by F S Naiden
6. Persian chain mail: Head (1992), 12–14. The differences between the two sides did not chiefly concern equipment, for the Persians had access to the Macedonians’ characteristic weapon, the pike: X. An. 4.7, where Chalybian mercenaries in Persian service used long spears. By Alexander’s time, the Persians had seen some Greek troops using them: Nep. Iph. 1.3. The differences were chiefly tactical and organizational. The Persians fought under standards (X An. 1.8.9–10) and were organized in multiples of ten, and not according to tactically convenient multiples, as the Greeks and Macedonians were. A different view, in which the units of ten are not artificial but are functional in combat: Sekunda (1992), 17–18.
7. A nearby derelict village, Cinarköprü, is named after the scrub oak trees. Here, nine miles from the sea, but less than half a mile from the confluence of the Granicus and the Koca Çay, is the only extant bridge on the lower Granicus, seen a century ago by Janke (1904), 139, fig. 20. Recent autopsies by Foss (1977) and Harl (1989), 316–17, find the banks to be less of an obstacle than stated above, provided that the battle took place below the confluence.
8. The council meeting: App. 3 #3. Two-piece Macedonian spears: Andronikos (1970); Markle (1977), 323–26.
9. Alexander controls the calendar: Plu. Alex. 16.2.
10. Sacrifices performed in this case, just as they were the night before Issus (App. 1a #12) and Gaugamela (24). Similarly, at the Tanais, where, since battle was not in the offing the night before, Alexander communicated with the gods earlier in the same day (33). Sacrifice at every river: Naiden (2013), 77, 100 n. 100, 101, 336, 342, and 345. Unnecessarily noncommittal about a sacrifice at the Granicus: Stoneman (2015), 72–73.
11. This account: DS 17.18.8–9, except that this source says little about units, the movements of which must be guessed; so also Plu. Alex. 16.1–4, Polyaen. 4.3.16. Many writers prefer Arrian’s account at An. 1.14.6–15.5, e.g., Badian (1977). Beloch (1922), 4.2.296, and Bosworth (1980), 1.114–17 with refs., both prefer Diodorus; Green (1991), 489–512, proposes a compromise. The crisscross reported by Arrian, an unparalleled maneuver, would be difficult to execute in a stream.
12. The countryside at the time of the battle: Rose and Korpe (2005), 325, reporting tombs “undoubtedly associated with estates linked to the satrapal court at Daskyleion.” Hunting is implied by the reservation of land for hunting in local regulations (Syll. 279.4–5). A late fourth-century sarcophagus with a hunting scene, from modern Çan, on the Granicus about twenty miles upriver from the battlefield: Sevinc (2001), 389, fig. 4.
13. The two plumes: Plu. Alex. 16.7, surpassing Cyrus, who wore only one, the same as his entourage (X. Cyr. 7.1.2).
14. Three named attackers: Arr. An. 1.15.7–8. Only two, but Spitadatha first: DS 17.20.5. Only two, Spitadatha second: Plu. Alex. 16.8–10. Among other differences, the sharpest concerns Clitus’s weapon: a cleaver (DS, Arr. An.) vs. a spear (Plu. Alex.).
15. A lack of helmets: as for many Iranian cavalry, to judge from Hdt. 9.22, and later the figures on the Abdulonymus Sarcophagus drawn by F. Winter (1912), pls. 1, 13, 14, and 17, although some Persians had casques (UCP 93, from the time of Darius II).
16. Casualties: DS 17.21.6, Plu. Alex. 16.15, Arr. An. 1.16.2, Justin 11.6.12, with Macedonian totals ranging from 29 (Plutarch) to Arrian (115), and Justin (129).
17. A list of grave goods based on the mass graves at Chaeronea, described by Ma (2008), 73–75, and Sotiriadis (1903), 309. Comparable finds at Derveni: Themelis and Tsouratiglou (1997), 84, 109.
18. Financial largesse: Arr. An. 1.16.5, 1.17.1, DS 17.21.6. Perhaps also rent exemptions for those occupying royal lands: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.16.5.
