by Tim Saunders
The Defence of Rees
The II Fallschirmjägerkorps had fully appreciated that by holding Rees they could potentially dominate the Rhine bridging sites either side of the town. While they would probably be unable to prevent an assault crossing, they could prevent or badly delay the consolidation and build up of Allied forces on the eastern bank, making them extremely vulnerable to counter-attack by XVVII Panzerkorps. Therefore, Rees was to be held by 12 Fallschirmjäger Battalion under Hauptmann Hubner, reinforced by a ‘battalion’ of Volkssturm and supported by some of the Fallschirmjäger’s self-propelled artillery. These were mainly improvised equipment made up from tank or other AFV hulls and the guns from towed artillery pieces. A German civilian reports that a Fallschirmjäger company commander told him that his command, at just fifty men, was the strongest company in the battalion.
Major General ‘Babe’ MacMillan.
51st Highland Division Situation A.M. 24 March 1945
Hauptmann Hubner’s tactics were similar to those that the Wesel Garrison had intended to use but in their case, they had been negated by the Allied bomber strikes. Hubner’s plan was based on the development of a number of well-prepared strongpoints at key locations within the town. These companies or more likely platoon strength positions, were sited to block likely Allied approaches and included substantial buildings that dominated these routes and were suitable for use as artillery or mortar observation posts.
Selected buildings put into a state of defence, invariably had a good strong cellar in which the defenders could shelter from the expected Allied artillery bombardment. To make an effective strongpoint a building would also have to have a good field of fire, covering the likely enemy assault routes and dominate surrounding houses. The buildings would be strengthened; potential entrances barricaded and concealed loopholes made in the walls and roofs. Inside, old-fashioned murder holes were cut to enable the defenders to drop grenades on attackers breaking in below. Finally, routes for the defenders to redeploy were created by ‘mouse holing’ from room to room and house to house and covered escape routes planned. This would enable the defenders to withdraw to their next prepared position, having inflicted the maximum casualties and delay on the attackers.
A composite air photograph of Rees before the battle.
Supplementing the strongpoints, which were principally held by Volkssturm under the eye of Fallschirmjäger officers and NCOs, would be patrols of veteran soldiers who were to provide a defensive perimeter to identify the routes that the Allies were actually taking, cover flanks and gaps between the strongpoints. These patrols were to play an essential part in inflicting attrition on the Scots and delaying them by forcing time-consuming clearance of buildings that were not in fact prepared for defence. An important task of the patrols was to hunt down and destroy with Panzershrecks or Panzerfausts, their priority target, British flame-throwing tanks – Crocodiles or the smaller carrier version the Wasp.
In summary capturing a medium sized town that the enemy had been afforded time to prepare for defence was going to be a protracted affair.
The Clearance of Rees
By 0800 hours B Company 1 Gordon Highlanders reached their first objective in the northwest corner of Rees; a cemetery, from where they took up a defensive position to protect C Company’s attack into the centre of the town. This company had just broken through the Fallschirmjäger’s perimeter defences and was fighting in the outskirts of the town.
C Company reported slow but steady progress in the difficult task of clearing a determined enemy from well-concealed positions, made worse by Rees’s state of ruin and chaos. Houses were shattered, streets blocked by shell craters and rubble, which the Fallschirmjäger were using to good advantage to supplement the defended buildings. The Gordons were completely unaware of the extent of preparations made by the enemy.
During the fighting, it is recorded that Private Blackman narrowly escaped being killed, when he was shot at by a German armed with panzerfausts, as he was observing from a window of a partly ruined house. Outraged, he set out on a personal vendetta:
... which was to continue to the end of the war, in search of the German who had shot at him, the PIAT was the British equivalent of the Panzerfaust and by this stage of the war had earned the reputation of being more dangerous to the firer than the target. Despite this Blackman began to fire his PIAT at any Germans he saw, this was to have a very salutary effect on the German resistance in his immediate vicinity.
Private Blackman was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his determined actions during the clearance of Rees.
C Company fought through to their objective in the town to a line west of the square by 1000 hours. While they had been fighting to clear the houses and buildings, D Company, having been relieved of rear area security by A Company, had advanced eastwards along the riverbank and without encountering enemy positions, was able to link up with C Company in the town. Unfortunately, in doing so, one of the platoon commanders of D Company, ‘Lieutenant Rodger and his platoon sergeant, Sergeant Mathews, had been killed by a shell whilst sheltering in a German trench on the riverbank. This was a particularly cruel double blow to the Company as Sergeant Mathews was one of only a few Senior NCOs who were experienced enough to act as a platoon commander’.
Lightly armed and equipped youthful defenders of the Reich prepare to repel invaders.
The North-South Road today from the area of the post office looking south to the river.
