A Georgia citizen named Mallory visited with the General this evening. He did not impress Hitchcock, who thought him “rather hang-dog and cowed looking.” Mallory’s presence prompted another of Hitchcock’s moral self-examinations as he charted how far his feelings had changed in the course of the past weeks. “Evidently it is a material element in this campaign to produce among the people of Georgia a thorough conviction of the personal misery which attends war, and of the utter helplessness and inability of their ‘rulers,’ State or Confederate, to protect them. And I am bound to say that I believe more and more that only by this means the war can be ended,—and that by this means it can.”
Doing what was necessary to finish things was much on Sherman’s mind as he dictated a message this evening intended for Brigadier General Kilpatrick. Perhaps sensing in the cavalryman’s report a plaintive tone seeking approval, Sherman took care to assure him that his operations to date “have been entirely satisfactory to the general-in-chief.” He repeated his desire that Kilpatrick not hold back from giving the “enemy all he wants when he offers you battle.” Finally, Sherman felt compelled to address a subject raised by Kilpatrick: acts of terror against his troopers.
The cavalry officer recounted more instances of the murder and mutilation of his men after they had been taken prisoner. Sherman was not yet convinced by the anecdotal evidence he had been given, yet he could not ignore the increasing number of incidents. He wanted to be sure that Kilpatrick put Wheeler on personal notice that the atrocities had to stop. Once Kilpatrick had alerted Wheeler, should he obtain substantial proof that Rebel soldiers were committing the excesses, the cavalry general would receive official approval to retaliate. In such a circumstance, said Sherman: “You may hang and mutilate man for man without regard to rank.” The edge of a terrible abyss had been reached, and Sherman was fully prepared to cross it if the situation—according to his rules of war—justified such a course of action.
Friday, December 2, 1864
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1864
By the day’s order of march, Major General Joseph A. Mower’s First Division (Seventeenth Corps) had the lead following the railroad along the Ogeechee River. His division would be the first to reach Millen, which still wasn’t good enough for Captain Oscar L. Jackson, commanding a company in one of Mower’s regiments, the 63rd Ohio. Jackson, who also happened to be in charge of the regiment’s foragers, was determined to get into Millen before anyone else in order to secure the best supplies for his men. His brigade commander gave him the okay to proceed, cautioning the captain to keep his group “well together and be cautious as…the enemy had been there a few hours previous and it was not yet known that they were gone.”
Jackson’s party arrived at the railroad bridge across Buckhead Creek several hours ahead of the main column. The floor planking had been thrown off and a feeble attempt made to torch the span, but, stepping gingerly, Jackson was able to get his “men across the creek in single file on the standing timbers.” To his great relief, there were no Rebel soldiers in the town. Posting a detail to watch the roads, the officer sent the remainder of his small command off to forage.
Besides the usual goodies, they found a lot of honey bee hives. “We would set a hive off the stand and split it open and brush the bees away and fill the heavy comb into vessels,” Jackson recollected. “It was warm and the bees [were] able to fly but seemed too much frightened to sting.” The Ohio boys had the town to themselves for only a short while before a patrol from the 1st Alabama Cavalry, on detached service with the infantry, ambled in to join the fun.
Jackson was comparing notes with the cavalry leader when one of his men came running over to report that a train that had come up the line from the south was stopped just outside the town. It must have been a scouting mission since its conductor was walking ahead to gauge the lay of the land. He paid for his boldness when he ran into Jackson’s picket line and was taken prisoner. Several of the cavalrymen galloped out to try to capture the train, but the alert engineer reversed gears in time to back out of danger.
When the head of the heavy column arrived at the creek by midafternoon, it was halted while engineers from the 1st Michigan repaired the bridge to handle bulk traffic. “Some of the boys had to get down and ‘coon it over,’” remarked a soldier in the 32nd Ohio. “One fellow fell off into the creek and came near losing his life.” Once the bridge had been restored, and the columns were passing through the town, serious attention was given to the legitimate targets of war. “The railroad and all government property destroyed,” commented an infantryman in the 43rd Ohio. The three divisions of the Seventeenth Corps camped this night in the Millen area.
