Unexpectedly, within days of Mullik’s return to India, Zhou made a formal complaint to Nehru alleging that Mullik was ‘unduly partial’ to the British in the investigation of the Kashmir Princess case. A distressed Nehru sent for Mullik and spoke to him about the allegation made by the Chinese Premier but dropped the matter once he realised that what Chou was referring to was untrue. Nehru then sent a letter to Chou emphatically denying any collusion between Mullik and the British. ‘There was no question of any official of the Government of India, let alone Mr Mullik, either acting as an apologist of the Hong Kong Government or condoning any wrong action taken by them,’ Nehru wrote.
Sensing the suspicion that the Chinese had with regard to the arrangement, Kao asked for a stenographer to be sent to assist him and be present in meetings with the Chinese representative. That’s where Rajan—mentioned earlier as someone who would watch the briefcase when RNK went out—came in, and Chandrapal Singh went back to India.
Almost a week later, the Hong Kong Government announced publicly a reward of 100,000 Hong Kong dollars for anyone giving information that might lead to the arrest and conviction of the people who sabotaged the Kashmir Princess. Despite the reward and sincere investigation efforts by the Hong Kong Police, the probe seemed to have run into obstacles.
1 R.N. Kao papers, serial No. 2, NMML, New Delhi.
2 Ibid.
FIVE
Running into a Roadblock
By the middle of June 1955, it was clear to RNK that one of his objectives in joining the investigation on behalf of the Government of India was achieved. It was to ascertain whether the Kashmir Princess aircraft was a victim of sabotage or had suffered any mechanical failure. The Indonesian enquiry, meanwhile, had also been completed, and it had conclusively established that the crash had occurred because of a time bomb that was placed in the plane during its halt at Hong Kong.
The second task—that of liaising between Hsiung, the Chinese representative, and the Hong Kong authorities—was proving to be more and more difficult, since Hsiung was in no mood to be open with RNK. In the first fortnight or so, Hsiung did share ample intelligence and information but later he cooled off. The initial information was of three kinds:
The first one relating directly to the sabotage.
The second one relating to the KMT intelligence set up in Hong Kong, which was supposed to be behind the sabotage.
The third one containing allegations against some officers of the Special Branch of Hong Kong Police.
Kao observed, ‘On the basis of the information given by the Chinese regarding the secret KMT intelligence organisation, the Hong Kong police raided various addresses and arrested a total of 25 people. From the statements made by some of them and the documents recovered from their possession, it was clear that the large KMT secret intelligence organisation had been functioning from Hong Kong. The enquiries in this regard were pursued energetically by the Hong Kong police and they were helped by some experts who had come from England.’ However, it was one thing to uncover the KMT intelligence ring and quite another to link the organisation to the sabotage of Kashmir Princess. The Hong Kong Police felt that while the arrest was welcome, it was not really leading to any progress in the investigation of the crash of the Kashmir Princess, and so they specifically appointed officers to unravel the conspiracy of sabotage and tracing Chou Chu, the main accused.
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong authorities were quite convinced that they had no further use of Hsiung. He had requested RNK for copies of detailed interrogation and progress reports about the investigation. The Hong Kong Police did not agree to this. RNK felt it was quite possible that the Hong Kong authorities resented some of the allegations made by the Chinese regarding the secret KMT loyalties of some of their officers. In fact, they appeared to be keen on Hsiung leaving Hong Kong as soon as possible. This was, by turn, expressed in clear words during the second week of June by almost everyone with whom RNK was dealing with—the Governor, the Commissioner of Police, the Director of Special Branch and an officer of the Security Service, who had come down from London.
In the face of such a rigid attitude, there was little that RNK could do by way of liaison between the Chinese officer and the Hong Kong authorities. Privately, RNK was told that it would be difficult for them to give any information to the Chinese. RNK had, thus, reached a dead end in this matter.
‘All these developments had led me to believe that my position at that time in Hong Kong will become increasingly difficult and the useful work that I could do, either for my own government or as liaison between the Chinese and the Hong Kong authorities, had been reduced to the minimum,’ Kao noted.