A Company still following up behind the advance, promptly relieved D Company of holding the newly captured area at 1030 hours and set about dominating this outskirt of Rees and kept the streets clear of enemy displaced from the central area. With the ground behind them secured by A Company, D Company continued its advance along the riverbank and managed to clear as far as the main town square.
The North-South Road looking north to the Post Office.
Prisoners being brought west along the bund to Colonel Grant-Peterkin’s Headquarters, were questioned by the intelligence officer who confirmed that the enemy they were facing were a battalion from 8th Fallschirmjäger Division and a Landschutzen battalion. With similar reports from 5/7 Gordons, this confirmed that 153 Brigade had landed astride the boundary between 7th and 8th Fallschirmjäger Divisions.
While A and D Companies dominated the southern part of Rees, C Company turned north and cleared the intervening streets, linking up with B Company. All three of the forward companies, B, C and D, now held a four hundred yard linked frontage within the town. By 1220 hours, the town was clear of enemy to within fifty yards of the main north-south road that bisected the town. The Commanding Officer recorded in his post operational report that:
The Germans ... concentrated in and fought from the key buildings, and then from the ground floors; only the odd Spandau and snipers were up a storey or two. Booby traps were not met with in any large numbers; mines were, however, lain in and around all their demolitions, key road junctions and in some gardens, but the latter were usually marked.
With his battalion well balanced, Colonel Grant-Peterkin ordered A Company to prepare to move up and occupy the rubble along the western edge of the main north-south road. However, during a preliminary recce, Major Rare came under fire from enemy held houses on the east side of the road that dominated the area. Consequently, the CO decided to leave A Company in its present position. The battalion had now been in action for a considerable time and the Colonel realised that reorganisation and re-supply was needed.
Fallschirmjäger had to be cleared from strongly constructed buildings and piles of rubble.
At 1600 hours, however, Brigadier Sinclair had reviewed the situation and ordered that the clearing of Rees was:
″... to continue without pause, throughout the night if the operation should take so long and that, at all costs it must be cleared by first light on the 25th.″
The 5 Black Watch who had been one of the initial assault battalions, was now in reserve and would assist by cleari
ng the town to the north of the station road and carry out a company attack on the railway station itself at 2300 hours. The CO, Colonel Bradford, however, seeing how exhausted his men where, asked if the operation could be postponed until an hour before first light, as a night clearing operation through the rubble of Rees seemed impossible. His men had, after all, now been awake for over twenty-four hours and needed rest. Such a delay could not be sanctioned, as the Corps Commander, General Horrocks, wanted Rees cleared ‘as a matter of highest priority’. Until this was achieved, the enemy artillery observation posts concealed within the town could prevent, or at least severely hinder, the construction of the bridges that would allow armour and other heavy equipment to cross the Rhine, prevent the battle developing as planned and leave the bridgehead vulnerable to counter-attack. (See map opposite.)
The unusual interference in battalion level operations by the Corps Commander was the result of General Rennie’s death. With the Highland Division’s brigades locked in combat, and with only one division in action, it was an easy decision for the Corps Commander, with his own tactical HQ, to effectively take over command of the division. Major Lindsay recalled seeing the Corps Commander with his CO and Brigadier Oliver, who was nominally commanding the division but in reality fighting the battle for Rees, ‘planning the coming night’s operations ...’
The 5 Black Watch attack began shortly after dark and, as described by the regimental historian:
It was bitter fighting, street by street and house by house. Early on, a young officer in Aldo Campbell’s company, whose first action it was, was hit in the stomach; the command of his platoon devolved on to one Corporal Greaves, an Englishman. Campbell asked him if he was quite confident about commanding the platoon; Greaves replied that he didn’t know much about it, but ′you just show me where to go and I’ll go.’ And so he did, to some tune throughout the night; wherever Aldo Campbell told him to go, he went, and took his platoon with him.
The Italianate Cathedral just off the square in Rees.
A personal snap of Fallschirmjäger fighting amongst the rubble in 1945.
The fighting went on all night and into the next morning. Houses were changing hands; the Germans were using Panzerfausts at close range in the rubble-filled streets so effectively, that the tanks and the fuel filled Wasp flame-throwers were vulnerable and had to be withdrawn.
Despite General Horrocks’ demands, it was obvious that 5 BW’s wide sweeping approach would take a considerable time to get anywhere near the station, and that the attack on the enemy strong point was more likely to take place at first light the following morning. Consequently, Colonel Grant-Peterkin decided, on his own initiative, to delay the start of the Gordon’s attack until 2100 hours and then to midnight on word of slow progress by 5 BW. In his post operational report, he stressed ‘how quickly troops get tired operating amongst rubble caused by the bombardment’.
