Similarly, when it came to the Corbettian theme of power projection onto shore, humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the littoral region – which figured centrally in the 2007 version – has now been placed as a subtheme of the power projection capacity. The emphasis instead is on ensuring a power projection capacity in an area denial environment. Naval power projection includes, among other things, kinetic strikes against targets ashore, sea-based fire support to land forces, sea basing of logistics support and ship-to-shore amphibious operations.44 Maritime security involves all naval actions to guard against piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation and transnational crime to ensure the sea lines of communication remain unencumbered. It continues to be presented as the key area amenable to cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners. The new role of ‘all-domain access’, listed first in A Cooperative Strategy even before strategic deterrence, refers to ‘the ability to project forces into contested areas with sufficient freedom to operate effectively’ and is in direct reaction to strategic areas being increasingly contested by state and non-state actors.45 Overall, the 2015 document reveals a much more muscular emphasis on the use of seapower in the defence of US national interests.46
Conclusion
A handful of scholars, analysts and practitioners, including those who drafted US Navy strategies, are associated with post-Cold War strategic thought on seapower. The ideas have helped modernize, elaborate and push forward the limits of those of history’s best-known seapower strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Leaning variously toward one or the other perspective – but always incorporating a degree of both – post-Cold War strategic thinking in the maritime dimension has done much to elaborate the role of seapower in a nation’s security: the primary purpose of seapower is to enable sea control both in littoral areas and on the open ocean; effective littoral warfare requires effective joint warfare; sea control in the littorals can significantly impact the course of intra-state conflicts and is necessary for effective naval support of humanitarian and disaster relief operations; navy expeditionary warfare is required to respond to distant crises and is facilitated by naval forward presence; sea control on the open ocean is necessary to maintain open the sea lanes of commerce; and seapower is necessary to ensure access to the contested high-ground areas of the ocean.
Much of the post-Cold War, including post-9/11, theorizing about seapower centred on the littorals and seapower’s impact on shore. In an environment where the demise of the Soviet Union had granted by default American control of the open oceans, Mahanian themes about fleet-on-fleet tactics found little or no place or relevance. But threats and competitors began to emerge in the latter 2000s that hark back to an earlier time, whether it is piracy on the open seas or concern about China’s growing blue-water fleet. As unipolarity gives way to multipolarity, this trend – already reflected in the strategic thought of Geoffrey Till, implicitly flagged in A Cooperative Strategy (2007) and more overtly addressed in its sequel (2015) – has pushed forward the boundaries of contemporary strategic thought on seapower. The next chapter examines post-Cold War strategic thinking with regards to landpower.
Questions
1 What are the main strategic ideas of Mahan and Corbett and how do their ideas differ?
2 What was the nature of the change in US naval strategy in the early post-Cold War era and what were the driving factors behind the change in strategy?
3 What was the nature of the change in US naval strategy in the 2000s and what were the driving factors behind the change in strategy?
4 What has been the nature of the change in US naval strategy in the 2010s and what are the driving forces behind the change – or adjustment – in strategy?
5 Do the ideas of Mahan or Corbett best explain the nature of great-power naval activity today?
6 How does A2/AD warfare relate to Mahan’s and Corbett’s strategic thinking?
Notes
1 Geoffrey Till, ‘New Directions in Maritime Strategy?: Implications for the U.S. Navy’, Naval War College Review 60:4 (Autumn 2007), 30.
2 For a more detailed discussion of Mahan’s work, see Margaret Tuttle Sprout, ‘Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power’, in Edward Mead Earle, Ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943); Philip A. Crowl, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian’, in Peter Paret, Ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
3 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), v–vi.
4 Ibid., iv.
5 Ibid., iii.
6 Crowl, 451.
7 Mahan, 28.
8 Ibid., 28, 50, 71.
9 Ibid., 28, 82.
10 Sam J. Tangredi, ‘Globalization and Sea Power: Overview and Context’, in Sam J. Tangredi, Ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 3.
11 J.J. Widen, ‘Julian Corbett and the Current British Maritime Doctrine’, Comparative Strategy 28:2 (March/April 2009), 176.
12 Till, 31.
13 Crowl, 458.
14 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), 14.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 13.
