by Richard Mead
There would thus be two battles, one to reach the Ijsselmeer, cut off all the German forces to the east and establish bridgeheads for a thrust into the Westphalian Plain towards the Ruhr, the other to create and hold open the corridor. With three divisions and two independent brigades under command, Horrocks would have had quite enough on his hands and thus another corps HQ was clearly required to run the battle of the corridor with three airborne divisions and one additional brigade, reinforced in due course by the air-portable 52 Division, which would protect the area between Arnhem and the Ijsselmeer from attack from the west. Because of the planned speed of the operation – Nijmegen in twenty-four hours, Arnhem in forty-eight – it was necessary to have that HQ on the ground ab initio. This was just the sort of situation which Eisenhower had spelt out to Marshall in his letter of 28 July.
Thus, notwithstanding the use of the tugs for the thirty-eight gliders needed to carry half of 2 South Staffs and six anti-tank guns, which would have been undeniably valuable to 1 Airborne but unlikely in retrospect to swing the battle in its favour, there was no alternative but to take the HQ as close to the battle as possible and Nijmegen, two-thirds of the way up the corridor, was a sensible location. As the decision was a rational one which met the needs of the plan and followed normal practice, Boy does not deserve criticism for concurring with it. Where he should be censured, however, is for taking into battle a corps HQ which was quite unfit to carry out its job.
There were two problems. First, the HQ had been set up as an administrative and planning organization, in which roles it was very good; to put together a highly complex operation in a week showed great skill. On the other hand, it had never been designed as an operational HQ, and most of the staff had no active service experience. This began to show early in ‘Market Garden’, when Boy discovered that Walch in particular was not adequately prepared for the role of BGS in the field. It was fortunate that Boy never had to control the operation which had been originally planned. As it was, Horrocks’s experienced XXX Corps HQ ran the battle as it developed.
Secondly, Corps Signals, which used up over half the gliders taking the HQ to Nijmegen, had only been formed three weeks before the operation began, had had no time to train and was using some sets with which it was unfamiliar. Because there was no common British-American airborne cipher, it had proved necessary to add a US element, which was also untrained. To be fair, Boy had been demanding a signal section for months before it was established and had always been denied on the grounds that the HQ was never going to be operational.
Although the corps signallers were undoubtedly inefficient and took far too long to establish reliable communications with other HQs, the signals problem within 1 Airborne Division was primarily of that formation’s making. The division was not even able to communicate with its own 1 Parachute Brigade at the bridge and, apart from occasional messages, it was only when a link was established with the Polish Parachute Brigade on 22 September (D+5) that divisional signals could communicate regularly with the outside world, although a link had been established between the artillery spotters and 64 Medium Regiment RA on the previous day. The Phantom net did work intermittently, sending its first message on the morning of 20 September, but it was not sufficiently reliable to be used as an effective medium of command between the Airborne Corps and 1 Airborne Division.
The poor communications left Boy blind as far as 1 Airborne Division was concerned through the first few days of the battle. It is doubtful if he would have fared any better if he had remained in the UK, although wireless contact between Rear HQ and 1 Airborne Division was marginally more satisfactory. In retrospect, Boy should probably have left behind in the UK a more functional Rear HQ, as his Main HQ was entirely dependent on XXX Corps’ success in moving up the road and did not arrive until D+4, forty-eight hours later than planned. Boy appointed Gale as his deputy in his absence, but the Rear HQ war diary shows him as visiting only twice, on 18 and 21 September, and there is no indication that he made any contribution to the battle.
Verdict. Guilty, but of a different charge. The decision to take an Airborne Corps HQ into the field was merited by the plan and in accordance with accepted practice. However, the HQ was not fit for purpose, for which Boy should take the blame.
5. That he was wrong to instruct Gavin to focus on the defence of the Groesbeek Heights and to treat the capture of the Nijmegen road bridge as of secondary importance
There is no doubt that Boy explicitly instructed Gavin, at a divisional commanders’ conference on 14 September, not to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge until he had firmly established control of the Groesbeek Heights. Gavin, for his part, needed no pressing on this, writing subsequently: ‘After a thorough study of the Nijmegen area, and after consulting a Dutch officer who was to accompany the 82d Airborne Division, it became clear that the key to the accomplishment of the 82d’s mission would be the prompt seizure, thorough organization and tenacious holding of the Groesbeek heights.’2 There was no difference between him and Boy over the priorities, which were first the heights, then the Grave bridge, then the bridges over the Mass-Waal Canal and only last the Nijmegen road bridge.
Anyone visiting the battlefield will be struck by the strategic value of the Groesbeek Heights, which form some of the highest ground in the Netherlands. They rise gradually from the outskirts of Nijmegen to two ridges, one well-defined and facing north-east towards the Waal, the other much more broken and facing south-east towards the Reichswald. These form a bulwark against any advance from Germany itself between the Maas and the Waal, and in particular control the key roads to Nijmegen through Mook and Wyler. The ground rises to the northeast of Mook and its possession by the enemy would have threatened the bridge at Heumen, which was to prove the only one capable of carrying tanks. Furthermore, the Heights dominate the drop and landing zones around Groesbeek itself.