Without the town being cleared, as feared by the Corps Commander, German assault guns concentrated their fire against the bridging operations on the banks of the Rhine, whilst well-placed observers directed mortar fire onto any troop movements on the open approach to the town. To the British, it was obvious that the Germans were using the Cathedral and Mullenturm (Mill Tower) as observation posts.
Despite their failure to comply with General Horrocks’ instructions, the Gordons had used the time well in order to consolidate their company positions and reduce isolated pockets of enemy in the part of the town they had already captured. By dusk, at 1900 hours, the Gordons’ situation was, consequently, more secure and the enemy’s ability to interfere with the forthcoming night operations, was considerably reduced. In short, Colonel Grant-Peterkin, the man on the ground, had defied his own commander’s instructions and it is recorded that the inactivity was concealed, when at:
2100 hours, night operations had officially started. The battalion however was in fact still resting, so Brigade HQ was kept happy by a series of periodical progress reports indicating that things were going slowly – according to plan.
The Mullenturm on the eastern outskirts of Rees dominated the river and much of the town.
Major Lindsay, the second-in-command, manning the rear link to Brigade recalled: ‘It was a little tricky trying to give periodical progress reports about operations that were not taking place!’
At 2200 hours, sustained shelling of the Gordons in Rees and the riverbank beyond by heavy calibre German guns was reported. At the same time, the Black Watch reported that their operations towards the station had started and that ‘progress was satisfactory against some opposition’.
During the long night, Major Lindsay was one of those:
... who were able to turn in for a few hours during the night and slept rather unevenly as the artillery, just across the river, were going great guns all night. In fact I dreamed that a huge demon of a gunner was lashing the crews with a gigantic whip, crying faster, you so-and-sos, faster.
The Second Day
By midnight, twelve infantry battalions of XXX Corps had crossed the Rhine along with approximately thirty DD Shermans. However, with the Germans in Rees still holding out artillery with fire being directed from the Cathedral and Mullenturm disrupting bridging and supply operations, the town had become a focal point of the Divisional Artillery. To the north 2 Seaforth were still fighting in the factory area and to the east, 5/7 Gordons, having cleared the island formed by the Alter Rhine, were pinned down by heavy mortar fire. Consequently, they were unable to contribute to the clearance of the town from the rear.
At 0020 hours, 5 BW reported that the northern part of the town was now clear of enemy, except for the area of the station, which they reported was a well developed strongpoint. An hour and twenty minutes later, 5 BW reported ‘slow progress against a determined enemy established in the top floors of houses in the vicinity of the station and the post office’.
With the report that the northern part of the town was substantially clear, Colonel Grant-Peterkin committed A Company to a preliminary operation, starting at 0100 hours. The Company moved off to occupy rubble to the west of the main north-south road in preparation for operations next morning. Within thirty minutes, under the cover of darkness they had partly completed their task, holding positions at the southeast corner of the square. C Company carried out a similar function north of the market place, ‘pushing forward through the rubble meeting surprisingly little opposition’.
By first light (053l hours), however, the Gordons had to report to Brigade HQ that they were making only limited progress.
The long but relatively narrow Market Square in the centre of Rees, then a German killing area.
B Company is unable to cross the lateral because of the fire fight around the station. C Company reports a lot of snipers in the area of the Market Place [square] and Cathedral Square which makes any advance in that direction appear suicidal.
In full daylight, C Company turned south, and set about going around the Market Place and then clearing down to the riverbank.
It was at this point that the Gordons were to able bring into action a troop of 454 Mountain Battery from 3rd Mountain Regiment Royal Artillery, commanded by Captain James McNair. The 3.7-inch mountain guns, attached to the Battalion for this operation were the only artillery that could cross the river in an amphibious Weasel. Until the bridges had been built, these were the only heavy weapons available in the direct fire role for street fighting. The Sherman DDs could not negotiate the rubble in the town and had already been seen to be extremely vulnerable (even if they had not been needed to repel counter-attacks around Speldrop and Bienen) but the 3.7-inch guns could be taken apart and manhandled into position.
C Company reported that sniper fire was coming from a building near the south east corner of the Market Place about 100 yards from their position. Captain McNair, who had not been in action before, was ably assisted by his troop sergeant, Sergeant White, and ‘set about impressing Scots and Germans alike as they brought a gun rapidly in
to action in clear view of the enemy’. In the excitement and tension of the moment, the gun was fired without the range having been set and the shell detonated short of the target. ‘The snipers no doubt believed the next shot would be closer as all enemy firing in that vicinity ceased immediately, signalling another enemy withdrawal.’
A Company were eventually able to cross the main lateral road at about 0700 hours, unhindered, as 5 BW were closing in on enemy positions around the station. Charging across the road, A Company was able to capture the block of buildings immediately to the west of the main and was now in a position to support an attack on an enemy strongpoint and artillery observation post in the Cathedral.
A 3.7-inch mountain gun and Jeep tractor combination.