South of the Ogeechee, the Fifteenth Corps marched in two columns operating roughly parallel to the river. Although the course of one was along what was grandly styled the Old Savannah Road, passage was anything but routine. “We had to wade a great many swamps,” recorded an Ohio diarist. “The roads very bad and we was obliged to make corduroy [roads] across the swamps,” added a journal keeper in the 47th Ohio. The point where the road crossed Scull’s Creek posed a significant challenge, requiring the construction of a log bridge for the wagons and ammunition. A mile or so beyond the creek, the leading brigade reached Clifton Ferry on the Ogeechee, diagonally across from Scarboro. The 1st Missouri Engineers were on hand, and in a remarkably short time a pontoon bridge had been laid over the Ogeechee, allowing a large mounted party to go across, reach the Central of Georgia track, then scout southeast as far as Scarboro.
The Federals galloped into the small station town to learn that the last train to Savannah had departed not two hours earlier. The local post office yielded a fine selection of recent Savannah newspapers, which were forwarded to Major General Howard. A civilian telegraph operator named Jonathan Lonergan was riding with this group. Lonergan found that his enemy counterpart had thought to take his instrument with him, but when he hooked his own device to the wires, the circuit south was still functioning.
For the next fifteen minutes the Yankee listened as Confederate operators down the line exchanged chatter without any helpful context. Now and again Lonergan heard an interrogatory for operator “9,” and it finally dawned on him that it referred to the Scarboro station. Tapping an acknowledgment, he was rewarded with the query: “What is the news? What is going on?” Lonergan promptly replied: “The Yankees have not yet crossed the river, and all is quiet.” Hoping to glean some fresh intelligence, he continued: “What is the news from the East? How are things looking in Savannah?”
The distant operator, growing suddenly suspicious, demanded to know the identity of his correspondent. Fortunately, an officer with the scouting party had learned the Scarboro telegrapher’s name. Lonergan promptly identified himself as the man, but any hopes he had of reaping a harvest of information were dashed when the man himself broke into the circuit from the next station to the south and exposed his deception. With the ruse exposed, Lonergan exchanged ironic pleasantries with the distant operator, spiced with barbed comments and patently false information. “Darkness approaching and camp being some distance off, the conversation ended,” reported Lonergan.
Across the Ogeechee from where he was sitting, the Fifteenth Corps settled into camp, the northern wing near Scull’s Creek, the two divisions to the south in Bulloch County. An Illinois veteran resting near the Right Wing headquarters scribbled in his diary: “While soul stirring music is being dispensed by Gen. Howard’s band—A warm day & pleasant evening,—Have heard the news from a Rebel paper today—They pretend to think that Sherman’s army is surrounded & about to be captured.”
North of the Seventeenth Corps’ line of march, the columns constituting all of the Twentieth Corps and two-thirds of the Fourteenth merged at a crossroads about two miles northeast of Birdsville, with the former having the right-of-way. The roads posed no exceptional problems, so the foragers were especially active. One incident this day offered a case study in how soldiers drawn from different regim
ents could work together for their own defense and self-interest.
It began with a decision by Sergeant Lyman Widney to undertake an unofficial foraging expedition with his messmate. The two set off at sunrise, hoping to prove the childhood adage that the early bird gets the worm. They encountered their first house after a tramp of several miles, only to find that it had just been visited by a five-man foraging party, so the pair trudged on. As they approached a small woods, they heard several shots. Soon two Federal soldiers came running toward them, exclaiming that their group of five had been ambushed by Rebel cavalry.
“We now considered ourselves in a predicament,” related Widney, “five miles ahead of our army and almost face to face with the enemy.” Looking over their shoulders, they saw not a relief column, but scattered clumps of men—other foraging parties like themselves. A bit of frantic signaling brought many to them on the run; before very long there were fifty or more soldiers on hand from perhaps a half-dozen regiments. A skirmish line was organized, and the group, representing several units and without any officers present, moved aggressively into the woods. The extended skirmish line pushed through the little forest, locating the bodies of the ambushed foragers as well as the remains of the Rebel cavalry’s night camp. Popping out of the belt of trees, the Yankees found themselves on the edge of a clearing, with mounted Rebels formed along the opposite side.
