by Tim Saunders
DD tanks moving up to the Rhine, showing the propellers and the flotation screen in the lowered position.
Staffordshire Yeomanry DD crews deflating their flotation screens following their crossing.
152 Brigade
Brigadier Cassels did, however, have an active role in the initial stages of the assault. He was, however, to provide a battalion (2 Seaforth) under command of 153 Brigade, to assist in the isolation of Rees and 5 Cameronian to 154 Brigade to further expand the bridgehead. With his remaining battalion (5 Seaforth), he was to maintain a divisional reserve and be prepared to lead the development of operations from the divisional bridgehead.
As the fourth battalions of the two assault brigades, the Seaforths and the Cameronians crossed the river in a ferry of storm boats operated by 70 Field Company RE. The ferry site was approximately on the inter-brigade boundary, which aided command and control in the dark. ‘Thirty-five boats and engines had been brought forward during the night before the assault, under cover of smoke, and dumped and camouflaged in the orchard behind the proposed launching site near Storm Boat House.’ According to the RE history:
About an hour after the assault waves of Buffaloes had crossed, the boats were carried over the dyke with the help of a company of pioneers and, by 2315 hours, twenty-two serviceable boats were in the water.
All boats were concentrated to run a continuous ferry service. Bank Control allotted the ferry to one battalion at a time, with the leading battalion of 152 Brigade moving up and commencing to cross at 0035 hours 24 March.
Highland troops were marshalled into boats as they became available and the loaded boats crossed one behind the other to the landing places on the far bank, ‘which had been marked upstream and downstream by carefully shaded coloured lights’. Only the most important light vehicles were ferried across in LVTs at this stage, which left the infantry battalions to man-pack their machine guns and mortars, along with their ammunition. With only light scales of ammunition, their own organic fire support was limited.
The boats continued to operate backwards and forwards. It was found that it took about 55 minutes to ferry a battalion across the river and, with some breaks in operating, the six battalions of 152 Brigade and 9 Canadian Brigade as well as some 500 other troops had been ferried across by the afternoon of 24 March. Prisoners and casualties were brought back on return journeys.
The ferrying operation was ‘peaceful while the first battalion was being taken over but the site was a very obvious one and soon became subjected to very accurate shelling which continued, off and on, well into 24 March’.
Captain Stafford, who was the far bank recce party for a heavy class 50 (tons) ferry, codenamed TILBURY, that was to be operated in the area of 152 Brigades assault the following day could testify that things did not remain ‘peaceful’ for long.
On touching down on the enemy bank, we immediately found that the initial wave of infantry had encountered a schumine field on the beach, and several men had been killed or wounded in it.... Owing to the minefields, I decided that our quickest and safest method of progress was to wade in the river, where it was unlikely that we would encounter any enemy obstructions. We soon found this easier said than done, mainly due to the weight and clumsiness of the equipment we were carrying. Mortar fire was becoming increasingly accurate and more than once I had to perform the divers act to protect myself. In doing this, I lost my 38 [radio] Set which had been strapped on my back. Every 150 yards or so, we encountered groins and, as we crossed the first one, I became aware that something was disclosing our exact position, as a sniper, hiding in a nearby crane, appeared to have our range very accurately. On investigation, I discovered the reason – every time I stooped down, a hand torch on the rear of my belt switched on, flashing out a vivid green light! Even so, we were increasingly troubled by accurate mortar fire.
Medium and heavy ferries would not be open for many hours, making the DD tanks an important asset.
While 2 Seaforth were across the river quickly around the appointed hour of 0235 hours, 5 Camerons prepared to cross around 0300 hours and HQ 152 Brigade and 5 Seaforth (divisional reserve) not until dawn. This last battalion went across in dribs and drabs due to the losses to storm boats and the fifty casualties amongst the Sappers of 70 Field Company, which reduced the number ferrying to twelve. The Seaforth’s historian recorded that:
The Battalion crossed company by company and disembarked on the far bank under intermittent shell fire, a few casualties being suffered. As soon as the stragglers, from a wayward boat, had been collected, the Battalion moved up the axis of 5th Black Watch, to a forming-up area in Esserden. We had sent a party, under the Second-in-Command, with the rear elements of 5th Black Watch to reconnoitre and prepare a forming-up place, within the perimeter of 5th Black Watch’s area. C Company, our reinforcement Company, had been employed launching the boats, after which they provided guides for the assaulting waves down to the riverside.
See map on page 95
At 0245 hours, A Company 2 Seaforth set out to seal off the northern approaches to Rees via an unnamed crossroads that was nicknamed ‘Bill’ and a bridge over the anti-tank ditch, which was in fact an existing water course that had been improved for defence. Here A Company contacted small parties of Fallschirmjäger who were promptly dealt with. The Seaforth were, however, in an unenviably precarious position.
It was not thought that the mopping-up of Rees, by the remaining Battalions of 153 Brigade, would be completed by the time the Battalion set out on its mission, and we were prepared for an unprotected right flank on our move. It had been planned, however, that a Battalion of 154 Brigade on the left [1 Black Watch] would be holding Speldrop, by the time we were launched, thus protecting our left flank. As it turned out, Speldrop did not fall until nearly 36 hours later and we went into our task with two open flanks.
