid of tables and chairs. The agent on duty sat behind a silvered one-way window. He could see us; we couldn’t see him.
A hairy hand shot out and took my passport. Since there was nowhere to sit, we stood. After five minutes we were told to proceed to room 306, where Major Kuzmin was waiting for us. We walked down a corridor. The carpet was a worn red-green. I noticed an old-fashioned lift, with a heavy metal grille. It sank to the prison’s lower depths where Litvinenko had been kept. Above us were old-style security cameras. The atmosphere was one of shabby menace and institutional gloom. Seemingly little had changed since KGB times.
Major Kuzmin was younger than I expected: late twenties perhaps, with blond hair, neatly cut, and wearing a dark olive-green uniform. Lying on his desk was a colour photocopy of the Guardian’s front-page Berezovsky scoop. I had explained that my role in the affair was a small one. Nonetheless, Kuzmin wanted to know under what circumstances the interview had taken place. Who was present? Was there a recording? Kuzmin typed my replies – there wasn’t much to say – two-fingered onto a computer.
It occurred to me that Kuzmin probably wasn’t the officer’s real name. Was he the guy who had been organising my apartment break-ins? There was nothing in the room that gave clues to his personality – no photos, one small spider plant. On the table in front of me was a bottle of fizzy water and a glass. Drinking didn’t seem like a good idea. The glass was engraved with four sets of initials in Cyrillic letters: Cheka, OGPU, KGB and FSB. These were the names of the Kremlin successive counter-revolutionary agencies, beginning with Dzerzhinsky’s Cheka.
After fifty-five minutes, the interview was over. Kuzmin gave me a witness statement to sign. We shook hands. He offered me a gift: a copy of the ‘Investigations department, Lefortovo Prison’ 2007 FSB calendar. It featured the FSB’s sword and shield logo, in dark red, against a purple background. Mirzoyan and I walked out into the corridor. It was empty. There was no noise or office chatter – merely a smooth and unnerving silence.
Despite the apparent end of the Cold War, the FSB clearly saw itself operating in the same tradition of Bolshevik conspiracy as its predecessors. The KGB’s and FSB’s goals were the same: to protect the state against all enemies. The agency’s neuralgic reaction to a single newspaper article suggested the Kremlin continued to view Berezovsky as its enemy in chief, a sort of modern Trotsky. Apparently I’d been marked down as Trotsky’s mini-helper and accomplice.
*
The FSB’s Lefortovo summons had the opposite reaction to what the agency may have intended. The Litvinenko case was inherently fascinating – and I was being told, through unsubtle KGB-style break-ins, not to investigate. The Kremlin’s extreme sensitivity to the topic suggested there was a lot to uncover. With digging and a little tenacity, perhaps it might be possible to find some a
nswers.
In the summer of 2007, I met Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s urbane English-speaking press spokesman. It was a moment when the Kremlin still cared about Russia’s image abroad, one the Litvinenko affair had dented. A group of western correspondents had been summoned to one of Moscow’s fancier Italian restaurants. Peskov explained the affair from the Russian government’s perspective.
In his version of events, the Kremlin was a blameless victim: a reasonable and forbearing partner, surrounded by hostile and irrational actors. Miliband’s decision to expel four Russian diplomats was ‘totally unexpected’, Peskov said, and a throwback to the bad old days of Cold War confrontation. ‘We consider it unfortunate,’ he added smoothly, his tone – this was classic Peskov – one of faux innocent regret.
Peskov stated that Moscow ‘strongly rejected’ any suggestion of Russian state involvement. Where was the proof? Litvinenko’s death was a ‘terrible crime’ and not a political murder, he said. He reeled off Moscow’s many grievances against London – unsuccessful extradition requests, ‘Mr Berezovsky, Mr Zakayev…’ One quip had annoyed him. Peskov recalled how he flew first-class with British Airways from New York to London. The stewardess had served him a cup of tea with the words: ‘No polonium this time, Mr Peskov.’