The tactical decision to seize and hold the Groesbeek Heights was bolstered by an intelligence report of German forces, including no fewer than 1,000 tanks, gathering in the Reichswald. Even if this report from SHAEF was not available to Boy and Gavin, it certainly was known to both Second Army and FAAA. Although it proved to be incorrect, Gavin was still to suffer attacks out of the Reichswald from the moment he landed and experienced some very tense moments, particularly on 20 September. Any breakthrough at Mook would have denied the Heumen bridge to the Allies, whilst around Beek and Berg-en-Dal, failure to hold the positions would have allowed the Germans direct access to Nijmegen.
The strategic priority was thus correct. Without the Groesbeek Heights, the road to Nijmegen via the Heumen bridge would have been barred and XXX Corps might never even have got past Grave. To have placed the Nijmegen bridge first and thus jeopardized the capture or retention of the other objectives, could well have led to complete disaster at Nijmegen as well as Arnhem. As Sosabowski was to say of his visit to Airborne Corps HQ on 24 September: ‘It crossed my mind that if Operation ‘Comet’ had been carried out, the position which my brigade was supposed to have occupied near Nijmegen, without the friendly forces on that high ground, would not have been very pleasant.’3
The problem lay, as did so much else, with the timing of the lifts. Had Gavin been able to take in substantially his whole division on D-Day, he could have allocated sufficient troops to deal with the Nijmegen bridge. He particularly lacked 325 Glider Infantry Regiment, which could only fit into the original plan for arrival on D+2 and eventually arrived on D+6.
Verdict. Not guilty. The priorities were correct, in the light of the intelligence and the available resources, but they were the product of a thoroughly bad plan.
6. That he should not have turned down the offer by the GOC 52 Division to fly in a brigade group
The reply to the message received late on 20 September by Boy’s HQ from Hakewill-Smith of 52 Division, offering to send in a brigade group by glider, was sent on 22 September, although it was apparently drafted on the previous day. Boy rejected the offer becau
se to him, on the morning of 21 September, the outlook seemed encouraging. The Nijmegen bridges had been taken on the previous evening, 43 Division was arriving in Nijmegen and the corridor was open. There was some hope that Arnhem would be reached within 24 hours.
In fact Boy was deluded. The situation on the Island was static, with the Irish Guards held up and strong resistance being encountered at Oosterhout. Moreover, he had little idea of what was happening to 1 Airborne, where by this time Frost had been forced to surrender, the Heveadorp ferry had been lost and the remnants of the division had been forced back into the Oosterbeek perimeter. In the light of these events his reply was ridiculously optimistic.
His rejection of Hakewill-Smith’s offer was not, however, necessarily wrong. Boy’s priorities were the correct ones, which were to bring in the Poles, two-thirds of whom arrived on the afternoon of 21 September, and 325 Glider Infantry Regiment, which was yet again delayed. There was also an enormous demand on transport aircraft to bring in supplies to the rest of the Allied armies, which had been interrupted by the demands of Market Garden. 52 Division had received no training on gliders, which were completely different in a number of respects to the Dakotas designated to bring it into battle. Neither its jeeps nor its field or anti-tank guns, for instance, had been modified to fit into Horsas. There was no safe landing zone near Arnhem, whilst Landing Zones N and T near Groesbeek were in the middle of a battlefield. The only alternative was Landing Zone O near Overasselt, but this was required for 325 Glider Infantry Regiment and the remainder of the Poles. Later on 21 September the airfield at Oude Keent was discovered, but this was probably unknown to Boy when he wrote his reply.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Boy would have received permission to use 52 Division. On 19 September a message had been received at Rear HQ to the effect that the division was now at the disposal of the Commander Second Army. Boy met Dempsey at Malden on the morning of 21 September, after he had received the offer from Hakewill-Smith, and it is unthinkable that the proposal was not discussed and that Boy’s reply did not have Dempsey’s endorsement. On the evening of 23 September, after Boy’s reply had been sent, a signal arrived from Second Army confirming that the division should not be flown in without Dempsey’s specific approval. It was by that time the only reserve available to Montgomery and Dempsey in the UK and, with one infantry division already disbanded to create reinforcements for others, it was not going to be squandered unnecessarily. Dempsey was perfectly prepared to use it to exploit success, but not to build on failure.
Verdict. Not guilty. It was the right answer for the wrong reason.
7. That he should have supported Sosabowski in his alternative plan to cross the Lower Rhine
The Valburg Conference on 24 September pitted Horrocks and Thomas against Sosabowski, with Boy playing little or no part in the proceedings. After the embarrassing confrontation in which Sosabowski had to back down on the use of his 1st Battalion in the crossing that evening with 4 Dorset, the Polish general had argued forcefully for a crossing by 43 Division and his own brigade further west than proposed, on the grounds that resistance would be much lighter there.