19. Troy: Str. 13.1.26–27, as at App. 1a #7. Burials: App. 1a #8. A few statues for infantry also: Plut. Alex. 16.7. Twenty-six figures: Arr. An. 1.16.4. Thirty-four equestrian figures: Plu. Alex. 16.16. One hundred twenty-nine: Justin 11.6.12, Vell. Pat. 1.11.3–4; similarly, Plin. NH 34.64 (turma Alexandri).
20. The inscription: Arr. An. 1.16.7, Plu. Alex. 16.17.
21. Although there is no report of a council meeting on naval matters, Alexander discussed them with Parmenio somewhat later, at Miletus (Arr. An. 1.18.6–9). Other councilors were surely present, even if the formalities of a meeting were dropped.
22. Supplication at Miletus: App. 2. #4.
23. The Sardis foundation: App. 1b #4. Argives to garrison Sardis—a plum assignment—and others to subdue and occupy other territory in western Anatolia: Arr. An. 1.17.8. Unlike Athens, Thebes, and Sparta, three cities of comparable prestige, Argos had never opposed the Macedonians.
24. Supplication at Ephesus: App. 2 #3. The status of a suppliant who was a tyrant: Naiden (2009), 147–53.
25. Celebration at the Artemisium: App. 1a #9. The dispute with the city: Str. 4.1.22, where Alexander makes a generous but undated financial offer to the Ephesians. Goats’ horns: Eust. ad Il. 8.249.
26. New governments: OGI 222, 223, 226, 229, 237. Apelles: Ael. VH 2.3, Pl. NH 32.95, 35.16.2 with Stewart (1993), 33–34.
27. Taxes: Priene 132. Shrine: Priene 145.
28. The pause, and then the fire set by Memnon: DS 17.27.4–5. Arr. An. 1.23.3 specifies the two remaining strongholds, whereas DS speaks only of a retreat to Cos.
29. Arr. An. 1.23.7–8 refers to Ada not only as being satrap, but also as holding sovereign power, or archein; so also DS 17.24.2. The adoption appears also at Plu. Alex. 22.7. A similar view of the episode: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.23.7–8, speaking of Alexander’s gaining “legitimacy.”
30. The inscription: Plu. Alex. 17.4. The nearby tomb of Sarpedon: A. Supp. 870. Observing the weaknesses of the military argument for this route: Bosworth (1988), 50, speaking of the “lure of conquest” while referring to earlier scholarship attributing to Alexander a grand strategy for dealing with the Persian navy. The lure of being rid of Parmenio was perhaps a factor also. The port of Telmessus: Arr. An. 1.24.4 with Berve (1926), no. 117.
31. The crown at Phaselis: Arr. An. 1.24.5. Local honors: Plu. Alex. 17.9. The miracle at the Ladder: App. 1b #7. No miracle: Str. 14.3.9. Road-building: Arr. An. 1.26.2.
32. This is the rugged region between Side and the vicinity of later Seleuceia Tracheotis, as at Str. 14.3.9. Action at Termessus: Arr. An. 1.27.5–28.1.
33. The need to hurry, evidently caused by lack of food: Arr. An. 1.28.2. Another route, by the Kestros River, was too rough to use according to Stark (1958), 120, who says that the army retraced its steps for some 8–9 km (5–5.5 mi.).
34. The bloody action at Sagalassus: Arr. An. 1.28.7 supp. Roos. A similar episode, but not a doublet: DS 17.28.1–4, where the local people burn their home before fleeing into the mountains.
35. The unfavorable terms: Arr. An. 1.29.2; so also Curt. 3.1.6–8, where Alexander begins a difficult siege before the enemy surrenders. Celaenae and vicinity: Thonemann (2011), 54–55. Payment of debts: Curt. 3.1.20.
36. Width of the road: Young (1963), 348–49 with fig. 2. Parmenio’s movement: Arr. An. 1.29.3.
37. Alexandrou charax at Celaenae: Steph. Byz. s.v. χάραξ with Ruge (1941). Alexandrou pandokeion (unknown): App. Mith. 20 with Ruge, ibid. Alexandri fontes (somewhere in Phrygia): Livy 38.15.15, unless the text reads Alandri fontes.