According to Peskov, London was succumbing to the kind of virulent ‘Russophobia’ more usually associated with Eastern European countries like Poland. ‘You want me to encourage my citizens to go to London?’ he asked, adding: ‘It takes two to tango.’ He was adamant the Kremlin was reacting to the aggressive behaviour of others. ‘We weren’t the initiators of this crisis,’ he said. ‘This mirror response [the expulsion of UK diplomats] was actually something we regret, and something we were forced into.’
Peskov’s performance reminded me of the writer and critic Clive James’s observation in his book Cultural Amnesia: truly unprincipled states never blush.
Meanwhile, the FSB sent me a further letter. Its investigation was going well; officers had concluded that I didn’t meet Berezovsky. I was therefore ‘not of interest’ to the agency, it wrote. In August we flew back to the UK for our annual summer holiday and a week on a Cornish beach. Later that month I returned to Moscow without my family, who were staying on.
The post in Moscow was unreliable; sometimes packages arrived, sometimes not. I had hand-carried a video taped by a friend, the poet Heathcote Williams. He had recorded two documentaries he thought might be of interest. One was a BBC Panorama investigation into Litvinenko’s death, How to Poison a Spy, presented by the journalist John Sweeney. The other was My Friend Sasha – a Very Russian Murder by Andrei Nekrasov, the filmmaker who had shot the deathbed footage of Litvinenko.
I dumped the tape under the TV, and forgot about it. Williams had Sellotaped programme notes to the side of the cassette, including the photo of Litvinenko in intensive care. One Sunday evening I slotted the video in to watch. The recording began normally – a slice of BBC Newsnight hosted by Jeremy Paxman. After this, something very strange. The Litvinenko documentaries had been erased. Instead of pictures, there were scratchy black-and-white lines; the sound, just audible, was a high-speed squeak.
It was hard to be sure, but it appeared the FSB had broken in again, taken umbrage at the tape’s contents, and deleted them. I emailed Williams. He’d checked the tape before he sent it; it played fine. The Panorama documentary, I found out later, featured interviews with all the major players. Peskov – who else? – denied Kremlin involvement.
There was also a clip from an interview with Litvinenko. In it, he remarked: ‘There were two ideologies in the Soviet Union, communist and criminal. In 1991, the communist ideology ceased to exist and only the criminal remained. The KGB was renamed, it became the FSB, but nothing really changed. Everything stayed the way it was before. The only difference was that a KGB officer killed for his ideology while an FSB officer kills for money.’
*
Lugovoi had friends in high places; that was obvious. They were keeping a close eye on his case. I caught up with the man himself four months later. He was on the campaign trail, embarking on an unlikely career as a deputy in Russia’s parliament. Lugovoi was number two on the federal list of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), an outfit set up by the KGB and led by the flamboyant Zhirinovsky. In his new role as a would-be politician, Lugovoi zigzagged across the country, traveling to the Far East, the Urals and European Russia.
It seemed that Lugovoi was going to make the best of his notoriety. His campaign, such as it was, had an anti-British flavour.
I went with Lugovoi to Manturovo, a village 60 miles (100 km) outside the western city of Kursk. It was always good to get out of Moscow; here were crumbling dachas, snow-covered fields and poplar trees. Lugovoi toured a farm, peered into its cowshed and visited an orphanage. That evening he talked to locals in a pink-walled hall decorated with an icon and a bust of Lenin. His audience listened politely.
Lugovoi, it struck me, wasn’t a natural politician. With his modish suit, purple tie with swirls and Italian shoes, he cut an incongruous figure. Since elections in Russia were fake political exercises – vote rigging on behalf of the ruling United Russia party was rampant – this didn’t matter. At a press conference in his hotel, the Nightingale, Lugovoi blamed Britain for Russia’s woes. The British had invaded Crimea, forged the Zinoviev letter in 1924 and carried on behaving like ‘Anglo-Saxon imperialists’.
I scribbled his remarks in my notepad. ‘If you look at Russian–British relations, the Cold War never started and never ended,’ he declared.