RNK, being very perceptive and sharp, realised that the British wanted his proximity to the Chinese or, at least, have access to the top leadership, which could be exploited to get a better understanding of the Chinese thinking. ‘The British were keen to get a better idea of the Chinese policy towards Indo-China, Burma, Siam (Thailand) Formosa and South Korea. They were also keen to get my opinion or through me, the Chinese view about their relations with the Russians, the extent of Russian aid to China and the behaviour of Russians in their dealing with Beijing. A crucial question that was engaging their attention was whether the summit talks that were then to be held in Geneva would be attended by the Chinese. And above all, they were keen to know about the Chinese government’s policy towards overseas Chinese communities,’ RNK wrote.
So even as the Hong Kong Police pursued the investigation at its own pace, RNK got more than adequate hints that he was no longer welcome in the island territory. And yet, his personal rapport with some of the important officers in the department meant that they kept giving RNK crucial inputs. On 20 June 1955, Hong Kong Special Branch Director, Willcox, revealed to RNK that the main accused Chou Chu’s roommate named Chow Si Hok—who had been arrested earlier but was released due to lack of evidence—reappeared before the police. He was hoping to qualify for the reward of 100,000 Hong Kong dollar announced by the administration and narrated the sequence of events as they had happened a day before the Kashmir Princess was sabotaged.
Apparently, Chow Si Hok told the police that on 30 April, Chou Chu came to their room late at night, puffed a few drags of heroin and revealed how he had carried out the sabotage of Kashmir Princess, tempted by a promise of a handsome reward. According to Chow Si Hok, Chou Chu had been given a readymade bomb in the Movieland Hotel on 10 April, a day prior to the crash of the aircraft. Next morning, on 11 April, according to Chou Chu’s statement to Chow Si Hok, he was taken by a KMT agent in a car and dropped off at the gate of the airport. Then, while cleaning the plane, he pushed the bomb in the cavity above the right wheel. Two days later, when the news of the crash of the Kashmir Princess was all over the place, Chou Chu went to the KMT agent, who he was in touch with, to claim the reward. He was rebuffed by the KMT officer who said Zhou Enlai was not on the plane that crashed and, therefore, he would not get any money! A frustrated Chou Chu spilled the beans on earlier KMT attempts to assassinate Zhou Enlai too.
According to that confession, the plan was to apparently assassinate Zhou Enlai the previous year while the Chinese Premier was on his way back from Geneva via Hong Kong. Later, the KMT agents decided to assassinate Kuo Mo Ju, who went to India as the Head of Chinese delegation for the Asia Conference. However, when they heard that Zhou Enlai would be going to Bandung via Hong Kong, the plans were changed, and the conspiracy to sabotage the plane was hatched.
Meanwhile, the Director of Hong Kong Special Branch handed over to RNK a note to be passed on to the Chinese representative. The particular memorandum, RNK noted in his recollection, objected to the request for copies of the investigations be given to the Chinese, pointing out that it was not a British practice to share the findings of the investigations with another party. The same memorandum also noted that the Hong Kong Police had carefully followed up all the inputs given by the Chinese authorities about the main suspect Chou Chu, but their enquiries had r
evealed that there was insufficient corroborative evidence to prosecute Chou Chu and get a conviction in a court of law. The Chinese were not convinced. They were unable to understand the legal reasons behind the reluctance of the Hong Kong Police to pursue the case to its logical conclusion.
Meanwhile, Michael Hanley (later Sir Michael Hanley), the Hong Kong Representative of the British Security Service, more popularly known as the MI5, confided to RNK that the British authorities expected him to leave Hong Kong as soon as possible. ‘I took Hanley’s observations as a broad hint that if I stayed any longer, my position would become embarrassing,’ RNK noted. Incidentally, Michael Hanley went on to become the head of MI5 between 1972 and 1978.
As a result of these developments, RNK was immediately asked to be withdrawn to India. Delhi, after careful consideration, however rejected the request. ‘I understand that this matter was considered carefully by Mr S.N. Dutt of our Ministry of External Affairs, but it was felt that for political reasons and to avoid misunderstanding with the Chinese…, it had been decided that I should stay on in Hong Kong,’ Kao wrote.