38. Memnon’s movements: Arr. An. 2.1–2, carried on by his successors, 2.4–5; DS 17.29.1–2. Macedonian worries: DS 17.31.3–4.
39. In the Roman period, roads well to the west of Tyana ran from Laranda to places in Cilicia, notably Seleucia Tracheotis, as at Hild and Hellenkemper (1990), 139–40, but there is no evidence these roads were suitable for an army in Alexander’s time. Sufferings of the Ten Thousand: X. An. 4.1.12–13, 4.5.15.
40. Macedonian Midas: Hdt. 8.138.2 and Euphorion FGrH 31 F 35 as at Lightfoot (2009). Alexander’s putative ancestor Caraunus expelled Midas (Justin 7.1.7–21), creating a complicated relation between Midas and Alexander: whereas Alexander’s ancestor wrested a kingdom from Midas, Alexander would receive a greater kingdom as a gift. O
ther complications: Roller (1983) and (1984). None of the versions in the Alexander historians, given at Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 2.3, mention either the Macedonian migration or any negotiations between Alexander and the temple staff. For these negotiations, Arrian substitutes the formula πóθος λαμβάνει; so also Curt 3.1.16, Justin 11.7.4.
41. Rituals at Gordium: App. 1a #10, 1b #8. A version for the engineers: Aristoboulos FGrH 139 F 7a.
42. Memnon’s death in the fall of 333, as at Berve (1926), no. 497. Barsine: Berve (1926), no. 206, reckoning she was born around 360 BC.
43. Sabictas (Arr. An. 2.4.2) or Abistamenes (Curt. 3.4.1). Cappadocian: Berve (1926), no. 690, although he supposes that the Persian Abistamenes (no. 4) was a subordinate and then a successor.
44. The sea captain: Nearchus, at Berve (1926), no. 544. The brother, Asander, thus Berve (1926), no. 165. Not Parmenio’s brother: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 1.17.7.
45. Wells named Midas: Paus. 1.4.5, Tz. H. 1.110–12.
46. Anahita at Zela: Str. 11.8.4. The army may have encountered Anahita elsewhere, or heard tell of this goddess, as shown by the sundry evidence in Robert (1948), chs. 2–4.
47. The very long north-south view: Str. 1.2.7.
48. The difference of opinion about a naval omen: App. 1b # 5.
49. Janke (1904), 107, found a space in the Gates that would allow one wagon at a time, as at Xen. An. 1.2.21.
50. The rush to the Gates: Curt. 3.4.11–13 (a day attack, Thracians leading) vs. Arr. An. 2.4.3–4 (a night attack, Alexander leading); no particulars at DS 17.31.4–6, Plu. Alex. 19.2–5, Justin 11.8.1–2. Another view: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 2.4.3, holding that the Cilician Gates could be turned, and that the Persians withdrew in order to establish a better defensive position farther south, even as far away as Syria. Similarly, Curt. 3.4.3–5 says that the Persians withdrew in order to devastate Cilicia and then fall back farther. The only precedent for avoiding the Gates, however, was a campaign of 401 (X. An. 1.2.20–21) by a few thousands with no heavy baggage.
51. For a conspectus of the versions of this episode, see Atkinson (1980), 165–69, but with no discussion of the meeting of the council, as is also true at Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 2.4.9–10; Atkinson (163) regards the councilors as amici “in the style of Hellenistic novels.” The council meeting on the subject: App. 3 #5. Alexander’s escaping common illnesses: one that may have struck him was typhus, if this was his fatal illness. For speculation as to the cause of his death, see Ch. 11, n. 64. Olympias’s gratitude for his recovery: Hyp. 4.19, Paus. 1.23.4. Whatever the illness was, it may also have killed Frederick Barbarossa, who died after bathing in Cilicia on his way to the Holy Land, as at the Hist. Frid. 100–105.
52. The anonymous Historia Alexandri supposed that Alexander did not move in an S-curve, and instead went straight to the southern part of the country (Anonymi Historia Alexandri FGrH 151 F 2).