17 Ibid., 300–301.
18 Widen, 172.
19 US Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Course Outline, Spring 2011.
20 Important works on Cold War seapower include George Baer, One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy (New York, NY: Praeger, 1965); Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); and Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: Naval Institute Press, 1986). See also R. Castex, Strategic Theories (1993, original 1935); and Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).
21 Till, 32.
22 US Navy, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, reprinted in John B. Hattendorf, Ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), 90.
23 US Navy, Forward … From the Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 8.
24 Friedman, 220.
25 US Navy, From the Sea, 90.
26 Ibid.
27 US Navy, Forward … From the Sea, 1.
28 Ibid., 8.
29 Carl E. Mundy, ‘Thunder and Lightning’, Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994), 50.
30 Benjamin Lambeth, ‘Air Force–Navy Integration in Strike Warfare’, Naval War College Review 61:1 (Winter 2008), 32–33.
31 Christopher P. Cavas, ‘Cebrowksi’s Legacy: Think Outside the Pentagon’, Defense News, 21 November 2005, 8.
32 Robert O. Work, ‘Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy’, Issues in Science and Technology (Autumn 2004), 63–64.
33 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 451.
34 Stephen Trimble, ‘US Seeks Wider Seapower Definition’, Jane’s Navy International, 1 July 2006.
35 Michael Mullen, ‘A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons’, in John B. Hattendorf, Ed., Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings 19–23 September 2005 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2006), 4.
36 Trimble.
37 As quoted in Christopher P. Cavas, ‘Spanning the Globe: U.S. Floats Fleet Cooperation Concept to Allies’, Defense News, 8 January 2007, 11.
38 US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2007). The document has no page numbers.
39 All references in this paragraph are taken from ibid.
40 Robert A. Work and Jan van Tol, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2008), 23.
41 Ibid., 24.
42 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2009), 14.
43 US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2015), 22.
44 Ibid., 24.
45 Ibid., 19–26.
46 Geoffrey Till, ‘The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Another View from the Outside’, Naval War College Review 68:4 (Autumn 2015), 36.
Further reading
Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911).
Friedman, Norman. Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
Gray, Colin S. The Navy in the Post-Cold War World (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).
Hattendorf, John B., Ed. U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006).
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987).
Tangredi, Sam J., Ed. Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002).
Tangredi, Sam J. Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
Till, Geoffrey. Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2009).
US Navy. Forward … From the Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994).
US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007).
US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015).
Work, Robert O. and Jan van Tol. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2008).
2 Landpower
Throughout much of recorded history, until Alfred Thayer Mahan emerged as a strategist of seapower, the study of strategic thought was all but synonymous with military strategy in the land dimension of warfare. Two names are familiar to even the most casual reader of military affairs: Sun Tzu, the fifth century BC Chinese general who lived during the ‘period of the warring states’ and wrote The Art of War; and Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general who served during the Napoleonic Wars and whose On War was published posthumously. Two others, somewhat less well known but whose ideas are usefully included in any volume on strategic thought, are: Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, a Swiss national who served as a general in both the French and Russian armies (including on Napoleon’s staff), and whose Summary of the Art of War in many ways documented Napoleonic warfare; and Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a captain in the British army during World War One who retired in the 1920s to a life of military writing, including a volume entitled Strategy: The Indirect Approach.
Although elements of some of these works, notably Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, are relevant to irregular warfare, and indeed to other walks of life, in general it can be said that the ideas of these theorists pertain primarily to conventional warfare. While definitions vary, conventional warfare can be understood as warfare between or among two or more roughly symmetrical organized groups (normally states) whose objective is the destruction of enemy forces, while irregular warfare features at least one non-state actor, a materially weaker and often difficult-to-locate opponent who, in operating against the stronger one, seeks not the annihilation of enemy forces (which is not possible) but rather the control of the population. Means and methods will also differ – the use of improvised explosive devices is one of the most prevalent contemporary ‘strategies of the weak’ – but the main distinction lies in the overall objective.