Neither group seemed anxious to press the issue, which worked to the advantage of the Federals, for more and more foragers joined them until the size of the battle line was imposing enough to scare away the enemy riders. With the danger removed, the impromptu formation dissolved as the soldiers picked up where they had left off. When Sergeant Widney and his messmate rejoined their regiment that night with their spoils, they were welcomed as lost souls, since their comrades “had heard just enough of our encounter to believe that the worms had caught the early birds.”
After dispersing a few Rebel pickets near Buckhead Church, the combined Twentieth/Fourteenth Corps column settled in for the night, a short march from the rail line connecting Millen with Augusta through Waynesboro. Just to their north was the flying column of infantry and cavalry, which had itself had a very busy day.
The formation—aligned like yesterday, infantry in the middle, cavalry watching the flanks—set off shortly after sunrise. “Commenced skirmishing with the enemy before we had gone a mile,” noted the enterprising staff officer, Major James Connolly. Brigadier General Baird, in overall charge of the expedition, wasn’t one to take chances. Connolly noted that “our movement was slow and extremely cautious, the ground ahead being well reconnoitered by our advance parties and skirmishers.” The enemy made every effort to justify Baird’s caution. “We have had sharp skirmishing with the rebels all day,” recorded an Indiana trooper. “They would take advantage of every creek, swamp, or any place they could retard our march.”
Brigadier General Baird, a Pennsylvanian, was something of an abolitionist. He made it a point to personally question as many slaves as possible, even allowing one named Jerry to tag along as a guide. Major Connolly thought him “a lively, rollicking, fun loving fellow, with a good deal of shrewdness.” Jerry and Baird had been riding together chatting amicably for the entire morning when the black man suddenly erupted in a loud laugh. “Golly,” he said in response to Baird’s questioning look, “I wish old massa could see me now, ridin’ wid de Ginrals.”
Eight miles on the flying column approached Rocky Creek, behind which Confederate General Wheeler was waiting with some of his men. The fight for the crossing unfolded in two short phases. In the first, Kilpatrick’s cavalry cleared the Rebel outposts away from the creek’s south side. These advance posts existed solely to sound the warning, so the Southern riders wasted little time getting across when challenged. “We made them fly,” boasted a Pennsylvania trooper.
Phase two was a little trickier, since General Baird was careful with his men’s lives. After probing the length of Wheeler’s line and locating an undefended stretch, Blair sent one regiment across Rocky Creek. Once over, the unit—the 74th Indiana—immediately made its presence known to Wheeler, who, finding his line breached, pulled back toward Waynesboro. In Major Connolly’s words, the Rebs “lit out.”
Several of Kilpatrick’s regiments charged across the creek to hurry the Rebels along. They brought back with them a wounded Texan who under interrogation admitted that everyone was expecting an attack on Augusta. “He also told us that there was no rebel infantry outside of Augusta, and that Wheeler’s cavalry was scattered all over the country,” reported Connolly.
The combined column pressed forward a mile to a crossroads where generals Baird and Kilpatrick argued about the next move—Kilpatrick wanting to follow the most direct route to Waynesboro, Baird preferring to swing below it in order to establish contact with the middle columns coming toward them from Birdsville. Since Baird was senior, his opinion prevailed, so everyone jogged a short distance south before setting up for the night. “If we get any communication from the rest of our Corps tomorrow we may turn toward Augusta again,” observed Major Connolly.*
Sherman’s headquarters tent for this night was located on the west bank of Buckhead Creek, just outside Millen. After tending to his duties, Major Hitchcock came upon the General engaged in a lively conversation (“wish I could note it,” said the aide) with five or six black men, who let one of their number do most of the talking. They had reasoned through the question of whether or not to accompany the Union army and had concluded it would be better for them to stay put. Sherman endorsed their decision, and was clearly impressed by the insight shown by the group’s spokesman.