We were of course operating in the dark and were equipped and prepared to force our way to our objective, there to remain in hedgehog fashion, astride the main road, until the Battalions, fighting in Rees, could fight their way through to us, or we to them.
Battalion Headquarters and the remaining two Companies, D and B, were poised ready to pass through B Company and continue quickly to their objective, the factory north of Rees. The bridge over the anti-tank ditch was, however, found to be badly blown and the road cratered. This did not delay the infantry companies, although it meant a good deal of engineer work, before the battalion HQ vehicles could pass. Under fire, a platoon of sappers, under command, started work immediately. A Sapper officer was ‘having an exciting chase with a sniper, rounded off by measuring his length in the water at the bottom of the ditch’.
By dawn 2 Seaforth had moved a mile inland and were astride the old B67 (east of the modern road of that designation) and had overcome stiff resistance in the Pipe Factory.
D Company reached the main road and B Company their objective, the latter going through to capture intact the road bridge, over the [another] anti-tank ditch, North of the position. The objective was a big one – too big for two Companies to hold, so the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel GW Dunn, ordered up A Company (less a Platoon which remained to protect our axis) to another area east of the Factory. The Battalion thus disposed had only just consolidated when dawn broke. The enemy was clearly thrown out of gear by the arrival of the Battalion across their main line of retreat, and some 50-60 prisoners were taken within a short time, most of them walking blindly into the trap set for them. At dawn, it was seen that quite a large number of enemy were all round us, and our axis of advance, the previous night, was under constant small arms fire. Further, the two Battalions clearing Rees had their hands full in the town and seemed unlikely to reach us that day.
The ‘anti-tank ditch’ is today back in use as a drainage ditch.
A Fallschirmjäger medium mortar crew preparing their ammunition.
Lieutenant Colonel Dunn’s aggressive tactics and local patrols cleared the whole of the Pipe Factory com
plex and the immediate surrounding area. This was a commendable result as it was a big task, and further prisoners were rounded up. The Seaforths requested a troop of tanks in order to extend their domination of the surrounding country but, none were yet available, so the battalion ‘had just to sit in their hedgehog’ defences, without transport of any description with them. To keep the enemy quiet, and take what local offensive action they could, patrols probed outwards. The enemy engaged the Seaforths with Spandau fire and casualties were suffered who could not be evacuated, leaving the Regimental Medical Officer with a growing number of men to treat with his scant man-packed resources.
To the east a significant number of enemy troops were seen moving on the Groin road running north out of Rees throughout the day. Signal communication was reasonably good because both Seaforth’s Tactical HQ and the attached gunner observation party had carried the heavy sets forward from the blown bridge, either on man-packs, or on improvised trolleys. Using the radios, the withdrawing Germans were engaged by observed artillery fire.
By placing themselves across the B67, 2 Seaforth had started the isolation of Rees from the north, leaving a one mile gap to the north-east between them and 5/7 Gordons on the Island. A gap that was covered by fire from machine guns and artillery. 2 Seaforth, however, were isolated but it was expected that their situation would improve when 5 Cameronian seized the hamlet of Mittelburg to the north, which once in a state of defence, would offer a degree of mutual support.
5 Cameronian moving up behind 5 Black Watch in Esserden found that fighting was still going on in the area and that it was not possible to advance on Mittelburg as planned at first light (0530 hrs). However, the Staffordshire Yeomanry’s DD tanks were now arriving in the bridgehead and the first squadron was duly allocated to the Cameronians for their delayed attack which was now due to start at 0700 hours.
With the tanks moving by bounds, supporting the infantry, the 5 Cameronian battle group advanced on the village of Mittelburg. As they approached, four or five assault guns opened fire from positions amongst the houses at the edge of the village. These assault guns were almost certainly from 15 Panzer Grenadier Division. The battle group possessing superior firepower, in the form of the Shermans of B Squadron and, of course, the corps artillery, was able to continue the advance. However, on closing up to the anti-tank ditch three out of four Yeomanry tanks were knocked out and the attack over the open ground came to a halt. It is probable that the assault guns were either the self-same vehicles or were from the company that supported the counter-attack on Speldrop and Klein Esserden just a little later. With the situation at Speldrop to their left rear deteriorating and Spandaus sweeping the open terrain they would have to cover to reach Mittelburg, the decision was made to abandon further advances by 5 Cameronian. This of course left 2 Seaforth isolated in the Pipe Factory in what their CO described as a ‘sticky position’.
At about 0800 hours the Seaforth and Cameronians reverted to command of 152 Brigade, once Tactical Headquarters and 5 Seaforth had crossed the river after dawn, in penny packets due to the loss of so many storm boats.