Responding to irregular warfare is arguably more difficult, and at a minimum more complex, than to conventional warfare. Rather than developing principles in this area, for example, Jomini simply advised states to avoid involvement in civil or religious ‘wars of opinion’.1 But such advice was not particularly tenable in the decades after World War Two and is even less so in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Strategic thinking as it pertains to irregular warfare will be discussed in Chapter 5. Conventional warfare can also be contrasted with unconventional warfare involving WMDs – that is, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Strategic thinking with respect to nuclear weapons and other WMDs will be discussed in Chapter 4.
This chapter examines strategic thought on conventional landpower. It begins by briefly highlighting the key ideas of Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, Clausewitz and Jomini. Their strategic thought, particularly that of Clausewitz but also the others, has been discussed and interpreted in innumerable places; the purpose here is only to outline the parameters of strategic thinking about conventional landpower up until the early post-World War Two period. The chapter goes on to discuss some ideas that emerged in the latter part of the Cold War, notably that of AirLand Battle, before examining in greater detail strategic thought on conventional landpower in the post-Cold War era. The first two post-Cold War decades were dominated by stabilization and counterinsurgency missions, for example in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq (the 2003 Iraq War, along with the 1991 Gulf War in the dying days of the Cold War, being the only truly ‘conventional’ wars). Nonetheless, there has been some strategic thinking and important insights on the use of conventional landpower in the post-Cold War era.
Sun Tzu2
Sun Tzu opens his treatise The Art of War by arguing that war is a matter of vital importance to the state, a matter of life or death, of survival or ruin, and that it therefore must be thoroughly studied. A proponent of an ‘indirect’ approach to warfare, Sun Tzu advised generals to prepare the battlefield using deception and manoeuvre, with the goal of reducing the amount of warfare as much as possible – and ideally to none at all – in the achievement of one’s objectives. ‘All warfare is based on deception’, he argues in his opening chapter, therefore ‘[w]hen capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity; when near, make it appear you are far away; when far away, make it appear you are near. Offer the enemy bait to lure him, feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under strain and wear him down.’ Manoeuvre, in turn, is an important part of this strategy. To achieve deception, a commander must be able to ‘make the most devious route the most direct … march by an indirect route and divert the enemy’. One able to do this, he argues, understands the strategy of the direct and indirect.
Sun Tzu did not conceive the objective of military action to be the annihilation of the enemy’s army or the destruction of his cities and countryside. Rather, the ultimate goal, was ‘to take All-under-Heaven intact’ – ideally by subduing the enemy without battle. ‘Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it … For to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’ Tactically he advised deception and manoeuvre, while strategically he advised first targeting the enemy’s overall approach. ‘What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack his cities. Attack cities only when there is no other alternative.’ Finally, Sun Tzu drew attention to the importance of moral influences and leadership in war. For effective command, he argued, a general must exhibit qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and stri
ctness and this, in turn, would give him the respect necessary for soldiers to follow him into war.
Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart
Writing in the aftermath of first one and then a second world war, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart was an admirer of Sun Tzu who felt that civilization ‘might have been spared much of the damage of the world wars’ had there been a greater knowledge of Sun Tzu’s approach.3 Liddell Hart’s ideas and works are voluminous and centred to a significant degree on theoretical development regarding mechanized warfare. What is of most interest here, however, is his refinement at both a strategic and tactical level of Sun Tzu’s views with respect to an indirect conventional strategy. Strategically, Liddell Hart argues that the purpose of a military strategy is to diminish as much as possible the likelihood of resistance. A strategist’s true aim, he argues, is to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if this does not produce a decision, its continuation by battle is sure to do so. The approach, he argues, is one that will limit hostilities: ‘For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.’ ‘The perfection of strategy’, he states in words that echo those of Sun Tzu, ‘would be … to produce a decision without any serious fighting’.4
Tactically, diminishing resistance involves exploiting the elements of movement and surprise. For Liddell Hart, movement lies in the physical sphere while surprise lies in the psychological sphere. The two elements react on one another in that movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement. Physically, the approach should be to take the line of least resistance. Unlike Clausewitz and even more so Jomini (see below), Liddell Hart advises against ‘the tendency … to treat war as mainly a matter of concentrating superior force’.5 Superior weight at the decisive point, he argues, rarely suffices unless that point is also weakened morally.
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