Locals seemed bemused by his performance. Did it matter that Lugovoi was accused of murder? ‘It’s difficult to say,’ Viktor Shumakov, a veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, told me. ‘In Russia many strange things happen all the time.’
*
A year after Litvinenko’s death, Lugovoi was elected as a deputy to Russia’s Duma. His meteoric rise, most observers in Moscow felt, could have happened only with the Kremlin’s endorsement. Lugovoi, meanwhile, gave numerous audiences to the domestic and foreign press. They took place in Moscow, on the remote and beautiful Kamchatka peninsula, and while he sat on the back of a horse.
My own on-off investigation into Litvinenko’s murder had not met with a breakthrough. But there were clues. I went to see Olga Kryshtanovskaya, an expert on elite politics, and a researcher in sociology at Russia’s academy of sciences. Kryshtanovskaya was an interesting figure, who would go on to became a United Russia MP. She had described how under Putin former KGB officers rose to senior positions – by 2007, 42 per cent of those in top Kremlin jobs had a military or intelligence background. She had good contacts inside Russian intelligence.
I asked her about Litvinenko. She said that FSB officers had privately admitted that his murder must have been one of their operations. They had no regrets about the target – Litvinenko was a traitor and merited the punishment – but expressed surprise at the shoddy way in which his execution was carried out. These things were done much more tidily by the KGB, in particular when Yuri Andropov – the only KGB officer to lead the Soviet Union – was communist party general secretary.
‘My FSB friends told me that this [Litvinenko’s bungled poisoning] would never have happened under Andropov,’ Kryshtanovskaya told me. ‘They told me the KGB was much more efficient at murdering back then.’
Lugovoi and Kovtun may have been third-rate killers, but they continued to enjoy support from where it mattered. In April 2008, I interviewed Lugovoi for the first time. The location was his first-floor office in Moscow’s Radisson Hotel in Kievskaya, the same place where the detectives from Scotland Yard had stayed.
Despite his contempt for the British ‘establishment’, Lugovoi turned out to be an Anglophile. He was a fan of English literature; the works of Arthur Conan Doyle sat in a glass-fronted cabinet case. ‘I’ve read all Conan Doyle. I’m very fond of The Lost World,’ he explained. His son went to the same British school in Moscow as my son, tho
ugh at a different campus. His daughter spent a year on an English course in Cambridge.
Lugovoi’s assistant, Sophia, brought us tea. On the wall was a photo of Putin shaking hands with Berezovsky; another jokey montage showed the president chopping the head off the exiled oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. There were framed snaps from Lugovoi’s days in the Federal Protection Service, when he accompanied Kremlin politicians including Boris Yeltsin and prime minister Yegor Gaidar. I spotted two photos of his trips with Gaidar to Washington.
I asked Lugovoi why he had joined the KGB’s ninth directorate, responsible for government security. ‘They invited me. Any normal Soviet officer would take it as an honour to be in the KGB. It means that you are the best.’ Lugovoi denied that he was ever a spy and said his job in the early 1990s, as head of a Kremlin platoon, was rather boring. Instead of intelligence work he trained new recruits to perform ceremonial drills in Red Square.
What happened in London? Lugovoi’s answer: nothing much. He claimed Litvinenko insisted on a meeting, picked the Millennium Hotel as venue, and called him ‘at least five times’. This was, as phone logs later demonstrated, untrue: it was Lugovoi who called Litvinenko. As for the tea: ‘I’ve always said I can’t remember whether we ordered tea at all. I remember that I drank some whisky or gin. Then Litvinenko arrived. He said next to nothing. He was very excited.’
Not all of what Lugovoi said was deceitful. He recounted how Litvinenko rang him at 8.30 a.m. on 2 November and explained he was feeling ill and couldn’t make their meeting later that morning. Lugovoi phoned Litvinenko in hospital on 7 November (‘We had an excellent conversation’) and on 13 November – the last call before his death. Lugovoi said Litvinenko had told him he worked for British intelligence: ‘He was definitely an agent of the English security services.’ Lugovoi took a dim view of MI6, which recruited its agents ‘in the pub’.