Throughout July 1955, however, RNK was repeatedly made to feel unwanted in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Police were unwilling to share any meaningful information, and the Governor was reluctant to meet him. RNK felt the evident cold treatment of the Hong Kong authorities because of political reasons. ‘In a meeting with me on the 11th July, apart from talking about other points, Mr Wilcox, the Director of the Special Branch, made an interesting observation. He repeated that there had been no further developments about the efforts to get Chou Chu back from Formosa (Taiwan). Then, he went on to observe that he thought that, in some respect, Chou Chu’s return to Hong Kong at that stage might be a source of embarrassment to the Hong Kong Government rather than anything else,’ RNK noted.
RNK went on to add that the case was becoming a political football. ‘By then, we were in the beginning of August (1955) and my ding-dong negotiations with the Hong Kong officials, on the one hand, and my attempt, on the other hand, to maintain the link between them and the Chinese proceeded at a desultory place. At this stage, Mr Maxwell, the Commissioner of Police, appeared to be becoming more difficult and somewhat impatient,’ RNK noted. Maxwell, according to Kao, was particularly disturbed about Prime Minister Nehru’s statement in the Indian Parliament giving credit to the Chinese for giving a definite lead to the Hong Kong Police. Maxwell complained to RNK that despite their sincere attempts at investigating the case, Nehru had not acknowledged their contribution. However, RNK remembers reminding Maxwell that the Chinese had indeed given the name of the main suspect to the Hong Kong Police, so the Indian prime minister was not wrong in his contention.
Amidst all this, Zhou Enlai summoned Hsiung to Beijing and also sent a word that RNK should reach the Chinese capital by 20 August. Within days, the attitude of the Hong Kong authorities towards RNK changed. They began to pretend a little more than they were doing earlier, by taking him fully into confidence and the Commissioner of Police as well as the Governor turned on the charm offensive to keep Kao in good humour! They suddenly offered to RNK access to notes prepared by the Hong Kong Police and said he should explain to the Chinese Government, when he would visit Beijing, their inability to prosecute the KMT intelligence suspect. ‘I could not help recalling that during the previous six weeks or more, the Hong Kong Police had not associated me with the sabotage enquiry and that suddenly when they realised I was to go to Beijing, they wanted me to bail them out…,’ RNK wrote.
In another awkward development, Hsiung wanted RNK to accompany him to Beijing instead of going back home alone. This was contrary to the instructions that RNK had received from Mullik who wanted him to proceed to the Chinese capital at least four-five days after Hsiung had reached there. Meanwhile, the authorities in Hong Kong were going all out to impress upon RNK the absolute necessity of impressing upon the Chinese the sincerity with which the Hong Kong Police had investigated the case so far. RNK had no desire to do their bidding but had sought clear directions from Delhi on what his stand should be when he met the Chinese Premier.
The final instructions came in the third week of August. The gist of the instructions was that RNK should stick to reporting what the Hong Kong Police had shared with him and not express any opinion of his own. ‘The idea was that I should not express any definite opinion on the merits of the case,’ RNK recorded. He notes that Mullik had told him very clearly why this stand had to be taken. ‘Mr Mullik had pointed out to me that while the Chinese Government would naturally like the entire KMT intelligence set up in Hong Kong to be rounded up and prosecuted, India’s interest was limited to the prosecution of the gang immediately responsible for sabotaging the Kashmir Princess,’ RNK wrote. The DIB warned him against making any comments on whether it was possible for the Hong Kong authorities to collect further evidence to implicate other persons in this gang or not.
In the meantime, in keeping with their changed attitude, the Hong Kong authorities shared, in private, their report on the probe thus far with RNK. In the report shared by Willcox, the police were able to confirm that the key figure in the conspiracy was a man named Wu, who was, however, neither identified nor located. According to the report, however, Wu appeared to be a high-grade KMT agent who had enlisted the services of Chou Chu alias Chau Tse Ming alias Chau Kui as the main saboteur.