9 Canadian Brigade
Meanwhile, the highland battalions of 9 Canadian Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division were crossing the Rhine behind 154 Brigade on the left flank of the assault. The Highland Light Infantry of Canada’s (HLI of C) advance party, consisting of nine other ranks commanded by Capt Donald Pearce, had gone ahead with elements of 154 Bde and were waiting on the east bank. Their task was to recce the ground in order to lead the battalion to its assembly area when it arrived on the far side. These men were the first Canadians to cross the Rhine.
At 0345 hours, the HLI of C received orders to move, and by 0425 hours the fighting men of the four rifle companies with ‘Mae West’ lifejackets slung round them and laden with 24-hour ration packs, were clambering into their Buffaloes in the marshalling area on the road north of Honnopel. Having driven four hundred yards over the flood plain they had crossed the Rhine under ‘sporadic shelling’. An hour later, once on the far bank, guides led the battalion into its assembly area to the south of Klein Esserden, a march that was enlivened for C Company capturing of 30 members of the Volkssturm. Here, fully assembled as dawn broke, the Highland Light Infantry of Canada came under command of 154 Brigade, at a crucial point in the battle; reports were coming in of 1 Black Watch’s difficulties at Speldrop. The original tasks allocated to the battalion in the expansion of the bridgehead, the capture of Bienen were now impractical and the battalion monitored the situation. Eventually, as we will see in Chapter 9, warning orders were issued and plans made to retake Speldrop.
The prime means of movement for both sides was marching.
The remainder of 9 Canadian Brigade were scheduled to cross later in the day and to be complete by mid afternoon.
Summary
Enemy reaction to the 51st Highland Division’s crossing in the Rees sector had at first been slight, due to a combination of the numbing effect of the bombardment, tactical surprise and the isolation of the battlefield, the interdiction sorties flown by the Allied air forces. However, the German response by local reserves was increasingly significant and supported with mortar fire and by sniping from determined Fallschirmjäger soldiers. There were also signs that the inevitable armoured counter-attacks were developing.
By 0800 hours, however, 51st Highland Division had secured a bridgehead with the majority of its infantry, with mainly man-packable support weapons. However, they were well served by a mass of artillery whose radio nets in most cases were working well and some tank support. Other heavy weapons and vehicles, along with the ordinary gun tanks of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry would have to await the opening of ferries before they could cross to the east bank of the river. The nature of the country, with its boggy terrain and defended villages and woods, was such that the two squadrons of DD tanks were very much in a supporting role in case of counter-attack. The leading elements of 9 Canadian Brigade were also across and with 152 Brigade now operational, sufficient combat power was being assembled to hold anything 15th Panzergrenadiers and 8th Fallschirmjäger could throw at the Highland Division. Meanwhile, 1 Gordons were in the first phase of clearing the virtually isolated town of Rees, which it was now acknowledged would be a slow business.
Officers of the Highland Light Infantry of Canada.
The Death of General Rennie
The 51st Highland Division had been subject to numerous changes of command. Major General Thomas Rennie was moved from 3rd Division and is widely credited with restoring the fame and fortune of the Division.
He was often to be found at the sharp end, encouraging his Jocks across the start line and visiting front line positions, leaving the infantry knowing that he shared their dangers and hardships.
At 0900 hours on the morning of 24 March, General Rennie had crossed the Rhine with his Jeep in an LVT and was on his way to visit Tac HQ of 154 Brigade. In the jeep along with the General were Lieutenant Tweedie, his ADC, and his radio operator, Lance-Corporal Craig. Still in the area of the riverbank, he wished ‘Good luck’ to the Adjutant of 7 Argylls, who was passing in a Bren gun carrier and as the divisional historian recalled:
A salvo of mortar bombs fell, and the jeep received a direct hit. General Rennie fell out on to the grass verge. Tweedie was unhurt, but Craig was wounded. ″Are you all right, sir?″ asked Tweedie. There was no reply. General Rennie was carried to 176 Field Ambulance, which was only some thirty yards away. He died almost immediately after admission.
General Horrocks wrote ‘I have always felt that Rennie had some foreboding about this battle ... I had never seen him so worried. He hated everything about it and I couldn’t understand why. Like so many highlanders I believe he was ″Fey″.’
The shocking loss of such a fearless, popular and effective divisional commander can be imagined. For instance, Colonel Bradford of 5 Black Watch, told his company commanders of the General’s death ‘but forbade them to pass it on to the Jocks until Rees should
be taken’. Perhaps this passage will explain Colonel Bradford’s fears:
There was never anybody quite like Thomas Rennie. He was as staunch as Dumbarton Rock, determined to the point of obstinacy; he was a great Jock-lover, and they in turn adored him. He was the most accessible and least pretentious of generals, of whom every officer and man could boast as a friend. He had an impish sense of humour, and a cheerfulness, which was proof against every crisis or disaster. He had a great flair for doing things the right way, and complete confidence in his judgment, which was shared by all around him. He could sift the essential from the non-essential, and refused to bother himself at all or take the slightest interest in anything which was not. His courage was far beyond the ordinary, but there was nothing flamboyant about him. ... there wasn’t a Jock in the Division who did not know his duffle-coated figure. He never wore a red hat to the day of his death; a Red Hackle was good enough for him.