53. A new era: Habicht (1970), 23–24.
54. Adapted from Firdausi 17.5–6, 19.1–2. For the motif of Alexander disguising himself as a subordinate or emissary, see Ps.-Call. A 2.13.4–15, 3.18–23; Ar. Ps.-Call. 2.6–7; Nizami 1.38.
Chapter 4
The Throne of Tyre
1. A sample of other views of Alexander’s aims in the Issus campaign: Droysen (1877), 113; Renault (1975), 95, 99; Milns (1968), 79; Bosworth (1988a), 59.
2. The identification of the stele: Lanfranchi (2003), with refs. Alexander may have supposed the emperor was the Sardanapalus of Arr. An. 2.5.4. Chamoux (2006), following Aristoboulos FGrH 139 F 9, doubts whether the stele was part of a tomb.
3. Solli: App. 1a #11.
4. Local Syrian coinage: Lemaire (2006), 407, specifying small change. Semitic legends: Lemaire (2000), 128–32. A survey of Alexander’s mints: Kremydi (2011), 167.
5. Parmenio thus had nearly half the army. The meeting: App. 3 #6. Some days later, and sauntering: Curt. 3.7, not the quicker, jerky pace that Bosworth (1980) questions ad Arr. An. 2.6.1. Discussion of other possible routes south for the two armies: Devine (1986). Another tourist stop: Magarsus (Arr. An. 2.5.8). Mount Amanus: Lipiński (1994), 207 n. 24.
6. Nebuchadnezzar’s boasting: WBC 9.33–56, 10.1–9.
7. Arr. An. 2.7.1–2 reports that the patients were killed; Curt 3.8.12–13 reports mutilation.
8. Darius’s meeting: App. 3 #45. Curtius reports that another experienced mercenary, Mentor’s son Thimodes, later advised withdrawing to Mesopotamia at a council of Darius’s held at Issus (App. 3 #46).
9. The victory of the mercenaries came at Cunaxa (X. An. 1.8), a tactical and defensive victory for the Ten Thousand, although a defeat for their employer.
10. Information from local observers: Plb. 12.17.2–3.
11. Rapp (1866), 130–31, cites ancient sources for this and other religious possibilities.
12. Royal drinking water: Curt. 3.3.9, with Schachermeyr (1973), 682–85.
13. The location of the Pinarus battlefield, best described at Plb. 12.17.4, is controversial; see Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 2.7.1. The essential feature is the riverbanks that would impede the Macedonian heavy infantry yet not stop the cavalry, a possibility explored by Janke (1906), 2–74.
14. App. 3 #7, one of the few instances of council procedure long noticed by scholars from Beloch (1922), 3.2.263, to Bosworth (1980) and Sisti (2001) ad Arr. An. 2.6.1. Arrian and Curtius differ slightly, for Curtius supposes that the meeting took place earlier before the battle, and that Alexander moved south (3.8.13), then back north, glad for the chance to fight where Parmenio had recommended. Other views: Brunt (1976), app. 3.6, and Atkinson (1980) ad Curt. 3.7.8–10.
15. App. 1a #12, where Curtius refers to dis praesidibus, evidently including Baal Haman; Bing (1991) suggests the other two. He adduces local coins, which would have made the task of identifying gods easier, but which were not indispensable, for Alexander surely consulted local informants.
16. Divine in its own right: Allen (2015), 230, citing the theophoric name “servant of Ḥamān.” If the mountain were El, it would have been compared to Zeus’s father, Cronus, and not to Zeus; thus Philo of Byblos FGrH 790 F 2. At S. Andromeda fr. 126, Cronus is taken to be Baal Haman by Lipiński (1995), 260–61.
17. Another view: Blazquez (2000), calling the rites Persian.
18. The modern name of Issus is long disputed, as at Bosworth (1988a), 109, Hammond (1980), 97–101, and Seibert (1972), 98–101. Speculation rests on the report that the battlefield was only fourteen stades wide and a hundred long, as at Callisthenes FGrH 124 F 35.