The elder slave displayed his knowledge of African-American history by citing the military service performed by blacks for General Andrew Jackson at New Orleans in the War of 1812. Sherman mentioned that the Rebel president had announced his intention to arm the slaves to help the Confederacy. If Jefferson Davis went ahead with his plan, Sherman wondered aloud, would blacks fight against the Union? “No, Sir,” said the spokesman with emphasis, “de day dey gives us arms, dat day de war ends!”
Saturday, December 3, 1864
When he wasn’t chatting with his black visitors, Sherman was making some key decisions regarding the campaign’s ultimate objective. To Major General Henry W. Slocum of the Left Wing, Sherman designated a pair of roads to be used by the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps in order to “continue to march toward Savannah.” General Kilpatrick, he told Slocum, “will be instructed to confer with you and cover your rear.”
Major General Oliver O. Howard also learned for certain that the “next movement will be on Savannah.” He was to keep the Fifteenth Corps marching along the west side of the Ogeechee River, as the Seventeenth was to continue to chew up the railroad along the opposite bank. Sherman, believing that the Confederate leadership remained uncertain whether he intended to strike for Macon, Augusta, or Savannah, authorized Howard, if feasible, to send raiding parties well south of Savannah to disrupt the rail links with lower Georgia and Florida. Speed was now becoming a watchword. Sherman remarked on the Savannah garrison: “The fewer the men and the sooner the party starts the better.”
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1864
An American eagle of a military bent, loitering high over the confluence of the Ogeechee River and Buckhead Creek, would have observed a decided, even decisive, change in the direction of Storm Sherman. Fully three-quarters of his force was either now committed or in the process of being committed to roads that led unerringly to the south and east—toward Savannah. The course so clearly delineated ran along a peninsula-like corridor, bounded to the east by the Savannah River and to the west by the Ogeechee. Into this region Sherman now steered three infantry corps and his cavalry division.
Both flanks were protected by difficult-to-cross water systems, which provided the principal tactical advantage of this movement. The main disadvantage was that Sherman was clearly showing his hand, so his enemy, who had been stumbli
ng and struggling to pin down his front, would soon know precisely where to find it. The closer to Savannah Sherman’s columns marched, the more the land became favorable to the defense. The number of swamps and swampy streams increased to the point where moving the wagons was limited to narrow strips of built-up roadways, making a situation ideal for delaying actions.
It was partially to offset this defensive advantage that Sherman kept one corps moving along the southwest bank of the Ogeechee, ready to turn any line of resistance the Confederates might try to establish. An almost textbook example of this plan working was provided this day by Confederate Major General Henry C. Wayne, who was nervously monitoring the Federal movements in person. On December 2 Wayne retreated from Station No. 7, Scarboro, to No. 4½, in the area of modern Oliver. There, at the junction of the Ogeechee River and Ogeechee Creek, Wayne was joined by several militia units under Colonel Robert Toombs,* forwarded from Savannah. About 10:30 A.M., after receiving a briefing about the advances of the Union Fifteenth Corps along the Ogeechee’s opposite bank, Wayne recognized that this column “would cut my rear,” so he conferred with Colonel Toombs. They agreed on a strategic withdrawal of approximately twenty-seven miles, to Station No. 2, Eden.
Sitting in Savannah with his maps spread before him, Lieutenant General Hardee realized at once that Wayne’s precipitate maneuver ceded a strong defensive position behind Ogeechee Creek, so when the militiaman arrived at Eden, he was met by one of the general’s staff officers “with instructions to return to No. 4½, and that further re-enforcements would be sent to me. Obeyed the instructions, though in opposition to my own judgment and that of my officers, and reoccupied No. 4½ about 7 P.M.,” Wayne reported. Sherman could read maps as well as Hardee. Even though he had no knowledge of Wayne’s back-and-forth actions, he saw the same potential at Station No. 4½ as did his opposite number. He pointed it out today to Major Hitchcock, commenting: “There we must cross a creek and there they have the shortest line to hold from river to river.” Added the aide: “Perhaps we shall fight them then—perhaps not.”
Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea Page 36