It was known by that time to Horrocks, Boy and Thomas that it would be impossible to effect a crossing in divisional strength. Two of the three brigades of 43 Division were heavily engaged in fighting the Germans around Elst and no further reinforcements were expected imminently. It was also known, as Boy confessed to Sosabowski later that day, and as was confirmed when the actual crossing was attempted, that there were not enough boats to carry it out. Although Horrocks wondered subsequently if he should have crossed further west, this might have been sensible two days earlier but was no longer a serious option. Even if a successful crossing had been effected, the troops would have had to have fought through the Germans to reach 1 Airborne.
Boy’s priority at this time in any event, as suspected by Sosabowski, was to save the remnants of 1 Airborne and he almost certainly already thought that this would be more readily achieved by evacuation than by relief.
Verdict. Not guilty. Boy was better informed on the situation than Sosabowski and almost certainly felt that such an operation would prejudice any chance of bringing out Urquhart’s men.
Conclusion
Loading the blame on Boy above all others for the failure of ‘Market Garden’, as some historians have done, is both facile and unfair. Nevertheless, as the co-architect at the very least of the outline plan and a willing accessory to the final plan, he must bear a significant share of the responsibility. Particularly after its modification by Brereton and Williams, the plan broke the fundamental tenets of airborne operations, namely that landings should take place in the maximum possible strength and as close as possible to the objectives, and that lightly armed troops should be assured of relief by conventional ground forces within a very short time. Montgomery expected that 1 Airborne would be relieved in forty-eight hours and Boy considered that they could hold out for four days, but the final plan, by denying to Gavin and Urquhart the resources necessary to capture the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges on the first day, made this next to impossible.
There can be no question but that Boy was desperate to lead his troops into battle, but he would not have gone if he had expected other than success. His judgement was clouded by four factors, of which the achievement of personal ambition was only one. The others were his determination to use the weapon he had forged before it was too late and morale had collapsed completely, his understanding that Montgomery was completely set on the operation as the only way to achieve victory in 1944 and would not be swayed against it, and his grossly overoptimistic assessment of the German Army’s capabilities, shared by most of his fellow senior officers and caused by recent experience and the memories of 1918.
As far as the execution of ‘Market Garden’ was concerned, HQ I Airborne Corps was not fit to go into action. In fact this made very little difference to events, as the operation stalled just north of the Waal and XXX Corps remained in control of the battle, although Horrocks did consult Boy on all the key decisions. With a highly capable and self-sufficient commander at 82 Airborne Division and little to do in the remainder of the Airborne Corps sector, Boy actually became irrelevant, except in one key respect. He was desperately anxious to save what was left of 1 Airborne Division and influenced the decision to evacuate it on the night of 25/26 September rather than encourage another, almost certainly vain, attempt to establish a new bridgehead further west. Roy Urquhart at least was later to give him credit for this.
Chapter 22
Aftermath (October–December 1944)
Montgomery described ‘Market Garden’ as 90 per cent successful. Although it was true that a valuable bridgehead had been gained, which would facilitate an attack through the Reichswald to clear the south bank of the Rhine in February 1945, on every other measure he was wrong. It was the end to his hopes of a ‘Northern Thrust’ to end the war in 1944. It left him with a vulnerable salient on either side of ‘Hell’s Highway’ which attracted further reinforcements by the Germans and led to some extremely difficult battles before 21st Army Group could close up to the Maas along its entire length. Most importantly, it diverted him from what was most pressing, the clearance of the Scheldt estuary and the opening of the port of Antwerp, which did not happen until 28 November.
Boy was broadly in agreement with his mentor, although his assessment was based more on the purely tactical achievements of I Airborne Corps. In a letter to Daphne on 30 September he wrote: ‘People don’t seem to have been told that it [Arnhem and 1 Airborne Division] was only rather less than a third of the Airborne effort and that the whole thing was 80% successful. The two US Divisions which I have the honour to command have done marvellously and if it hadn’t been for the atrocious weather and sheer bad luck the whole thing would have been 100% successful which in war would have been phenomenal.’ Boy was constantly exasperated by the failure of the British press at the time and of historians later to give ful
l credit to 82 and 101 Airborne Divisions. Both of them, in his view, had done all that had been asked of them and he had developed a high regard for both Gavin and Taylor. As he wrote to Hollinghurst: ‘I only wish that the exploits of the two American divisions and everyone else during those hectic days when we were holding the corridor open, fighting the battle against the Germans in the Reichswald and struggling to force a corridor to the 1st Division, might be more fully appreciated.’ Overall, just like Montgomery, Boy remained an ‘unrepentant advocate’ of ‘Market Garden’, but the anguish he felt over the losses incurred by 1 Airborne Division was to stay with him for the rest of his life.
Contrary to a commonly held belief, Boy received no British recognition for his role in the operation other than a mention in despatches, along with every other British corps and divisional commander in North-West Europe,1 when these were announced in the following March. He had become a CB in the New Year’s Honours of 1943, almost certainly in recognition of his work in raising 1 Airborne Division. He was not included among the knighthoods gazetted in July 1945 to all those corps commanders in North-West Europe and Italy who had not already received one, including Horrocks and Ritchie. He had to wait until 1 January 1946 before being awarded the KBE on the recommendation of Mountbatten. The Americans were more generous, putting him in for the Legion of Merit, whilst he also received the Order of Polonia Restituta from the Polish Government-in-Exile.