19. Alexander immediately next to the cavalry, with the agēma or elite of the hypaspists: Hammond (1992).
20. The opposing orders of battle: Arr. An. 2.8.3–8, preferred to Curt 3.9. The infantry: Cardaces, whether heavily armed (Arr. An. 2.8.6) or lightly (Plb. 12.17.7), as these troops were not identified by their armor or weapons, as Greek and Macedonian infantry commonly were. According to Str. 15.3.18, they could be identified by age, and again differed from Greek and Macedonian infantry. Ethnically mixed: Bosworth (1980) ad Arr. An. 2.8. Light infantry: Charles (2012), 7, with n. 4 giving bibliography on weaponry and ethnicity. The view that they were hoplites would make Alexander’s sweeping thorough or past them more difficult to envisage. A guard of 2,000 means 1,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, but 3,000 elite cavalry as well as 1,000 infantry are reported by Curt. 3.9.4 with Charles (2015), 24–26, on the value of this report. These troops plus the Immortals were about as numerous as the Macedonians in the army of Alexander. Another view of this subject: the Immortals no longer existed, as at Fuller (1958), 164 n. 2, and Charles (2011), 114.
21. Tight royal control of troops: Curt. 3.8.9, DS 15.41.5. A similar view: Head (1982), 44. Opposing view: Atkinson (1980) ad Curt. 3.8.9. Darius’s gray mare: Plu. Alex. 33.8, Ael. HA. 48. The palisade: Arr. An. 2.10.1.
22. Persian archers would be behind the infantry if the latter were heavily armed, in front of them otherwise. In front: Fuller (1958), 160. Arrian does no
t say (An. 2.10.3). A similar view of Alexander’s aims during the battle, but without the religious element: Badian (1965), 188, and Wilcken (1932), 149. An aim of fighting nobly: Rüstow and Köchly (1852), 145; Berve (1926), 1.145–46. Darius as a target of opportunity only: Fuller (1958), 160.
23. The two kings approach each other: Arr. An. 2.10.1, Curt. 3.11.7, DS 17.34.5, Plu. Alex. 20.7–9. Chares’s divergent report that Darius wounded him (FGrH 125 F 6) confirms that Alexander had drawn near his quarry.
24. The break in the line: Arr. An. 2.10.3–7, a danger noted at Plb. 12.20.6 followed by Hammond (1992), 402. The battle thus in the balance: Bosworth (1988a), 61. Ptolemy the son of Seleucus: Berve (1926), no. 670.
25. One hundred or so officers, reckoned at 1 per file, or 16 per lochos, and thus a total of 96 and the commander himself. Casualties: Arr. An. 2.10.7. Attributing the high number to “racial animosity”: Hammond (1980), 107; so also Milns (1968), 80.
26. Trumpets in emergencies: Ael. VH 8.7. The leading regiments near Coenus were those of Perdiccas and either Meleager (Curt. 3.9.7) or Amyntas (Arr. An. 2.8.4). The initiative of Coenus and his fellow commanders: Arr. An. 2.11.1. Credit given to Alexander for this initiative: Droysen (1833), 63; Fuller (1958), 162; Green (1991), 232. Just as Coenus led the first three regiments, Craterus, at the opposite end of the line, anchored last three regiments—a variation on the standard Greek practice of giving the position of honor, which was on the far right, to the best unit, and the second-most-prestigious position, on the far left, to the next-best. A somewhat different view: Lendon (2005), 125–31.
27. Given Persian methods, Darius did not order the mercenaries to change their place in line after the fighting started, as claimed by Callisthenes FGrH 124 F. 35.
28. The attack in swarms: Arr. An. 2.11.2, Curt. 3.11.1. There are well-known exceptions to the tendency for horses to shy away from rows of spears or bayonets, such as the charge of the Light Brigade. Whether such an attack occurred at Chaeronea is uncertain: DS 17.86.3, where Alexander breaks the enemy’s ranks, is consistent with such an attack, as is Plu. Alex. 9.2; Plu. Pel. 18.7, where the sacred band resists a frontal attack by Macedonian infantry, perhaps is not; Justin 9.3.9–10 omits cavalry. For the Granicus there is no information.