Interestingly, the report also mentioned that if the Hong Kong authorities had appointed a Commission of Enquiry instead of going for a straight police case, it (the government) would have come under criticism because the authorities had delayed decoding the message sent by the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing based on a definite information given to him about the possible sabotage of the Kashmir Princess. As a final attempt to influence RNK, all three—Willcox, Maxwell and the Governor of Hong Kong—impressed upon him the need to convey to the Chinese, particularly Zhou Enlai, about how assiduously the Hong Kong Police had pursued the case. Clearly, they wanted to use RNK, and through him, India, as an ally against the Chinese suspicions.
Amidst all these pressures, RNK left for his second and final visit to Beijing on 25 August 1955. On 27 August, Zhou Enlai summoned him for the much-awaited meeting. RNK was accompanied by Bahadur Singh, Counsellor in the Indian Embassy, in Beijing since Ambassador Raghavan was busy with a pre-scheduled meeting. The most distinct memory that RNK had about the meeting was that it lasted for nearly three hours. The Chinese Premier was assisted by the then Vice Foreign Minister, Chang Han Phu, Hsiung and Zhou Enlai’s interpreter. A lot of time was wasted in translation of the conversation. But more than anything else, RNK remembered, how the Chinese Premier was suspicious of the British attitude towards the investigation and how he thought the probe was flawed.
First up, the Chinese Premier asked RNK what he thought about the investigations so far. RNK, under instructions to be absolutely factual, replied that he would confine himself to the developments in the days after Hsiung had left Hong Kong—which was on 10 August—and talk about the information that the Hong Kong Police had shared with him informally. RNK also told him that according to his understanding, the Hong Kong authorities would soon submit a formal report to the Chinese Government. Zhou was not convinced. RNK noted, ‘On this (hearing Kao’s remark), Zhou Enlai made the surprising remarks that it was hard to say whether the Chinese Government will receive the report, as he considered it possible that the Hong Kong Government might not inform even the results of the enquiries. I countered this by saying that my personal impression was that the Hong Kong Police could not afford to maintain complete silence about it.’
The Chinese Premier was not convinced. He asked RNK what he thought would be the next course of action by the Hong Kong authorities—whether they would lapse into inactivity and, subsequently, close the case by the end of 1955. Kao refused to take the bait. He refrained from making any comment on the political aspect. Instead, he told Zhou Enlai that in his estimation, the Hong Kong Police had done a fair job unde
r the circumstances so far. ‘I confessed to Zhou Enlai that there had been a period when I felt disheartened by the apparent lack of communication on the part of the Hong Kong Police regarding the day-to-day happening, but my overall impression was that they had not relaxed in their effort to unravel the case,’ Kao noted.
Zhou, however, continued to press his point and said he had information about two officers of the Hong Kong Special Branch who, according to him, were secretly in league with the KMT. He felt that had it not because of these two officers, the case would have been solved much quicker. ‘The Hong Kong Government seemed to believe more in the agents of the KMT than in the information given by him personally,’ the Chinese Premier remarked. ‘There are clearly political reasons for this attitude of the British Government and these reasons are connected to developments in world politics,’ an angry Zhou ranted. A careful Kao told him that he could only share what was in his direct knowledge and that these views were not to be taken either as those of the Hong Kong Government or the Government of India. Zhou, however, would not give up easily. He, in fact, asked RNK, ‘Can we put it this way? The Hong Kong authorities knew that you were going to leave Hong Kong and would return to India via Beijing. Is it possible that they wanted to ‘bluff’ you regarding the present state of the investigation?’ RNK replied, ‘Anything is possible. But my personal assessment was that substantial progress had been made in the investigation of the case. This somewhat angered Mr Zhou Enlai who felt that I seemed to question his assessment. He averred with some heat that if in the event he was proved right, then it would mean that I had been deceived by the Hong Kong Government,’ RNK noted. Holding his ground against an aggressive Zhou, RNK continued to listen to the Chinese Premier who remained sceptical of the British attitude towards the investigation.
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